


TRANSFORMING THE EDGE

SOCIO-SPATIAL GOVERNANCE AND MIGRANT PLACE-MAKING
IN HO CHI MINH CITY



A dissertation
presented to the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences - Heidelberg University
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Abstract

TRANSFORMING THE EDGE:
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Since the Communist Party of Vietnam launched economic reform in 1986, the peri-urban areas of Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) have undergone a significant transformation induced by unprecedented urban expansion and rural-urban migration. These internal migrants provide a large labor force for economic growth, and their settlements significantly impact peri-urbanization. The spontaneous practices in making migrants' places intersect with the state-led production of space generated socio-spatial paradoxes and contradictions, highlighting that these locations become arenas for diverse agents involved in interweaved economic, political, cultural, and spatial processes associated with urban issues such as uneven development, marginalization, and social exclusion. Such complex practices, actors, and structures challenge reductionist views in urban politics/studies. This project analyzes and explains the process of peri-urbanization based on the "cultural political economy" (CPE) approach by studying dynamic socio-spatial production and governance related to problems of rural-urban migrant workers' settlements on the urban edge.

The insights CPE draws on the strategic-relational approach, state theory, regulation theory, and their institutional, spatial, reflexive, and cultural turns, alongside related mid-range concepts and Territory, Place, Scale, Network (TPSN) scheme, providing relative premises from which this study departs. By combining the aim of the CPE to study the variation, selection, and retention in producing (counter-)hegemonies and Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-Neo-Gramscian dialogue on urban (counter-)hegemonic struggles, an analytical framework is concretized and employed for analyzing socio-spatial production and governance practices, and mechanisms that they are selected in different patterns and sedimented in hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects. Moreover, CPE's roots in critical realism inform the appropriateness of critical grounded theory methods, which combine theoretical and

fieldworks in this research. In particular, this study is based on a multi-layered analysis and process tracing to explore the data from the field in the reflexivity with established theories.

The research findings suggest that transforming socio-spatial production and governance on the urban edge involves tensions between different strategic selectivities in spontaneous and state-led practices and how they are inscribed in hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects. While the state selects the strategies of territorialization and territorial governance to serve their hegemonic project of the civilized and modern socialist city, marginalization by these strategies has promoted place-making and place-based governance strategies of migrant workers and some local people as a manifestation of counter-hegemony. In the context of migrant workers' spontaneous places increasingly lacking in sustainability by facing crises and transitions, the strategies of liminalization and multi-spatial meta-governance that emerge through state intervention reflect temporary transformations through a sub-hegemonic project. Such dynamic transformations are explained and interpreted through "soft hypotheses" derived from the discussed theories as responses to contradictions and dilemmas in different socio-spatial regulation models to stabilize the socialist-oriented market economic model. Accordingly, these state-led transformation strategies can be explained through their priorities for economic growth and their art of authoritarian neoliberalism to solve them. Furthermore, the hegemonic struggle perspective also implies that these transformations are not simply constituted by consensus but are better understood as a consensus-coercion continuum.

The study on the CPE of transforming socio-spatial production and governance on the edge of HCMC provides insight into the nature of economic innovation and political reform in Vietnam. It also contributes to urban politics/studies in concepts such as migrant place-making and liminal space, concretizing CPE to an analytical framework, and rethinking power and (re)production in exploited and/or dominant socio-spatial relations. Such a study can help promote future research beyond formal-informal and state- or society-centered dichotomies in urban politics, highlighting the importance of continually politicizing the complexity of transformation processes to "becoming urban."

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDA	Critical discourse analysis
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
CPE	Cultural political economy
CPV	Communist Party of Vietnam
DOC	Department of Construction
DOET	Department of Education and Training
DOLISA	Department of Labor, War invalids and Social Affairs
FDI	Foreign direct investment
GDP	Gross domestic product
GRDP	Gross regional domestic product
GSO	General Statistics Office of Viet Nam
HCMC	Ho Chi Minh City
HFL	Ho Chi Minh City Federation of Labor
HIDS	Ho Chi Minh City Institute for Development Studies
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MOC	Ministry of Construction
MOET	Ministry of Education and Training
MOLISA	Ministry of Labor, War invalids and Social Affairs
MOPS	Ministry of Public Security
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PPP	Public-private partnership
RA	Regulation approach
SMEs	Small and medium-sized enterprises
SRA	Strategic relational approach
STF	Spatiotemporal fix
TFP	Total factor productivity
TPSN	Territory, place, scale, network
UN ESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UN Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Program
UN-FPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
VND	Vietnamese Đồng
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. The peri-urbanization and rural-urban migrant settlement

As one of the fastest-growing megacities in Southeast Asia, Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) has expanded its urban land area sixfold from about 10,000 to about 60,000 hectares, and its population more than doubled from nearly 4 million to almost 10 million people over the past three decades (GSO, 2001; 2020). In this process, the peri-urban area plays a central role in the urban expansion from the center to the suburban areas, corresponding to economic and population growth. The peri-urbanization takes place significantly, creating an accumulation of resources that change the economy, politics, culture, society, and environment around the city's edges, which will merge and become urban through the development process.

Peri-urban areas are buffer zones between rural and urban areas and are not geographically fixed (McGee, 1991). In Vietnam, there is a rural-urban dichotomy in the local administration system (rural and urban districts) under the 2013 constitution, creating gaps and conflicts in the definition and management of peri-urban areas (Pham, T. N., 2020). Thus, local authorities in HCMC define these areas heuristically based on high rates of spontaneous urbanization. These localities include part of rural districts surrounding urban areas and newly established urban districts from rural areas (Du, P. T., 2008; Leaf, 2015). The characteristics of these areas are development despite the lack of planning and standards, poor infrastructure, and weak regional connectivity (Du, P. T., 2008; Vo, K. C., 2008; Nguyen, D. S., 2020); gradual decline in agricultural production and instead industrial production activities, handicrafts, and urban services (Truong, 2010; Pham T. & Phan, 2020); shift from rural to urban culture and society with many positive elements but also many negative and contradictory ones (Ngo, V. L., 2008; Truong, H. T., 2010; Ngo T. T. T., 2014).

Urban expansion is one of the key drivers of peri-urbanization. As land funds in the city center become increasingly limited and housing costs increase, peripheral areas always attract many people to settle and invest (Kontgis et al., 2014). In addition, the goal of economic growth leads to related policies and institutions expanding economic space to the periphery, promoting the construction of factories and infrastructure to promote the development of industries and services, attracting FDI, and improving productivity and growth quality (Hong & Kim, 2023; Hong, Kim, & Lee, 2023). Accordingly, peri-urban areas in HCMC serve as industrial and residential land reserves for urbanization. The agricultural land area in these locations accounts for an average of 10-30% of the total natural land area (Nguyen, D. S., 2020). However, this area is shrinking due to increased industrial zones and clusters, along with many self-built houses and sprawl constructions.

Rural-urban migration is also a driving force of peri-urbanization (McGee, 2009). The outskirts of HCMC became the leading destination for the wave of rural-urban migration after the government ended the policies of separation of administrative territories through economic reform in 1986. In 1999, about 1 million people migrated to the city. By 2019, this number had increased to 1.62 million people (GSO, 2001; 2020). Regarding distribution, districts with high rural-urban migrant population growth rates are mainly located in the West and Northwest peri-urban districts due to geographical location, appropriate costs, and job supply due to industrial development orientation. Migrants promote economic, cultural, and technical exchange, encouraging the exchange of goods and services between their origins and destinations. They are crucial to labor resources for the city because of their flexibility and positivity in most job segments, promoting the development of service industries for urban residents and changing the city's labor and economic structure. An estimate shows that migrant workers in the city are contributing about 30% of the city's GDP (Le, V. T., 2006). Despite their important role, many migrant workers earn low wages that are not enough to create the necessary facilities for daily living needs for themselves and their families. Furthermore, they are often marginalized in accessing public services, social protection, and urban development policies (UN-FPA, 2010; OXFAM, 2015; HFL, 2020).

Rural-urban migrant settlements associated with urban expansion significantly impact the socio-spatial transformation process in peri-urban areas (Acolin & Kim, 2022). They choose to live near industrial parks and factories, which create convenient locations and suit their needs and cost conditions, such as housing, health care, and education for their children, gradually forming communities with identity. These practices are often labeled as informal/illegal and unplanned compared to the state's development perspective and, in some cases, are even considered an urban burden related to infrastructure overload, social stratification, environmental pollution, and disease risk. However, the place-making perspective emphasizes the positive and dynamic side of these social processes in engaging and ensuring the survival of migrants in their new places. Regardless of how migrant settlement practices are interpreted, this phenomenon is an integral part of the peri-urbanization story in HCMC and of Global South cities more broadly.

What happens on this edge of HCMC, therefore, can provide a new configuration for empirical studies of the (re)production of urban space and time as proposed by David Harvey (1996) or can be just expressions of a universal phenomenon (Christensen & Hogen-Esch, 2015) already discovered in many other places during the last couple of decades. Indeed, urban issues related to migrant settlements, marginality, and informality can be found similarly in stories about rural-urban linkages (Iaquinta & Drescher, 2000), urban periphery (Clonts, 1970), rural-urban fringe (Martin, 1953), *desakota* (McGee, 1991), or "arrival city" (Saunders, 2010).

Nevertheless, the urban edge also has specific and unique characteristics expressed in its spatial production (Marcuse, 1997). In this way, two potential starting points for this project are the socio-spatial paradoxes of these locations and their contexts, which can highlight new expressions in examining the ongoing processes.

1.2. Paradoxes regarding governance and socio-spatial processes

Peri-urbanization in HCMC occurs rapidly due to the speed of urban expansion and rural-urban migrant population growth, which leads to shifting socio-spatial complexity. Indeed, these areas have an unstable overlapping spatial structure and a complex population structure with diverse social groups. These features relate to socio-spatial paradoxes on the edge of HCMC and can be explained through different perspectives.

The first paradox is that the developed social space has spontaneous characteristics but appears to be controlled. While informality-driven urban areas are often characterized by slums, land grabs, poor infrastructure, and instability, peri-urbanization in HCMC was relatively stable and basically controlled. Some reports show that the outskirts of HCMC have fewer slums than the suburbs of many megacities with similar levels of development (UN-Habitat, 2014). At the same time, informal social service provision activities, although more or less not following current regulations, always receive the consent of local authorities. Besides, although many social inequalities, contradictions, and tensions exist, there are few conflicts (Leaf, 2015). The uneven development of the center and periphery, as well as migrants being excluded from social security policies and urban development programs over the past decades, have led to institutional and social inequality. At the same time, the high concentration of rural-urban migrants with many differences in religion, ethnicity, customs, culture, and lifestyle creates potential conflicts and tensions between different social groups. However, social orders have always been balanced in the production of peri-urban social space, and no significant conflicts have been recorded. In addition, although diversity and social tolerance are high, sustainability is lacking. Social space in peri-urban areas in HCMC has “porous” properties to absorb the influx of migrants, helping them stabilize their lives and promote social cohesion in the destination (Pham, H. C., 2011). However, this social space cannot adapt well to related economic and epidemic crises.

Scholars from different fields have provided relatively diverse explanations about the mechanisms that have shaped the social space with the above paradoxes in HCMC. Leaf (2015) explained the above paradoxes by considering the interaction between formality and informality as an integrated system with segmentation, resulting from the combination of state interests, market, and society. Based on these flexible and informal management strategies and practices, social spaces are created to serve the interests of different actors. Quertamp and Miras (2008)

emphasized the spatialization process and governance model for growth taking place in the periphery of large cities in Vietnam. Among them are the privatization of urban expansion projects, unsustainable urban growth, limited national and local governance capacity, project approaches, and rigid master planning. The unresponsive and top-down nature of decision-making and limited financing are all factors that create the existing form of peri-urbanization. Through an ethnographic lens, Harm (2011) analyzed the differences, oppositions, and ideological negotiations between rural and urban areas in the development orientation of modern civilized cities, between capitalists and socialism in economic transformation, semiotics related to the inside/outside dichotomy in Vietnamese kinship, and the different symbolic meanings of space and place through daily life practices and modes of governance associated with control that lead to the formation of marginal spaces. Referencing the work of Harm (2011), Schindler (2015) argued that these peripheral areas are entering a “territorial” moment where city governments focus on spatial transformation rather than improving population. Accordingly, the state implements “comprehensive transformation” strategies associated with urban hegemony and territorial governance by controlling people in “ways ensure that they do not jeopardize the project of urban transformation” (Schindler, 2015, p. 20).

The above studies show that paradoxes in peri-urban social space in HCMC come from the complexity of the peri-urbanization process when many different transformation strategies take place overlappingly. The authors emphasize that the analysis of socio-spatial governance and practice mechanisms helps clarify the characteristics of the production of peri-urban social space. However, they mainly focus on the static and mono-disciplinary perspective of these mechanisms rather than on their transformation process and the intersection between diverse fields such as economics, culture, politics, and society. In addition, although the transition process is considered more broadly, the analysis is limited to viewing it as local and/or national political and economic contexts/structures instead of a co-factor producing social space on the city’s outskirts. Furthermore, although it is affirmed that marginalization, exclusion, social inequality, and resistance are an inseparable part of the peri-urbanization process in HCMC, these works do not directly address or demonstrate the power relationships that lead to these characteristic phenomena in this case. Therefore, scholars implied that further research in this area needs more systematic and theoretical analysis (Quertamp & Miras, 2008), more plurality (Schindler, 2015), and more emphasis on the processes (Leaf, 2015).

1.3. The encounter of transformations on the urban edge

If the transformation of practices and governance of peri-urban social space can play an important role in the investigation of the process of peri-urbanization in HCMC, the relevant economic, political, cultural, and spatial context also needs to be put into place as the structural

cohesion of these dynamic practices. Indeed, the peri-urban areas of HCMC are not simply the places where spatialization from rural to urban takes place but also the convergence of broader, interrelated transformation projects, including marketization, decentralization, industrialization - modernization, and globalization.

Economic reform, known as *Doi Moi*, towards marketization is identified as the focus of the extensive reform process in Vietnam that has taken place since 1986. There is a transition from an economy that is a centralized administrative planning mechanism, mainly based on the regime of ownership by the entire people and collective, to a multi-sector commodity economy operating under a market mechanism with the management of the government, a so-called socialist-oriented market economy. The condition has helped Vietnam escape from underdevelopment, from one of the poorest countries in the world to becoming a developing country with a lower middle income, and at the same time, have the basic and essential capital accumulation to serve socio-economic life and industrialization, urbanization, and modernization of the country, serving the transition process to socialism. In particular, peri-urbanization is a process that reflects this growth through rapid economic restructuring, exploding real estate market, and urban space development with the participation of diverse people components, including state, market, and society. However, many things could be improved in the early stages of marketization related to growth below potential, social inequality, and increased corruption due to a lack of synchronization and consistency. Furthermore, the relationship between the state, market, and society has yet to be handled appropriately, clearly, and transparently (Nguyen, P. T., 2021; Dang, Q. D., 2021).

Besides, the political reform process in Vietnam is a gradual reform, mainly in the administrative management system. In particular, the process of decentralization, including fiscal decentralization and administrative decentralization, is identified as the focus. This decentralization was first tested in localities with many development advantages, such as HCMC and Hanoi, then explicitly regulated for the whole country in the 2013 Constitution, relevant laws, and policies. The trend of increasing decentralization in state management between the central government and local governments has relatively promoted local governments' dynamism, creativity, autonomy, and self-responsibility to attract investment, economic and social development, and at the same time, promote the ability to manage urban areas and respond to developments in the market economy, and in specific areas such as peri-urban areas. However, decentralization can lead to conflicts between the one-party state and the rules of the competition. If much power is given to localities, there is a concern about the dispersion of power. On the contrary, the central government will destroy local dynamism and creativity if its power is overemphasized (Doan, M. H., 2020). This leads to a dynamic relationship between central and local governments outside of administrative decentralization

through internal negotiation processes in instruments such as fiscal policy and leadership appointments (Nguyen, M. D., 2020).

Industrialization and modernization are policies that the party-state of Vietnam identifies as central, throughout, and consistent in the country's development process. Modernization associated with industrialization is "a process of a fundamental and comprehensive transformation of the economy and social life based mainly on the development of industry and services on the foundation of science, technology, innovation" (Doc P17), that is, improving the level of the modern economy, culture, and society based on more advanced technology. Peri-urbanization in HCMC is the inevitable result of industrialization and modernization, specifically the transition process in development fields such as economics, construction and infrastructure, and development management according to the state's direction to build modern, civilized, smart, and livable urban areas. In fact, Vietnam is in the early stages of industrialization, modernization, and urbanization, characterized by the juxtaposition between tradition and modernity. In particular, the peri-urban area is where strong interaction occurs between traditional and modern civilization, old and new, industry, and agriculture, changing traditional social structures such as village, commune, and family structures; tensions and conflicts even exist between traditional culture and urban civilization (Luong, V. H., 2004).

The opening of the economy and international economic integration also promotes the globalization process to become more and more extensive in Vietnam. Along with the presence of many multinational corporations and companies in Vietnam in general and in HCMC in particular, the production facilities are often established on the outskirts of the city, or some companies also invest in real estate here as necessary driving forces for peri-urbanization. Accordingly, global capital flows in the form of FDI into the peripheries, allowing these areas to symbolize emerging nodes in the connecting network of export flows and the global real estate market. Besides, globalization is expressed through material flows such as capital and goods. It is related to the flow of symbols and ideas about lifestyle and architecture and shapes promising global neighborhood imaginaries (Leaf, 2015). However, this process also creates risks of dependence on external capital and markets and the intrusion of values unsuitable for the locality (Nguyen, M. H., 2021).

Marketization, decentralization, industrialization-modernization, and globalization are inseparable transformations in the development process in Vietnam since the *Doi Moi*. Together, these processes have had solid and simultaneous impacts on urban development regimes, the dynamics of rural-urban migration, and the resulting changes in practices and peri-urban social space management. Therefore, an analysis of transformations in the practice and governance of peri-urban social space should be conducted closely to broader transformation

processes. Such an anti-reductionist perspective needs to consider an integrated economic, cultural, and political approach and highlight these processual conflicts and reconciliations.

1.4. Critical realist questions and cultural political economy approach

Preliminary practical observations and an overview of existing studies on peri-urbanization in HCMC show that understanding the complex transformations at the city's edge, especially their unique characteristics, has yet to be fully explored to contribute to the debate of global city/planetary urbanization as one of the world's next manufacturing hubs in the making. There is a research gap regarding power mechanisms that can illuminate the dynamic transformations of governance and socio-spatial processes associated with rural-urban migrant settlement and explain peri-urban socio-spatial paradoxes in the intersection of broader transformation contexts. This concern raises critical realist questions aimed at identifying phenomena as discernible events and the reasons why they occur, specifically:

- How do spontaneous socio-spatial processes and governance related to rural-urban migrant settlement occur on the urban edge? How do they interact with the state-led practices? And how do they transform over time?
- How do the transformations of socio-spatial processes and governance associated with rural-urban migrant settlements reflect peri-urbanization and broader transformations in Vietnam?
- Why do these transformations take place? Who is involved in these processes?

Answering these questions requires an appropriate lens. One appropriate approach to this task is cultural political economy (CPE) as an approach based on critical realism. It is a post-disciplinary approach introduced by Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum (2013) to undertake an ontological "cultural turn" in political economy research. This approach focuses on the process of (counter-)hegemonic production about the discursive-material practices, mechanisms, and processes by which hegemony is secured in diverse economic/political fields and in broader social formation. Through four modes of strategic selectivity in interrelated aspects: semiosis, agency, technologies, and structuration, CPE is capable of analyzing relational, pluralistic, and trans-contextual socio-spatial processes that can provide an interdisciplinary interpretive analysis of urban politics.

CPE has its roots in the regulation approach (RA) and Jessop's strategic-relational approach (SRA), which operates within Marxist political economy and the Marxist theory of the state, concerned with the political economy of capitalism and the anatomy of capitalist society. This approach can thus provide a retrospective account of the temporarily changing combination of economic institutions, norms, and practices that helped stabilize the process of economic

accumulation despite fundamental contradictions and conflicts inherent in the nature of capitalism (Jessop & Sum, 2006; 2013). These regulation strategies offer the potential to explain paradoxes on the urban edge in light of the broader context. Moreover, the RA often focuses on the accumulation regime and regulation modes of individual countries and is considered an alternative approach for studying transformations in post-socialist cities within the new conditions of the market economy (Pickles & Smith, 1998; Kosonen, 2007; Boyer, 2018), which can be applied to the case of economic reform in Vietnam.

The fundamental objective of CPE stems from a critique of ideology and domination (Jessop & Sum, 2013). Specifically, it provides a firmer foundation for understanding ideology and its impact on social domination but does not ignore marginalized strategies and actors who are voiceless in the observed conflicts. Therefore, when specified through perspectives of critical political economy and critical governance studies, this approach can be extended to consider urban political processes beyond limited territorial sovereignty and focuses on the temporal boundaries of social, spatial, and temporal boundaries of hegemonic compromise, involving conflicts between common interests that privilege specific identity and interests of a group of people and excluded groups of people in the urban context. This objective can respond to the call for the critical urban theory that peri-urbanization is not only a reflection of dominant patterns of territorial sovereignty but also of what is happening in the practices of everyday life (Roy, 2016), capitalist globalization (Massey, 2007; Amin & Thrift, 2002; 2016), and it even crosses all boundaries to become planetary urbanization (Brenner, 2014).

CPE offers a useful heuristic for empirical research (Jessop & Sum, 2023). Although this approach only provides some initial abstract answers and explanations to research questions, its logic can help articulate and concretize different perspectives to develop appropriate theoretical and conceptual frameworks for the empirical analysis associated with specific models of governance and regulation in specific contexts. Accordingly, by combining CPE with different urban political economy perspectives, the concepts of socio-spatial governance and spatiotemporal fixes will be expanded to be relevant to the inquiry. At the same time, through the Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-Neo-Gramscian dialogue, a perspective of urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle is identified that can contribute to a specific research strategy for applying CPE in peri-urbanization.

In short, the CPE approach can provide a more critical and pluralistic lens to the story of transforming the edge of HCMC concerning the dynamics of governance and practices of rural-urban migrant worker settlement. These observable phenomena will be interpreted through concepts of CPE and urban political economy to connect them to broader economic, cultural, and social transformations through selective strategies of different actors to resolve conflicts and tensions resulting from complex societal adjustments. Such a project not only identifies

the manner of the transformations but can also provide a broader account of power relations through the processes of urban (counter-)hegemonic production.

1.5. Dissertation structure

The second chapter establishes the theoretical and conceptual framework for the entire study by starting with a level of theoretical abstraction and gradually moving to more concrete levels. First, the theoretical discussion introduces basic concepts from RA and SRA, which serve as the theoretical foundation for CPE's general perspective on capital accumulation and the regulatory strategies that partially overcome contradictions and potential crises of capitalist society. Second, the essential concepts of the CPE approach will be discussed, including discursive-material moments, semiosis and structuration, and the production of (counter) hegemony. Based on these conjunctural approaches, certain intermediate concepts for analyzing capitalist socio-spatial formations, such as regulation-cum-governance, spatiotemporal fixes, and tools such as the TPSN framework, exist. Third, the concepts are applied to the case through specific analysis of the accumulation regime and national regulation models, urban accumulation strategies in Vietnam, and local regulation methods in HCMC. Next, intermediate concepts relating to this research are expanded, such as socio-spatial forms of peri-urban governance and spatiotemporal fixes related to peri-urban territorialization and migrant place-making.

The third chapter develops an analytical framework for analyzing the transformation of socio-spatial governance and spatiotemporal fix by evaluating different perspectives of transformation analysis based on a regulation approach. While the perspective of analyzing transitions through the hegemonic project in the Neo-Gramscian regulation approach provides a structure within which transitions must be embedded, it easily falls prey to problems of subjectivism, structuralism, and reductionism. The CPE approach offers a potential framework to overcome the problems of the hegemonic project perspective by analyzing transformations in (counter-)hegemonic production through evolutionary stages involving modes of selection from discursive and material strands. While appreciating the potential of this perspective, the overall assessment shows that it needs to be supplemented with an empirical research strategy. Accordingly, through the Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-Neo-Gramscian dialogue, this chapter proposes urban (counter-)hegemonic production strategies to complement empirical research while proposing a transformative analytical perspective through (counter-)urban hegemonic struggles. Finally, a specific analytical framework is proposed to study the transformation of sociospatial processes and governance as an expression of urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle.

Chapter 4 explicitly presents the connection between the CPE approach and critical grounded theory methodology, emphasizing a combination of theoretical and fieldwork. The appropriate

field research is designed in the most typical area of HCMC's peri-urban area. First, explanations about the research site selection, the target group of migrant workers, and the problems of migrant workers' settlements on the urban edge are provided. This is followed by a statement of the researcher's position about the research area and an interdisciplinary research project. The remainder of this chapter is concerned with applied qualitative data analysis methods. In this, primary data sources include institutional documents, semi-structured interviews, and field observations. Secondary data sources include reports from various agencies and organizations, scientific articles, and media reports. These data are then processed and analyzed according to three order codes and layered themes and combined into chains related to the (counter-)hegemonic struggle process according to the process tracing method.

The following three chapters present the results of empirical research presented in analytical strands that move from specific practices and actions in migrants' housing, schooling, and belonging issues to selected specific patterns of socio-spatial dimensions, and then sedimented in spatiotemporal fixes and governance-cum-regulation in moments of producing urban hegemony, counter-hegemony, and sub-hegemony. Accordingly, chapter 5 analyzes the peri-urban territorialization and peri-urban territorial governance in the hegemonic production of modern, civilized socialist cities. Chapter 6 presents migrant workers' place-making and place-based governance as manifestations of urban counter-hegemonic practices. Chapter 7 reflects on the spatial practices and governance that emerge as migrant worker places reach the dismantling threshold, including the reterritorialization of multi-spatial meta-governance.

Chapter 8 focuses on explaining the question of why transforming the edge occurred in the way it was analyzed. Key empirical findings will be restated and interpreted through power relations from a broad and interdisciplinary theoretical perspective. In this, marginal transformations take place to harmonize tensions and conflicts during the transition to socialism in order to maintain the legitimacy of urban hegemonic projects. These transformations also reflect authoritarian neoliberalism as an art in economic development and social control by the party-state. This chapter also discusses emerging discourses on urban development as an alternative to current edge problems in HCMC.

The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and how the research questions were answered. It also discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the research approach and analytical framework and suggests research directions that can overcome limitations in further research. At the same time, it also opens a discussion on the interdisciplinary potential of the CPE approach to urban studies/politics, especially in Global South cities.

CHAPTER 2: CULTURAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPATIALIZING AND GOVERNING THE URBAN EDGE

2.1. From regulation approach to cultural political economy

2.1.1. Regulation approach

The regulation approach emerged from the empirical observations of several economists on economic instability and crises and the diverse ways in which countries try to resolve such crises in the context of the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. This concern motivates regulationists to examine accumulation systems, modes of regulation, and institutional models for a country's growth regimes. Their works are generally inspired by a foundational hypothesis rooted in Marxist political economy that despite its contradictions, capitalism continues to survive and, at times, flourish.

French regulationists (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 1990; Lipietz, 1988) pioneered the foundational arguments for this approach through two useful concepts, "accumulation regime" and "mode of regulation." In particular, the accumulation regime refers to maintaining a balanced method between production and consumption to ensure capital accumulation and its progression over time (Boyer, 2015). "Mode of regulation" is expressed in institutions and organizational forms that help stabilize the accumulation regime. Its components include five institutional forms: monetary regime, wage labor nexus, competition, state economy nexus, and degree of integration into the world economy (Boyer, 1979; 1990). Accordingly, this regulation approach stresses the changing forms and mechanisms and their contribution to expanding reproduction and maintaining capital relations.

From the core concepts of the original method, in addition to empirical extensions related to the broader debate on different models of "capitalism" (Boyer & Sailard, 2002), scholars are not economists using the articulation method helped expand the role of the regulation approach beyond the field of economics (Jessop, 1997), making it highly influential in many other fields of social sciences. Accordingly, different schools of regulation have expanded the regulation approach in various ways by focusing on economics (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 1979) and concentrating on societalization (Hirsch & Roth, 1986; Davis M., 1984; Jessop, 1982), as well as at different levels such as international (Aglietta, 1982; Lipietz, 1982), national (Boyer, 1979; 1990), and local (Peck & Tickell, 1992; MacLeod, 2001; Brenner & Theodore, 2002). Among them, regulationists with the societalization focus argue that the diversity of social and spatial forms is irreducible and needs to be combined with accumulation and regulation to examine the relationships between them for their research agendas.

2.1.2. Neo-Gramscian strategic-relational approach

The strategic-relational approach (SRA) developed by Bob Jessop is one of the essential contributions in articulating the regulation approach into state theory in particular and society in general. Jessop (1982; 1990; 2004; 2008) used the method of articulation to help overcome the challenges posed by the theoretical dilemma posed by the choice between a “capital” and “class theory,” along with the part-whole relationship in the Marxist tradition leading to different priority approaches to the economy, the state, or the discourse of socialization. Accordingly, he used Polanzas’ view of the state based on Marx’s perception that “capital is a social relationship” as well as borrowed from the regulation theory that the state is the social relations of production related to structural forms, institutions, and organizations with capital functions deeply problematic, structurally embedded in the economy in many ways, and interfere with its functioning at various points in the capital cycle (Jessop, 1982; 2002; 2008; 2015). That is, this approach emphasizes accumulation strategies and institutionalized class compromises, in addition to spatiotemporal fixes, which play a crucial role in structural cohesion and shaping efforts to manage the contradictions and dilemmas of capitalism.

From arguments in regulation theory and capitalist state theory, Jessop (1982; 1990; 2008) used philosophical perspectives of critical realism to develop the SRA as a tool for analyzing processes of change in which agents create related strategies and interact with each other at contingency in the context of strategic selection (Jessop, 1982; 2015). Developing from the structural theory of Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu (1990) and referencing Luhmann’s systems theory, Jessop (1990; 2008) developed SRA into a positive contribution to the debate on structure and agency in social theory as it combines elements of structuralism with recognition of the importance of the actions and intentions of social actors. By implying that accumulation processes and regulation modes are strategically selective, this approach provides a more complex and specific hybrid explanation for the regulation approach that focuses on structure in the context of the Marxist critical political economy. A particular form or regime that becomes dominant strengthens some social forces while weakening others. In other words, dominant strategies do not simply reflect a decision to include and exclude the actors involved but also reflect the inscription of different structural stratifications (global, national, regional, local) formed by previous strategies (Jessop, 1990; 2002; 2008).

Jessop (1983; 2008) also develops the SRA through a Neo-Gramscian perspective regarding how the state can create a broader “consensus” because “accumulation” is not just an economic issue but also extends to political and ideological issues such as a hegemony related to integral state and integral economy. Jessop also argues that the key to exercising such leadership is to develop a concrete “hegemonic project” that can resolve the abstract problem of conflict between particular interests and the common good. Accordingly, the hegemonic project is the

strategic effort of political-economic elites to create ideological consent for their rule through institutionalized accumulation strategies and materialization. The successful diffusion of a hegemonic project would ensure an adequate social basis for exercising state power and impose a degree of substantive unity within the state apparatus to complement the latter as its most official. Jessop (1983; 2008) argues that in studying hegemony strategically, one needs to consider the different social projects, the specific social groups and classes involved, the interests they represent, the identities, values, and worldviews they hold, and the resulting political blocs and alliances. “Thus, to study hegemony in its strategic sense, we must examine different social projects, the particular social groups and classes involved, the interests that they represent, the various values and worldviews that they hold and the resulting political blocs and alliances” (Jessop, 2003, p. 141-2).

The logic of the neo-Gramscian SRA approach also helps to study the local modes of regulation related to rescaling and restructuring the state involved in flexible accumulation. This relevance is based on the belief that the local state is a historically and geographically particular component of a complex institutional system, rather than simply reflecting the goals of a territorial nation-state, not consistent with the social space of the state (Gramsci’s concept of the integral state). At the same time, it is also a terrain of struggle whose unity, institutional organization, and practices are contingently articulated and rearranged through the urban scale (Smith, 2001).

2.1.3. Cultural political economy approach

During the cultural turn, both cultural scientists and political economists began to rethink the role of culture and the discourses associated with the material political and economic processes of capitalism (Adorno, 2001; Lefebvre, 1991; Harvey, 1989; McCann, 2002). However, these perspectives are generally biased towards culturalism or materialism to provide additional explanations for issues that mainstream field and sub-field perspectives often ignore. Aiming to explain “the power of economic structures without falling into economic reductionism” and to examine “the power of discourse and meaning-making without falling into constructivism” (Sau, 2021, p. 6), Jessop and Sum (2006; 2013) have proposed a post-disciplinary approach that aims for a more balanced articulation of regulation into cultural and political issues, called the cultural political economy approach (CPE).

CPE makes theoretical innovations to address the above temptations. This approach seeks to articulate the capitalist economy’s macro, meso, and micro-processes and their transformations by intertwining three sides of encounter and triple movements between Marx, Gramsci, and

Foucault¹ as constitutive of subjectivity, identity, and even emotions. They focus on Marx's structure of social relations, Gramsci's hegemony and the production of hegemony (the hegemonic process), and Foucault's focus on discourse and the governmentality of everyday life. CPE enhances this system by integrating Foucault's insights on objectification, subjectification, power/knowledge, and related power technologies such as governmentality.

CPE does not reduce everything to discourse nor understand culture as a superstructure force. Instead, it considers both cultural and economic, immaterial and material, processes as constitutive of social relations. In essence, CPE draws on the tradition of political economy, and, more specifically, it takes a cultural twist on the neo-Gramscian SRA approach to establish an embedded and conditional model of accumulation and statehood culturally and socially. At a high level of abstraction, CPE represents a theory of connection, that is, a theory of the connection between ideas and materiality (and also between agents and structures). That is, the CPE approach is not only a "dialectical analysis" between material and discursive but also a compelling "holistic analysis" that takes complete account of co-constitution, interpenetration, and their mutual influence through the evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention (Jessop & Sum, 2013).

A typical version of CPE emphasizes the power of imaginary types that are "discursively structured and materially reproduced" (Jessop & Oosterlynck, 2008, p. 1158). This perspective examines the structural and discursive biases that influence the transformation, selection, and maintenance of discourse and extra-discursive practices. It thereby posits the causal efficacy of material and discursive factors in political-economic dynamics. Jessop (2020) argues that imaginaries, or semiotics, play an essential role in reducing the complexity of the world and socially structured coherence, helping us "go on" in the world. Therefore, one of the focuses of CPE is to investigate the production of imaginaries and their (re)constitution in the economic, political, social, and spatial spheres toward stability relative to specific forms of social institutions.

¹ Based on Marsden's observations that "Marx can tell us why but cannot tell us how, and Foucault tells us how but cannot tell us why" (1999, p. 135) about power, Jessop and Sum (2013) propose three main steps for intertwining Marx, Gramsci, and Foucault. As discussed previously, Gramsci tried to innovate Marxism on the first side of the meeting. The second side concerns Foucault's works on discourse, discursive technologies, and governmentality that can help rethink Gramsci, especially in the attempt to governmentalize Gramsci. The third aspect of the encounter is Marxianizing Foucault in a post-Foucaultian approach that tries to bring social relations back to Foucault.

2.2. Applying SRA and CPE in studying spatialization and governance

2.2.1. Spatiotemporal fix

The spatial turn contributes another articulation between the regulation approach to time-space relationships. Such articulation is reflected in the development of conceptual tools such as uneven spatial development and spatiotemporal fix. These concepts originate from David Harvey (1981; 2001) to explain the temporal and spatial nature of the capitalist mode of production. Later, regulationists, most notably Jessop, developed these concepts from a more political, cultural, and social perspective. Harvey and Jessop's argument about spatiotemporal fixes is deeply concerned with stabilizing the contradictions created in the development of capitalism.

Drawing inspiration from Lefebvre on spatial production, Harvey (1985) argues that the capitalist mode of production continuously creates space(s) favorable to the production process. The production of space is, therefore, crucial to continued capitalist expansion. At the same time, this geographical expansion and development serve as a spatial remedy to the crisis of overaccumulation (Harvey, 1978). This is the first understanding of Harvey's "fix" term, which is the internal fix of capitalism within a given territorial space to address "over-accumulation in a certain territorial system" by temporarily shifting through social projects and/or opening a new production space. As capital freely "flows" across many spaces and times through globalization and urbanization, some spaces will become more attractive because they meet the necessary conditions for profit maximization and expansion, leading to uneven development between the center and periphery of the system (Smith, 2010). A space-time fix is needed as a temporary solution to overcome such contradictions. This is Harvey's second understanding of the term fix. Thus, Harvey develops two distinct but overlapping notions of spatial fix that serve as capital investment vehicles that restructure space to address the crisis of accumulation and uneven spatial development.

Jessop (2006b) finds arguments based on "pure capital relations" and the "territorial logic of power" that Harvey has underdeveloped and emphasizes that a complete account of spatial fix. Therefore, he suggests considering the fixed aspects beyond economics (or theories of value) and territorial logic. Jessop, therefore, proposes that we can understand a mode of regulation as a stochastic solution that acts as a spatiotemporal fix, or rather a spatiotemporal fix that is the articulation of various economic, political, social, and spatial regulation strategies that act as a temporary solution to the inherent crisis tendencies that are deeply embedded in the accumulation system. As such, Jessop uses a robust articulation method that combines a combined economic and extra-economic analysis to emphasize the social relations of uneven development and fixes based on place and environment construction, land markets, rural-urban

division of labor, urban decentralization, local policies, territorialization of political power, and efforts to manage uneven geographical development.

Both the Harvey and Jessop approaches help to expand the scope of observing problems of uneven development beyond capital relations by linking accumulation regimes and modes of social regulation within a certain territory. Through the scalar turn, urban geographers emphasize the scale of uneven development involving urban, national, and global spaces as an inevitable part of capitalist reproduction (Massey, 1984; 1995; Brenner 1998; 2004). At the same time, by viewing regulation as a process, Painter and Goodwin (1995; also, Goodwin, 2001) argue that there are heterogeneous forms of development in both accumulation regimes and regulation models hidden not only in national but also local accumulation regimes due to various social struggles and conflicts, and examine the dependence of these forms of uneven development on different patterns of previous uneven development. Thus, both perspectives emphasize that regulation and governance models operating at different scales create inequalities, unevenly impacting specific spaces and objects, leading to the chronic exclusion, marginalization, or peripheralization of other places, regions, and territories. These arguments also logically contextualize the diversity of scale and complexity in the everyday practices of uneven development. At the same time, they also require the articulation of regulation and spatiotemporal fixes as a regulation process that allows us to consider continuity and change in environments of uneven development (Painter & Goodwin, 1995; Painter, 1997; Jessop, 1995).

To explore ways of overcoming such a diversity of uneven development, regulators and geographers have created different vocabularies to consider the spatiotemporal fixes in the articulation between capital fixation and extra-economic characteristics related to institutional fix, semantic fix, and scalar fix. Adopting a cultural political economy approach, Jessop (2013) defines institutional fix as “a complementary set of institutions that, via institutional design, imitation, imposition or chance evolution offer (within given parameters) a temporary, partial and relatively stable solution to the coordination problems involved in securing economic, political or social order” (p. 9). Jessop and Sum (2013) posit that spatiotemporal fixes are most effectively explored at the level of institutional fixes and thus “an institutional fix can also be considered a fix space-time and vice versa. Meanwhile, semantic fix involves the sedimentation of social imaginaries “as an appropriate object of observation, calculation, management, governance or guidance, and that thereby frames the competition, rivalries and struggles that occur within its parameters” (Jessop, 2020, p. 104) for the relative stability of a particular hegemonic order. Drawing on the processes of capital circulation being successively territorialized, territorialized, and reterritorialized, Brenner (2004; 2019) has emphasized scalar properties in different spatiotemporal fix configurations, promotes viewing cities as multilateral entities connected by social relations rather than territorially bounded localities and

avoids the risk of spatial fetishism. Accordingly, a scalar fix emphasizes the process of restructuring through “spatially selective political strategies” (Brenner, 2004, p. 200) to overcome uneven development on many different scales.

To date, uneven development and spatiotemporal fix have been located and demonstrated at global, national, regional, urban, and suburban spatial scales. It is synthesis and synthesis for more problems and more places. Accordingly, uneven development is broadly defined as the relationship between places that (re)produce inequalities in wealth, power, and different types of capital (Peck et al., 2022). That is, uneven development and inequality exist everywhere as a fact of life, a structural condition of capitalism. To overcome them, the perspective of spatiotemporal fix goes beyond the starting point based on material capital relations and articulates it into politics, society, space, and even culture. Even so, the notions of capital fixation, semantic, institutional, and scalar fixes are still linked to the base layer of the accumulation regime and the state through its regulation imperative to stabilize the hegemonic order.

2.2.2. Regulation-cum-governance

It is no coincidence that governance theories and practices emerged simultaneously with regulation theory. The new post-Fordist era of capitalist globalization, neo-liberal politics, contracting out, public-private partnerships, and the welfare state also offers a new terrain for research on governance. The term governance refers to models of organizational efficiency based on information exchange, individual empowerment, and transparent allocation of tasks and functions (Rhodes, 1997). Besides the rich management perspectives originating from political and social sciences, such as steering theory (Mayntz, 1997; Scharpf, 1994), governability (Kooiman, 2000; 2003), governmentality (Dean, 1999; Rose, 1996), integration theory (March & Olsen 1995; Powell & DiMaggio 1991), and interactive theory (Sørensen & Torfing 2003; 2005), some political economists theorize governance by coupling it with regulation in observations of accumulation in capitalism. The articulation between regulation and governance relies on considering non-economic and non-state issues from a Neo-Gramscian perspective. SRA provides many complementary commonalities between regulation and governance² regarding material, institutional, policy-oriented, and discursive matrices in dealing with contradictions and crisis tendencies (Jessop, 2013). That is, economic and political changes can influence regulation and governance to some extent (Hollingsworth

² Despite certain similarities, regulation regimes and governance regimes should not be considered equivalent or interchangeable because they also have differences related to their original theories, structures, and actors, as well as governance is regulated by a broader set of institutions (Fürst, 2003; Moulaert & Nussbaumer 2005a; 2005b; Jessop 1997).

& Boyer, 1997; Jessop, 2013a; Fürst, 2003), and at the same time, governance practices help explain regulation structures and processes, and regulation will provide a structured coherence to governance (Hollingsworth et al., 1999; Kosonen, 2007).

This articulation provides a political-economic interpretation of governance. In the SRA analysis of governance, governance questions will be developed based on the analysis of state transformation processes through strategic adaptation strategies of different actors to address the crisis. In this interpretation of governance, Jessop emphasizes strategies involving the interaction of four ideal-typical modes of governance, including market exchange, command coordination, reflexive networks, and unconditional solidarity. Different from Kooiman's interactive perspective³, Jessop (2020) believes that the above forms of governance are problem-solving, quickly encounter their problems, and often overlap in first-level governance. The failure of first-order forms of governance leads to second-order ideal-typical responses aimed at improving their effectiveness. Meta-governance, as the third level, is concerned with the overall coordination of governance practices. According to Jessop's account, there is no single best management mechanism and form of governance; even if these forms are fixed many times, they will inevitably fail (Haus & Heinelt, 2004).

Articulating the two concepts of regulation and governance made the most progress when researchers tried to discover how the connections between them were formulated in political economy concerning reality urban practices⁴ (Scharpf, 1993; Jessop, 1995; Hay, 1995). As cities become more globalized, competitive, and neoliberal, national governments recognize that nationalizing city politics has become outdated and have updated decentralization and transferred power to cities. Besides, cities have never existed in a vacuum but are constantly adapting to increasing complexity. In the context of finite local resources, mobilizing various social and market resources to participate in providing public services is a top priority for local governments. This shows that local government capacity can only solve some of the city's problems. Therefore, non-state actors and self-organizing networks have an essential voice in the urban governance process and require a framework to participate in collective decision-making. This process provided the source for the shift in new city governance observed early

³ Along with Jessop, Kooiman is considered one of the first to use the concept of meta-governance. He (2003) distinguishes the orders of governance into three orders of governance. The first order is described as routine management associated with specific problem-solving. Efforts to change the institutional context (institutional arrangements) to influence first-order conditions can be understood as second-order adjustments. Third-order, or meta-governance, is described as general management activities addressing broad principles related to management at first or second place.

⁴ Note that early work in regulation theory often viewed local governance as a structural by-product of broader political-economic trends (Goodwin et al., 1993; Jones, 1997; Keil, 1998).

on through the growth machine theory (Molotch, 1976; Molotch & Logan, 1984), urban regime (Stone, 1989; 2008), and urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989) in the United States. European urbanists and political scientists also pay more attention to institutional cohesion in the context of increasingly multi-level policy-making processes, changes in state size, regionalization, globalization, and the participation of social forces in the provision of public services (John, 2001; Borraz & Le Galès, 2010; Pierre, 2011; 2014).

Jessop (1997) argues that urban governance is an important area to explore the articulation of regulation theory into local politics. There is a tendency to relax the regulation focus on state mediation at the national level in favor of a geographically differentiated, spatialized nature of capitalist regulation (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Duncan & Goodwin, 1988; Kipfer & Keil, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 1992). In particular, the state is seen as a multidimensional, uneven, and distinct set of institutions with a division of labor according to scale (Kipfer and Keil, 2002; Brenner, 2019; Cox, 1993; Swyngedouw, 2000). In this vein, regulators have sought to theorize urban governance and its constitutive institutions through interactions between the contingent and structural strategies of actors. (MacLeod, 2001; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Cox & Mair, 1991), contributing to the broader project of ensuring economic, political, and social harmony (or social regulation) necessary for the reproduction of capitalist accumulation (Collinge, 1999; Cox & Mair, 1991; Painter & Goodwin, 1995). Here, the Neo-Gramscian strategic relations approach can provide an alternative approach that complements Stone's urban regime (which focuses on economic changes and alliances) by emphasizing "the strategic selectivity of specific regimes (political or economic respectively) and their implications for class domination" (Jessop, 1997, p. 71). That is, by viewing urban regimes as produced by processes of local governance and regulation within hegemonic structures, we can investigate specific urban issues while maintaining a point about how each of these issues relates to one another within a broader set of spatial, social, economic and political processes (Goodwin, 2001). This perspective helps overcome the tendency toward reductionist and one-dimensional analyses of urban political economy (Galés, 1998; Peck & Tickell, 1992) and does not sacrifice the importance of local processes for the logic of macrostructure (Haus 2010a; 2010b), contributing an alternative to the debate regarding "seeing like a state" and "seeing like a city" in political science (see Magnusson, 2011; Boudreau, 2017; Barbehön & Haus, 2021).

2.2.3. TPSN scheme to study spatialization and governance

From a reflexive turn based on the cultural and spatial turn concerning a regulation approach, Jessop, Brenner, and Jones (2008) introduce the TPSN schema and show how territories (T), place (P), scale (S) and network (N) function as semiotics and are articulated in different types of structural principles that reduce the complexity of geographical relationships and social space (Table 1). As a heuristic framework, it focuses on popular spatial lexicons. First, the

territory is a bounded space with fixed boundaries, under the jurisdiction of or administered by a political authority, and geographically, having social formation is relatively coherent and is often equated with state space (Agnew, 1994; Schmitt, 2005; Brenner & Elden 2009). Second, the place is a space that has been given meaning or a meaningful place through social construction and people's experiences (Agnew, 1987; Tuan, 1977; Cresswell, 2014). Third, scale refers to "the nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing sizes, e.g., local, regional, national, and global" (Jessop, 2005b cited Delaney & Leitner, 1997; Howitt, 2003). Finally, a network is a set of decentered social relations characterized by symmetrical interconnection to centered ensembles of power relations organized according to function or flow (Castells, 2010; Sheller and Urry, 2006). However, the authors acknowledge that the four proposed imaginaries are not the only important aspects of socio-spatial relationships. Other candidates, such as environment/natural or position, could be added.

Table 1

Four key dimensions of socio-spatial relations

Dimensions	Definitions	Principles of socio-spatial structuration	Associated patterning of socio-spatial relations
Territory	Organized division of the earth governed by a political authority	Bordering, bounding, parcelization, enclosure	Construction of inside/outside divides; constitutive role of the "outside"
Place	Tied to everyday life, has temporal depth, links to collective memory and social identity	Proximity, spatial embedding, areal differentiation	Construction of spatial divisions of labor; differentiation of social relations horizontally among "core" versus "peripheral" places
Scale	The nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size	Hierarchization, vertical differentiation	Construction of scalar divisions of labor; differentiation of social relations vertically among "dominant", "nodal", and "marginal" scales
Networks	Decentered sets of social relations characterized by symmetrical connectivity to centered ensembles of power relations organized on functional or flow	Interconnectivity, interdependence, transversal or "rhizomatic" differentiation	Building networks of nodal connectivity; differentiation of social relations among nodal points within topological networks

Note. Synthesis from Jessop, Brenner, and Jones (2008); Jessop (2016)

By emphasizing the “polymorphism” and “heterogeneity” of social space and the complex socio-spatial processes based on the characteristics of each different imaginary, the TPSN scheme aims to provide multidimensional spatial analysis models by critiquing one-dimensional space analyses and (re)organizing socio-spatial relations in many forms. Based on SRA, these works relate to “a multifaceted, strategic relational analysis of socio-spatial processes can be pursued” (p. 399), that is, examining how actors choose “some aspects are more meaningful or important than others” (Jessop, 2020, p. 104) to shape their understandings, projects, experiences, and also other kinds of imagination in accurate complex socio-spatial regulation. Thus, this schema can potentially study contentious politics and the strategies and tactics of actors involved in the strategic selectivity of socio-spatial forms (Mayer, 2008). It can also help illuminate dominant power relations and social movements expressed in different structural principles strategically chosen by actors. In addition, researchers can look for emerging or distinctive and characteristic spatial practices. At the same time, the authors also emphasize that besides examining differential weights, it is also necessary to consider the coupling of different dimensions, such as the relations of territory to place, scalar and networked, within a given spatiotemporal context in which one can explain the relative coherence of socio-spatial configurations.

In its most basic application, this scheme can provide different structuring principles for studying spatialization and the governance of social space. The TPSN scheme suggests four forms of spatialization. Firstly, territorialization draws the boundary of spatialized zones by rights, controls, and authority (Sack, 1986; Peluso, 2005). It is also a process of statecraft, political technology, and a constant preoccupation with modern states (Anderson, 1991; Brenner & Elden, 2009; Sassen, 2006; Elden, 2010). Secondly, place-making is considered a process of transforming space into a place with a sense of user experience. It is related to the formation of place identity and a sense of place (Cresswell, 2014; Tuan, 1974; 1977; Akbar & Edelenbos, 2021). Thirdly, rescaling refers to constructing and reorganizing the vertical division of labor and resources. It emerges from a politics of scale, struggles around institutionalizing particular interests at particular spatial scales relative to others (Brenner, 2001). Lastly, networking is the action or process of cross-border interaction between individuals, groups, or organizations for common purposes without merging their identities. It is a consensus-oriented process of coordination that encourages mutual adjustment in the parties’ behavior (Scott, 2000; Weyer, 2012).

In terms of governance, due to “space can be a site, object, and means of governance” (Jessop, 2016, p. 10), governing practices are associated with various spatial imaginaries. Jessop (2019a) argues that different structural principles of territory (T), location (P), scale (S), and network (N) can favor different forms of socio-spatial governance. That is, these socio-spatial imaginaries can be articulated into the structural principles of governance and form relevant governance models.

Similar to the suggestions of the TPSN framework proponents (Jessop et al., 2008; Jessop, 2016; 2019a), relevant documents show that territorial governance reflects a top-down hierarchical state logic (Neto, 2007; Davoudi et al., 2008); network governance refers to managing self-organizing and coordinating mechanisms (Powell, 1990; Rhodes, 2007); scale-based governance relates paradigms interplay between multiple scales in the context of localization, regionalization, and globalization (Brenner, 2017; 2019; McGuirk, 2004); and place-based governance emphasizes community and bottom-up elements (Hambleton, 2014; Feuer et al., 2021) (Table 2). Recent developments in the TPSN framework also reveal the existence of more complex socio-spatial governance strategies within each form of spatialization and the relationships between different forms of spatialization. These governance strategies involve meta-governance and multi-level governance and require alternative perspectives, such as multi-spatial meta-governance and multi-scalar meta-governance (Jones & Jessop, 2010; Zhang & He, 2021).

Table 2

Spatial forms of governance based on TPSN scheme

	Territorial governance	Place-based governance	Scale-based governance	Network-based governance
Main mode(s)	Command	Solidarity	Interactive	Dialogue, exchange
Main purpose of governance	Transforming material space	Improving populations/ community	Responding to decentralization and territorial reforms	Leveraging resources outside public field
Governance structure	Top-down authority	Bottom-up	Multi-level	Reticulated
Main governing tools	Formal institutions	Community agreement, love, identity	Regulations, guidelines	Trust, rules, reciprocity, negotiation
Main governing actions	Implementing administrative orders	Self-managed, coordination	(Re)dividing tasks between various government-level	Learning, negotiations, cooperation
Role of the state	Rowing	Facilitating	Leading	Steering
Who governs?	Government-led	Communities-led (or local government)	State/ regional/ provincial government	Civil society-led, market-led

Note. The author's synthesis

Its further and more profound applications involve analyzing spatiotemporal fixes and regulation-cum-governance issues. Studying the interactions between spatial configurations helps explore strategies related to spatiotemporal fixes. These interactions show how strategies and fixes are constructed and pursued because spatiotemporal fixes are best conceived as a polymorphic superposition and interpenetration of spatialized forms seeking to replace or postpone contradictions and crisis tendencies. Then, they become subjects of re-regulation and reorganization. This recursive reproduction can be seen as contingent manifestations of coordinated efforts of structural cohesion, the strategies and practices of actors in interactions between territorialization, place-making, rescaling, and networking (Jones & Jessop, 2010). Next, Jessop (2019a) argues that the interaction between these four basic forms of spatialization involves more complex spatial governance strategies. These strategies and forms can be combined into more complex forms of meta-governance aimed at specific spatial locations or distinct combinations to pursue larger socio-spatial projects, which he calls “multi-spatial meta-governance.”

Thus, the TPSN scheme is based on SRA and CPE and can adopt socio-spatial imaginaries in spatialization and governance studies. It also encourages useful investigations on the relationships of spatialization forms vis-à-vis spatiotemporal fixes and governance-cum-governance. However, as a heuristic tool, it has several issues for empirical studies. Relying too heavily on TPSN risks makes a study a mere empirical observation describing a series of random, aggregated phenomena, not the random effects of development. Therefore, it is necessary in some cases to incorporate the TPSN framework into different analytical traditions that can be framed and identified as changes and/or reversals of dominant state ideologies and dominant institutional practices. At the same time, research also needs to consider the interactions between these processes in conjunction with specific historical-geographical contexts to create special orders and rearrangements of the socio-spatial landscape by being linked to state power and hegemony (Jessop, 2019a).

2.2.4. Relations between spatialization and governance within broader orders

The contributions to the development from regulation to CPE above suggest that articulation is the key to theory construction. By adopting his “method of articulation” based on the works of Gramsci, Poulantzas, Laclau, and Mouffe, Jessop (1982; 1990; 2002; 2008; 2015; also, Jessop & Sum, 2013) emphasizes contingent necessities and social practices in articulating economic, political, and ideological relations within capital production. In other words, the complex world “is irreducible to but articulated with accumulation and regulation” (van Heur, 2010a, p. 433). Although this method faces some debate, it effectively builds an ontology of relationships between different fields at an abstract level, such as economic and extra-economic, and discursive and extra-discursive. It also allows for tracing expanded mechanisms

on lower levels of abstraction by introducing and renewing concepts, such as “accumulation strategy,” “hegemonic project,” “spatiotemporal fix,” and “regulation-cum-governance”. Moreover, Jessop (1990; 2002; 2008) also developed an “overall articulation,” which provides configurations to characterize the cohesion in accumulation, state activities, and respective social and spatial formations. It relates to social cohesion, economic-political orders, and hegemonic projects to serve the structural coherence of capital accumulation. Thus, such articulations significantly affect the definition of the relationship between spatialization and governance within and concerning broader social formations.

First of all, both regulation-cum-governance and spatiotemporal fixes are articulated into related modes of regulation. Therefore, they share an institutional matrix, sometimes with the (temporary) coincidence of interests between economic and political forces, and their intersection also appears in policy practices. Therefore, regulation-cum-governance transformation and spatiotemporal fix can be observed based on the analysis of socio-economic structural change processes through state projects such as response to the crises of capitalism. This means governance transformations and spatiotemporal fixes involving changes in regulation in response to capitalist crises and conflicts. Although these combinations can at least partially resolve conflicts and dilemmas in capital relations, they are always unstable and temporary, creating many contradictions and dilemmas (Jessop, 2002). In this case, Jessop (2019a; 2020) argues that spatiotemporal fixes are linked to regulation-cum-governance, which uses different strategies to resolve conflicts and dilemmas through hierarchization, prioritization, spatialization, and temporalization.

The complex relationship between regulation-cum-governance and spatiotemporal fix becomes meaningful when articulated into a broader economic, political, social, and spatial order. Jessop (2020) argues that governance-cum-regulation and spatiotemporal fixes are interrelated because they operate within defined socio-spatial dimensions. To some extent, the spatiotemporal fix is the site where governance-cum-regulation is established and the object of governance. So, socio-spatial governance can be observed through the structures of spatiotemporal fixes performed randomly, which, in turn, governance-cum-regulation can also structure to constitute broader representations of contingency as spatiotemporal fixes of capitalist social relations (Peck & Tickell, 1992; 1994). At the same time, their relationship also involves a complex articulation of culture, economics, and politics to maintain a hegemonic order. Indeed, they are concerned with hegemonic practices, in which more extensive collective action challenges become essential in both the economic and political spheres, requiring “a continuing process of collibration to get the balance between modes of production, distribution, and governance right, with priority given to the social economy, social cohesion, and solidarity as guiding principles and aspirations” (Jessop, 2019b, p. 106). These

practices help establish and ensure a social order (hegemonic order). Therefore, a (counter-)hegemonic perspective in the study of regulation-cum-governance and spatiotemporal fixes can offer the potential for exploring the path-dependent linkages between different economic and political trajectories for structural embeddedness in broader society.

2.3. The accumulation regime of Vietnam

2.3.1. The *Doi Moi* and institutionalization of a socialist-oriented market economy

After unifying the country, Vietnam entered one of the darkest economic periods in its history due to the hasty application of the Soviet model to build socialism nationwide while also facing two border wars and the Western embargo policy. For a decade (1975-1985), commodity production stagnated due to mistakes in the collectivization of agricultural production and investment policies for heavy industry based on loans and aid (mainly from the Soviet bloc) and ineffective corrective/remedial solutions leading to the national economy's inability to accumulate wealth and hyperinflation. Furthermore, this period coincided with a deep crisis among socialist countries worldwide, leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. In contrast, the largest remaining socialist country, China, had proactively been carrying out reform and opening up since 1978. Faced with this situation, the leaders of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) decided to implement economic reforms. This process is known as *Doi Moi*, and it is associated with decisions from the 6th Congress of the CPV (1986) to transform the mechanism from subsidized central planning, which mainly involved state-owned and collective ownership, to a market mechanism that includes multiple economic sectors. By 1991, these views were theorized through the transition to socialism at the 7th Party Congress, and at the same time, the economy was opened to the world through the normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States. Joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2006 demonstrated that Vietnam's economy had become relatively marketized and deeply integrated internationally.

Over 30 years, the *Doi Moi* process has been redefining socio-economic relationships and the conditions for their reproduction through a series of institutional reforms, transforming the country from one organized through central planning to a socialist-oriented market economy. The CPV emphasized that this is a new model "unprecedented in the history of the development of the market economy." Vietnam has been establishing a "modern, internationally integrated, operating market economy" that functions comprehensively and synchronously according to the rules of the market economy with state management. This means that the process of institutionalization (which is continuing to improve) of socio-economic relationships in Vietnam today can be observed according to specific market economic models.

Until now, the relationship between the state and the market has been at the center of institutionalizing the socialist-oriented market economy in Vietnam. Although this relationship has experienced many changes at each stage of the country's development, the primary trend is that the state gradually reduces direct intervention (by administrative orders) in the market, focusing instead on macroeconomic and regulation tools consistent with the market economy. The vital role of the party-state, in this case, is not simply to manage and regulate economic activities within the market but also, from the root cause, to ensure political orientation towards the economy, guidelines, viewpoints, and the guiding ideology of the ruling Communist Party. However, the challenge of compatibility between the process of market economic transformation and one-party management needs to be clarified, as there are many contradictions and inadequacies. In some areas, the state also intervenes extensively in the economy and maintains the "ask-give" mechanism (Doc P09). Group interests in the relationship between the state and the economy play a particular role in the accumulation regime, negatively impacting social and other economic benefits.

Redefining the multi-sector economy and expanding economic relationships through *Doi Moi* has promoted competition. The CPV's platform for building the country during the transition period to socialism (1991) revolved around: "Developing a multi-sector commodity economy with socialist orientation, operating according to the market mechanism under the management of the State." This focus has determined the political basis for constructing the 1992 Constitution and essential laws in the economic field. While economic benefits were not given due attention in the centralized subsidized economy, they are now the driving force of all economic relationships nowadays. They are also motivating competition among businesses, industries, and localities. Although the 11th Party Congress clearly stated that by "improving the socialist-oriented market economy institution, the focus is on creating an equal competitive environment and administrative reform," these forms of competition have significant asymmetry. Stemming from the unique characteristics of the socialist-oriented market economy, "the state economy plays a leading role, being an important material force for the State to orient and regulate the economy, contributing to macroeconomic stability" (Doc P06), leading to the private economy not being given sufficient attention and low competitiveness. At the same time, the difference in competitive advantages between localities is highly significant in the context of increasing pressure to decentralize power to localities, resulting in unfair competition.

The *Doi Moi* process also transformed labor relations from being fully subsidized by the state to labor relations as a commodity to be bought and sold according to its value on the market, promoting rural-urban migrant workers. Socialist-oriented market economic institutions are established to create a corridor and legal framework for labor relations to form and develop in

the direction of “harmony, stability, and progress” through the two-particle mechanism (employees, employee representatives, and employers) and the tripartite mechanism (State - employer representative - employee representative). However, the current legal framework on labor relations in Vietnam still has many shortcomings in the context of low labor productivity, unfair distribution to informal workers (more than 50% of the total), and an imbalance in labor supply and demand between localities and industries. Another notable issue is that Vietnam applies a labor relations model with only one trade union in an enterprise, which differs from market principles and sometimes does not represent workers’ rights (MOLISA, 2018).

The nature of the market economy is open to integration with global capital. By 2024, Vietnam had commercial ties with 193 nations and territories. The WTO, in particular, as well as more than 500 bilateral and multilateral agreements in a variety of fields, including 19 free trade agreements in which Vietnam participates (16 agreements have been signed and are in effect, and three agreements are currently being negotiated), provide large, multifaceted opportunities to focus on perfecting the institutional framework for market economic development and deeper and broader global integration. The opening of integration through trade agreements and institutional framework reforms such as the Investment Law has continuously created motivation to attract FDI in Vietnam and increase economic benefits from international trade. However, preferential policies and unfair competition between localities to attract FDI lead to low investment quality, creating inequality for domestic private enterprises.

In summary, the process of *Doi Moi* and the institutionalization of a socialist-oriented market economy in Vietnam simultaneously reflect the goal of economic development and maintaining the controlling role of the party-state. Although this process has helped the country achieve continuous economic growth and political stability for over three decades, Vietnam faces the dilemma of balancing economic and political reforms toward marketization while remaining faithful to orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Additionally, the lack of resources for transformation leads to uneven development, and policies that prioritize solving urgent problems have marginalized issues of inequality and social contradictions.

2.3.2. Accumulation regime and transforming growth model

The *Doi Moi* in 1986 brought a “big-bang” breakthrough in Vietnam’s economic growth (Perkins, 1994; Sachs & Woo, 1994). Over the past 30 years, Vietnam’s GDP has grown continuously (see Table 3) and has become one of Southeast Asia’s most dynamic economies. This process is characteristic of a pattern often seen in the early stages of an emerging market economy with rapid economic growth in a context of significant fluctuations due to market mechanism deficiencies and a lack of economic growth effective state interventions (Kvint, 2009). Vietnam’s growth model can be analyzed based on two primary components, according

to regulationists: the productivity regime and the demand regime (Boyer, 1987). Additionally, economists can analyze the growth model (accumulation regime) through the structure of production and consumption (or, more broadly, aggregate supply and aggregate demand) in terms of the increase of gross domestic product over a certain period.

Table 3

The GDP growth of Vietnam by economic sector and ownership

Time	GPD Growth (%)	Structure by economic activities (%)			Structure by economic sectors (%)		
		Agriculture, forestry, fisheries	Industry and construction	Service	State economy	Non-state economy	FDI
1986-1990	4,4	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991-1995	8,2	32,9	25,8	36,3	48,7	45,0	6,3
1996-2000	7,0	24,5	36,7	38,8	38,5	48,2	13,3
2001-2005	7,5	19,3	38,1	42,6	37,4	46,7	15,9
2006-2010	6,32	19,2	38,0	42,8	28,9	48,3	18,1
2011-2015	5,91	18,7	38,4	42,9	28,9	43,7	21,5
2016-2020	6,01	12,5	39,3	49,2	23,5	42,3	25,1

Note. Author compiled from data of the GSO

On the production side, for a long time, growth in Vietnam “still depends mainly on increasing investment capital and the number of workers” (Doc P25). From the 1990s until now, Vietnam’s economic growth has relied on continuously increasing and maintaining a high level of social investment capital, most of which comes from the state budget and state corporations. However, high dependence on investment capital in the context of low savings rates, low investment efficiency, and low productivity leads to an increasing reliance on FDI capital sources for growth. At the same time, a sharp increase in the labor force, especially rural-urban migrant workers, has contributed significantly to growth. Abundant labor resources and cheap labor costs are important reasons for attracting foreign investment and promoting the development of processing and manufacturing industries and labor-intensive manufacturing industries. However, although the labor force is large, it mainly consists of unskilled workers providing low-quality labor. Thus, economic growth in Vietnam is mainly based on increasing capital, the number of workers, and exploiting natural resources. The contribution of total factor productivity (TFP) has increased but remains very low compared to many countries in the region during the same period of development.

On the demand side, the three main factors contributing to Vietnam’s growth are consumption, investment, and exports. In a developing economy like Vietnam, consumption often accounts

for a large proportion of total demand, followed by asset accumulation. Specifically, consumption accounts for more than 70% of GDP, while asset accumulation accounts for about 26%. However, asset accumulation (investment) tends to decrease, and growth is maintained due to consumption. During the period 2011–2020, total accumulation and consumption were smaller than GDP, reflecting the fact that the value of domestic production output exceeded total domestic demand. Consequently, during this period, Vietnam had a trade surplus, and the balance of payments was stable and improved. However, Vietnam’s trade surplus is mainly due to the FDI sector (up to more than 76.3%, compared to more than 60% in 2001-2010), reflecting increasing dependence on foreign investment and trade in capital accumulation due to the decline in investment and competitiveness of domestic enterprises, which has established an export-oriented growth regime (Tran T. AD., 2022).

Table 4

Contribution of capital, labor, and total factors to growth in Vietnam

Time	GDP Growth	Aggregate supply			Aggregate demand		
		Capital	Labor	TFP	Consumption	Investments	Net exports
1991-2010	7,6%	56,9%	21,1%	22,0%	71,5%	38,7%	-6,7%
2011-2020	6,6%	51,1%	8,5%	40,4%	70%	26%	4,0%

Note. Author compiled from data of the GSO

An analysis of Vietnam’s accumulation regime over the past three decades shows the heterogeneity of relationships in the growth process over time, emphasizing the continuous reshaping of the development dynamics structure of the accumulation regime. In other words, Vietnam’s growth model is in transition. Two relatively observable periods are 1991–2010, characterized by economic growth based on cheap labor and resources, and 2011–2020, with a relative increase in TFP (Table 4). This distinction aligns with the differentiation made by regulationists regarding the two modes of accumulation: extensive and intensive. In a regime of expanded accumulation, economic growth is maintained through the expansion of industries producing capital goods (sector I) rather than consumer goods (sector II) (Aglietta, 1979). The accumulation regime in Vietnam from *Doi Moi* up to now reflects expanded accumulation and efforts to transform the growth model to sector II since the 2010 economic recession was institutionalized (Nguyen, T. V. & Vo, H. P., 2004). According to the 11th Congress of the CPV, “transforming the growth model from mainly based on breadth to reasonable development between breadth and depth, both expanding scale and focusing on the importance of improving quality and efficiency” (Doc P06).

In summary, Vietnam's *Doi Moi* process emphasizes transforming a centralized economic model to a socialist-oriented market economy while building a people's democratic state still controlled by the Communist Party. Absolute leadership has gradually created a unique development model (path) aimed at harmony and political stability to maintain economic growth. Currently, Vietnam is in the stage of transforming its growth model from an economy based on extensive investment, resource exploitation, and cheap labor to an idealized model that harmoniously combines the old model with development goals based on in-depth investment, high labor productivity, and the application of scientific and technological advances. However, the transformation of the growth model, although progressing, is slow, with many potential conflicts between different regulation regimes in the context of an average economy with very high economic openness (Boyer, 2022).

2.3.3. Urban accumulation strategies in Vietnam

After 35 years of *Doi Moi*, although still in the early stages of urbanization, urban areas have become a pillar in the economic growth model of Vietnam, with high growth rates, contributing about 70% of the country's GDP. By the end of 2020, the urban system in Vietnam had 862 urban areas of all types, and the urbanization rate increased from 30.5% in 2010 to nearly 40% in 2020⁵ (Doc P10). Urbanization and urban development have become important driving forces to promote socio-economic development, acting as poles of economic growth, especially in Hanoi and HCMC due to their high concentration of factors such as capital, labor, services, and technology. This phenomenon is fundamentally similar to the concept described by Harvey (1987) as flexible capital accumulation through urbanization in the United States in the 1970s. More specifically, urbanization facilitates "transforming capital" from the "primary" circuit (industry and manufacturing) to the "secondary" circuit (land, assets, real estate, and built environments) to ensure continuous accumulation (Harvey, 1985; Gotham, 2006; Christophers, 2011). This argument has significant parallels with regulation theory regarding the rules, norms, and compromises that allow institutions to regulate interactions between actors to overcome inherent conflicts in the economy. Accordingly, this phenomenon can be identified as urban accumulation strategies involving accumulation regimes linked to regulation models capable of reproducing them (Jessop, 1997). Three prominent features of the urban accumulation regime in Vietnam can be identified: rural-urban migrant labor, real estate market development, and local competition.

⁵ This rate is lower than the target set in the Socio-Economic Development Strategy for 2011–2020. It is currently among the countries with a low level of urbanization compared to the world average.

The rural-urban migrant labor force plays an essential role in urban accumulation strategies in Vietnam. Output growth and urban expansion are possible outcomes of the labor surplus pattern created by labor migration. Migrants contribute to the urban population of 4.9 million (only counting official immigrants), equivalent to 12.3% of the urban population and 8.6% of the national workforce (GSO, 2020). However, rural-urban migration causes significant pressure on urban areas regarding infrastructure and resources for social welfare, especially in urban areas where migrants account for nearly 20% of the population. To regulate this problem, Vietnam uses a population management mechanism through *Ho Khau* (household registration)⁶, creating a “semi-urbanization” situation for the rural-urban migrant labor flow. On the one hand, excluding migrant workers from accessing housing, health care, and education reduces the burden on large cities, which is beneficial for the accumulation process of these localities. On the other hand, household registration acts as a “safety valve” that creates constraints for migrants who have to return to their hometown when they are unemployed or cannot stay in the city. This mechanism also promotes migrants’ ability to transfer part of their income to rural areas, reducing regional disparities (GSO, 2012). Specifically, about 30% of migrants send money home; on average, migrants send about 5 million VND/month, while the rate over 5 million VND is over 10%. The flow of money from urban to rural areas in this way has partly contributed to reducing inequality in development between urban and rural areas in Vietnam over the past decades (WB, 2020a).

Urban accumulation is associated with increasing use value and shifting (or expanding) urban land. When the state recognized land use rights as a commodity in the late 1990s, it led to the formation and development of the real estate market, resulting in the rapid conversion of agricultural land into urban land through urban development projects or spontaneously. During the period 2011–2020, the urban land area increased by 510,920 hectares (an average increase of 51,092 hectares/year), accounting for about 10.26% of the natural land area of the country, with 14,760 km² in the inner city, accounting for about 4.42% of the country’s natural land area. Especially in Hanoi and HCMC, the expansion speed of these two cities (3.8% and 4% annually, respectively) is much larger than the growth rate of urban areas in other countries in the region, except China (WB, 2015). Revenue from land allocation and land lease accounts for about 10.75% of total annual budget revenue, most of which comes from urban land. Two forms of urban land expansion are invariably linked: state intervention strategies and spontaneous development strategies. For a long time, the expansion of urban space was highly

⁶ Only a few countries in the world have a residence registration system that is linked to the provision of social services and restricts changes in registration. The most similar to the Vietnamese case is China’s *hukou* system.

spontaneous, but gradually, this began to take place within the framework of plans and administrative reterritorialization within the overall strategy of each country, territory, and locality. However, subsidy inertia still influences planning strategies, which are mainly based on administrative principles, and some land policies need improvement (Fanchette, 2017).

Another noteworthy point about the urban accumulation regime in Vietnam concerns the fact that localities use their competitive advantages to attract investment and promote growth. Up to now, the growth driver has always been overly focused on large urban areas with many competitive advantages (5 centrally-run cities accounting for 50% of GDP) based on preferential potential and many policy mechanisms. These cities have become places where human resources from across the country gather to make a living and have become lands where it is easier to make a living than elsewhere. However, development based on advantages has caused uneven development among regions, leading to a characteristic two-level urbanization system in Vietnam. Level 1 includes Hanoi, HCMC, and surrounding areas, while Level 2 includes the rest of Vietnam (WB, 2020a). Accordingly, national budget allocation is considered an essential regulation mechanism in Vietnam to overcome the uneven development of the accumulation system. In Vietnam, the budget system is divided proportionally between central and local budgets, which is the focus of the regulation mechanism to support disadvantaged localities, thereby ensuring equal development and securing social stability and people's lives. However, this budget allocation mechanism leads to HCMC lacking resources for development and having to implement an "austerity" policy for a long time, resulting in a decrease in the growth rate.

2.4. Local growth regime, regulation modes, and urban imaginaries of HCMC

2.4.1. The role of HCMC in national economic growth

As the largest city in Vietnam, the economy of HCMC plays a vital role in the country. Following *Doi Moi*, the city's economic growth increased rapidly as it went through a period of accumulation driven by land advantages and low labor costs without competition from other localities. In the first years of *Doi Moi*, the city's GDP grew at an average rate of 7.82% per year, and in the following years, the city's economic growth consistently reached double digits. Foreign investment increased rapidly, and the city's GRDP per capita increased from 700 USD (1996) to approximately 5,000 USD (2010), affirming the city's position and role as an economic driver in the Southern Key Economic Region and the country. The city's economic structure has shifted towards industry and services, primarily focusing on labor-intensive manufacturing and processing industries.

HCMC's growth is essential to Vietnam's GDP and budget (Table 5). In the period 1996–2000, the city's economy accounted for an average of 17% of the country's economy; in the period 2001–2010, this ratio increased to 20%, and in the period 2011–2019, it accounted for more than 22% of the country's economy. Furthermore, HCMC consistently has the country's most significant budget contribution rate (about 27%). The city's contribution rate to the national budget has increased from 26.5% in 2001–2010 to 27.5% in 2011–2019. Since the economic recession in 2010, the city government has been determined to transform its economic model in depth, focusing on a knowledge-based economy, applying science and technology, innovation, and high labor productivity. According to CVP HCMC's assessment, the city's current growth is driven by maintaining the old economic model while shifting towards increasing the service sector and high-tech industry (Doc P31; Doc P32).

Table 5

The GDP contribution rate, budget contribution rate, and budget retention rate of HCMC compared to the whole country

Time	GRDP Growth (%)	GDP contribution rate (%)	Budget contribution rate (%)	Budget retention rate (%)
1991-1995	12,62	15	17,6	-
1996-2000	10,11	17	20,6	33
2001-2005	11,00	19	24,3	32
2006-2010	11,18	20	26,5	25
2011-2015	9,50	21,2	27,5	23
2016-2020	6,41	25,9	28	18

Note. Author compiled from data of the GSO and HCMC People's Committee

From 2010 to 2020, the city's growth rate tended to decrease compared to the national average, while in 2001–2010, the city's growth rate was 1.6 times that of the whole country. However, in 2011–2019, it was only 1.2 times that. There are many reasons for this situation. The old growth modes based on land and labor costs have been gradually phased out, and competition among other localities is increasing, causing total FDI capital to decrease continuously. Additionally, the percentage of the retained budget for the city is decreasing. In 2000, the percentage of the retained budget was 33%, but it was only 18% in the period 2017–2020. This severe imbalance causes the city to no longer have public financial resources to invest in infrastructure, reducing local competitiveness and challenging the city's economic growth. Moreover, as a special urban area of Vietnam, HCMC often faces many specific issues beyond the scope of national regulations and general policies associated with the limitations regarding decentralization, which also hinder the growth of the city.

2.4.2. Imagining a civilized and modern socialist city

In the socialist urban regime, official urban imaginaries play an important role in reflecting the views and policy visions of the party-state in shaping the economic, political, and social issues of the city. Politically, through the mechanism of democratic centralism, similar to other term-oriented policies of the CPV, these imaginaries receive consensus from both the central and grassroots levels through the consultation process and are subsequently discussed and officially approved at the city's party congresses⁷. Since the first congress of the HCMC CPV after the country's reunification, the orientation of building the city into a civilized and modern city has been officially stated in their documents (Doc P27; Doc P28; Doc P29). By the 9th Congress (2010–2015), these images were fully defined as “striving to build HCMC into a civilized and modern socialist city” (Doc P30). At the 10th Congress (2015–2020), the city was given the slogan “Civilized, modern, and sentimental HCMC” (Doc P31). By the 11th Congress (2020–2025), this image was further detailed as “a smart city, a modern industrial and service city, maintaining its role as an economic locomotive and growth driver of the Southern Key Economic Zone and the whole country, taking the lead in innovation, with a good quality of life, civilized, modern, and sentimental” (Doc P32).

At the same time, this urban imaginary is also emphasized in the central party-state guidelines for local development, especially in the CPV resolutions on HCMC (Doc P22; Doc P23; Doc P24). These guidelines outline the directions and tasks for developing HCMC by 2030, with a vision extending to 2045. The goal is to transform the city into a civilized, modern, sentimental, dynamic, and creative city with high-quality human resources. By 2030, HCMC aims to be a modern service-industrial city, a leader in the digital economy and society, and the economic, financial, commercial, cultural, educational, and science-technology center of the country, with deep international integration and a prominent position in Southeast Asia. The vision for 2045 is for HCMC to develop on par with major cities worldwide, becoming the economic, financial, and service center of Asia. In addition, CVP also provided the guiding viewpoint that “building and developing a civilized and modern HCMC is an important political task of the entire Party, the entire people, the entire army, and the entire political system, with the motto: HCMC for the whole country, the whole country for HCMC” (Doc P24).

⁷ While the National Party Congress is the highest leadership body of the CPV, the local Party Congress is the most important political event in the locality, which includes planning local development policies in each specific historical period (Doc P01).

Accordingly, the HCMC government aims to develop the city by 2030 to become a leading economic, financial, commercial, scientific-technological, and educational center of Southeast Asia; a modern service and industrial city; a cultural city; and a locomotive of the digital economy and digital society (Doc P30). The vision of a civilized and modern city is also constantly updated through emerging discourses and projects such as the “smart city,” “green and sustainable city,” and “livable city” initiatives (LG02; LG04). Additionally, it is institutionalized and materialized through specific plans, policies, programs, projects, and state-led movements. It can be said that the modern, civilized city is a hegemonic project of the party-state to create ideological consent for their rule at the urban level and consolidate it materially through urban accumulation strategies. It is also an institution-building program and a state project, as per Jessop’s interpretation (1983; 2008).

2.4.3. Local regulation modes

Local regulation modes in HCMC are concerned with national regulation modes but focus on implementation or complementary approaches to overcoming the structural limitations of national urban accumulation strategies, in addition to regulation modes specific to the locality. Therefore, many different local regulation modes exist. This section focuses primarily on local modes linked to national urban regulation strategies.

Labor is one of the essential issues in the local growth regime. As the number of immigrants exceeded the city’s capacity to accommodate them, local authorities took advantage of the *Ho Khau* system to impose restrictions on urban-rural migration. Before 2015, local authorities tended to set stricter entry criteria to limit immigrants from obtaining urban citizenship. At the same time, exclusionary strategies were implemented in the context of public services provided mainly by the state. Limiting the number of people entitled to urban citizenship was necessary to maintain the urban regime’s regenerative capacity. In recent decades, the state has also begun reducing subsidies in education, healthcare, and housing provision, socializing all public services instead. Thus, the use of household registration to control workers migrating to urban areas has gradually relaxed. Recently, in labor competition with other localities, HCMC has implemented policies to support and create conditions for rural and urban workers to access urban services.

Urban space expansion also manifests as a mode of local socio-spatial regulation. Under the influence of market forces, the previous close link between industrial parks and significant residential developments has been broken. Opportunities for business and service development in the city center have led to rapid increases in land prices, causing low-income households to sell their homes in the city center and move to the suburbs, where rural land is relatively cheap. The conversion of rural land to urban land occurs often in peri-urban areas. Over the past 30

years, urban space has continuously expanded through peri-urbanization and the development of new urban areas. Furthermore, land revenue accounts for about 10% of the city's budget and is an essential source of revenue. This source of revenue is associated with the process of peri-urbanization, which involves converting low-value land into high-value through planning and socio-economic development projects that increase the value of the land, changing land use purposes, and developing infrastructure systems. There are 118,052 hectares of agricultural land in HCMC, but they only account for 0.89% of GRDP. Meanwhile, industrial and service land, which covers only 14,264 hectares, accounts for 99.11% of GRDP, with a value reaching 50.9 billion VND/ha/year. Therefore, peri-urbanization promotes the conversion of agricultural land into non-agricultural, industrial, service, and commercial land (with the government's consent). This represents a strategy to create additional revenue for the budget. Local governments prioritize planning as an essential tool for managing and promoting growth rather than merely guiding the city's urban development. Indeed, it has played an active role in the city government's negotiation with the central government, financiers, other stakeholders, international aid organizations, and private enterprises in building the city over the past two decades (Huynh, 2015).

Another local regulation mode that has emerged in recent years involves strategies to improve local competitiveness, as the city's absolute competitive advantage over other localities is increasingly being eroded. First, the city prioritizes and focuses on industries with higher added value, such as high-quality services that use less labor when attracting FDI capital. These include nine service industries (commerce, transportation, tourism, information and communication, finance and banking, real estate, science and technology expertise, education and training, and healthcare) and four key industries (precision mechanical engineering and automation, electronics and information technology, refined food processing, and chemicals – pharmaceutical entailing both chemistry and cosmetics). The second key strategy is improving labor productivity by prioritizing human resource development for industries with high technology content and high-added value, ensuring the need for high-quality labor. These are also regulation modes that innovate the growth model in general in Vietnam. In fact, despite being a leading locality in transforming the growth model, attracting investment in high-value industries remains slow, and as a result, strategies that focus on labor-intensive industries still prevail to maintain the current growth rate.

2.5. Beyond regulation: Towards a CPE of dynamic peri-urban transformations

2.5.1. Peri-urbanization and regulation modes

As Harvey (1996) claims, the peri-urban area can be the new center of inquiry into urban processes. Urban political economists explore this process not only in terms of the

transformation of rural environments into urban landscapes but also as a new spatial form of capitalism aimed at exploiting spaces and places (Harvey, 1978; 1994). In the case of HCMC, peri-urbanization is closely related to economic growth. The most noticeable impact of urbanization on the local economy, in particular, and the country in general, is the conversion of land use purposes from agriculture to non-agricultural purposes such as building industrial parks, residential areas, and service and entertainment areas, shifting the economic structure towards industry, service, and agriculture. At the same time, investing in the peri-urban area helps resolve excessive accumulation in the city center and exploit new spaces to attract global capital for investment in manufacturing and real estate. Furthermore, these are also places where national and local regulation practices are implemented as centers of attraction for migrant workers, where urban spatial expansion is taking place, and directly witnessing the gradual shift to a production model based on increased labor productivity, reflected in the gradual reduction of labor-intensive industries since the 2010s. Therefore, peri-urbanization in HCMC is also associated with modes of regulation and spatiotemporal fix to over-accumulation and stabilizes the (transitional) accumulation regime in Vietnam.

Marxist urban political economists also point out that as accumulation strategies by expropriating resources in peripheral areas increase, uneven development becomes an increasingly common problem (Brenner, 2014; 2019). On the edge of HCMC, apart from the uneven development between the center and edge of cities in the context of poor investment resources and spontaneous development, there is inequality between rural-urban migrants and local urban residents in settlements associated with exclusion from accessing public services and social welfare. Therefore, peri-urbanization is not only a mode of regulation but also creates problems related to uneven development and inequality that require other modes of regulation to overcome. This uneven development, inequality, and tension within the peri-urbanization process promote the regulation of socio-spatial relations to temporarily stabilize the process of (re)production of space and the accumulation regime in general. These modes of regulation involve the configurations of territorial organizations that have underpinned previous rounds of capitalist expansion, which have been abandoned or reworked to establish a new network of locations for further accumulation (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). In other words, socio-spatial modes of regulation involve spatialized practices that exceed or partially substitute for modes of regulation based on problematic territorial sovereignty and existing jurisdiction.

In short, the regulation approach to peri-urbanization reflects both the exchange value and the use value of peri-urban areas. On the one hand, it helps to consolidate the dominance of urban spatial forms through capitalist and state strategies that enforce and expand the use values of urban space. On the other hand, it involves various spatiotemporal fixes to address the problems

of uneven development and inequality created by the process of accumulation by dispossession. This perspective also emphasizes the inevitable tensions and conflicts between peri-urbanization as a regulation mode and other regulation modes, alongside those between different socio-spatial regulation modes of peri-urbanization. To explore these relationships, the regulation approach should be rethought broadly to fully consider extra-economic and extra-political issues in overcoming uneven peri-urban development problems and ensuring effective urban accumulation strategies in general.

2.5.2. Heterogeneous and contradictory socio-spatial regulation modes of peri-urbanization

According to SRA regulationists, intrinsic contradictions of capitalist accumulation and strategic selectivities result in contradictions, struggles, and tensions within each mode of regulation and among them (Jessop, 2008; 2015). This argument is similar to Harvey's emphasis on the contradiction between fixity and mobility as a concrete expression of the use-value/exchange-value contradiction in the production of urban space, leading to "heterogeneous spatio-temporal forms." In terms of socio-spatial relations, according to Jessop et al. (2003), these contradictions can be explored through the TPSN scheme, which can help provide a deeper analysis of the relationships between different spatialization practices. Accordingly, modes of socio-spatial regulation of peri-urbanization involve heterogeneous and scalar configurations beyond territorialization processes such as place-making, re-networking, and rescaling (Brenner, 2004; 2019).

In HCMC, peri-urban areas are entering a "territorial moment" (Schindler, 2015) where regulation and governance modes focus on infrastructure investment, attracting investment, and integrating administrative territories rather than solving problems of uneven development and social inequality. In other words, this territorialization process expands urban territory by converting the social, economic, political/organizational, physical, and natural resources of the periphery from rural to urban, resulting in urban expansion. Accordingly, peri-urban territorialization can be seen as a set of activities conducted by the state and social groups to organize and control peripheral areas of the city related to infrastructure construction, land conversion agriculture, real estate investment, social services, and administrative organization. Moreover, this process is a particularly salient subset of broader socio-spatial regulations/spatiotemporal fixes at the national and local levels because it allows for continued growth, expansion, and urban accumulation (Brenner & Theodore 2002; Harvey 1989; Jessop 1997; 2019a).

One of the main characteristics of territorialization is that it is always associated with exclusion. It involves including or excluding others from a space marked by easily identifiable boundaries and controlling what they can do within the designated area (Vandergeest & Peluso, 1995). For

example, case studies of peri-urban areas in China show that land control and exclusion aim to exploit profits from scarce real estate in central areas or reduce costs of welfare fees for migrants to increase local competition, thereby stabilizing the growth model cities are pursuing (Shih, 2017; Boyer, 2018). Therefore, considering peri-urban territorialization as a spatiotemporal fix associated with regulation models can help account for the underlying mechanisms of accumulation by dispossession and its central role in maintaining the “structured coherence” of economic, political, and political processes (Harvey, 1985).

Counterbalancing such processes of peri-urban territorialization are the spatial practices of the subjects dispossessed and marginalized by this process (Harvey, 1990; 2003). Harvey (1990) believes that “low-income populations, usually lacking the means to overcome and hence command space, find themselves mostly trapped in space. Since ownership of even basic means of reproduction (such as housing) is restricted, the main way to dominate space is through continuous appropriation. Exchange values are scarce, and so the pursuit of use values for daily survival is central to social action. This means frequent material and interpersonal transactions and the formation of very small scale communities. Within the community space, use values get shared through some mix of mutual aid and mutual predation, creating tight but often highly conflictual interpersonal social bonding in both private and public spaces. The result is an often intense attachment to place ...” (p. 260). This place-making process, as emphasized by Jessop (2019a), is “usually closely tied to everyday life, has layered and differential temporal depth, and is linked to collective memory and social identity” (p. 58) and “could become the basis of local democracy based on community and solidarity and act as a counterweight to centralized territorial power” (p. 63).

In the peri-urban area of HCMC, more than half of the population consists of urban-rural workers, most of whom have a low income. Thus, their place-making practices have a significant impact on peri-urbanization. These practices are not just simple survival strategies but also examples of resistance in claiming spaces for their needs. In essence, migrant place-making is a set of practices of familiarization (Roy, 2009) and appropriation of space by migrants so that they can stay, live, and belong to a particular part of the city. Over time, their active and meaningful participation in this process goes beyond mere settlement, giving them a “place in space” (Byrne & Goodall, 2013, p. 65) with stronger belonging, identity, and social cohesion. Therefore, migrant place-making can also be understood as asserting collective identities among populations (Castles & Davidson, 2000). Theoretically, these practices can indicate a regulation mode that stabilizes these tensions arising from exclusion, marginalization, and uneven development generated by territorialization.

Socio-spatial relational theories have shown that territorialization and place-making constantly interact, creating structural contradictions that lead to strategic dilemmas (Jessop et al., 2008;

Jessop, 2019a). These two practices are simultaneously in tension with ideology, institutions, and actions in everyday life. Concrete places are where people's activities and living conditions continually confront the state in both small and large ways (Lefebvre, 1974; 1992; 1996). Place-making practices, while subject to territorialization, also disidentify with these logics in mundane spaces, creating identities for their inhabitants and horizons that are familiar and authentic to everyday life. To some extent, migrant place-making is deterritorial because it challenges the logic of territorialization. However, these practices may not be intended as a direct challenge to state power but rather as an attempt to stabilize the city (Escobar, 2001). These assumptions highlight those empirical studies should be concerned with how migrant place-making interacts with the process of territorialization and the outcomes of this process.

2.5.3. Complex and dynamic peri-urban socio-spatial transformations

According to Harvey (1996), the edge city is not the boundary or endpoint but an essential part of the "dynamic moment" in urbanization (p. 52), where hegemonic power cannot completely control, but all kinds of possibilities for freedom and liberation can flourish. These areas are often clearly defined by their messy, unplanned nature, with their spatiotemporal practices always reflecting the complexity, competition, conflict, confrontation, and cooperation between different groups of actors with varying interests at various spatial scales over time (Harvey, 1978; 1996). The heterogeneous and dynamic transformation of the peri-urban can be observed through different socio-spatial practices from different critical perspectives.

Marxist urban politics studies detail how the increasingly powerful socio-spatial transformation in the peripheries of cities is consistent with the dialectics of global capital accumulation and circulation (Harvey, 1973; 1982; 1989; 2003; 2006), in addition to reflecting regulatory logics and emphasizing the dynamism and complexity of this process through forms of socio-spatial organization, governance, and socio-political conflict as strategic sites for commodification processes (Brenner et al., 2012). According to Jessop (2019a; 2020), contradictions between different modes of socio-spatial regulation can be resolved through different strategies, such as decentralization or prioritizing some of these contradictions as more important than others. Spatialization to resolve contradictions relies on different actions based on scale and sites or shifting them to marginal or liminal spaces. Finally, temporalizing involves treating interleaved or unidirectional logic into conflicting subsets until the problem reaches a threshold. These modes of regulation are associated with territorial reorganization, which in this case is the transformation of the state's management system, along with spatiotemporal fixes at certain levels. Accordingly, transformations through the resolution of such contradictions and conflicts provide terrain for studies of "the right to the city" struggles, more specifically, urban social movements and local-scale protest initiatives aimed at gaining rights in the areas of public services, infrastructure, and public spaces (Andretta et al. 2015;

Mayer, 2007; Mayer et al. 2016), as a reaction to the unequal space-time development of capitalism (Castells, 1983; Mayer, 2007; 2009; Harvey, 2015). Essentially, popular struggles are taking place, albeit separately, but they aim to gain appropriate space for social, collective purposes to deal with the “processes of creative destruction that entail the dispossession of the urban masses of any right to the city whatsoever” (Harvey, 2012, p. 22).

Studies on the relationship between formal and informal urban practices also reflect the dynamics and complexity of spatialization and governance in peri-urban areas. These studies have largely focused on cases in the Global South where spatial forms fit the term peri-urbanization, which is to be distinguished from the term urbanization that avoids the Northern normative term of “city.” Studies on informal practices in peri-urban areas often focus on issues in the periphery but from a particular stance, such as migration, informal settlements, energy, water, or waste (Habyarimana et al., 2009; Auerbach, 2019; Suhartini & Jones, 2019; Zhang, 2020), to remark on spontaneous, informal development on edge due to weak state mechanisms and capacity. Nevertheless, besides opening opportunities for a deeper understanding of power practices in different urban contexts, many scholars have neglected the complexity of power relations in ongoing transitions from informality to formality. While some informal areas are occupied illegally by people working in the informal economy, many other areas on the edges of cities are mixed. Formal laborers often live in informal settlements, while informal workers live in places with land use rights. The emergence of this hybrid urbanism requires new research directions to understand its dynamic transformations (Davis D. 2017; 2018).

Additionally, some studies use the hegemonic lens to analyze peri-urbanization dynamics. Arabindoo (2009) points out that this dynamic is related to the dominance of global capitalism and the relevant actors involved in pursuing hegemonic contestation and conflict over the regulation of space. In the case of urban clearance for peri-urban transformation in China, Shih (2016) offers a theoretical explanation for why state-led urban territorial projects remain hegemonic despite the long history of peri-urban villages struggling against state control of land in the area in response to marginalization and dispossession of agricultural land. Analyzing the contestation of space in peri-urbanization in India from a value perspective, Majumder (2014) shows that the hegemonic legal-rational forms of the state always seem to confront the local community. While counter-hegemonic forms lead to disruptions to state projects and capital movements, capitalist hegemony is more deeply embedded in areas otherwise understood as challenging the hegemony of the capitalist state, such as the unorganized sector, the family, and the household. In general, the lens of hegemony can potentially recognize the complex, interactive relationship between citizens and the state and analyze the relationship between governing regimes and citizenship practices beyond the dichotomy between formal and informal urbanism.

Different perspectives in studies of peri-urban socio-spatial processes show that peri-urban transformations are dynamic and complex. They emphasize their temporal and heterogeneous nature, in addition to the dynamic and rapidly changing nature of the peri-urban area, which can challenge any reductionist view on formality or informality and state or social-centric urban politics studies. Non-reductive studies, in this case, therefore, require exploring narratives of the fluidity, diversity, and complexity of socio-spatial changes related to economic reforms, institutional arrangements, and the construction of physical environments while also acknowledging the struggles through which marginalized working classes can overcome the limitations imposed on them by the logic of market capitalism. At the same time, we can also focus on the interaction and struggle of these practices against the dominant ideologies and imaginaries protected by the ruling apparatus. This is not an ordinary two-way relationship but is dialectical, nonlinear, and time-varying.

2.5.4. Towards CPE study on dynamic peri-urban socio-spatial transformations

Reviews of arguments related to socio-spatial relations theory and empirical studies of peri-urban socio-spatial processes suggest that these areas are shaped not only by issues related to accumulation and regulation but also by different institutions, practices, discourses, ideologies, and representations that interact to shape how peri-urban areas are created, experienced, contested, and transformed (Ekers et al., 2012). Accordingly, peri-urbanization can be seen as a cultural, economic, and political arena between state, market, and social forces. Politically, it is a site associated with macro and micropower and the possibility and impossibility of state power, where political forces are indispensable and continuously engage in politicizing and depoliticizing the fundamental problems of cities, returning them to or removing them from sovereign politics (Tedesco, 2012). Economically, accumulation mechanisms based on global capital and micro-interest logic are intertwined here. Culturally, there are many differences between the visions of a modern city and the places that suit the lifestyles of different classes of people. These spheres overlap within a certain (counter-)hegemonic order. Therefore, to fully understand the processes of spatial and social transformation in peri-urban areas, it is necessary to consider at least three factors: heterogeneity and conflict, complexity and dynamism, and the social, economic, physical, and political contexts in which the transformation takes place. Thus, the lens of hegemonic struggle seems most appropriate for such a non-reductive description. This means that the CPE approach has much potential in studying peri-urbanization dynamics.

Given that CPE can provide articulations that transcend regulation issues, including socio-spatial and cultural factors reflected in arguments regarding the “integral state” and “integral economy” concerning (counter-)hegemony, it has the potential to facilitate the study of political-economic issues regarding peri-urbanization without ignoring the dynamism and

complexity of socio-spatial practices and governance in this area. It may also prove useful in understanding how forms and patterns of spatialization and socio-spatial governance are selected through strategic calculations by relevant actors based on structural selectivity. In addition, it provides suitable foundational perspectives for developing critical research studies on transformation in spatialization and governance by honoring resistance and dynamism. However, while the proponents of CPE aimed to seek a meta-theory, applying it to specific studies such as dynamic peri-urban transformation requires consideration of research topics and questions, analytical frameworks, and interpretations.

First, many urban issues arise in the process of peri-urbanization. This complexity is reflected in a variety of studies ranging from case studies to comparisons of economic, political, social, and spatial issues; urban-rural linkages; and specific issues such as housing, public services, and urban image. Depending on the identification of the problem to be analyzed and the research question, appropriate approaches will be applied. A CPE study of peri-urbanization would be suitable for addressing wicked problems that are complex problems having antagonistic mechanisms and require interdisciplinary solutions, such as the dynamic transformation of spatializing and governing peri-urban areas. Additionally, this approach can help answer not only the research questions of “how” but also “why” and “who.” Based on the logic of SRA in CPE, it can provide insights into actors, structures, and strategic structural choices of actors, specifically which actors and institutions are empowered to carry them out, where they are carried out, and for whose benefit they are carried out.

Second, the application of CPE to practice requires an appropriate analytical framework. In addition to the specific focus of CPE on the relationship between semiotics and extra-semiotics, this analytical framework needs to more fully incorporate the micro-practices of everyday life and the major transformations in the socio-spatial form (through the TPSN scheme), along with the larger contexts related to culture, politics, and economics. For example, in research on the transformation of spatializing and governing peri-urban areas, the analytical framework needs to facilitate the identification of how variations in spatializing and governing practices have shaped and manifested through modes of spatiotemporal fix and regulation-cum-governance in hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects. Additionally, it should not ignore the differences and conflicts, including hegemonic struggles between different social groups. Accordingly, it helps to discover which social forces are included and which are excluded and how they react to hegemonic projects.

Third, such a study needs to effectively utilize the explanatory power of CPE. While providing descriptions and explanations for research questions through a designed analytical framework, CPE can also offer broader implications based on its underlying theories. These theories suggest that antagonisms originate from and tend to be exacerbated

by the crisis-prone nature of capitalist political economy. In the case study of the transformation of spatializing and governing peri-urban areas, hypotheses about the contradictions and dilemmas between different spatial practices can help explore how the transformation between socio-spatial regulation and peri-urban governance occurs. This transformation, if it exists, may reflect the nature of economic models and the power relations between the state and society in this process.

In short, the CPE approach theoretically offers a potential non-reductive lens to observe dynamic peri-urban socio-spatial transformations through arguments about the articulation of semiotics and socio-spatial dimensions into political economy issues. This (counter-)hegemonic production perspective provides the potential for studying the complex and dynamic transformation of the city's edge. However, a specific analytical framework is needed to analyze different spatialization and governance practices and how they shape hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects in different urban contexts.

CHAPTER 3: TRANSFORMATION ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK OF PRODUCING AND GOVERNING THE URBAN EDGE

3.1. Transformation analysis perspectives based on SRA

3.1.1. SRA for analyzing transformation

Stemming from the aim of explaining the transformations within the capitalist state and society, SRA emphasizes the power interactions and structural relations that help to effectively trace these processes. It helps to analyze transformation through the relational mediation of strategies as the recursive interaction of the structure-agency dialectic (Jessop, 2005a; 2008). In this relationship, changes are the result of transformations in the way actors operate, which take place in strategic calculations based on specific structures. Accordingly, agencies are motivated and actively involved in the processes and carry out the change process themselves. In doing so, change depends on the crucial role of actors in deliberately placing strategies within given structural selectivities. This means these strategies also reflect shifting structures within broader processes of social, political, and economic change. Instead of explaining transformation in terms of simple context changes, SRA emphasizes structural selectivity for strategic calculations.

This approach can effectively account for transformations in governance and socio-spatial relations associated with crises, the rise of “globalization,” and the simultaneous restructuring of inherited geographies of capital accumulation, state regulation, urbanization, and social reproduction (Jessop, 1995; 1997; 1998; 2008; 2009). Among these, one of its most prominent applications is as a tool to describe processes of urban rescaling in post-Fordist European spaces, resulting from transformations in the operations of the state, capital, and actors simultaneously at many different spatial levels (Brenner, 2004). This process of (re)spatialization also involves transforming governance as the strategic reorientation of state, market, and society based on specific structural transformations. That is, SRA provides a perspective on governance strategies that implies complexity, pluralism, and dynamics in terms of agency and spatiotemporal aspects (Jessop, 1998; 2015; 2020). Thus, the analysis of spatio-temporality and governance based on SRA challenges one-sided claims about transformation perspectives, such as the state- or society-centered approach in governance and the economy-centered approach in the process of spatiotemporal changes, ignoring other modes and logics of power and capital.

More broadly, SRA also proves useful in analyzing hegemonic shifts in processes of socio-political struggle. These transformations can be seen more clearly as changes in reconciling the conflict between the logic of capitalist competition and the logic of political integration (Haus,

2010a), providing temporary solutions to challenges related to the strategic ambivalence and hegemonic orientation of state projects. Thus, it can provide a conjunctural analysis of transforming governance and spatiotemporal arrangements into broader assemblages of accumulation and hegemonic strategies. This offers a potential discussion of urban politics in its broad sense concerning the relationship between state and society, ideological struggles, social images, and different social experiences among social groups (McGuirk, 2004).

The diverse applications of SRA in state theory, political economy, and CPE show that it is a suitable starting point for analyzing transitions, especially in “addressing the dialectic of path-dependency and path-shaping in hegemonic transformation” (Sum, 2016, p. 39). For this approach to be effective in such analyses, its founder proposed that “it must always be applied in specific cases using the appropriate substantive theories and concepts. What the SRA offers is a more sophisticated set of questions that have to be translated into a set of substantive arguments” (Jessop, 2006a). Accordingly, the next section will focus on reviewing two popular SRA-based transformation analysis perspectives: analyzing transformation through hegemonic projects and the production of (counter-)hegemony.

3.1.2. Analyzing transformation through hegemonic project

For Gramsci (1971), hegemony involves “bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a ‘universal’ plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups” (p. 182). Accordingly, neo-Gramscian SRA argues that hegemony is formed through successful hegemonic projects. Such hegemonic projects can be defined as comprehensive policy plans combining an accumulation strategy with a state project (Jessop, 1983, 1997, 2002). Considering the political process, Hajer (1989) stated that “a hegemonic project is a political project which constitutes a general political-strategic program at a specific political-institutional level” (p. 32). More specifically, the hegemonic project synthesizes “the myriad of actions, practices, tactics and strategies that are pursued by an often-unaccountable number of actors in any given societal conflict, and that are chosen by actors before the background of their vastly different, specific power resources” (Kannankulam & Georgi, 2014, p. 64). According to this understanding, forming and maintaining an urban hegemony requires coordination by multiple strategic state projects, operationalized by various scalar forms of coercion and consensus, the dialectic of “hard” and “soft” power. Such a hegemonic project is always linked to strategies of political-economic transformation that ensure its success and maintain its dominance. The perspective of the hegemonic project is, therefore, suitable for an investigation that illuminates the changing patterns of regulation-cum-governance and spatiotemporal fixes that stabilize the capitalist order.

The hegemonic project provides an effective analytical structure to clarify the state's perspective as a complex and socio-spatially heterogeneous institutional ensemble (Jessop, 2008). Through this lens, one can explain how the power practices of transitions are connected and articulated within a broader set of interdependent political-economic relations and contingencies. This argument allows neo-Gramscian SRA to expand the analysis of state institutions changing scale, such as decentralization and centralization, regionalization, and internationalization. Alternatively, it allows for an account of the governance transformations and scalar fixes linked to the capacity of the state to ensure global neoliberal accumulation (Cox, 1993; Keil, 1998; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; Brenner, 2019; Brenner & Theodore, 2002a). Overall, the use of historical materialist-centered institutional analysis provides powerful explanations of governance transformations and spatiotemporal fixes based on their strategic role in shaping hegemonic projects.

Analyses based on the hegemonic project emphasize the strategic coordination and structural combination of economics and politics performed contingently by political actors through situational practices. Therefore, it becomes consistent with the logic of discourse analysis (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Hajer, 1989). Some scholars applying a neo-Gramscian perspective extend the analysis of the articulation of power relations through the specific socio-spatial discourses and practices of actors to identify the political identities and interests of particular actors or collectives. They document their participation and selectively institutionalize it, showing how they support specific strategies of discourse and action and outcomes of particular policy practices. This, in turn, facilitates the emergence of hegemonic projects (Jessop & Sum, 2006; Jessop, 1997). Through this, analysts can determine discursive coalitions forming through partnerships in which a hegemonic project and the consensus around it are implemented through *realpolitik*. Meanwhile, actors without coherent interests are often marginalized because they have less influence in the political discourse (Jessop, 1997; Hajer, 1989; Cox & Mair, 1991; Jenson, 1993). Accordingly, the multidimensional debates of political actors in urban contexts can provide institutional structures for understanding the constituent parts of internal and external discursive contexts that draw attention to the scalar organization of the state and local politics of modes of regulation and governance.

Both institutional analysis and discourse analysis in urban hegemonic projects involve the strategies of a group or coalition of urban actors to incorporate their own spatial and political vision into the production of urban space. This process is associated with the specific interests of subordinate social forces through political, intellectual, and moral leadership. The aim is to ensure the long-term interests of the hegemonic power by convincing other groups that their interests would be well served by joining a social coalition under the leadership of the hegemonic group. This involves integrating relevant forces from contingent practices and

promoting them into a typical project that creates benefits felt by subordinate social forces, ultimately becoming a “policy model” in which conflicts of interests and competing demands can be negotiated without threatening the totality of social hegemony.

Regulationists argue that new modes of regulation emerge as accidental discoveries through trial-and-error searches. This is reflected in continued experimentation to find new and more appropriate forms of representation of governance and spatiotemporal fixes in response to the failure and crisis of urban political and local economic patterns. This line of analysis emphasizes the path dependence of the transition process through the hegemonic project. Such a political logic of urbanization is not new in its political forms, but it allows for the analysis of urban political-economic transformations without recasting the dichotomy by distinct political ontologies and epistemologies.

3.1.3. Analyzing transformation through the production of (counter-)hegemony

This perspective, based on CPE, focuses on hegemonic and counter-hegemonic production processes, rather than seeing hegemonic projects as structural transformations to analyze. Indeed, this approach is an SRA analysis of political-economic dynamics and transformations based on the constitutive role of semiosis and the emergent extra-semiotic features. It helps to study the process of forming, reproducing, and transforming hegemony, counter-hegemony, and sub-hegemony. Accordingly, by examining the transformation of governance and spatialization in (counter-)hegemonic production, the CPE analytical framework can link these transformations to cultural processes, the broader economy, and society. Through this, it also emphasizes the process of creating resistance, leading to struggles and conflicts, and continuous negotiation and changing compromises to stabilize the hegemonic order. This reveals the nature of these transitions’ politicization, depoliticization, and repoliticization.

In terms of the analytical framework, a study of transformation based on CPE should focus on analyzing (counter-)hegemonic production and the interaction between semiotic and non-semiotic aspects involved in this process to answer the questions: On what terrain does hegemony take place; how hegemony is formed; what is the role of hegemony; who participates in (re)producing hegemony? Interests from various perspectives of hegemonic production suggest that CPE’s research agenda is broad and requires a specific research framework. Jessop and Sum (2013) propose studying hegemonic production based on three evolutionary mechanisms involving the interaction of four interweaving modes of strategic selectivity and the emergence of seven discursive-material moments.

Concerning evolutionary mechanisms, CPE proposes a model of politicization that distinguishes between three stages: “the contingent emergence (variation), subsequent privileging (selection),

and ongoing realization (retention) of specific discursive and material practices” (Jessop, 2013b, p. 237). During the first phase of transformation, many ideas and visions circulate to describe and resolve the crisis. In disputes between representatives of different views, politicization occurs. In the second phase, selection, ideas are confronted with reality as they are integrated into structures such as state apparatuses, institutions, laws, and hegemonic discourses. In the third stage, retention, the dispute is reduced to which of the few remaining ideas and visions will prevail and materialize in policies. In short, the production of a (counter-)hegemony comes from various perspectives and positions at the beginning of a political debate process, which then confronts existing material structures and gradually adapts to existing hegemonic groups through selection and retention (Jessop & Sum, 2013; Kallert et al., 2021).

To analyze the evolutionary process that creates this hegemony, Jessop and Sum present four strategic choices that include structural, agential, discursive, and technological (in a Foucauldian sense) selectivity. Among the multitude of discursive-material mechanisms, processes, practices, and technologies, only some structures, actors, discourses, and technologies become more dominant by “the asymmetrical configuration of constraints and opportunities on social forces as they pursue particular projects” (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 214), and through which hegemonies (intellectual, moral, and self-leadership) are constructed. Structural and actor selectivity are dialectically related, referring to actors' capacity to devise different strategies in social forms, institutions, organizations, and contexts. Next, discursive selections are a complex result of the combination and co-evolution of semiotics and extra-semiotics. Finally, technological selectivity identifies “the social technologies involved in constituting objects, creating subject positions and recruiting subjects, and, in particular, in this context, creating relations of power/knowledge and the possibilities of governmentalization” (p. 216).

In addition to the four interweaving modes of strategic selectivity, the CPE approach also focuses on analyzing material and discursive moments that help examine the production of (counter-)hegemony. These moments reflect the variation, selection, and retention process through new discourses that shape social practices and create social restructuring. The moments make apparent a (counter-)hegemony that is formed, fixed, and realized through the interaction between materiality and discourse. Meaning-making and materiality are like a pendulum that swings back and forth in different phases. Some are more discursive in these moments, while others are more material. Jessop and Sum (2013) present seven discursive-material moments in producing hegemonies and the associated counter-hegemony, including:

- Discursive-strategic moment of socio-economic restructuring;
- Agential selective moment rooted in the wider social formations;

- (Inter)discursive selective moment in the order of discourses;
- Technological-selective moment in constituting social/economic reality;
- Moment in the constituting/consolidating of subjects and sedimenting of common sense;
- Moment in re-regularizing and sedimenting social relations;
- Counter-hegemonic resistance and negotiations.

Because “CPE recognizes both the constitutive role of semiosis and the emergent extra-semiotic features of social relations and their conjoint impact on capacities for action and transformation” (Jessop, 2004, p. 161), the CPE analytical framework can contribute to research on transformations of governance and spatialization practices by articulating these transformations into broader practices involving interactions between meanings, institutions, and capital to (re)produce (counter-)hegemony. Accordingly, CPE’s research interests manifest in its focus on the interactions of different actors in their discursive and material practices in multiscalar arenas to (re)produce (counter-)hegemony. Such an ambitious research framework offers many different marketable approaches that can be developed. However, at the same time, as a post-disciplinary, it is also vulnerable to attacks from other research traditions, particularly regarding the relationship between meaning-making and materiality and critiques of ideology and domination.

3.1.4. The limitations of analyzing transformation through the hegemonic project and CPE

The analytical framework based on the hegemonic project provides a structural perspective that effectively contributes to neo-Gramscian SRA by expanding their understanding of the local state. However, transformation analysis based on this perspective also has problems related to structuralism and reductionism.

While this approach emphasizes the structural importance of the hegemonic project and sees it as an order into which transformations must be embedded, Davies (2011) argues that this approach focuses on the form of domination and ignores resistance. He believes that a strong dialectic emphasizes that no matter how different urban management mechanisms are, they cannot completely eliminate the antagonisms that originate from and tend to be aggravated by the crisis-prone nature of the capitalist political economy. Indeed, while focusing on transformations of domination within zones of relative hegemonic stability and emphasizing the state’s central role, this perspective has little to say about forms of resistance or the cultural politics of subordinate actors. In places and times where the contradictions of hegemonic projects are not readily apparent to those occupying marginal social positions, such groups are beyond the reach of hegemonic projects but still within the economic and political “foundation” of their city (Brenner et al., 2012). Therefore, this approach limits the understanding of hegemony, especially in contexts of unstable zones of hegemony, such as peri-urban spaces. As a result,

some contributions to urban political processes that rely on hegemonic structures and hegemonic projects tend to echo analyses of nation-states at the local level rather than focusing on the position of local states as a terrain of struggle between state institutions and civil society.

In addition to the structuralist problem, analyses of governance transformation and spatiotemporal fixes through the hegemonic project also face issues related to reductionism among economism and culturalism. While cities are becoming increasingly complex due to global competition, immigration, and neo-liberalism, it is impossible to explore and define the chaotic conditions of urban life through an overly reductive terminology of urban hegemony. An excessive focus on economism and culturalism also reduces transition analysis to materiality and discourse. Studies that focus on institutional change tend to downplay the importance of “political processes such as coalition building between factions or agencies, and neglects the important practical question of creating the organisational capacity and resources to govern effectively in the interests of capital” (Collinge & Hall, 2005, p. 140). Discourse-based analyses are often criticized for obscuring extra-discursive concerns, such as path dependence, institutional frameworks or material practices (Torfing, 1999; Jessop, 2008).

Regarding CPE, the above descriptions make it clear that this approach is concerned with the process of (counter-)hegemonic production from a variety of perspectives, as it is concerned with capturing the interplay between semiotics and structures. Therefore, CPE provides a comprehensive and multidimensional analytical framework, which can supplement solutions to overcome the limitations often encountered in studies applying the neo-Gramscian SRA approach to analyzing the transformation of urban governance and spatialization. However, this approach also faces various criticisms. Van Heur (2010a; 2010b) criticized CPE’s proposal of a theory that sought to explain everything but could explain nothing because it was not designed to explain specific phenomena in depth. In other words, CPE “lacks an empirical research strategy” (2010b, p. 445).

CPE-based studies to date have mainly focused on analyzing and explaining the production of images such as economic imaginaries (Sum, 2009; 2014), urban imaginaries (Dannestam, 2008; Suitner, 2015), and governance imaginaries (Jessop, 2015; 2020). These studies show that CPE can provide a starting point for designing analytical frameworks that are more suitable for empirical research. The CPE research framework can be expanded or adapted by including the practice-relevant links and processes that need to be explored. At the same time, studies can also emphasize the specificity of some prominent aspects of CPE’s form, content, and logic for specific research objectives without necessarily applying the entire research framework. Such perspectives based on personal experience make a significant empirical contribution to this approach. At the same time, they also reveal the problems facing the CPE approach.

First, using imaginaries as key objects for analyzing hegemonic production practices is appropriate and valuable because imaginaries are essential in reducing complexity and helping us “go on” in the world (Jessop, 2020). However, imaginaries only partially reflect the complex hegemonic relationships in different contexts because imaginaries concern ideology and lived experience rather than direct material aspects. It is, therefore, necessary to develop more comprehensive analytical perspectives on imaginaries to clarify their various elements and their links to ideas, practices, forms, and objects of governance.

Second, these studies link the narratives that justify the production of hegemonic imaginaries to the underlying regimes of accumulation they support. This tendency shows that CPE analysis often needs to be revised to include the role of interests and material needs, as explanations are often based on logical references to surplus accumulation. Not all shifts in hegemonic production directly reflect changes in the underlying accumulation mechanisms. Sau (2021) argues that this aspect of Jessop and Sum’s project needs further development and that some inconsistencies can be found in their theoretical claims. Accordingly, while acknowledging the importance of surplus accumulation in explaining transformations in hegemonic production, it is necessary to provide means to demonstrate its connection with other interests and motivations.

Third, while analyzing emerging economic/urban imaginaries, much research applying CPE tends to ignore critical features of the actual economy/apparatus of urban spatial production at work, which exists and continues to have a real impact. This analytical tendency can miss other aspects of power that involve conflicts, dilemmas, and paradoxes; conditions of existence and impacts beyond the economy or semiosis; and spatiotemporal depth, breadth, rhythm, and sequence. It is, therefore, necessary to develop a broader analytical framework that reflects the interactions between dominant hegemonic production and emerging counter-hegemonic and sub-hegemonic production.

Some scholars have sought to overcome the above problems to enhance CPE. Caterina (2018) proposes supplementing the historical materialist policy analysis (HMPA) method to analyze how to build specific policies based on the context of the country’s fundamentally conflicting and competing interests in various social forces. This approach emphasizes the social projects that are struggling to achieve hegemonic status but have yet to achieve it, including the countless actions, practices, tactics, and strategies pursued by different subjects. Sau (2021) uses “social commentaries” as a supplement to observe the process of hegemonic struggle related to class, interests, and other political struggles.

Drawing on the reviews of transformational analysis based on the hegemonic project and hegemonic production perspectives, this study concretizes CPE by applying it to the case of urban (counter-)hegemonic production through the analysis of the dynamic transformation of

spatialization and governance processes instead of through urban images as in previous analyses. To do this, this study needs to integrate CPE arguments into urban theories to develop a suitable analytical framework.

3.2. Towards transformation analysis through urban (counter-)hegemonic struggles

3.2.1. Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-Neo-Gramscian dialogue

To concretize and adapt the CPE approach to research on the transformation of governance and spatialization in peri-urban areas, it is essential to fully determine what urban (counter-)hegemony is, the process of producing urban (counter-)hegemony, and its characteristics. This work meaningfully connects the works of Henri Lefebvre, Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, and the scholars following these schools. Although the socio-spatial theories of all three thinkers have mainly been researched and theorized independently of each other, they have valuable intersections that can serve as complementary foundations for analyzing power relationships in space and time.

It is no coincidence that scholars in socio-spatial studies claim all three thinkers as spatial theorists. Lefebvre is credited with laying the foundations for thinking about space in a way that integrates its social meaning produced along with its formal and material aspects (Soja, 1989). Lefebvre believes that spaces are created from social relations and nature because those spaces are both products and conditions of the possibility of social relations (Lefebvre, 1974). His significant contribution to the production of space led to the premise that social space is a social product based on the spatial triad of spatial practice, spatial representation, and performance space. Gramsci, a Marxist before Lefebvre, considered space from a historically spatial approach related to the strategies that led to the division of labor space between different territorial scales, territorialization, amorphization orientation of political power, and the different ways of representing space (Gramsci, 1971). Not drawing on the Marxist tradition, Foucault explores space in its heterogeneity concerning history and social context. His emphasis on disruption, discontinuity, and surveillance encouraged a spatialized conception of subjectivity. In general, all three spatial theorists emphasized that social space is not an immaterial thing, an empty, static plane, but one on which people act and events occur. In other words, space is constructed through social relationships and thereby reshapes social structures.

The critical intersection between these three spatial theorists is the relationship between power and space. All three thinkers considered how space and power function in interaction, each created according to the principle of reciprocity (Table 6). Lefebvre's oeuvre sheds light on how the dialectical relationship between social existence and space is essential, as it lays out a framework for analyzing how space shapes social life (and vice versa) and how power operates

through spatial structures. His spatial triad view shows that the power of capital and the state have a crucial role in how space is structured and thus influences how it is perceived and experienced. Accordingly, his analysis of spatial forms of capitalism and their direct connection to the modes of capital accumulation and the social relations that originate from these forms show the ways of power over space to make a profit. Meanwhile, Foucault challenges the idea of the privileges of sovereign power. He examines biopower—including its techniques, methods, mechanisms, and institutional forms—at its specific sites of operation (space), where power is conceived, exercised, and resisted as an integral part of modern networks of power relations and social discipline. Thus, “space is fundamental in any exercise of power” (Foucault, 1986, p. 252), and “space as an apparatus of political technology and scientific discourse in the transition from absolutist to disciplinary power” (Ronneberger, 2008, p. 136). For Gramsci, (counter-)hegemony is formed in spatial relations. Examining hegemony is, therefore, to consider “a confluence of multiple temporalities and a multiscalar and unevenly developed set of spatial relations” (Kipfer, 2013, p. 85–86) in which spatial strategies for gaining hegemony can be seen as a part of the “war of position,” or “invisible power” (Lukes, 2005). While Foucault (1980; 1986; 1995) argued that power always leads to an inevitable consequence of resistance at the micro level, Gramsci’s strong theory of resistance emphasizes class at a more macro level. From Lefebvre’s perspective, resistance is in a dialectic with power in different spaces and everyday life. In general, all three theorists argue that specific power relationships determine social space. In it, there always exist contingent processes of domination/resistance through which a social space is constructed that becomes hegemony and counter-hegemony.

Table 6

Lefebvre, Foucault, and Gramsci on power, space, and time

	Lefebvre	Foucault	Gramsci
Main spatial perspective	Social production of space	Heterogeneous spaces of sites and relations	Socially produced spatial distinction
Modality of power	Power over urbanization but possible power to citizens	Power to disciplinary society	Hegemony (dialectic between coercion and consensus)
Power and space	Dialectics of spatial production	Spatial techniques of power	Spatial strategies
Level of analysis	Interaction between micro-macro-level	Micro-levels of power to individual bodies	Macro-level of institutions
Temporality	Linear and artificial	Across a range of temporal scales	Confluence of multiple temporalities

Note. The author’s synthesis

Integrative work amongst these theories enriches this ongoing Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-neo-Gramscian dialogue. First, Gramscianizing Foucault is central to Jessop and Sum's work (2013) in constructing CPE by emphasizing the production of hegemonies that are mediated through micro-logical power related to specific technologies and practices. This can help explore the material-discursive mechanisms, processes, practices, and technologies in and through which hegemonies (intellectual, moral, and self-leadership) are built in diverse and broader social fields. While this resonance is an important way of developing CPE, other productive dialogues between Lefebvre and Gramsci and Lefebvre and Foucault can provide ways of applying CPE in an urban context. By implicitly referencing Lefebvre and Gramsci, some scholars have brought understandings of hegemony through the (re)production of space at the urban and regional scale (Brenner & Elden, 2009), and into everyday life (Kipfer & Keil, 2002; Kipfer, 2002). They emphasize that hegemony requires specific forms of abstract space to dominate the way space is perceived, conceived, and lived. These spatial orders only become hegemonic when a compromise is reached between abstract space and space of difference (or heterotopias, to use Foucault's term). In addition, re-reading Lefebvre and Foucault shows that the relationship between spatial production practices cannot be narrowed down through their ideology or materiality but needs to incorporate all aspects together (Prigge, 2008). This combination can be found in several works of geographers such as Claude Raffestin (1980), Guy Di Meo (1991), and Edward Soja (1996). The most obvious is Soja's term Thirdspace, which merges the abstract and the concrete, subjectivity and objectivity, mind and body, consciousness and the unconscious, the disciplined and the transdisciplinary, and the real and the imagined together as "an-Other way of understanding and acting to change the spatiality of human life, a distinct mode of critical spatial awareness" (1996, p. 57).

While the insights of the three theorists on power and space can help explain how space becomes governable, the works based on their dialogue and integration emphasize more pluralism and criticalism in accounting for the complex power relations in spatial processes. In the following sections, the relevant content of this dialogue will be discussed heuristically to supplement CPE with specific perspectives on urban hegemony, urban hegemonic production, and urban hegemonic struggle.

3.2.2. Production of space and production of urban (counter-)hegemony

The aim of this section is to define the scope and content of urban hegemonic production based on the Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-neo-Gramscian dialogue. The basis of these arguments is the commonality of all three theorists of hegemony. Gramsci conceptualized "hegemony" (1974) as the domination of one or a group of classes over society with minimal repression. Lefebvre (1974) echoed a similar argument put forward by Gramsci, arguing that hegemony extends beyond the influence and coercion of the ruler. He asserts that it extends to controlling the

production space and managing the rulers' ideologies and rationalities, which are later imposed on the ruled through everyday life (Kipfer, 2002; 2008). The concept of hegemony corresponds to Foucault's analysis of the relations between power and knowledge (Smart, 1994). He emphasizes that the effects of hegemony should be implanted in micro-relationships to produce and govern subjectivation. Accordingly, this section proposes to examine (counter-)urban hegemony through three main perspectives integrated from this dialogue.

Urban (counter-)hegemonic production in spatial production

In urban contexts, (counter-)hegemony is embedded in and reproduced through the production of space. Accordingly, (counter-)hegemony is achieved through the processes, relations, and multi-scalar spatial structures to ensure capital accumulation through the reproduction of urban space and the survival of capital existence through capitalist accumulation and the reassertion of political power. That is, "the production of space 'serves' hegemony" (Kipfer, 2008: 200).

Accordingly, Lefebvre's proposed three-dimensional model of space can provide a foundational understanding of (counter-)urban hegemony. The first dimension is the representation of space (conceived space), which is the space formed concerning the relations of production and the order that these relations regulate, that is, knowledge, signals, and rules. In other words, it is institutional or ideological. This is the conceptualized space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocrats, and planners aiming at a space that can be quantified and managed, thereby supporting and integrating legalized state management methods. The second dimension is spatial practice or perceived space. The reality of perceived space can be realized through empirical and physical examination as streets and networks of interconnected places for work, leisure, and private life. Finally, lived space is represented through associated images and symbols and is the space of people and users. This is the space of passive experience that the imagination seeks to change or occupy. This representational space overlays physical space, making the use of symbols of objects possible. Simply put, urban (counter-)hegemonic practices are formed and expressed through the production of space and time created by various methods, including material, spatial representation practices, and everyday space appropriation practices (Lefebvre, 1974).

Because urban (counter-)hegemony is reflected through spatial production as a relationship between different spatial production activities, hegemony is reflected not only by images but also by entities, institutions/technology, and materials that make up urban space. Due to these elements having a dialectical relationship, (counter-)urban hegemony essentially involves a dialectical unification of culture, economics, and politics into a dominant universal perspective in producing urban space.

Production of urban (counter-)hegemony in everyday life

Foucault, Lefebvre, and Gramsci all explored and emphasized the role of everyday life in the relationship between power and space. This concept is essential in forming Lefebvre's spatial dialectic triad. It is a space where all activities occur realistically and simultaneously, an inauthentic experience colonized by capitalism. Foucault argues that this is the space that is actually lived and socially created as the habitus of social practices, that is, the micro-dynamics of power (discipline and knowledge) in everyday life. The Gramscian view is that the concrete practices of the interaction between the state and civil society can be understood as the micropolitics of the unified state in action. Therefore, everyday life is key to (re)creating the (counter-)hegemony of the urban, as it is associated with repetitive and familiar routines (Kipfer, 2002).

Lefebvre's perspective on hegemony lies in the relationship between abstract structures and everyday life. Hegemonies are realized through everyday life and act as a relative urban hegemonic order. This process involves the formation of coalitions (historical blocs) to form a hegemonic bloc. These dominant hegemonic assemblages tend to monopolize control and expand spatial production (capitalist expansion), leading to ever-deepening spatial division and exclusion. In the opposite direction, opposition projects also use everyday life as a terrain to connect claims to influence strategies that turn isolated, minimally differentiated peripheral areas into tasks in the quest for spatial centrality and non-capitalist forms of everyday life. Accordingly, counter-hegemonic practices also impact abstract space through daily life. In short, urban hegemony and counter-hegemony are produced by implementing meaning in abstract structures into concrete places through everyday life practices. These everyday practices thus help to extend the scope of observation in producing urban (counter-)hegemony beyond the issues of accumulation associated with urban lifestyles, habits, everyday urban life, living environments, and costs.

Focusing on the analysis of (counter-)hegemonic practices in everyday life within the context of abstract structures can form a bridge for the analysis between exchange value (surplus accumulation orientation) and use value (daily life) of urban socio-spatial configurations (Lefebvre, 1996; Harvey, 1978; Molotch & Logan, 1984). This combination of multiple dimensions of power and the integration of "minimum difference" into the reproduction of capitalism (Kipfer, 2008) reflects the combination of micro and macro dimensions of the fabric of reality. Here, the SRA approach can help clarify how different (counter-)hegemonic practices are produced as strategic selectivities of relevant agents in given structures.

Production of urban (counter-)hegemony as dispositive

The arguments to date have expanded the understanding of urban (counter-)hegemony as a set of cultural, economic, and political practices through which power relations are channeled to (re)configure the relationships between the state, civil society, and individual actors, attempting to create shared perceptions of urban space to reinforce urban (counter-)hegemony. These heterogeneous assemblages are what Foucault (1980) named a *dispositif* (many scholars use the English word dispositive/apparatus instead). The *dispositif* here involves spatializing a field of social action through the placement of material things in social space through a particular constellation of discourse and non-discourse (Pløger, 2008) that includes discourses, formal and informal institutions, architectural forms, management decisions, laws, administrative measures, and everyday life. Such a contingent knowledge-power combination leads to changes in control techniques or the development of new power techniques in space through tactical strategies related to the concept of governmentality as Foucault's "art of government." Thus, the assemblage of these strategic selectivities in terms of the spatial production of urban hegemonic space reflects a dispositive in its extended sense in CPE. That is, urban hegemonic production "always has its own structural, discursive, technological and agential selectivities that are grounded in the complex topological ensemble that comprises the "dispositive" (Jessop & Sum, 2013, p. 208).

In sum, the Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-neo-Gramscian dialogue offers the view that urban (counter-)hegemonic production is a synthesis of evolutionary mechanisms in shaping transformations of understanding and construction of urban space, in addition to a more inclusive conception of (counter-)hegemonic urbanism that incorporates concerns about the role of difference, ideology, culture and symbolism in the production of urban space (Jackson 1989). Urban (counter-)hegemonic analysis must go beyond urban political economy and state theory and extend to issues of everyday life (Kipfer, 2002; 2008). Accordingly, such a project must capture the meaningfulness and materiality of the urban as the intermediary, multidimensional center between macro-social (and state) structures and micro-realities of everyday life (Lefebvre, 1974), thereby helping to shed light on the production of urban space under capitalist hegemony (Lefebvre, 1992).

3.2.3. Urban (counter-)hegemonic struggles

All three theorists believe that power is always accompanied by struggle or conflict. Foucault (2008 [1978]) claims, "Where there is power, there is resistance and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (p. 95). In the same vein, both Lefebvre and Gramsci articulate that (counter-)hegemony is the incomplete and never complete result of multidimensional processes and strategies in the

spatial dialectic (Lefebvre, 1974; Kipfer, 2008). Therefore, there is no stagnation in any urban (counter-)hegemony but always continued struggle, conflict, and rivalry. In everyday life, we find constant struggles between elite and subaltern forces (to strengthen and weaken hegemonic projects or to offer counter-hegemonic alternatives) and within elite groups (to redefine and rework the existing framework's political, ideological, and economic foundations). This process reflects the view that social power is not simply a matter of domination, obedience, or resistance but is also a struggle. In Gramsci's thought, this struggle involves a battle for position, "passive revolution" – through agreement rather than force – or "a form of intellectual, moral and political change" by his interpretation. Thus, the process of (counter-)urban hegemonic struggle emphasizes competition with each other or opposition from different forces in producing urban space to maintain or change existing (counter-)hegemonic projects with alternative projects. Accordingly, the Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-neo-Gramscian approach provides three aspects to further clarify the nature of urban (counter-)hegemonic struggles.

Urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle within and between abstract and concrete space

Lefebvre's spatial triad also explains the mechanism for the formation of abstract and concrete space. Abstract space is the constitutive basis of the capitalist mode of production. According to Lefebvre, capitalism and new capitalism created abstract space through the unity of the conceived activities of capitalists and the state and imposed it on perceived and lived space in their favor (Kipfer, 2008). The concretization of the abstract space coded by professionals and politicians can lead to the expulsion of peripheral elements by force, and "lived experience is crushed, vanquished by what is 'conceived of'" (Lefebvre, 1974, p. 51). In contrast to the abstract space often used by the state, people use their own living space, which Lefebvre calls distinct or concrete space (also similar to Foucault's heterogeneous space). Differential space appears as a unified whole of lived space, and perceived space involves spatial practices that users appropriate to create heterogeneous spaces and relationships. The space of difference is characterized by the diversity of perceptions of different social groups that form different spaces in the urban whole. Thus, these two types differ in their emphasis on the unity of conceived and perceived aspects in abstract space and lived and perceived aspects in concrete space.

The struggle for urban hegemony is fundamentally the interaction of power to seek influence, compete, and pursue consensus from different actors within each type of space and between these two types of space. Lefebvre argues that it is a mistake to assume that the production of space is limited to bureaucrats, managers, and planners. The planning and use of space by the state and real estate developers and investors can conflict with how people use social space. Imbalances in decision-making in spatial production create relationships of domination,

subordination, and spatial conflict. Lefebvre believes that this contradiction in abstract and different spaces is one of the fundamental contradictions in modern society, besides the contradictions in class interests from a Marxist perspective. He focuses on the contradictions between abstract space and difference through the dialectic between everyday life, urbanity, and difference. More specifically, there is a polarization between technocrats, who create urban forms with top-down strategies, policies, and plans, and other groups, which distinguish themselves by resisting the process of assimilation, trying to occupy a space of their own through bottom-up practices.

(Counter-)hegemonic struggle is also a feature of the production of urban space and underlies Lefebvre's arguments about "the right to the city." Forming urban hegemony always asymmetrically affects different groups of people living in the city. The situation of marginalization is increasingly serious for disadvantaged social groups such as immigrants, professionals, unskilled workers, those who make a living on the streets, and people experiencing homelessness in the abstract spatial context of neo-liberalism, which is increasingly dominant. One of the solutions to this problem is urban movements at the local scale to claim the "right to the city" (Andretta et al., 2015; Mayer et al., 2016).

Urban (counter-) hegemonic struggle in everyday life

Because abstract and concrete spaces need to be performed and embedded in everyday life to gain meaning and thus exist, practices through everyday life play an essential role in producing space, which is also an arena for the struggle for urban hegemony. Everyday life, therefore, is full of contradictions. In this way, abstract spaces, through institutional systems, technology, and state apparatus, transform the ideologies of the ruling class into idealized images and incorporate them into everyday life. At the same time, spaces of difference often arise from everyday practices related to ideology, reification, and lived experiences outside the stable zone of the existing hegemonic order. These practices challenge existing hegemony by influencing mediating aspects such as image, institutions, and action to a certain extent. Depending on the context, such as political openness/control and the capacity of subordinated groups, they can organize these practices into collective actions such as social movements, political groups, socio-political opposition, and the formation of anti-hegemonic projects. More typically, they choose a reformist or pragmatic method, making their demands in a way that does not fundamentally undermine the dominant worldview or power dynamics while gaining some concessions or small compromises from those in power. In other contexts, counter-hegemonic actions can be found through the appropriation of space by marginalized groups through everyday practices and the affirmation of collective identity.

Urban hegemonic struggles in everyday life emphasize the possibility of action-power, similar to Stone's logic of the urban regime (1989). In this, the daily practices of political actors' political visions, projects, and strategies depend not only on their material resources and opportunities but also on their ability to form and gain influence for ideological frameworks. That is, their capacity to act and their possibilities for action are based on both discursive and material foundations (Kipfer, 2002; 2008; Hajer, 1989). This perspective can address the challenges of linking micro- and macro-levels to spatiotemporal fixes by incorporating an analysis of (macro) regulation embedded in the struggle for hegemony, which takes place across multiple locations and scales simultaneously and articulates them with (micro) everyday life. At the same time, these activities provide sources for strategic-relational analysis, which highlights collective actors regarding the strategic selectivities inscribed within structures of urban (counter-)hegemonic projects.

Discursive-material moments of urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle

Because the production of (counter-)urban hegemony operates as a *dispositif*, urban (counter-)hegemonic struggles also involve conflicts, negotiations, and bargaining in a set of interventions not only meaning-making by discourse but also techniques, knowledge, and power apparatuses in ways that urban space was formed. In this sense, the (counter-)hegemonic struggles include different ways of building power/knowledge through the dialectical relationship between materiality and discourse to intervene and attempt to influence other social groups as strategic selectivities. It is not a zero-sum game but a relational struggle (a resistance) that continues and changes. Thus, this perspective does not focus exclusively on dominant assemblages but also reflects strategies emerging from below and the periphery, which can help analyze and overcome structural problems while not ignoring voiceless actors in the processes of production and reproduction of urban space. This is clearly appropriate in some cases of urban hegemonic struggles in which actors (especially the subaltern) cannot raise their voices but instead act through material things (Kipfer, 2002; 2008; Jessop & Sum, 2013).

The above aspect implies that there are a variety of material-discursive moments in (counter-)urban hegemony. At the same time, there are many ways to define specific moments. This process can be observed through the material-discursive moments proposed in the CPE approach, with a more dialectical perspective, to identify strategic choices in the production of urban (counter-)hegemony, in addition to the reaction, resistance, contestation, and compromise between (counter-)hegemonic projects and their outcomes related to the possibility of restructuring power, opening up different processes of objectification.

3.2.4. Transforming socio-spatial production and governance through urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle

As mentioned, urban (counter-)hegemony is always unstable, conflictual, and constantly changing, so transformations in governance and the production of space must inevitably involve the processes of urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle. Thus, it is necessary to consider these transformations as involving not only a complex set of tools and policies articulated by cultural, economic, and political issues to overcome crises and maintain an ideology as a certain way of life that is dominant and widespread throughout society, but is also constitutive part of the constant struggles to build consensus and support it through coercion. In other words, the change in spatial production and governance can be better seen as a change through the reconciliation of conflicts between the logic of capitalist competition, the logic of political integration, and the logic of culture in the struggle for urban (counter-)hegemony.

The perspective of transforming governance and spatialization in peri-urban areas as manifestations of (counter-)hegemonic struggle emphasizes that in addition to a main hegemonic order that has been/is being established, there still exist governance practices and spaces below created by disadvantaged groups. These two orders have a close relationship in the continuous chain of consensus and coercion in the process of (counter-)hegemonic struggle (Davies, 2011). Therefore, analyzing transitions as an expression of urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle is distinct from approaches to transitions as a manifestation of a changing political-institutional order in the city, or from a normative perspective as the expression of political practice, institutionally enabled for “social innovation” (Gualini, 2018). Equally, one could argue that the transition reflects the fragility and failure of current coordination practices between different sectors, which are necessary to maintain urban hegemony, leading to the need to re-adjust forms of coordination and establish flexible institutions or the general equilibrium perspective of capital. However, the perspective of transformation through urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle emphasizes the continuum of consensus and coercion to define a relative hegemonic order (Davies, 2011).

Analyzing transformation through urban (counter-)hegemonic struggles is necessary to understand the pluralism of socio-spatial governance and practices in contemporary urban politics. This perspective provides insight into how transformations are deeply articulated in diverse, complex, and heterogeneous cultural, economic, and political relationships within urban spaces. Such an eclectic perspective can provide an integrative analytical approach, help overcome some of the limitations of the CPE approach, and offer the potential to bridge various dichotomies in current research studies on urban politics, such as formality/informality and

local/national. Such an analysis of transition needs to reflect the characteristics of the logic of urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle.

First, the analysis of transformations must reflect the dimensions of urban (counter-)hegemonic production. Transformation processes must take place within the production of urban space. In particular, the analysis of transforming spatial production and governance needs to focus on the related aspects of conceiving, perceiving, and living activities to form urban spaces. Additionally, these transition analyses need to be embedded in different abstract and concrete spaces. Thus, it emphasizes the diversity of models of governance and spatialization patterns that coexist within different (counter-)hegemonic projects. This perspective of transformational analysis responds to Jessop's call (2003) to move beyond relative institutional orders, avoiding the neglect of resistance, counter-hegemony, and political practices and movements from areas of hegemonic chaos. At the same time, it follows Soja's (2000; 2010) call to grasp a transitional perspective regarding the spatially uneven distribution of resources and the processes that cause and sustain geographies of injustice, especially place-specific manifestations (such as peri-urban areas) of uneven development and underdevelopment. This emphasizes the importance of the subaltern in resisting hegemony, creating new potential for agreement with the ruling class, and possibly leading to the reproduction or creation of new hegemonies in the process of social transformation.

Second, transformation analysis needs to be based on everyday urban (counter-)hegemony practices and how they form part of the (counter-)hegemony fabric. These practices reflect not only the continuous, contingent, and always incomplete processes of (counter-)hegemonic struggle but also those involved in the transformations, in addition to a constitutive compound of (counter-)hegemonic projects. Because specific (counter-)hegemonic practices are contingent on the terrain of cultural, political, and economic struggles, it is necessary to clarify how these practices become (counter-)hegemonic strategies that shape (counter-)hegemonic projects through the strategies of the specific social groups and classes concerned, the interests they represent, the different values and worldviews they hold, and how they create blocs and political alliances. In addition, monitoring their sedimentation as governance-cum-regulation and spatiotemporal fixes in (counter-)hegemonic projects can help to further understand regulation modes in overcoming potential uncertainties of urban accumulation regimes. Thus, this analytical direction can help to identify the structural selectivity of spatial production and governing strategies and the relationships between constellations of involved actors.

Third, because transformations are linked to urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle, transformation analysis of spatial production and governance needs to pay attention to the discursive-material moments of urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle. In these moments, the interactions between the relations of different lines of power/knowledge in the production of

urban social space emphasize the dialectical relationship between discourse and materiality. Thus, an analytical framework that fully reflects this relationship is required. Moreover, transitions are manifestations of the dynamics and struggles at play at specific historical moments, helping us understand what is at stake in broader relationships. This transition reflects the interplay between new (emerging) practices and established orders. It involves hegemonic and counter-hegemonic moments within consensus, domination, resistance, and coercion through complicated social ties organized in institutions that are the historical products of class struggle. At the same time, it is also necessary to direct attention to restructuring urban (counter-)hegemonic struggles associated with emerging practices and models in governance and spatiotemporal fixes that can lead to a new hegemonic/sub-hegemonic project.

In sum, analyzing the transformation of spatial production and governance through urban (counter-)hegemonic struggles helps to emphasize non-reductive perspectives through strategic-relational views and dialectical relationships of power and space. It not only has the potential to shed light on the characteristics but also to answer questions about how the mechanisms involved transform within the broader context of structural cohesion and who the primary agent of that transition is. Thus, this perspective can define a more complete framework for CPE so that it can operate appropriately in urban studies.

3.3. Analysis framework of transforming socio-spatial production and governance through urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle

3.3.1. CPE approach to the analytical framework of urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle

The above assessments regarding the CPE perspective and the urban hegemonic struggle perspective based on the Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-neo-Gramscian dialogue show the potential to concretize CPE into a specific analytical framework to analyze transformations through urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle. Such a framework must ensure two dimensions: (1) moments of urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle and (2) evolutionary stages in urban hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic production. In effect, these two analytical dimensions are interrelated with each other in the variation, selection, and retention of socio-spatial activities through hegemonic, sub-hegemonic, and counter-hegemonic moments.

First, this framework needs to emphasize the moments of struggle and negotiation of urban (counter)hegemonic production. Drawing on moments as a dialectical chain to constitute Gramsci's account of hegemony, the CPE approach evolved into discursive-material moments in (counter-)hegemonic production (Sum & Jessop, 2013). The (counter-)hegemonic struggle

perspective directs attention to three main moments relevant to discussing hegemonic production, counter-hegemonic production, and hegemonic transformation.

The moment of hegemony occurs when some organized political group can take a position that wins the sympathy of other allies and creates a unity of economic and political goals, along with intellectual and moral goals, and impose it on subordinate groups (Gramsci, 1971). For political actors to successfully construct a “hegemonic moment,” they must address the needs (material or broader social needs) of different groups, explaining their problems and mobilizing their consensus into hegemonic projects. However, it should be noted that because hegemony is always a battle and is never complete, even certain hegemonies have a finite spacetime, meaning they are periodically challenged from the top down and through the mobilization of counter-hegemonic forces from the bottom up.

The moment of counter-hegemony involves the ability to resist and fight against hegemony in response to conflicts, tensions, and disagreements caused by existing hegemony. This moment includes a collection of tactics and strategies of the weak/subaltern, such as social movements and practices from below aimed at building solidarity networks, knowledge of alternative leadership, and negotiating with hegemonic powers. This leads to the potential for strategic and tactical disruption of dominant cultural symbols and practices, promoting the incorporation of explicit strategies into a counter-hegemonic project to challenge hegemonic norms about legality. In such a situation, hegemonic forces must continuously negotiate and change strategies and promote change in discursive-material terrains. In many cases, the subaltern classes are not capable of sustaining a hegemonic project; nevertheless, they can provoke or force reactions from above, leading to changes that address some of their demands.

The moment of hegemonic transformation involves readjustment and restructuring of social relations. These transformations are essentially diverse forms of strategic logic aimed at preserving or rebuilding social relationships that involve “unstable balances of compromise” between groups and class divisions. This moving but unstable equilibration can lead to temporary strategic solutions that can resolve some contradictions, such as sub-hegemonic projects, hierarchization, prioritization, spatialization, and temporalization. They then become formalized and sedimented through different strategies, institutions, and governance. However, this unevenness creates constant challenges from marginal/subordinate groups and continues to harbor other conflicts that could trigger crises.

These three moments are causally connected in the continuous chain of consensus and coercion in urban (counter-)hegemonic struggles. This process is associated with the renegotiations of the ruling group and other groups in society, through which they strengthen their alliances and promote their value systems and ideologies to gain and maintain widely acknowledged power.

Regarding capitalism's spatial production, these three moments can be associated with the territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization of capital. Politically, they involve politicization, depoliticization, and depoliticization. The diverse manifestations of this process can be observed and framed in different interpretations. However, its ultimate goal is the relative stability of a (largely) consensual social class that aligns with the ruling class's ideology, institutions, and actions through their representative, the state. Furthermore, these moments of synthesis are a set of discursive-material moments related to the selection of agents, structures, and technologies involved in governance and spatiotemporal fixes in favor of hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects.

Second, this framework needs to emphasize activities/practices in spatial processes and how they are mobilized into hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic moments. From the perspective of the CPE approach, urban hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic production must undergo a process of variation, selection, and retention through discourses and extra-discourses to contribute to shaping social practices and creating corresponding structures. Developing this further, this analytical framework focuses on analyzing the dialectical practices between semiotic and extra-semiotic through Lefebvre's spatial triad. Accordingly, the terrain for observing transformations is specific (counter-)hegemonic practices and their mobilization into (counter-)hegemonic projects. This extension can help overcome the existing shortcomings of the CPE.

The variation phase concerns (counter-)hegemonic practices in the urban context. Urban (counter-)hegemonic practices are rich and diverse because they reflect the interests and power of different actors in the spatial practices of everyday life. These practices can be seen through Lefebvre's lens of the spatial triad. Such practices often arise from everyday life related to the interaction between the common and the creative, between producers, managers, and users. This is precisely why the Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-neo-Gramscian approach is more concerned with the politics of everyday practices, the rise of new social movements, and the development of new uses of space, which can transform and shape the formation of space.

Selection concerns how practices become mobilized strategies for hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects. Although urban (counter-)hegemonic practices always carry potential solutions to urban problems, they are always fragmentary. They become meaningful when mobilized and assembled into different strategies for the production of hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects. This process emphasizes contingent sets of practices as strategies and tactics because they are also intertwined with other power relations in different spatial and temporal dimensions, emerging from different contradictions, creating different conflict problems, and being mobilized into different tactics and strategies together.

Retention reflects the integration of practices through selectivities into urban hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects, and widely accepted accumulation strategies in general. That is, practices must resonate with the interests and strategic selectivities of specific social groups through institutional arrangements of spatiotemporal fixes and regulation-cum-governance to create and maintain a relatively stable order of power (economic, political, and social) that historical blocs can hold and maintain for an extended period. Accordingly, the more dominant strategies and tactics have more potential for ideologization and institutionalization into patterns of structured coherence.

In short, CPE-based analysis of transformation through the chain of hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic production moments and the production stages within them based on hegemonic practices helps to create a more critical lens. Emphasizing the dialectic between semiotic and extra-semiotic mechanisms in variation ensures that the interpretation of important issues of selections and retentions creates an effective articulation of economics and politics that does not ignore micro-power. At the same time, this framework can also serve beyond the analysis of producing hegemonic imaginaries and ideologies, investigating more specific and fuller transformations in spatial production and governance. The following sections will demonstrate how to analyze and interpret the transformation by exploring urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle moments in terms of the evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention of socio-spatial production and governance activities.

3.3.2. Analysis of variation in socio-spatial producing and governing practices

Variations related to emerging practices serve as sources that feed into social transformation through selecting and retaining urban hegemony, counter-hegemony, and sub-hegemony. In particular, they emphasize the contingent emergence of actions/activities in the production and governance of space, such as state-led, spontaneous, and transformative actions/activities.

In terms of actions/activities in spatial production, drawing on Lefebvre's spatial triad, we can focus on analyzing these activities in three fundamental aspects of the social production of space: conceived, perceived, and lived. Three-dimensional activities of producing space have dialectical relationships with one another and, therefore, emphasize dialectics between their semiotic and extra-semiotic mechanisms. However, they have varying degrees of dominance over the production of different types of spaces. While abstract space is formed by the dominant role of conceived and perceived activities, lived and perceived activities are significant factors in producing concrete space.

The first aspect is conceiving activities or activities to form the conceived space. These activities are practices of social and political power created by making knowledge about space,

such as ideology, institutions, maps, plans, and models. That is, they are directly related to the meaning-making and institutional settings of decision-makers to intervene in space. Powerful actors actively participate in discussions and negotiations about the development of an urban space concerning their political beliefs, knowledge, and interests. Often, one or some urban imaginaries will emerge as the dominant view and have an essential position in framing visions and concretizing them into technologies to govern and transform space, including laws, rules, regulations, codified procedures, budgets, plans, programs, enforcement, and monitoring.

The second aspect is perceiving spatial activities or spatial practices that form the perceived space. These activities are related to transforming physical space toward the formation and stabilization of objects (Duineveld, van Assche, & Beunen, 2013), such as constructing buildings and infrastructure, traffic, other infrastructure, and parks. This aspect can be seen as implementing institutions and imaginaries through daily life (Simonsen, 2005) or materialization, which expresses and recognizes an object as separate and distinguishable. These activities are associated with the competence and performance of individual and collective subjects in materializing knowledge and power.

The third dimension is living activities. It is an interactive activity that involves thinking and feeling about space, the results of which are the spatial users' lived experiences and satisfaction. These activities relate to the user's repeated experiences of intentional actions in a given space to create a space of pure subjectivity (Watkins, 2005), such as their sense-making, identity, memories, and emotions. Thus, activities that form the lived space are performed in users' everyday lives where social relations are formed.

In terms of governing social space, the key elements of governance-cum-regulation, including images/ideas, tools/institutions, and actions/practices, identified by Jessop (2019b) and similar to Kooiman (2003), can be used as sources for interpreting socio-spatial governance patterns.

First, images/ideas can be present on the surface or hidden in the background in visions, knowledge, facts, judgments, presuppositions, desires, goals, hypotheses, convictions, and even metaphors or allegories. Jessop (2020) argues that images are linked to ideologies and lived experiences as necessary to "go on" in the world. In forming governance imaginaries, challenges will be identified and become regulation and governance issues. In regulation-cum-governance, selected images/ideas will become the main frame of reference for governing tools and actions.

Second, tools/institutions are related to the way of governing. They are used to facilitate the necessary support for governing actions. The most essential tools of governance are institutions, including both formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) and informal

constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) (North, 1991). In addition, they also include other forms such as organizations, information, and technologies. Each tool has different capabilities and functions, related to whether the tool is appropriate to the complexity, dynamics, scale, and size of the problem.

Finally, the actions/practices of actors in urban regulation and governance can be individuals, public and private, and large-scale organizations such as administrative agencies. Such action requires the accompanying socio-political capital resources of each actor participating in the governance process and interaction with the images and tools of governance. Kooiman (2003) pointed out that the basic types of actions include leadership, social movements, and coordination. Different types of leadership can help manage the diversity of society; social movements can become sources of activation to mobilize social capital to convey social dynamics; coordination is a crucial way to deal with the complexity of bureaucratic constraints.

To sum up, these dialectical perspectives in analyzing elements of production and governance of space can deepen the relationship between discourse and materiality in the (counter-)production of urban hegemony. It can help strengthen CPE's purpose by avoiding the understanding of discourse as a one-way factor leading to the material formation of the urban process (Jessop, 2004, 2008; Ribera-Fumaz, 2009; van Heur, 2010a, 2010b), and countering some views in materialistic determinism. At the same time, these dialectic perspectives can also allow a more holistic exploration of power relationships through a strategic perspective within a CPE approach without ignoring practices that are not clearly labeled strategic.

3.3.3. Analysis of selections on spatialization and socio-spatial governance patterns

In the selection phase, activities related to socio-spatial production and governance are subject to different strategic selectivities, depending on how they fit into possible materiality, meanings and patterns, technologies, institutions, and discourses inscribed in certain structures. That is, each structured activity is selective, in which some activities are privileged and come to dominate over others in particular contexts and by particular actors. Thus, this analysis phase will focus on interpreting at least three selectivities: (1) spatial production and governance models, (2) structural selectivities, and (3) agential selectivities. This does not mean that technological and discursive selectivities are not emphasized but rather that they are analyzed as embedded within other selectivities.

Jessop et al. (2008) argue that different actions in the production and governance of space can be structured into specific models. Accordingly, the TPSN scheme is particularly useful here to help structure these related activities into fields of operation of that structuring principle, including territory, place, scale, and network, because "any TPSN combination, involves

material interactions among different structures and strategies that draw upon these principles of socio-spatial organization in differential, historically and geographically specific ways” (Jessop et al., 2008, p. 394). These socio-spatial pattern selectivities combine these actions in specific ways to mobilize different forces and resources to engage more strategically in hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects. As presented in Section 2.2.3 and 2.5.2, the principles of each socio-spatial form can help structure related practices in territorialization, place-making, rescaling, and networking. In addition, these different socio-spatial relations combine in diverse and dynamic forms in governance arrangements that form spatial governance modes/form selectivities. Governance practices can be patterned after the principles of spatial governance forms, such as territorial governance, place-based governance, network governance, scalar governance, and multi-spatial meta-governance (see Section 2.2.3). Furthermore, choices about production models and space management also reflect technological selectivities because of the mutually constitutive relations between structuring principles and technologies.

As noted, spatialization and socio-spatial governance patterns are not chosen or applied randomly but rather as a strategic selectivity (many factors leading to success or failure are considered). These selectivities must “match” possibilities of structural factors and agential capacity. Thus, analysis of structural and agent selectivities can help to understand the path-dependency and path-shaping of these patterns. Because structures typically represent asymmetric configurations of a set of constraints and opportunities facing actors in the pursuit of their strategies, their analysis closely corresponds to the consideration of structural pressures triggering specific strategies and tactics in spatial production and governance. According to Jessop and Sum (2013), “analysing structural selectivity is to explore forms, institutions, organizational structures and, eventually, conjunctures in terms of their strategic selectivities” (p. 203–04). These structures are also continuously reproduced and transformed in relation to their path-dependency and the capacity of actors to challenge this. In turn, agential selectivity emphasizes the ability of actors to shape strategies and actions to produce and govern space in structurally oriented strategic calculation. Accordingly, “analysing agential selectivity is to distinguish different social forces, their subjectivation as bearers of specific identities and ideal and material interests, their capacities for strategic calculation and their capacities for action” (Jessop & Sum, 2013, p. 204). Jessop and Sum (2013) also noted that both structural and agential selectivity is “always overdetermined by discursive and technological selectivities” (p. 204). Thus, analyzing them can also help reveal semiotic and material mechanisms such as discourse coalitions and interest groups.

To sum up, analysis of selections on spatialization and socio-spatial governance patterns from observed activities emphasizes the recursive selection of strategies and tactics through

dialectical interaction between agential and structural selectivities. Moreover, such selectivities need to be explored alongside the discursive and technological selectivities. Such selectivities can be described as strategies mediating the relationship between structure and agent to some extent. They may provide part of the causal mechanisms, triggering a specific transformation, and can help reveal the power relationships of the actors involved.

3.3.4. Analysis of retention through spatiotemporal fixes and governance-cum-regulation

Retention refers to the stage when selected strategies and tactics “are embodied in a structurally coherent set of social relations and a spatiotemporal fix compatible with continued accumulation” (Jessop & Oosterlynck, 2008, p. 1156). Thus, the analysis of retention is related to the sedimentation of strategies to spatiotemporal fixes, regulation-cum-governance modes, and broader hegemonic, sub-hegemonic, and counter-hegemonic projects and their societal repercussions and contradictions. This reflects the structural coherence of different conjunctures in transformation processes.

Analyzing spatialization patterns inscribed in spatiotemporal fixes can go beyond the fixation and circulation of capital in a particular territory to include a set of different elements, such as semantic and institutional fixes, as mentioned in Section 2.2.1. The semiotic fix involves fixing meaning. Imaginaries, lived experiences, and ideologies are constantly remade to become more relevant and (re)establish their influence on decisions regarding the (re)production of urban space. In addition, the institutional fix refers to a set of redesigned rules and regulations coordinated through new mechanisms to stabilize a changing economy and society. It includes both formal and informal institutions rearranging through different strategies of conflict and compromise, such as inclusion, marginalization, exclusion, and oppression.

Following the same logic of retention through spatiotemporal fixes, modes of regulation-cum-governance relate to the governance of capital relations “through the development of appropriate rules, regulation, agencies, mechanisms and institutions” (Jessop, 2020, p. 226). Accordingly, the specific spatial forms of governance have some structural correspondence with modes of economic growth and “can temporarily stabilize an accumulation regime through its regulation-cum-governance of specific structural forms despite the conflictual and antagonistic nature of the capitalist social relation” (Jessop & Sum, 2013, p. 246). It should be noted that different forms of governance are based on different spatial structuring principles, such as territorial governance, place-based governance, network governance, scalar governance, and multi-spatial meta-governance, which may be conducive to different contributions regarding accumulation strategies.

Spatiotemporal fixes and regulation-cum-governance can “help to secure the relative stabilization and structural coherence of accumulation regimes and modes of regulation” (Jessop & Sum, 2006, p. 345). In essence, they “establish spatial and temporal boundaries within which the always relative, incomplete and provisional structural coherence” (Jessop, 2020, p. 110) and externalize the material and social costs beyond these boundaries, building/supporting the structural coherence of a stable social order. Based on Lefebvre and Harvey, Brenner (2004; 2019) supposes territorial coherence relates to securing the provisional stabilization of socio-spatial configurations, in which constitutive and conflictual moments of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization can provide a structurally coherent set of production of space for capital accumulation.

The process of urban (counter-)hegemonic struggles is associated with the overlapping of hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects to achieve and maintain dominance in both ideological and material fields. These projects, as a composite set of strategic selectivities, originate in (counter-)hegemonic everyday practices. Thus, patterns of spatial production and governance can be expressions of these projects, meaning these patterns can be sedimented in these projects if they prioritize broader visions related to stabilizing the accumulation regime, remaking the state, guaranteeing social class interests, and maintaining social dominance.

3.3.5. Critical realist description, explanation, and interpretation of the transformations

Besides SRA, CPE is also grounded in critical realist epistemology, which is the notion of depth ontological reality as the overlap between the domain of the real and the domain of the actual. This approach emphasizes the distinction between occurring practices and processes as actual events and the interpretation of such phenomena. Thus, this CPE framework can provide a critical realist account of transformation, helping to answer not only the question of “how” the transformation in production and spatial governance takes place but also the question of “why” in the understanding of culture, economics, and politics.

While analyses of variation, selection, and retention of spatial production and governance practices are in the empirical domain, their transformation involves the actual domain where events and non-events are enabled or constrained by the real domain. In the actual domain, the transformations described are based on observed strategic choices in the empirical domain of the conditions under which they are reproduced, contested, and transformed. Accordingly, the way in which the transformations occur can be determined “as the sedimentation of reflexively reorganized spatiotemporal matrices or spatial orders as processes of variation, selection, and retention lead to the partial, temporary, and provisional consolidation of specific spatiotemporal arrangements and, concomitantly” (Jessop, 2019a, p. 50). At the same time, the

transformations can be described as a set of structurally inscribed strategic selectivities involved in emergent configurations of production and governance of space, oriented toward relative actions and modes of calculations.

To explain and interpret the analyzed phenomena, a critical realist approach allows focusing on different structural layers and mechanisms leading to transformation. In terms of causal explanation, CPE “posits the existence of real but often latent causal mechanisms that may be contingently actualized in specific conjunctures but may also, thanks to diverse factors or actors, remain latent” (Jesop & Sum, 2013, p. 9). Therefore, a causal explanation based on reproducing actions can help unveil internal mechanisms leading to transformation. Accordingly, transformations can involve overcoming the contradictions and dilemmas involved in (counter-)hegemonic struggles. Analyzing urban hegemonic struggle practices is useful for identifying contradictions in different socio-spatial production and governance configurations, along with conflicts over the regulation and/or management of these contradictions and dilemmas that can provide deeper explanations. In addition, these explanations need to explore path dependence and structural coherence for reflexively reorganized structural configurations and recursively selected strategies and tactics in transformation.

In terms of retrospective interpretation, based on its roots in economic, political, or cultural disciplines, this framework can provide diverse interpretations through the logic embodied in temporarily stabilizing accumulation regimes and the broader social formation. This intends to capture the dynamics of space production and governance by examining historical political, social, and economic transformations. These structural interpretations can relate to changes to the economic model, political reforms, and the replacement of imaginaries in response to crises and antagonistic mechanisms. These interpretations also imply the nature of patterns of accumulation and the power relations between economics, culture, and politics.

To sum up, this framework provides an analytical tool beyond describing transformations to interpret and explain even more powerfully the logic of capital accumulation and its relation to these transformations. In addition to prioritizing answers about how the transformation in the production and governance of space takes place, it also addresses the why questions regarding the dynamic transformation. Therefore, this framework may provide the potential to analyze the case of peri-urban transformation in HCMC.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH SETTINGS

4.1. CPE and critical grounded theory methodology

Besides providing researchers with ontological premises of critical realism, CPE also provides methodological requirements for empirical studies. In essence, research based on CPE follows a critical realist retroductive process. It encourages analysis from a specific observable phenomenon to possible explanations for that phenomenon through generative mechanisms. (Bhaskar, 2009). This methodology rejects a unified model of explanation and the naïve realism of orthodox (objectivist) grounded theory (Jessop & Sum, 2013). It aims to provide positive guidelines for experimental studies through the methodological principles of the retroductive approach.

A suitable applied methodology should consider the dialectical principles to operationalize CPE underpinned by critical realism. First, it needs to emphasize “a continuous movement between abstract and concrete,” i.e., making abstract theory inform the analysis of concrete data and also providing valuable data in theory (re)construction. In CPE-based research, methods not only focus on analyzing the concrete reality of everyday practices and strategies but also systematically integrate them with the abstract level of capital accumulation and social regulation perspectives through intermediate and modifiable concepts, which were discussed earlier. Moreover, CPE also focuses on the methodological requirement of retroduction to dialectically account for the relations between semiosis and the extra-semiotic. Therefore, to promote the strengths of this approach, the empirical research method related to CPE is mainly linked with “critical discourse analysis” (CDA) to create a synthesis between its core textual analysis and the extra-semiotic conditions in which the semiotic process takes place.

As discussed in the previous two chapters, the study of dynamic peri-urban transformations requires a fuller extension of dialectical relations between everyday practices and broader structures and between discourse and materiality in the production and governance of space. However, linking CPE with CDA may create tension between ontology and methodology if not combined with other methods (Belfrage & Hauf, 2015; Caterina, 2018; Sau, 2021). This study agrees with the suggestion of Belfrage and Hauf (2015; 2017) that critical grounded theory is a suitable method for operationalizing CPE because its core, beyond textual analysis to more comprehensive elements of societalization, is related to better discursive-material analysis. Accordingly, this suggestion can help “combine ethnographic fieldwork with substantial theoretical work and/or critical discourse analysis” (Belfrage & Hauf, 2015, p. 324).

Belfrage and Hauf (2015; 2017) operationalize the critical grounded theory methodology of CPE through deductive and inductive moments of knowledge construction. First, pre-existing theories help provide “pre-concepts” and “soft hypotheses” for the deskwork phase. This support will provide a “compass” for the researcher during the ethnographic fieldwork phases. That is, interviews and observations will be reflexive to established theories and open enough to investigate emerging mechanisms. The collected qualitative data were analyzed and presented using a bottom-up approach. At the same time, they were also interpreted and structured using “pre-concepts” and “soft hypotheses.” This means that empirical findings are reflective in the light of initial proto-theories and at the same time, field research results can modify, refresh, and extend theories.

In this study, the arguments, concepts, and analytical frameworks related to the dynamic transformation of peri-urban spatial production and governance are developed based on the theoretical line from regulation theory to CPE, and the urban hegemonic struggle perspectives provide “pre-concepts” for empirical research. At the same time, the general and preliminary analyses of the HCMC case also establish a “soft hypothesis” that these transformations may be related to regulation efforts to stabilize the transition accumulation model toward a “socialist-oriented market economy” in Vietnam. In the next step, field research settings and corresponding data collection and analysis methods will be introduced appropriately with the combination of CPE and critical grounded theory methodology.

4.2. Selecting the research site


Binh Tan District and Binh Chanh District are typical peri-urban areas of HCMC and Vietnam. In the formation and development of the city, this area has always been a “fringe area” or “backyard” of the city. Following the country’s unification, Binh Chanh District was a large rural area at the western gateway to the inner city, serving as a bridge for economic exchange and road trade between the Mekong Delta and the Southeast region. *Doi Moi* policies subsequently attracted FDI enterprises to this area, and many industrial zones were quickly established. The process of industrialization, along with a population explosion, has driven rapid urbanization. In December 2003, to create favorable conditions for development, Binh Chanh District was divided into Binh Tan District (urban district) and Binh Chanh District (rural district).

During two decades of development, these two localities recorded the highest economic growth rate in Vietnam (about 20% per year) and are also the two most populous district-level administrative units in the country (Binh Tan has more than 784,173 people, and Binh Chanh has 705,508 people). Each district’s economic scale and population surpass those of many provinces. In particular, the proportion of migrants in these two districts is substantial,

accounting for nearly 60% of the migrant population. The majority (about 50%) are migrant workers employed in industrial zones and industrial clusters, small and medium-sized enterprises, production facilities, and even as freelance workers.

Figure 1

Administrative map of Binh Tan District and Binh Chanh District by area and population



Note. Author's graphics based on administrative maps and data from the GSO (2019)

The urbanization process in these two districts is characterized by an urbanization rate that is excessively rapid and highly spontaneous, along with housing, social infrastructure, and technical infrastructure that cannot meet demand and is even seriously overloaded. Many changes in demography and land use affect social order and security, creating a chaotic landscape. There is a lack of appropriate orientations and management tools, and legal guidelines and management tools for planning urban and rural areas are overlapping and coming into conflict with each other in peri-urban areas. The result is that it creates many shortcomings related to the environment, society, and economy, exacerbating the situation of uneven development between the center and the periphery (Pham T. N., 2020; Du P. T, 2008; Vo K. C., 2008; Nguyen D. S., 2020; Pham T. N. & Phan T. V. A., 2020).

The selection of these two localities also reflects the temporal aspect of urbanization. Areas closer to the city center start this process earlier and gradually spread to more distant areas in an “oil slick” fashion. This phenomenon can be observed through the construction and redefinition of administrative boundaries by establishing urban districts and upgrading from rural to urban units in highly urbanized communes. As a result, urban boundaries are constantly changing and expanding beyond rural areas (Du P. T, 2008; Leaf, 2015). Therefore, the difference in the level of urbanization between the two districts may also affect the research results. To overcome this difference, field surveys and interviews were conducted in selected

areas located on the border of these two districts. These locations are also in the wards/communes with the largest populations.

4.3. Selecting migrant groups and their settlement issues

4.3.1. Internal migration and rural-urban migrant workers

This study applies the concept of migration as the movement of a person or group of people from one place to another to live permanently or temporarily. Migrants are people from one locality, country, or territory who move to another locality, country, or territory to live and work (Skeldon, 2018). According to this definition and research practices on migrants in Vietnam, this project limits migrants to people from other provinces who come to live and work in HCMC without permanent residence there.

The limits of the above definition encompass a very diverse set of temporary residents coming to HCMC based on job type, destination, place of residence, education level, and purpose of arrival. Regarding the type of work, temporary residents can be divided into small groups: those who work in informal (free) jobs such as scavenging, retail trading, street vending, portering, domestic help, and transportation (delivery workers, motorbike taxi drivers), and those working for household production establishments. Employees are recruited (officially) to work in factories, plants, and services. In addition, it is necessary to mention groups that are not direct workers, such as students, apprentices, people who come to the city for medical treatment, and those displaced or, due to difficult circumstances in central districts, temporarily settled in peri-urban areas. Based on the reason for migration, migrant workers can be divided into two groups: those who are too poor to live in their original locality (usually unskilled workers with poor education) and come to HCMC to pursue career opportunities, jobs, and access to better living amenities, medical services, and education; and people struggling to find suitable employment in the locality of origin. These are people with high levels of education, technical skills, and professional skills, and possess assets that enable them to come to HCMC to seek investment opportunities and develop their professional capacities. In addition, classified by type of migration, there are groups of temporary migrants, long-term migrants, and groups of migrants who shuttle regularly from their old place of residence to their new place of residence.

This project does not seek an absolute classification or identification of rural-urban migrants in the context of complex practices and incomplete statistics. Accordingly, this study focuses on rural-urban migrants who work in industrial zones, industrial clusters, small and medium enterprises, production facilities, and even as freelance workers (referred to as migrant workers) in Binh Tan and Binh Chanh Districts. This study is fully aware of the differences

and specificities between the two types of migrant workers, classified as formal (with a labor contract) and informal (without a labor contract). However, the analysis does not focus on comparisons between these two groups because, in practice, separating these two types of workers statistically and in the provisions of relevant laws and policies is difficult.

4.3.2. Identification of migrant workers on the urban edge

Regarding age, qualifications, and living standards, most migrant workers in Binh Tan and Binh Chanh Districts are between 18 and 50 years old, mainly unskilled workers without technical expertise. A survey of migrant workers living in peri-urban areas of HCMC shows that migrant workers in peri-urban areas have low education levels, with up to 70% only having completed primary school. In addition, they have low incomes; half of the interviewed workers have an income of 4–6 million VND/month, and less than 10% have an income of over 10 million VND/month. However, they must work long hours, typically 8–10 hours, with some working 11–12 hours and others up to 13 hours. This situation shows that while migrant workers generate income no lower than the basic salary, the time they spend working is much higher than that of those employed in companies or by the state (OXFAM, 2015).

Moreover, migrant workers in peri-urban areas of HCMC exhibit three essential characteristics that need to be noted in the analysis process: mobility and transience, conflicts in asserting identity, and often being marginalized by policies and state projects.

First, mobility is demonstrated through their frequent travel and interaction with their homeland. The primary purpose of migrating is to provide a better life and income for themselves and their families and to support their families in their hometown. This is why their homeland and family always hold an essential position in the decisions of migrant workers, seen as insurance against their precarious situation. The back-and-forth movement during their years of residence in the city creates mobile, regular, and continuous population flows. Additionally, migrant workers have high occupational and workplace mobility due to dissatisfaction with wages, unsecured living conditions, and business owners cutting back production or going bankrupt. However, the occupational mobility of migrant workers is mainly within occupations of unskilled labor or moving to new jobs similar to their previous occupations. Temporality also reflects the characteristics of migrant workers at the city's edges. Many workers migrate to the city to work temporarily. If things do not go well, they move to other localities to do business or return to their hometown. A group of migrant workers view living and working in the city as temporary. They prioritize seeing the city as a place to seek a livelihood rather than a place to settle permanently (Dang N. A, 1998; 2005; GSO & UN-PFA; 2004).

Second, the lifestyles of migrant workers on the outskirts of the city constantly intertwine conservation, conflict, and the blending of their identities. One of their most significant cultural challenges is the conflict between rural and urban cultures. Migrant workers are often born and raised in self-sufficient agricultural production and village organizations. This lifestyle, on the one hand, values experience, respects behavior, promotes community cohesion, and valorizes labor. However, on the other hand, it is based on customary law rather than formal law. This lifestyle has a complex effect on adapting to an urban, industrial lifestyle. It usually takes them some time to adjust to the urban lifestyle and industrial chain jobs if they work in manufacturing plants. Furthermore, differences in culture and customs across regions, ethnicities, and religions also challenge the social cohesion of migrant workers in a space with a high density of migrants, such as in peri-urban areas (Luong V. H., 2004; GSO & UN-PFA; 2004).

Third, migrant workers are often marginalized by the state's policies and projects. Due to limited state resources for social security and low coverage, migrant workers are not considered beneficiaries of social security policies and the Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction Program (HEPR) by the local urban government. Although the state is gradually building specific policies and programs for them, the support does not seem to meet this social group's needs and development trends. Thus, they do not fully enjoy social welfare. For a long time, migrant workers have faced discrimination in accessing public services such as healthcare and education. At the same time, the rate of participation in voluntary social insurance and unemployment insurance among this group remains low, only reaching workers working in the formal economic sectors. In reality, migrant workers working in the informal economic sector receive almost no support from the social security system (UN-PFA, 2010; OXFAM, 2015; HFL, 2020).

In short, although migrant workers are a vital labor force that drives the city's economic growth, industrialization, and urbanization process, most migrant workers living on the city's edge have not received adequate attention from state support policies. Due to their mobile and temporary nature, they do not have close relationships with community institutions at their departure and destination locations. Their "temporary guest" mentality causes them to encounter many obstacles when integrating and asserting their identity in the local community of their destination. At the same time, they also live amid policy uncertainty, more precisely on the edge of local social security policies. The situation of standing "on the margins of society" and not being full members of the places where they reside makes migrant workers always feel like a disadvantaged group, which is why they are always afraid to come forward and actively engage with official practices.

4.3.3. Selecting migrant settlement issues

As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, socio-spatial theories can contribute to migration research by identifying various issues related to the spatial sensitivity of migrants as a marginalized group by state-led peri-urbanization. In particular, Lombard (2014), Conlon (2011), and Çaglar and Glick Schiller (2018), based on an ethnographic perspective, mentioned that migrants' spatial, social, and cultural practices reflect the socio-spatial construction of their settlements. I agree with this approach but want to go beyond these scholars' migrant place-making perspectives by drawing on socio-spatial relations and Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-neo-Gramscian perspective to argue that the spatial, social, and cultural aspects of peri-urban construction can relate to the heterogeneous processes between spontaneous migrant settlement practices and state-led socio-spatial practices. On that basis, I consider focusing on three main issues of migrant workers on the edge of HCMC to analyze the relationship between heterogeneous social spaces, including housing (representing the spatial aspect), schooling (representing the social aspect), and belonging (representing the cultural-political aspect). In each element, I also limited the analyzed issues based on references to reports, studies, and interviews with experts related to this area.

Housing

The traditional concept of “*An cư lạc nghiệp*” [Having a place to live in peace, then work in joy and contentment] demonstrates the importance of housing to the lives of Vietnamese people. Choosing a place to live is the first challenge migrant workers face when arriving in the city. However, as urban real estate values increase, housing becomes one of the most severe inequality problems of urbanization. As a result, migrant workers cannot own a home because housing prices are increasingly far beyond their financial capabilities. Even the housing rental market in central areas is relatively high compared to their ability to pay (UN-ESCAP 2008a; 2008b; WB, 2015).

Since the explosion of rural-urban migration, local people have built and rented a series of spontaneous boarding houses on the city's edge. These boarding houses provide accommodation for most migrant workers. This type of housing is the most popular choice for migrant workers because it is affordable, close to the workplace, and suitable for their lifestyle and activities. Since 2005, the process of industrialization and urbanization has been spreading throughout the country. Social housing has received much attention and renewed interest from policymakers. However, up to now, this type of housing has only met a tiny part of the housing needs of migrant workers (UN-Habitat, 2014).

Schooling

Before 1986, Vietnam implemented subsidies and monopolies in providing public services. After *Doi Moi*, the state retained only certain types of public services; the rest were socialized, encouraging the participation of the private sector and organizations in society to mobilize social resources to realize equality between public service providers and social beneficiaries. The two leading public services in socialization activities in Vietnam are healthcare and education. At the same time, these are two issues in relation to which migrant workers in Vietnam have been marginalized for decades because local governments do not have enough resources to provide for all people, especially migrants (WB, 2016). However, the severity of inequality between healthcare and education for migrant workers varies. Recent studies and surveys have shown that medical care services in HCMC have recently improved, and the distinction between migrants and locals has narrowed due to the popularity of voluntary health insurance in recent years (HIDS, 2020; HFL, 2020). Therefore, this study will focus not on health services but on education.

Because the majority of migrant workers are young families with children between the ages of 1 and 12 years old, the need for childcare and schooling is the top public service concern of migrant workers. However, for a long time, preschool education has not been identified as a priority for investment in social development policies. At the same time, universal preschool education is given priority after universal primary and secondary education in the Constitution and legal regulations. This context causes a lack of investment in developing preschool education, and the number of schools cannot keep up with population growth, especially in peri-urban areas. The solution to the socialized education problem has been to rapidly increase the number of private kindergartens and preschools, demonstrated by the city government's investment in building schools. However, pressure regarding the need for preschools always exists and tends to increase, leading to independent, private childcare groups that spontaneously become a solution to meet the childcare needs of migrant workers (UNICEF, MOET, & VIES, 2016; WB, 2020b).

Belonging

Migrant workers come from rural areas, where they have formed a unique lifestyle, so breaking with traditional values, that is, an inherent value orientation, to integrate and connect with an unfamiliar environment in the city is very difficult. On the other hand, economic, income, and employment conditions make it challenging for them to integrate into urban culture. However, to avoid “culture shock” or the risk of being marginalized in urban society, many practices help migrant workers adapt, integrate, and belong to the destination. This section cannot describe all aspects of cultural and spiritual activities but only reflects a few indicators related to the

role of household registration and social networks in people's community cohesion, creating a sense of belonging for migrant workers (Dang N. A., 1998; 2005; Luong, V. H., 2004).

Administratively, citizens' belonging in Vietnam is managed and controlled through household registration, the so-called *Ho Khau*. This form of residence control fails to create social cohesion, limits the right to free migration, and excludes groups of migrants for long periods. However, studies show that interactions between migrant workers, social networks, and communities have become practices that impact migrant workers' belonging (Dang N. A., 1998; 2005; Le N. H., 2008; Nguyen, V. C., 2021). These social interactions are often emotionally supportive and solidarity-based, promoting social cohesion, increasing social capital, and creating a sense of belonging.

In sum, all three representative aspects of migrant socio-spatial practices chosen for analysis here, including housing, schooling, and belonging, are closely linked in theory and reality to create a living and working space suitable for them. At the same time, each aspect has many different practices related to the strategies of various actors, such as the state, individuals, and society. These strategies involve interaction, competition, conflict, negotiation, and even imposition to gain influence over others. Therefore, these aspects are suitable for investigation through the lens of socio-spatial relations.

4.4. The role of the researcher

Selecting research sites and issues in my hometown provides many favorable conditions and the ability to have a good grasp of the context when conducting empirical research. Through personal relationships, I quickly accessed the field, conducted interviews, and obtained documents without many barriers regarding administrative procedures, such as applying for a license to do research and building trust. This position also gives me many advantages in interpreting political, cultural, and social structures through familiarity with the research location's language, belief systems, values, rules, and customs. However, my "insider" perspective also presented several challenges. First, being a member of a peri-urban community comes with assumptions of a good understanding of the research environment, making me subjective and potentially overlooking deeper and more detailed research on specific issues such as housing, schooling, and belonging, leading to a lack of information for analysis and the need for additional fieldwork. Second, my role as a researcher affects my relationship with the community. I frequently have to explain why I am conducting the research and how I am using the data I collect, and I strive to be neutral and objective in the interview and observation process. Additionally, I refrained from preconceived judgments about the information I had collected or any aspect of the research context because I thought I already "knew" and "understood" groups, organizations, or communities. Aware of such

challenges, I have always managed my role throughout the research process to avoid unintentional bias, misuse of personal data, and possible erroneous conclusions based on unfounded assumptions.

I also reflect on my role as a researcher in an interdisciplinary project. The project stemmed from my observation of dilemmas when researching the issue of inequality among migrant workers in Binh Tan and Binh Chanh Districts in my previous research project. In the early stages, I approached sources from urbanism and geographical anthropology to search for explanations. My long-term commitment and attachment to urban governance since my university graduation thesis on state management of industrial zones in HCMC and my master's thesis with the topic of post-socialist urban governance transformation also inspired me to learn about the ways and mechanisms of management practices in the peri-urban context. These exciting and different literary sources motivate me to connect interdisciplinary issues. I define the role of interdisciplinary researchers as dealing with tensions and divisions in work between disciplines such as political science and political geography. At the same time, I anchor these open dialogues in a political science approach by combining different intellectual bodies to clarify how the production of space takes place, focusing explicitly on the political struggle or, rather, on answering the question of power relations through the production of social space. This interdisciplinary work is also supported by an articulation approach within neo-Marxism that connects the various issues between economics, politics, and culture and makes sense of these blocs.

Additionally, I need to confirm the relational perspective/approach in studying socio-spatial practices related to migrant workers. Because there is a fundamental difference between the internal and external experiences of a given space (Relph, 1976), when discussing territorialization or place-making, it is necessary to identify the subject of that process and how its subjects participate in the production of that space through existential outsidership and existential insidership or between these two extremes. Utilizing a relational approach emphasizes repeated interactions between actors in a polymorphic space. That is, the place-making of migrant workers is not only related to the internal existence of migrant workers but also to other actors; even further, it is related to different spatial configurations by overlapping and influencing each other. Therefore, I position myself as an observer of phenomena and events regarding the relational production of space rather than fixating on a specific internal or external location within that space.

4.5. Data identification and collection

4.5.1. Primary data


The primary data used in this study comes from two sources. The first is the official institutional data issued by the party-state, and the second was created based on interviews and observations through field studies. The first data group includes legal documents, policies, and planning documents from central to local levels in HCMC, concerning land and housing, education, belonging, urban policies, labor, and migration. In particular, the legal system documents collected for this project include the constitution, codes, laws, and resolutions of the National Assembly; ordinances and resolutions of the National Assembly Standing Committee (Doc NA); Government decrees and decisions of the Prime Minister (Doc G); resolutions of the people's councils of cities, districts, and ward/communes (Doc NA); decisions of the people's committees of cities, districts, and communes (Doc G). Additionally, government and local policy documents related to the topic include long-term (strategic) policies and policies addressing specific developments. In addition, the planning system includes planning by subject (land use planning, sector planning, urban planning) and by scope (national master planning, regional planning, city planning). Furthermore, a typical type of institution in the Vietnamese context that plays an essential role in this research is the group of documents of the CPV. In principle, CPV documents (Doc P) were only valid for CPV members before being institutionalized. However, as the sole ruling party, the party's documents are visions, policies, and guidelines that guide institutionalization and implementation. In particular, essential concepts in these texts are highly theoretical and act as a form of semantic correction. The documents collected for this study include political platforms, party charters, party congress documents, resolutions, decisions, directives, regulations, and conclusions. These data can be accessed from the government's digital archive covering the period from 1975 to 2023.

The second group of primary data is based on interview and observation methods through two field research trips, the first from May 2022 to September 2022 and the second from June 2023 to August 2023. The area chosen to conduct field research is the wards and communes located between the boundary of Binh Tan District and Binh Chanh District, where the highest population growth rate and the fastest urbanization rate are occurring. Specifically, they are close neighborhoods of Binh Tri Dong A, Binh Hung Hoa A, Binh Hung Hoa B, and Tan Tao A wards (Binh Tan District), and Vinh Loc A and Vinh Loc B communes (Binh Chanh District). The logic of this selection is that these are typical areas for the urbanization process of HCMC; at the same time, it also reflects the timing of urban expansion into rural areas and the management characteristics of peri-urban areas under two different management mechanisms: urban and rural authorities. Although this study reflects the impact of this mechanism, it will not delve into comparing the differences between them.

Approximately 90 interviews were conducted and selected through the so-called “snowball selection” method (Esaiaasson et al., 2012). This principle means that the choice of interviewees is not determined in advance but is decided by the people to whom the interviewee first addresses them. Such an approach helps me quickly grasp the actors involved in the research. After a while, when similar groups of people began to respond repeatedly with high frequency, I concluded that the process of interviewing that group of people had reached saturation. Regarding the structure of interview partners, migrant workers accounted for 30% of the interviewees, with a balanced ratio between workers in the formal sector (46.6%) and non-formal workers (53.4%). Leaders and civil servants at localities account for 15%, representing different administrative levels, including wards/communes, districts, and cities. Local people account for the largest proportion of 35%, with many other components, including neighborhood and residential group leaders, boarding house owners, landowners, real estate brokers, local business owners, and leaders of unions, associations, and groups. Additionally, there are experts and leaders of non-local organizations.

Figure 2

The visual information related to collecting data is based on interviews and observations



Note. Compiled by author. Notes: (a) map of the fieldwork area, (b) proportion of interview samples, (c) number of interview samples divided by subjects

All interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format, with questions tailored to each type of interview partner based on established theoretical and conceptual frameworks. The structure of the questions for migrant workers differs from those for the other subjects, whereby the questions revolve around their stories, forms of residence, daily problems, and feelings about their place. Questions for the other partner groups mainly address their roles in providing housing, schools, and assistance for migrant workers. However, so that interviews are not limited to predetermined theories and concepts, I also work with a high degree of flexibility in interview situations to adapt to the interviews' development and explore new issues discovered during the interview process.

The data obtained from observations is also quite diverse and rich in information. During the fieldwork, I paid attention to the layouts and spatial structures of different residential areas, specifically the spaces of homes, preschools, childcare groups, and public areas (neighborhood offices, playgrounds, and alleys). At the same time, I also took the time to observe the behaviors and habits of the migrant workers after their working hours in the boarding houses. In addition, I also participated in neighborhood community meetings, regular meetings of ward/commune people's committees with people's representatives, community events such as Great Solidarity Day, and some community activities of local organizations. I also observed the party-state's visual propaganda forms in public spaces and newsletters in neighborhoods and residential groups where communities' conventions and self-governance regulations were posted. Information from these observations helps inform the material and rhythmic aspects of everyday life to analyze spatial production.

Data groups based on interviews and observations played at least three roles in this study. First, they help provide data to informal institutions. Informal institutions include unwritten rules such as customs and codes of conduct, governance mechanisms, and sanctions that have not been promulgated in written documents. These data include village conventions and regulations developed by the community and individuals in addition to methods of community governance within different social networks. Thus, semi-structured interviews and observations help provide more information about self-governance processes and the roles of stakeholders in related peri-urban socio-spatial practices for migrants, which are not entirely written in official documents. Second, they provide information about the everyday spatial practices of various actors. This includes housing and schooling construction, operations and investment, and social interactions, which show different forms of space use and people's emotions. They helped collect data on what happens in everyday practices. Third, this data group helps verify the accuracy and reasonableness of processed secondary data, which different agencies surveyed at various times.

4.5.2. Secondary data

Secondary data used for this study includes five main groups. The first consists of reports based on statistics, including the 1989, 1999, 2009, and 2019 Population and Housing Censuses; national population and labor statistics over the years; and socio-economic status reports from the General Statistics Office. These reports can be found on the General Statistics Office website. The second group comprises published reports based on surveys conducted by competent authorities, socio-political organizations, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. These reports often have large survey samples, detailed analyses, and interpretations of results, and are widely accessible. Meanwhile, reports serving state management by competent agencies and socio-political organizations are based on administrative surveys and sector data that are not publicly available and require permission to access (Appendix B). The fourth group is scientific research. Although there are not many articles and books related to migrant worker issues in HCMC's peri-urban areas in English, there are a certain number of articles in Vietnamese. This study also selects scholarly works related to the research subject and location for reference and citation. The last group is data from mass media. Although the mass media system in Vietnam is affiliated with party-state organizations and is subject to censorship, most issues and policies concerning migrant workers are still widely discussed in various mass media to a certain extent. These news and magazine articles also reflect multi-dimensional discourses from migrants, and managers, and contain statements from parliament members, residents, experts, and researchers.

Secondary data provide quantitative and qualitative information to contextualize economic, political, and social structures at national and local levels. This data forms the basis for my earlier discussion of the national and local political and economic context (see Chapter II). Moreover, information from secondary sources, especially reports based on surveys, contains in-depth information regarding the socio-spatial practices, issues, and even feelings of migrant workers. Thus, it can be combined with the interviewed and observed data sources to assess the degree of marginalization of migrant workers by policies, along with the scale of place-making practices such as boarding house construction, private independent childcare groups, and migrant engagement at the destination. These assessments help identify the problems of different socio-spatial practices related to migrant workers.

4.6. Qualitative data analysis

4.6.1. Multi-layered analysis

The CPE-based analytical framework for exploring transformation through variation, selection, and retention of hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects implies that it

requires multiple levels of analysis. In this case, multi-layered analysis of the data has similarities with several analytical methods commonly labeled grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) and thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006; King & Horrocks, 2010), acknowledging that analysis may be influenced by pre-existing theories and concepts in terms of critical realism (Belfrage & Hauf, 2017). These methods emphasize translating analysis at a lower order of abstraction to a higher order of abstraction, which is often concretely called a data analysis process, including (informant-centric) first-order, (researcher-centric) second-order themes, and aggregate dimensions. These methods can be combined heuristically with CPE through critical grounded theory methodology.

Analyzing variations is mostly based on first-order coding. This stage focuses on assessing the data directly to reduce and organize them into first-order codes in line with the main pre-defined codes of first-order categories developed in the conceptual and analytical framework, including spatial production (conceiving activities, perceiving activities, living activities) and spatial governance (images/ideas, tools/institutions, actions/practices). These codes are also grouped by subjects, including state-led and spontaneous activities. Besides established codes, emergent codes also play an important role in this phase to identify transforming activities, hybrid activities, and chronological orders that emerge from the data.

Analysis of selections is associated with second-order themes, working at higher-level theoretical constructs than first-order codes. In particular, this phase combines first-order codes into second-order codes through interpretations based on the CPE guidelines and the identified concepts. First, different activities will be patterned to define spatialization processes (territorialization, place-making, and reterritorialization) and governance modes (territorial, place-based, and multi-spatial meta-governance) based on extensive discussions from the TPSN scheme. Next, first-order codes are interpreted into second-order codes related to the discursive, structural, agential, and technological selectivities of these patterns. During this stage, emergent codes and developing concepts, which are not fully addressed in the literature, can help reveal and conceptualize emerging transformation models.

Retention analysis is related to third-order themes or aggregated dimensions. This involves investigating the structured coherence of the patterns and models determined in the second order, which helps organize and connect them more theoretically. In particular, it examines their relevance to spatiotemporal fixes and regulation-cum-governance modes, considering the possibility of transforming and aggregating them into broader themes of urban hegemony projects, counter-hegemony projects, and-hegemony projects. However, not all patterns and models can be clearly articulated in these projects, so it is necessary to indicate the relevance between them through the reflection between theory and empirical evidence.

These analysis steps provide the foundations to build a data structure as “a way of understanding how all the terms, themes, and dimensions relate to each other” (Gioia, 2012, p. 26). Specifically, this structure represents where concepts and models come from by connecting them to describe first-order codes as empirical evidence. Thereby, it can help to clarify their place in the transformation and systematically explain such processes. At the same time, the data structure also supports checking the conformity of the “pre-concepts” and “soft hypotheses” through empirical evidence. Connecting empirical data to established theories can help open up deeper interpretive discussions of theory and context.

4.6.2. Process tracing

To address the complexity challenges in analyzing data related to dynamic transformations of peri-urbanization, this study uses process tracing as a parallel and supporting method for multi-layered analysis. Process tracing examines diagnostic patterns of evidence, often evaluated in a specific chronological order, to support or disconfirm hypotheses. The main aim is to trace the course and mechanism of events, thereby searching for observable manifestations and providing causal explanations (George & Bennett, 2005; Collier, 2011). Therefore, process tracing is a favored method of qualitative researchers and is also very useful for political scientists to study the causal mechanisms through power relationships, especially in case studies (Ricks & Liu, 2018).

In keeping with a retroductive study, this project required a process-tracing approach that ensured iteration between theory and empirical evidence from within the case (Trampusch & Palier, 2016). That is, processes are predicted from available theories and then tested and reflected upon by a set of empirical observations. Accordingly, this technique makes at least two contributions to the analysis of data. First, it helps arrange activities in the first-order codes into the patterns and modes, then retention in spatiotemporal fixes and regulation-cum-governance through the causal relationship of hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects. Second, this technique plays an important role in analyzing strategic selectivities, mainly structural and agential selectivities because it implies causal mechanisms for how some strategies become more important than others in the transformation process.

To use this method effectively in data analysis together with critical grounded theory methodology, it is necessary to ensure reflexivity between the hypothesized causal relationships and the empirical observations and analyses and vice versa. In addition, time factors also need to be considered when determining processes. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind the principles of the proposed CPE analysis framework to avoid falling into the trap of tracing causality to abstract concepts that are simplified and concretized in this approach.

CHAPTER 5: TERRITORIALIZATION AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE OF PERI-URBAN AREA IN PRODUCING HEGEMONY OF CIVILIZED AND MODERN SOCIALIST CITY

5.1. State-led socio-spatial practices

5.1.1. From commercial housing to social housing

Conceiving activities

After the *Doi Moi*, “solving the housing issues for the people” became one of the key issues in the CPV’s national development strategy (Doc P03). Through each stage of development, the CPV identified viewpoints related to encouraging economic sectors to participate in building, developing, and renovating housing (Doc P02), abolishing the system of housing subsidies, and forming and developing the real estate market (Doc P04). In response to market failure, the Party emphasized that “realizing progress and social justice” and “ensuring social security” must be “panel-linked with economic growth” (Doc P06). Accordingly, it is required to “improve housing conditions for the poor and low-income people in urban areas, gradually solving the housing needs for workers in industrial zones and students” (Doc P11) and “have policies to support promoting social housing development” (Doc P08).

Along with changes in CPV orientation, perspectives on housing development and management have been continuously institutionalized. The Constitution stipulates: “every citizen has the right to a legal residence” (Doc NA02; Doc NA03), and “the State shall adopt housing development policies and create the conditions for everyone to have his or her own home” (Doc NA03). The amendment to the 1993 Land Law allowed the buying and selling of houses, creating conditions for the beginning of the real estate sector under market mechanisms. Further institutional fixes (Land Law 2003, 2013, and Housing Law 2005, 2014) have continued to improve regulations on commercial housing in the form of projects, allowing foreign investors to access the real estate market. In parallel with completing the legal framework for commercial housing, institutions for social housing have also gradually synchronized after this concept was codified in the Housing Law in 2005⁸. Housing Law 2014, and the government’s decrees specify social housing regulations. Key provisions include the

⁸ In 2004, the phrase “social housing” first appeared in the National Housing Strategy through the concept of the “state-owned housing fund.” In 2005, the concept of “social housing” was legislated in the Housing Law 2005, which states that “social housing is housing invested in and built by the State or by organizations or individuals for the subjects specified in 53 and Article 54 of this Law to rent or buy.”

requirement that owners of commercial housing projects and new urban areas must reserve 20% of the total land area of the project for social housing and establish preferential mechanisms and policies for businesses, households, and individuals participating in social housing development. These include exemptions from land use fees and land rent and exemptions from/reductions in value-added tax and corporate income tax. Investors are allowed to set aside 20% of the house and land fund to sell at market prices to offset costs, which helps to reduce the sale, rental, and lease-purchase prices of social housing. Furthermore, houses formed in the future can be used as collateral for loans. Companies that invest in housing for their workers and employees can account for housing costs as part of their production costs.

In HCMC, the city party's conception of housing issues encourages the construction of "high-rise apartment buildings suitable for the living conditions of modern urban areas" (Doc P28). To concretize the central party's viewpoint on ensuring housing for everyone, the city party later determined the "priority to build high-rise apartment buildings suitable for the ability to buy and rent housing of the majority of the population, especially low-income people" (Doc P28). Based on the provisions of law and policies of the central government, HCMC is one of the first localities to set out housing development programs, targets, and plans, along with specific solutions every five years. The city currently has two housing programs: commercial and social housing. While commercial housing projects play the role of "developing new urban areas in a synchronous, civilized and modern manner," the social housing program is associated with urban gentrification, relocating and rearranging housing for households living on and along canals, and prioritizing the development of social housing "to meet the housing needs of target groups who cannot pay according to market mechanisms"⁹ (Doc P29).

The peri-urban areas of the city are identified as essential locations in housing development orientation, in addition to "prioritizing investment in building technical and social infrastructure for new districts and urbanizing districts" by the local government (Doc P31). In its housing development program, the city government encourages the development of low-cost commercial and social housing in peri-urban areas "to meet the enormous need for housing for low-income people, especially for those with very difficult housing difficulties (migrant

⁹ According to Housing Law 2014, the entities shall be eligible for incentive policies on social housing are (1) People with meritorious services; (2) Households living in poverty or near poverty in rural areas; (3) Households that are often affected by natural disasters or climate changes in rural areas; (4) Individuals living in low income, poverty or near poverty in the urban areas; (5) Employees working in enterprises inside or outside the industrial zones; (6) Commissioned officers; (7) Officials and civil servants prescribed in law on officials and civil servants; (8) Entities who have returned official residence as prescribed; (9) Students of institutes, universities, colleges, vocational training institutions during their duration of the study; (10) Households or individuals subject to land withdrawal and land clearance.

workers) who can rent accommodations, contributing to limiting the construction of houses without permission, illegally, in suburban areas” (Doc P29). Accordingly, Binh Tan and Binh Chanh Districts have also prioritized the development of investment projects to build new housing, especially social housing, in the direction of high-rise apartments along main traffic axes and areas with plans to implement corresponding technical infrastructure systems (Doc P29; Doc P39; Doc P40; Doc P44).

The party-state’s views on housing issues show that the city’s peri-urban areas occupy strategic locations in the development orientation of the real estate and housing market in addition to state intervention strategies with the goal of “gradually converting the low-rise housing model to high-rise housing modern”, and “step by step solving housing for all strata of the population” through social housing development (Doc P29). These orientations are (re)institutionalized into a legal system, policies, rules, and regulations to establish and shape the framework for implementing relevant institutions. However, institutions related to social housing development still have many limitations and shortcomings. Policies related to social housing “remain influenced by a subsidy-heavy approach” (UN-Habitat, 2014). Furthermore, “some regulations between the Land and Housing Law, implementation instructions, and other laws have inconsistencies, leading to confusion in management and creating loopholes for some individuals and organizations to take advantage of for corruption, profiteering, waste, and loss of State assets” (Doc P09).

Perceiving activities

The housing sector in HCMC has changed rapidly since the subsidy mechanism was eliminated. The marketization of land use rights and housing has promoted the emergence of construction activities by more stakeholders with diverse housing models. As a result, “the real estate market develops strongly, increasingly meeting the housing needs of city residents. In the period from 2016 to the present, the average housing area in the entire city has increased significantly (from 17.32 m²/person in 2015 to 20.4 m²/person in 2020). The entities participating in the real estate market are gradually being improved, contributing to the development of the market” (Doc P30).

Self-built housing is a typical type and accounts for the highest proportion of all types of housing in Vietnam (UN-Habitat, 2014; WB, 2015). Households build their own houses using their accumulated savings and loans to serve the residential needs of individuals/families and to rent or sell. Before the Housing law was issued, the essential characteristics of self-built housing were that it was informal due to the lack of a Certificate of Land Use Rights and Ownership of Assets Attached to Land, built or gradually built without complete permission from the authorities. However, if self-built housing exists for a certain period and is consistent

with urban planning, it can be “legalized” to become official housing (granted a certificate of individual housing ownership and residential land use rights). The cost-effectiveness and functionality of this type of housing make it highly efficient in Vietnam, helping most households (over 80%) to have housing of acceptable quality compared to countries with a similar level of development. This type of housing is considered the most affordable and accessible housing for the low- and middle-income segments of society. However, in recent years, the price of self-built housing/individual housing has increased significantly, making this market accessible only to the high-middle income segment (WB, 2015).

The Land Law 2003 creates conditions for large-scale housing production enterprises, including state-owned enterprises, private enterprises, and international corporations, to invest in commercial housing projects. These projects can be high-rise buildings with one or more towers or villa lots. Land for use is often purchased at preferential prices from local authorities; projects are officially licensed, and housing units are sold to the market through real estate brokers with professional and management services. Capital sources for commercial housing projects are also very diverse. Foreign direct investment is considered an essential source of finance, especially for large-scale projects (accounting for nearly 20% of total FDI investment in HCMC). In addition, the financial sources used for commercial housing projects include loans from banks and prepayments. These projects mainly invest in high-end housing to earn significant profits (typically a profit rate of 10–15%) (UN-Habitat, 2014; WB, 2015).

The above two types of housing account for a large proportion and contribute to “achieving the average housing target for city residents... but the affordable housing and social housing segments have not met the needs” (Doc P30). During the period 2016–2019, HCMC has just completed construction and put into use about 14 social housing projects, with a total land area of 15.8 hectares and 10,255 apartments (Doc R05). In addition, as of 2016, there were only 18 worker dormitory projects in export processing zones, which are industrial zones invested in companies that employ workers. These projects had a total construction floor area of 297,526 m², meeting 39,368 accommodations, just accounting for just 7.4% of the total number of official workers throughout the city (Doc R02; Doc R05). This limitation is due to many factors, not only those related to the quality of institutions but also the process of implementing these institutions (Doc R02). Private capital for social housing is minimal because investment in social housing construction has low profits (no more than 10% of total project investment), and capital recovery is prolonged. The state intervenes to overcome this problem through social housing projects and preferential policies on capital and land funds for social housing projects (Doc G05). The city government has had several solutions to develop social housing, such as exemption from land use fees of 5% (commercial housing

must pay a 10% tax), incentives on design criteria (such as construction density and construction coefficient), and exchange of land use rights value. In addition, the land fund for social housing has two sources: businesses create it themselves by negotiating compensation, and the state grants 20% of the land fund to build social housing in commercial housing projects. However, state-directed housing projects play a very modest role in the context of limited city budget capital and incentives that are not attractive to investors. The limited budget leads to the inability to allocate capital for infrastructure investment and social facilities to attract the business community to participate in project investment and creates difficulties in attracting migrant workers to buy housing (HIDS, 2016). On the other hand, social housing projects will have to compete with a considerable amount of construction that needs to be invested in peri-urban areas, and usually, funded housing programs, for example, when compared with developing transport networks, will no longer be considered a priority in an austerity public finance system.

The imbalance between supply and demand and the structural mismatch between such housing types are more serious in peri-urban areas. In Binh Tan and Binh Chanh districts, self-built houses account for around 88% compared to other types of housing. Self-built housing in this area is higher than the average for the whole city because it is quite common for people to build houses on agricultural land (UN-Habitat, 2014). Furthermore, the price of this type of housing is reasonable and accessible to the needs of the middle class, internal migrants with accumulated assets, and real estate speculators despite the legal risks. However, the development of this type of housing in these areas is often associated with illegal construction activities, challenging the planned development of peri-urban districts. Besides the boom and dominance of self-built housing, commercial housing projects are also increasing rapidly in this area with high-rise apartments and new residential areas. These projects provide about 10% of the housing for people in this area and are considered to contribute to aesthetics, as evidenced by the statement that “the local urban appearance is increasingly more spacious and modern” (Doc P38). However, most commercial housing projects in these areas are skewed towards the mid-and high-end housing segment, with only a few projects providing affordable commercial housing. Although identified as a key area for social housing development in the city (Doc LG01), state-supported housing is estimated to account for about 1% of the total number of houses built (Table 7). The completed projects are mainly resettlement houses and priority housing for groups of civil servants working in the public sector. In addition to social housing, these two localities have also developed some accommodation houses for workers, mainly built by labor-owning enterprises, but the ratio of this type of housing compared to the number of workers is quite low.

Table 7*Types and proportions of housing types in Binh Tan District and Binh Chanh District*

Types	Subjects	Capital	Ratio
Self-built housing	House owners	- Household savings - Informal lending - Bank capital - Microfinance investment	88%
Commercial housing	People in need	- Investor capital - Prepayment	10%
Private-invested social housing	- Low-income people - Workers' accommodation	- Investor capital - Prepayment - Bank capital (low interest rates for social housing)	1%
State-invested social housing	- Officials - Policy object	- State budget - Private capital	0,3%
Resettlement housing	Land confiscated households	- Cross compensation between new uses - Investors contribute capital - Bank capital - Multilateral funding (WB, ADB)	0,7%

Note. Author classified based on reports of UN-Habitat (2014) and WB (2015) and synthesize data from GSO (2019)

Living activities

In most interviews with migrant workers about social housing, they responded that they did not know about these projects. One worker said, “I only heard about social housing on TV, radio, newspapers, etc. I really don’t know where the projects are, or how to buy or rent a room in these projects” (Interview, MW18). Another added, “How can I have money to buy it when I spend every month’s salary which is sometimes not enough” (Interview, MW22). In fact, “migrant workers have almost no opportunity to own social housing under current conditions” (Interview, A05). Although according to the housing law and housing provision programs, workers in industrial zones are one of ten groups eligible to buy social housing for low-income people in urban areas, over the years, social housing projects have mainly focused on selling, renting, and leasing to officials, civil servants, and employees working in public units. Just a tiny number of official workers in export processing zones/industrial zones have benefited from this policy. Furthermore, complicated procedures for renting and buying social housing are also barriers for migrant workers (Doc R15; Doc R16; HFL, 2020).

Regarding worker dormitories, although these buildings are “invested in accordance with the standards of the MOC, including private living areas, community living areas, and green area [...] It can be affirmed that the accommodation area is an ideal place of residence for workers”

(HFL, 2020). However, the report of the HFL shows that the number of accommodations in worker dormitories throughout the city is currently only filled about 80% (about 8,000 out of 10,000 accommodation rooms). The occupancy rate of these boarding houses is quite low compared to expectations because “most workers believe that they are constrained by having to comply with the rules of the boarding house, such as closing before 10 p.m. every day; relatives, family, parents, and friends must be received in the living room, and these guests are not allowed to stay in the accommodation.” These conditions affect workers’ ability to work overtime or do other jobs to earn extra income, especially for workers with families. Moreover, some dormitories have inconsistent social infrastructure and transportation issues, are far from work, and do not allow workers to choose roommates (HFL, 2020). This reality shows that when migrant workers benefit from social housing or worker accommodation programs, they are forced to bear constraints related to collective regulations and limited living space, even if that choice does not fit into their daily lives. This situation explains why social housing is built but does not attract migrant workers to live there.

5.1.2. Privatization of preschool education

Conceiving activities

The term “socialization” appears as an urgent requirement of public service reform in a socialist-oriented market economy. Its root is in the policy of “diversifying training forms” and the motto “the State and the people work together” proposed by CPV in 1993. This term was first used by the government in 1997 regarding the direction and policy of socializing educational, medical, and cultural activities (Doc G06). After that, the policy of socialization of education and healthcare continued to be further clarified by the Resolution of the 8th and 9th Congresses of the Party: “Socialization of education work means mobilizing the entire society to educate and mobilize all strata. The people contribute to building national education under the management of the state. Social policies are carried out in the spirit of socialization, promoting the responsibility of governments at all levels, mobilizing resources among the people, and the participation of people’s organizations and social organizations” (Doc P04).

The party-state determines that the socialization of education is essentially transferring the educational and training functions of society from the public sector to the private sector, sharing responsibility for public services from the state to the civil sector; associated with determining that the social function of the state is to lead through institutions, policies, and inspection, instead of directly operating economic, cultural, and educational institutions. These characteristics show that “socialization” in Vietnam almost entirely overlaps with the forms, signs, and characteristics that represent the nature of the “privatization” trend around the world. However, opposing the above understanding, the party-state emphasizes that “socialization” of

education is no longer simply supporting the state in the context of a limited investment budget for education but also helps improve the quality of education, meet the growing needs of the people, and follow the rules of the market economy. Resolution No. 90/CP clearly states that “socialization is building a community of responsibility,” “is expanding investment sources, exploiting the potential of human, material and financial resources in society,” “does not mean to reduce the state’s responsibility, or reduce the state budget,” and “is an important solution to realize social justice” (Doc G06). As per this understanding, the socialization of education is one of the strategic policies of the party and state, identified as an essential solution to democratize education and build close relationships between school, family, and society. According to the party’s visions, government agencies have issued guidelines and policies to promote socialization in the fields of education, health, culture, sports, and physical education. In education, the main directions to promote socialization are identified as follows: The state innovates policy mechanisms and investment structure methods; converts public establishments operating under a heavily subsidized administrative mechanism to an autonomous mechanism; strongly develops non-public establishments with two types of people-founded and private; and strengthens inspection and examination activities (Doc G06; Doc G13; Doc G14; Doc G15).

Preschool education is one of the key areas of socialization. The CPV emphasized: “For teachers, preschool, and general education, the state prioritizes investing in the construction and development of public educational establishments and has support mechanisms to ensure the gradual completion of the goal of universalization according to law. Encourage the development of various non-public schools to meet social needs for high-quality education in urban areas” (Doc P17). In addition, the socialization of education is specifically expressed and continuously amended in the Law on Education over the years (Doc NA10; Doc NA11). At the same time, the MOET issues specific regulations on non-public preschool education institutions and the financial autonomy mechanism of public educational institutions. In particular, they stipulate those private kindergartens are allocated or leased land and facilities by the state, receive budget support when performing tasks assigned by the state, and enjoy preferential policies on taxes, credit, and other policies according to the provisions of law (Doc P26; Doc P27). In addition, localities also develop their projects on the socialization of their education and training sector (Doc G27).

Perceiving activities

Currently, in the national education system, preschool is the level of education that is “socialized” most significantly (Doc G30). The socialization of preschool education has become an inevitable trend in peri-urban districts due to a mechanical population explosion caused by migrant workers and limited budget conditions. The two most important trends in

the socialization of preschool education are the development of non-public preschool education facilities and the promotion of financial autonomy of public education facilities.

Every year, HCMC spends about 20% of the total local budget on education. This budget is mainly used for school construction and regular expenses. However, the mechanism for allocating state budget resources for education still follows administrative territory criteria and norms, with no connection between the number of enrolled students and investment expenditure from the state budget. Binh Tan District and Binh Chanh District are two localities that receive city budget priority for investment in school construction (accounting for nearly one-third of the city's total education budget, with the two districts spending 50% of the regular expenses on education) (Doc R09). However, public school investment still cannot keep up with population growth due to limited budgets and unreasonable and unsuitable territory-based education planning. In addition, this area is constantly overloaded due to a lack of teachers, classrooms, and teaching equipment. Public schools conduct socialization through sources of funding and voluntary contributions from businesses, organizations, and individuals in various forms to enhance school facilities and support teaching and educational activities, accounting for about 40% of total investment in education belonging to the public sector (Doc R10).

Public schools meet only around 20% of the demand for children in these two localities, and there are too few public preschools recognized as suitable for early childcare (before 36 months old) (OXFAM, 2015; HIDS, 2020). Therefore, the private sector's participation in this field has grown enormously. According to statistics from the HCMC DOET (Doc R08), the total number of preschools in the city is 1,035 (public: 431, non-public 604). Binh Tan District has 24 public and 78 private schools, and Binh Chanh District has 22 public and 39 private schools. The proportion of children studying in non-public schools is higher than in public schools, with more than 65% of children enrolled (Doc R11). "This results from preferential policies, mobilizing social resources to develop education, such as policies on land rental, taxes, stimulus loans, interest rate subsidies to build schools, and government policies" (Doc R10). In other words, the socialization of preschool education through the privatization of preschools is a central goal of the local government to ensure the provision of educational services to the people. Currently, due to the lack of financial support from the state, only a few private preschools receive support in terms of land funds.

Although the number of private preschools is increasing rapidly, they still cannot meet the needs of migrant workers in peri-urban areas. The reason is that the mechanisms and policies on public investment, public-private partnerships, and socialization are not strong enough and do not create fair competition between public and non-public preschool education, so they cannot attract investors to participate in the development of preschools. Large investors, such

as international schools, often do not choose to invest in peri-urban areas (Interview, A01). Moreover, there is no land fund left to build preschool education facilities in areas with industrial zones. At the same time, site clearance and initial investment costs are high, and tuition revenue is low and insufficient to cover the costs. The field of preschool education has more risks than other educational levels, so private investors are not interested in investing in preschool education despite the incentives offered under Decree No. 69/2008/ND-CP (Interview, A31). Additionally, the conditions and procedures for applying for permission to open a school are complicated and cumbersome. The continuous amendments to the guiding decrees further complicate the process of applying for a business license to establish private preschools and kindergartens (Interviews, A01; A31).

Living activities

Although the views of local leaders are always consistent regarding the lack of a distinction between permanent and temporary residents, in reality, local authorities prioritize children with household registration to attend public preschools in a context where the number of children admitted to public schools is very limited (Interview, A05; A06). In addition, the childcare hours of public preschools do not always match the working hours of parents, who are migrant workers often working until 7:00 p.m. and in shifts on weekends. Meanwhile, public preschools only care for children until 5:30 p.m. on weekdays from Monday to Friday and do not accept childcare on weekends and summer holidays. Due to the facilities and teaching staff conditions, most public preschools do not accept children under 12 months old. Classes for children under 36 months old in public preschools are very few, and priority is given to children of people with local permanent residence. This situation is inconvenient when most mothers have to return to work after six months of maternity leave and have no choice but to find someone to look after their children or send them back home to their grandparents. This solution is reasonable and safe, but it leads to negative consequences when children cannot stay with their parents (HIDS, 2020; WB, 2020b).

Increasing socialization of preschool education, along with high tuition fees of private schools, has created a significant financial burden for migrant workers. According to HLF (2020), each child sent to a private school must pay fees that are between 5–9 times higher than those of public schools, while worker salaries remain low, around 4,500,000 VND/month. Moreover, the socialization of education also leads to additional costs being placed mainly on the shoulders of the people concerned. For example, parents sponsor teaching and learning activities and equipment facilities in addition to tuition fees. Schools use outsourcing services to organize life skills courses, English classes, and extracurricular activities for students. This trend increases the financial burden on parents and exacerbates the inequality in access to

education for children of migrant workers. According to a report by OXFAM (2015), 21.2% of children of migrant workers aged 6–14 do not attend school, only 7.7% of migrant children attend public kindergartens, and 12% attend private kindergartens.

5.1.3. Belonging and household registration system

Conceiving activities

In Vietnam, citizenship is linked to the principle of household registration, known as *Ho Khau*, based on the idea that those born in a particular administrative territory (ward/commune-level administrative unit) should belong to that area in terms of state management and public benefits. For a long time, this system used a household registration book that included information about family members, such as name, date of birth, gender, and occupation, to keep track of each person's travel and residence. Through the registration and management of *Ho Khau*, the state monitors changes in the population, and develops specific plans to build strategies for Vietnam's working population and employment (WB, 2016; Doc R01).

The household registration system has been in place in Vietnam since the 1950s, based on China's *hukou* system and the Soviet Union's *propiska* system. Initially, the household registration system aimed to control counter-revolutionary and criminal activities (Hardy, 2001). After 1975, when the household registration system was imposed on the entire country, the household registration book was a necessary book for families to buy food because, at that time, Vietnam's economy was under a central planning regime. However, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the stamp regime no longer existed, the household registration system continued to be maintained. The argument for maintaining household registration was to limit the flow of too many migrants to big cities. The household registration regime is a tool and administrative procedure for the state to manage the movement of Vietnamese citizens, aiming to control social order and economic management. After the *Doi Moi*, along with the wave of labor migration from rural to urban areas, the purpose of the *Ho Khau* system has become a major debate topic in Vietnam. The CPV requested "innovation of residence and household registration policies" (Doc P02). Then there were many amendments to the Residence Law and related laws in household registration and residence registration conditions. The process of revising the *Ho Khau* regime's meaning occurs regularly and fluctuates between different perspectives regarding tightening residence management (social order control) and economic management (welfare distribution) or further relaxing restrictions to ensure "freedom of residence" (WB, 2016).

Before the Residence Law 2006, there were four types of household registration: KT1 for permanent residents (who can buy land use rights and access other social services at the place of residence); KT2 for people registered in the province but in another district (who can buy land use rights and access social services); KT3 for long-term temporary residents (who can buy land use rights but have limited access to social services); and KT4 for temporary residents (who have no right to buy land and limited access to social services). For individuals classed as KT3 and KT4 to register household registration in centrally-run cities, they had to live in the area continuously for three years. The Residence Law 2006 made relatively significant changes to household registration policy by combining the four types of household registration into two categories: permanent residence and temporary residence. One of the reform directions was to reduce difficulties in registering permanent residence. If permanent residence registration could be done quickly and inexpensively, it would no longer be a barrier to accessing services. This law also significantly reduced the conditions for applying for permanent residence, especially in centrally-run cities. Specifically, citizens needed to stay continuously for one year instead of three consecutive years. However, the Ministry of Public Security (MOPS) and some local governments believed that this law was too lax and put pressure on cities' infrastructure and social services (Doc NA19; Doc R01).

The amended Residence Law in 2013 reversed that reform direction by increasing the residence period to two years and stipulating that local governments should be allowed to introduce their own residence policies. Regulations restricting permanent residence registration were also applied in Da Nang, while Hanoi's regulations are based on the Capital Law, which required a minimum average housing area for household registration. HCMC also required a minimum housing area of 20m²/person for permanent residents. This revision reflects the "wavering" position between simplifying the procedure for changing household registration status and concerns that the regulations were too loose, putting pressure on cities' infrastructure and social services (Doc R01).

After many amendments and supplements, practical implementation showed that some specific contents of the law on residence still had problems and inadequacies from both a theoretical and practical perspective. This led to inconsistent implementation of state management functions based on household registration, and the efficiency achieved was not high. The government issued Resolution 112/NQ-CP in 2017 to simplify administrative procedures related to population management within the scope of the MOPS's state management functions. Accordingly, the government agreed to abolish the form of management of permanent residence registration according to the *Ho Khau* book and replace it with management through personal identification numbers that can be accessed through the national population database accessible via the Internet. This process paves the way for the 2020

Residence Law to abolish many regulations related to household registration, reduce the difference between temporary and permanent residents, and reaffirm the system's role as a population control mechanism. The new management model being built maintains the residence management model based on household registration with improvements, simplifying procedures and conditions for residence registration, and creating convenience for residence registration. Accordingly, the urban management agency classifies people into three main groups: permanent residents, semi-temporary residents, and temporary residents. The first group includes people who have lived long and stably in the ward/commune and have permanent residence registration. The second group includes those who have lived in the ward/commune for 30 days or more and have registered temporary residence. The last group includes temporary residents who stay in an area other than their permanent or temporary residence for less than 30 days. Population management and urban development policies rely on this classification to handle daily work.

Perceiving activities

The practical implementation of the *Ho Khau* mechanism extends its influence go beyond a mere residence management tool. According to the MOPS, there are 39 administrative procedures where people are required to present their household registration book or a copy to be processed according to the provisions of the law. Accordingly, local governments use this bureaucratic administrative regime as a tool to control the migration process by creating a distinction between those with a household registration and those without a household registration in the city in matters related to access to public services and other administrative regulations. This “technical barrier” puts pressure on migrants, complicates the meaning of *Ho Khau*, and conflicts with the Constitution and laws on freedom of residence (Doc R01).

When the *Ho Khau* system becomes too complicated and troublesome, but its effectiveness in practice does not solve the problem of rural-urban migration, a proposed solution to eliminate the *Ho Khau* book according to Resolution 112/NQ-CP “receives the support of most leaders and people” (Doc G28). However, “residency management must still be guaranteed; just replace manual management with electronic management. When there is a change in temporary or permanent residence, people will declare information to the authorities. This information will be updated, transferred and stored in the national population database according to regulations” (Doc G29). This means that the government’s policy of “abolishing household registration books” is only the abolition of the “form of management.” Residents who register as temporary residents no longer use household registration books and replace them with management through personal identification numbers to simplify procedures. This change only shifts the form from physical to digital but does not alter the nature of population management through residence registration.

Living activities

In the early stages of the migration wave, migrant workers became second-class citizens in urban areas because they did not have household registration to carry out administrative procedures such as buying land, building houses, registering motorbikes, and receiving community benefits. Only 64.6% of unregistered children between 6 and 17 study in public schools, compared to 82.4% of the total population. Migrant workers have a doctor's visit rate of less than half that of other residents, 11.4% compared to 23.4% (WB, 2016). Continuous amendments to regulations on household registration, along with the marketization and socialization of public services and housing, have gradually changed the injustice of the household registration system for migrant workers. Data on permanent and temporary residents in HCMC shows that household registration gradually ceases to play an essential role in migrants' attachment to their destination. Over the past ten years, the number of permanent residents has decreased, while the number of temporary residents has increased (from 2.1 million to 3.6 million). As of 2019, there are 3.67 million people temporarily residing in the city (accounting for 36.5% of the total population). An estimated 2.61 million people are migrant workers in HCMC (GSO, 2020). Accordingly, the rate of permanent residence registration of migrants to the city is insignificant. Of the 3.67 million people temporarily residing in the city, on average, each year, about 178,211 people have registered for new household registration in the city (accounting for 6.3%) (GSO, 2020). This ratio indicates the following possibilities: the need for migrants to register permanent residence is no longer high, and/or the ability of migrants to meet permanent residence requirements has decreased (due to increased housing prices), and/or there is a reduction in dependence on the management regime based on household registration (or household registration is less of a barrier for workers migrating to HCMC than before). However, 70% of people surveyed believe that the *Ho Khau* system still limits the rights of people without *Ho Khau* (WB, 2016).

One of the other negative impacts of the *Ho Khau* regime is that it limits the participation of migrant workers in activities related to official political and social life in urban areas, such as elections, meetings, and local activities. They do not have time due to the nature of their work and only register for temporary residence, so they have little opportunity to participate. Typically, such activities invite representatives from the head of the household, not the individual. Therefore, boarding house owners often represent them in connection with local authorities. According to OXFAM (2015) survey results, participation in these community activities is minimal. Up to 77.2% of respondents said they did not participate in any community activities or have any contact with the local government where they temporarily resided. More than 7% of migrant workers have contact with neighborhood group leaders and area police, and around 4% participate in neighborhood group meetings (Table 8). In addition,

workers do not feel clearly supported by local authorities, especially regarding electricity, water, and boarding policies for workers (HFL, 2020). Thus, in addition to the personal reasons of migrant workers, such as not being able to adapt to the urban environment and the psychological disadvantage this creates, the *Ho Khau* regime, the center of the territorialization process, has created barriers to promoting the belonging of migrant workers to the peri-urban areas of HCMC.

Table 8

The rate of participation of households in community activities

	Permanent residence (%)	Temporary residence (%)	Long-term temporary residence (%)	Short- term stay (%)
Neighborhood meeting	84	17	21	10
Voting at the local level	82	21	22	18
Voting at city and central levels	34	7	8	7
Meeting to contribute policy opinions	64	12	15	8
Contribute to social funds	85	29	30	27
Neighborhood activities	92	44	47	40
Communicate with neighbors	98	92	93	90

Note. OXFAM, 2015

5.2. State-led governing practices

5.2.1. Governing housing issues

Governing images

The marketization of land use rights and home ownership leads to the transfer of national resources into private hands, creating various housing types driven by different driving forces. During this process, the state gradually limited its direct participation in housing construction and development. At the same time, they allowed new factors, such as transnational corporations, housing construction enterprises, and individuals, leading to different combinations of institutions and modes of coordination in management. However, the role and function of the state in the context of the marketization of the land and housing sector are always maintained in a central position. In particular, the state is still directing and operating the market: “The state plays a leading role in the formation and development of the residential real estate market and at the same time, has appropriate support policies so that all strata of the population can have improved living conditions” (Doc P09). This vision leads to an adjustment

in the role of the state, and the regulation modes of the state become important to stabilize the macro environment. The specific goal is to shift the focus from management using administrative tools to effectively using economic tools to promote housing development and establish tools to control the power of agencies and people with authority in housing management and development, preventing and combating loopholes, corruption, and negativity in housing management, use, and development (Doc P09).

Regarding governing social housing development, the state implements the social housing development model mainly through projects in “the spirit of public-private partnership” (Doc G18). That is, social housing is built on the principle of state support to reduce construction costs, and at the same time, the state promulgates a series of regulations to control transactions. Enterprises are responsible for construction and distribution, with state supervision and housing operation management. Although the trend of decentralization is clearly identified in policies on social housing development, its governance still emphasizes the top-down image with the state as the center to “strengthen the role of state management for social housing” (Doc G27). Accordingly, the state aims to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of state management, innovate methods and models of social housing management and development, strongly decentralize power to localities in housing development in society, strengthen inspection and supervision, and ensure the implementation of social housing projects. This includes planning, land use plans, land funds for social housing development in commercial housing projects for the right purpose, and strictly managing and supervising the investment, construction, sale, rental, and use of apartments in social housing projects (Doc P18).

Governing instrumentation

Besides legal documents, planning is an essential tool in urban governance. General planning provides the legal basis for the city government to make decisions on housing projects, identify priority development areas to call for investment, and designate areas where development is restricted. In addition to general planning, the housing planning regime functions as a two-level strategic planning system. This system involves top-down vertical management from the perspective of vision, goals, and national housing targets to the provincial level while also incorporating local horizontal coordination between provincial-level agencies and departments related to housing. This coordination is crucial in the process of developing provincial-level housing goals and targets, measures, and necessary resources to implement those goals and targets within the same action plan. This plan includes clear commitments and the assignment of specific tasks and responsibilities among agencies, departments, and local administrative units (Doc NA12; Doc NA13; Doc NA14; Doc NA15). However, housing management based on planning and programs in Vietnam is still affected by subsidy inertia, mainly relying on

static design principles, lacking market-oriented flexibility, and especially lacking substantive participation from the people (Nguyen, T. H. & Nguyen, Q. T., 2012).

Regarding the governance apparatus of the housing sector in general and social housing in particular, the Ministry of Construction (MOC) plays a central role at the national level in adjusting and establishing policies and national investment targets for housing. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of the social housing sector, there is a need for discussion between many central-level ministries participating in the implementation of various housing-related activities based on recommendations, decisions, and circulars. Effective management of such a large number of stakeholders requires precise mechanisms for coordination, which is challenging without the necessary tools. Many government agencies still operate relatively independently in the social housing sector with ad hoc coordination and reporting systems, which has limited the MOC in promoting cooperation in the social housing development program. Local authorities are responsible for implementing general housing policy. The Department of Construction (DOC), a specialized agency under the City People's Committee, advises and assists in state management of social housing. Similarly, urban management departments, under the district-level People's Committee, advise and assist the district-level People's Committee in managing housing within their administrative territories. These agencies follow the instructions of both the People's Committee and the MOC, which manage the respective industry and field. Currently, local social housing projects are mainly managed by city-level departments and branches, while the district level oversees individual housing (Doc NA18; Doc NA15).

In addition, the state also uses financial tools through housing development programs to serve the governance process. For example, the state promulgates mechanisms and policies on tax exemption and reduction, exemption and reduction of land use fees, land rent, long-term credit with preferential interest rates, other financial incentive mechanisms, and support from state capital to implement social housing support policies (Doc NA18; Doc NA15). The HCMC People's Committee also established a Housing Development Fund to invest in housing development in the city. This fund is a tool for the city to effectively organize and implement financial support policies for housing investors and buyers according to regulations (Doc G31). However, some local government efforts, such as committing capital and local resources to housing, have been unsuccessful due to a lack of local budget flexibility and numerous regulations requiring successful implementation. The city must depend on guidance from the central level to implement and maintain national programs locally (Doc R05).

Governing housing issues must be based on the analysis of information related to land and housing. The Land Law 2013 stipulates: "State agencies and persons with authority in land management and use are responsible for creating conditions and providing land information to

organizations and individuals according to law provisions” (Doc NA07). At the same time, this law also specifically regulates the housing information system and database. These regulations highlight the importance of transparency in land information and overcoming the situation of information monopoly in state management of land. However, the current land and housing information system does not have a synchronous connection to serve governing activities. In many cases, competent state agencies do not provide information, provide incomplete information, are slow to provide information, or do not provide a written response or explanation to individuals because the law does not have specific regulations on time limits for processing requests for information (Doc R02).

Governing actions

Currently, management action on housing issues is mainly administrative management (state management) according to assignment and decentralization from top to bottom. While project-based housing (commercial and social housing) is managed by city-level departments, agencies, and branches, individual housing is managed by the people’s committees of districts. These agencies guide and require investors, relevant organizations, and individuals to comply with current legal regulations. At the same time, they conduct inspections, examinations, and management of construction orders for housing investment projects to direct and handle violations relatively independently. This dual hierarchical management system makes monitoring and providing overall solutions for the housing sector quite complicated. Fragmentation by administrative territory and management objects has created many governance issues, such as shifting responsibilities between state management agencies and some public officials assisting illegal construction acts and violations of construction orders (Interview, A02).

Compared to commercial housing and single-family homes, governance actions for social housing are more interactive between different actors. A typical example is the relationship between the city government, commercial housing project investors, and social housing owners regarding land funds for social housing development. According to the provisions of the Land Law, the state has the right to recover and set land prices. The state issues administrative decisions to recover land from current land users and allocate land to investors to implement investment projects; investors pay land use fees or land rent to the state and compensate for recovered land and resettlement money for people whose residential land is recovered according to state-prescribed land prices. This process often favors investors. These two land price mechanisms (state-regulated compensation price and market-based commercial price) create large profits from the difference between inputs and sold products, promoting the boom of commercial housing projects and making social housing projects less attractive to investors (Interviews A02; A06). To address this situation, the state stipulates that commercial housing

projects must reserve 20% of their land fund for social housing development or pay land use fees instead (Doc NA08, Doc NA18). This process creates specific interactive actions between local authorities and housing investors. However, this relationship also leads to some enforcement actions that are favorable to investors, such as converting land use for the wrong purpose. Sometimes, there are signs of bureaucracy or self-interest in investor relationships (WB, 2011).

Leaders, especially city-level leaders, play an essential role in governance actions related to social housing development. They actively negotiate with the central government to achieve better policy and budget autonomy for housing development, seek funding and technical support from international donors, and encourage private enterprises to participate in housing construction and development. In addition, city leaders actively direct the transformation of public management by promoting administrative reform, improving the investment environment, and collaborating with businesses to solve investment difficulties (Interview, E02).

5.2.2. Governing preschool education

Governing images

According to the perspective of the CPV, there are three main governing images: “improve the effectiveness and efficiency of state management,” “implement the autonomy mechanism of public service units,” and “promote socialization in public service provision” (Doc P19). These images are concretized in state views on preschool education management.

In particular, the government stipulates the responsibilities of state management of education to “ensure consistency, transparency, and improve effectiveness and efficiency in state management of education; ensure correspondence between tasks, powers, and responsibilities with financial and human resources; conditions to ensure educational quality and other necessary conditions to carry out assigned tasks; determine specific tasks, powers, and state management responsibilities of ministries, people’s committees at all levels, and relevant agencies” (Doc G07). In implementing the autonomy mechanism of public service units, there is a type of decentralization of management to localities, especially at the school level. The mode of school-based management is the general direction, which also has many other names, such as decentralized management, empowerment management, and school autonomy (Doc G07). Moreover, governing non-public preschools is based on the principle of educational socialization. This process is targeted to benefit stakeholders mutually. However, besides profits, investors must align with the common goal of the country, for the development of education and training and the benefit of children. In addition, decentralization and

socialization must guarantee fairness between the public and private preschool systems (Doc G21; Doc G22).

In the context of the high population growth of Binh Tan District and Binh Chanh District, the authorities have determined that the governing goal in preschool education is for 100% of children aged three to five years old to attend kindergarten, ensure that the rate of teachers with college degrees or higher reaches between 90% and 100% by 2030, and provide each kindergarten class with its own classroom. To achieve these goals, they have determined that socialization plays a vital role while emphasizing the state's management role in investing and ensuring educational quality (Doc P40; Doc P44).

Governing instrumentation

Educational governance tools for decentralization and socialization are continuously institutionalized. The Education Law and related legal documents regulate solutions and policy mechanisms to promote the socialization and decentralization of preschools and primary schools (Doc NA11; Doc G22; Doc P20), emphasizing “increasing local initiative and management responsibility for education. Provinces and cities, based on the general mechanisms and policies of the state, decide on mechanisms and policies for the socialization of education to apply specifically to their localities” (Doc P20). In addition to policies and legal documents, the school network plan is one of the typical tools that influence governance activities in the city's peri-urban areas. This planning is linked to the city's overall planning and detailed planning for each location in the district, which is based on territorial factors. However, in some periods, temporary residents and floating migrants were not subjects in educational planning, and these plans could not meet actual school needs in the peri-urban districts (Interview, A01).

Educational agencies and organizations, on behalf of the state, deploy education and training and manage and regulate education and training activities. Accordingly, the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) is the unified state management agency for education and training nationwide. Local authorities manage state education and training through their specialized agencies according to the functions, tasks, and powers prescribed by the state under the decentralization mechanism. Accordingly, district people's committees establish and manage preschools and primary schools. The Department of Education and Training (DOET) helps the district People's Committee perform the state management function of education for all types of primary schools and classes in the area and performs the state management function of nurturing, care, and education for preschools (Doc NA11; Doc G22).

Governing actions

One of the essential characteristics of educational administration in Vietnam is the combination of administrative management (external) and professional management (internal) in educational management activities. This feature is intended to ensure a favorable pedagogical environment for implementing educational goals prescribed by the state.

Based on the school network development plan in the city's education and training sector (Doc LG03), districts have developed school network planning projects in the area. Through these, they implement solutions to develop the scale of the number of schools, such as calling for social investment, adding school construction projects to residential area planning projects, adjusting the educational land area, and allocating capital for site clearance to implement school and classroom construction projects. However, the current situation of public land areas according to planning projects arranged for educational works is still limited. The planning location is mainly on land used by organizations, households, and individuals, causing high compensation and site clearance costs and affecting the feasibility of planning. Up to 2022, according to existing planning in districts, the area of educational land has only reached 57.48% of the approved planning. The reason is that the regulations based on territory are not suitable for the context of peri-urbanization in terms of minimum land area/coefficient, and requirements and regulations on educational land use planning are still challenging, affecting the city's development of schools and classrooms (Doc R11).

In governing the development of the non-public preschool system, localities have balanced the urgent need for education in their management areas with the need to attract investors to participate in the development of local education through preferential policies on land, income tax, and other legal conditions. Several projects have been carried out to build and develop school networks in the form of public-private cooperation, demand stimulation, and socialization. In addition, according to construction law regulations, commercial housing investors must build schools as part of their projects. Despite attracting a large number of resources from society to invest in education, non-state social actors still play a heavily dependent role due to the persistent habit of subsidizing and controlling the power of state agencies. This habit has not been eliminated, and at the same time, the practice of requiring the socialization of public services in society has not been established. For example, the administrative procedures for licensing to open a school are very complicated. An owner of a private preschool shared: "The license goes through many stages, but mainly there must be "relationships" to be issued quickly; otherwise, you have to wait, and sometimes it is not granted permission at all" (Interview, CGO01).

Preschool governance actions are mainly related to ensuring the effectiveness of developing non-public preschool education facilities and promoting the autonomy of public preschool education facilities. These strategies can be observed through actions within and outside these educational institutions. Accordingly, the school has the right to recruit and has financial and educational program autonomy. The schools are responsible for self-assessment of academic quality and are subject to accreditation by competent authorities for educational quality. However, although schools have autonomy and self-responsibility, most public preschools still rely heavily on the state for budget and recruitment targets (Interview, BHO01). This means that every preschool education facility must perform its educational and training functions and tasks according to the direction of educational management agencies located in a specific area, so it must also comply with the instructions of these agencies.

Local administrative management follows the state's decentralization regulations to ensure unified centralization, which affects the creativity and decisiveness of leadership actions. There is little evidence that prominent initiatives came from local leaders: "Leaders also want to have creative initiatives suitable to the local situation; however, applying any initiative will affect relevant parties. Therefore, the administrative-territorial perspective is restraining views consistent with the practical situation, leading to a situation where officials are afraid of responsibility or have reduced will and cannot develop the locality" (Interview, CGO01).

5.2.3. Governing citizens' residence

Governing images

Residence governance is a component of state administrative management in Vietnam. It aims to "ensure the harmony of the legitimate rights and interests of citizens, the interests of the state, community, and society; combining ensuring the right to freedom of residence, other basic rights of citizens and responsibilities of the state with the task of building and developing socio-economics, strengthening national defense and security, and ensuring social order and safety" (Doc NA20). Accordingly, citizens' rights to residence must be harmoniously combined with the principles of registration and residence management, according to the demarcation of administrative boundaries and decentralization of management according to the provisions of law. This goal determines that "residence governance must ensure urban order, safety, and local development" (Doc NA20).

One of the essential goals of governance related to residence is to ensure citizens' freedom of residence according to the provisions of the Constitution. Competent authorities continuously emphasize that "actions that hinder citizens from exercising their right to freedom of residence are strictly prohibited: abusing information about a permanent and temporary residence to limit

citizens' legitimate rights and interests; giving or receiving bribes, causing trouble in registration and residence management; not receiving or delaying the receipt of permanent or temporary residence registration dossiers; failure to perform or improper implementation of permanent residence registration or temporary residence registration for citizens when the dossier is eligible for permanent or temporary residence registration; setting own time, procedures, documents, and forms contrary to the law or falsifying information, books, and residence records; intentionally issuing or refusing to issue residence documents contrary to the provisions of law" (Doc NA20).

Over the past decades, administrative reform has become a familiar concept in Vietnam's general public administration, especially concerning such vital issues as residence rights. After a long period of reform and amendment, the state determined that the ultimate goal of this process was to reduce administrative procedures, create favorable conditions for people, and ensure state management requirements. Abolishing household registration books can be considered a "turning point" in administrative reform, streamlining the state's administrative procedures and benefiting the people and the state (Doc R01). Accordingly, the new management method is expected to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of population management, reform and reduce administrative procedures, create favorable mechanisms for people to participate in civil transactions, and demonstrate transparency in the activities of state administrative agencies when serving people.

Governing instrumentation

According to the provisions of the Residence Law, the government determines how to unify state management of residence throughout the country. Based on the provisions of this law, the government has issued a decree detailing the following contents: scope of regulation, subjects of application, and prohibiting acts of abusing regulations on household registration for work restrict citizens' rights; responsibilities of ministries, ministerial-level agencies, branches, people's committees at all levels and citizens in implementing regulations on household registration; citizen's place of residence, duration, creating a unified legal corridor for the registration of permanent and temporary residence of citizens; determining the responsibilities of ministries (first and foremost the MOPS), sectors, and people's committees at all levels in this field (Doc NA20).

The Ministry of Public Security (MOPS) is a state administrative agency with specialized authority at the central level, responsible to the government for performing state residence management. The General Department of Police for Administrative Management of Social Order and Safety, under the supervision of the MOPS, is the unit directly in charge of registration, residence management, and national data on population nationwide. People's

committees at all levels are state administrative agencies with general local authority and, within the scope of their tasks and powers, are responsible for implementing state management of residence in the locality according to the provisions of the relevant laws, and decentralization of the government and superior state administrative agencies (Doc NA20).

The national population database aims to provide an essential tool for population management, but it also reveals many population management problems in peri-urban areas. Previously, the Police Force for Administrative Management of Social Affairs and Social Affairs of the City Police had built a database system on residence management for citizens in general and migrant workers in particular, but collecting information and documents was complex. Building a database system still faces many difficulties and limitations due to manual implementation. On the other hand, the quality of information in this system often does not fully reflect reality because many migrants do not register for temporary residence and frequently change residence. The effectiveness of database exploitation activities on residence management to serve state management activities does not meet the established requirements. Therefore, the new management system is expected to progress in applying science and technology in residence management. The national population and residence database are the technology platforms for the new residence management method. These databases must be built synchronously, put into operation, and ensure seamless connection, updating, sharing, and exploitation of information between registration and management agencies from central to grassroots levels (Doc R01).

Governing actions

Up to now, managing residence issues has been identified as a responsibility of the state. Powers and responsibilities are increasingly delegated to the MOPS through the authority to advise the government on policies and promulgate and organize the implementation of relevant legal documents in the country. At the same time, the police at all levels (in vertical sectors) are the advisory agencies that directly manage state management in this field for the people's committees at the respective levels to operate within the territory of the city, districts, and wards. Accordingly, local police agencies at all levels, within the scope of their prescribed responsibilities, establish residence registration agencies, manage citizens' residence activities, and serve the management of citizens. The state's social management and the work of preventing and combating all types of crimes and violations of the law on residence ensure social security and order.

Residence is also a field related to many different ministries and branches. Having existed for more than 70 years, the social management system through household registration creates extremely complicated legal relationships. Therefore, horizontal coordination between state

agencies is important in the residence administration system. Through cooperative relationships, coordination mechanisms are built with forces outside the police sector, such as the judiciary, planning, and investment sectors, to exploit citizens' residence data. However, coordination with sectors, levels, agencies, organizations, and professional forces in citizen residence management is not synchronized and unified, leading to low administrative efficiency (Doc R01).

In the context of significant mechanical population growth in peri-urban districts, the police force at all levels, according to regulations based on territorial principles, is meager compared to the number of people that need to be managed. Combined management networks are formed in residential communities under the ward. Reception notification points are held in neighborhoods, hamlets, wards, communes, and towns. Here, a regional police officer is in charge of a neighborhood, coordinating with assigned ward police officers, the executive board of the neighborhood, the residential group, and the people's group to jointly manage residence. At the same time, in the process of accepting residence, the Social Security Administration Police force coordinates with many related agencies and socio-political organizations to organize residence activities. They also receive information about stays in many diverse and varied forms, from directly receiving information from individuals via phone, the internet, or through social organizations in the grassroots area, companies, and enterprises where employees work and live (Interviews, A05; A11; A23; A27).

5.3. Selections of territorialization and territorial governance mode

5.3.1. State-led socio-spatial strategies as urban territorialization

State-led socio-spatial practices on the edge of HCMC reflect the nature of local government occupation and domination of peri-urban administrative territory through access to and control over land, resources and population. This finding is consistent with Vandergeest and Peluso's (1995) claim that in Vietnam, "the provincial elites controlled land as well as people" (p. 392). This section argues that these state-led practices reflect strategies of dispossession, expansion, control, and exclusion as patterns of peri-urban territorialization.

The city government has increased the expansion of urban land to serve the goal of "prioritizing investment in building infrastructure and residential areas for new districts, which are urbanizing localities" (Doc P13). Accordingly, land in peri-urban areas is included in the requisition planning to build residential areas, new housing projects, industrial parks, and infrastructure such as schools and hospitals. This process is influenced by legal ambiguity surrounding state-owned land. The law has decentralized power to allow provincial authorities to approve investment projects within their territories, in addition to allowing them to

requisition and convert agricultural areas into projects of up to 200 hectares (Doc NA07; Doc NA08; Doc G26). The state compensates this land at a price much lower than the market (two-price land mechanism) and hands it over to investors. After the investors build and sell houses on the market, they earn a large profit. Such profits are one of the main factors motivating private enterprises to invest in housing and service businesses in these areas. In addition, local authorities also implement strict controls to prevent people from building informally on land that is planned for state-use but not yet utilized, regardless of people's legitimate rights. These strategies reflect the dispossession with the involvement of the state and large-scale private corporations. As a result, the peri-urban area has undergone strong spatial changes involving large-scale agricultural land loss in the 1990s and 2000s due to state land acquisition and self-development, followed by the conversion of agricultural land into residential and industrial uses. However, the process of land commercialization in these areas is also accompanied by speculative activities, pushing up land and housing prices, making the shortage of affordable housing and land for school construction increasingly serious.

Strategies to control peri-urbanization are led by the state using technologies such as planning, mapping, and demarcation according to administrative boundaries. These technologies are designed and deployed within the territory to suit the proposed nature of the specific area. In HCMC, peri-urban areas are associated with power relations between the party-state and their local hierarchies of "urban districts" or "rural districts." By law, urban districts correspond to a high level of urbanization and have greater political and financial support than rural districts (Doc NA22). Accordingly, socio-spatial activities in peri-urban areas are influenced by these two distinct territorial organizational mechanisms. The division of urban and rural territories has led to policies to separate and merge areas with high urbanization rates into urban territories (i.e., urban districts), specifically the establishment of Binh Tan District out of Binh Chanh District in 2004. Such administrative-territorial divisions create tensions between the specificity of peri-urban areas and the policies, administrative structures and spatial organizations imposed by urban or rural governments.

Additionally, exclusion strategies are also used by local authorities through the *Ho Khau* regime. This regime (re)shapes the relationships between locals and non-locals, and specifically between (legal) homeowners and non-homeowners in the city. At the same time, the population management mechanism through household registration also becomes a strategy to distribute welfare policies to people in conditions of limited resources (Interviews, A02; E04; E05). Accordingly, these strategies often create benefits for population groups aligned with local development orientations, thereby often depriving migrant worker communities of their "rights to the city." This technology helps to provide rationalities about the strategies employed in the complex relationship between people and peri-urban territory to maintain state

power. In this sense, peri-urban territorialization is a governmental technology that regulates who participates and what people do in the process of urban territorial expansion.

These state-led territorial strategies reflect the process of territorialization aimed at turning the peri-urban area into the urban territory of the future. That is, it refers to the case where the city's territory expands to include more areas under its control. Through territorial expansion, the city gains control of land and economic interests in the new area. Accordingly, the process of peri-urban territorialization includes political technologies and spatial strategies to control resources and people by controlling these areas. Although this process is seen as a city-building and urban development strategy, it simultaneously reflects the "power over" emphasized in the context of the commercial land strategies of large public and private actors, and the population control and welfare under the *Ho Khau* regime that dominates this process. Accordingly, the dispossession of local people's land and the exclusion of migrant workers in the process of territorialization will generate different coping strategies.

5.3.2. Territorial governance of peri-urban areas

The trend of housing marketization, school socialization, and liberalization of residence rights is occurring significantly in peri-urban areas with increasing participation from non-public sectors. This changes the relationship between the state, market, and society in these areas. These relationships and interactions are often regulated, arranged, and organized within an administrative hierarchy of territorial governance to make the area governable. It means that territorial principles can influence the governance of socio-spatial processes on the urban edge to achieve common visions for the future of that territory.

There is a shift from the perspective of the state "rowing" to "steering" in tackling socio-spatial issues on the urban edge. However, this change is still slow and still reflects the maintenance of democratic centralism principles in the direction of unity and synchronization from the top down through administrative orders through four levels of vertical government organization, in which the levels of government at localities are divided into two types: urban and rural. Moreover, territorial governance actions in peri-urban areas emphasize combining sectoral state management with territorial state management through administrative management activities. That is, according to the division and decentralization of management between horizontal management across sectors and vertical management of administrative levels. Accordingly, the coordination and organization of this guiding hierarchical apparatus and related non-state actors through implementing projects and programs has become a dominant model in governing peri-urban issues.

A relatively solid system of technologies guarantees the territorial governance model. Firstly, the responsibilities and tools of state management are defined in the legal system, and policies are continuously improved to create favorable conditions for state management activities at the macro level. However, these are often not concretized into specific targets or feasible solutions for special cases such as peri-urban areas and migrant workers. Secondly, peri-urban governance depends on urban development planning based on administrative territory. However, these plans often carry a heavy orientation without fully considering the resources, implementation ability, and actual needs in the process of governing complex areas such as peri-urban localities. Thirdly, peri-urban territorial governance is closely linked to demographic transitions, which are managed through the household registration system for population control and welfare distribution.

The territorial governance principles in this case also create constraints on the territorialization process. Despite decentralization and administrative reform efforts, this local territorial model based on rural and urban division is still rigid and unsuitable for typical areas such as peri-urban areas, leading to fragmentation in the development of these areas. Additionally, although the process of institutionalization is continuous, the effectiveness and efficiency of these policies are not high, mainly based on administrative orders. There is no specific and sufficiently strong incentive policy mechanism to create preferential conditions for investors in building social housing and private schools in peri-urban areas. Project application procedures and operating procedures reflect robust administrative mechanisms and are overly complicated, leading to extended time for investment preparation, compensation, site clearance, land allocation, and appraisal and approval of project planning, which still takes longer, leading to increased virtual costs (HIDS, 2016; DOC R02). In addition, this top-down governance model creates convenience for the management purposes of the state and public agencies and does not facilitate benefits to the lives of migrant workers in particular. Such exclusionary governance has placed the state and the public apparatus in the most advantageous position. It seems that migrant workers have fallen into a subaltern position when exercising their rights and are afraid to contact the authorities and practice participatory governance.

5.3.3. Structural selectivities

From an SRA perspective, different territorial strategies and territorial governance are shaped by different calculations in various contexts regarding issues of housing, schools, and belonging in peri-urban areas. Strategies related to housing issues in peri-urban areas occur within the context of the party-state's view that "land is owned by the entire people, assigned to the State as the owner's representative, unified in management and used effectively" (Doc NA03). However, the state also recognizes land use rights and promotes their commercialization, laying the legal foundations for the formation and development of

Vietnam's real estate and housing market. Accordingly, reformed land and housing policies help improve overall housing development in the market and increase the availability and diversity of housing products that meet different needs. However, marketization also pushes up house prices and does not create enough supply for low-income groups, especially migrant workers. In that context, strategies in social housing development appear as a solution to overcome market failure. Meanwhile, strategies in preschool education development consider the structures of public service socialization. In the context of limited resources, the state does not possess sufficient financial and human resources to fully meet the increasing demand for public services, so support from the private sector is needed (UNDP, 2009; Do A. D. & Le H. S., 2020; Pham, V. D., 2021). In addition to state investment, the provision of preschool education services in peri-urban areas expanded to private economic sectors and individuals. Despite emphasizing the goal of liberalizing people's right to residence through administrative reforms, the household registration system remains a tool to help local governments focus on people with household registration and limit budget spending on migrants. With a limited budget, local authorities cannot take care of everyone, so they prioritize people with permanent residence when infrastructure and social facilities, especially education and health, are overloaded and demand exceeds supply. This strategy was effective when the state provided the majority of public services, but gradually blurred as privatization and marketization processes became increasingly intense.

The selected structures reflect three main trends related to adjusting the relationship between the state, market, and society in Vietnam to suit the "socialist-oriented market economy." The first trend is resource diversification in economic and social development. In the new context, the state no longer assumes many functions and tasks, nor holds a monopoly position in society (Doan. M. H., 2023). This is established in the most important documents of the CPV, where it is stated that: "The state apparatus gradually shifts to the state management function, gradually overcoming interference in business operations" (Doc P02), and "the role of the State is adjusted to be more suitable to the market mechanism, increasingly promoting democracy in economic and social life" (Doc P07). This trend is most evident in housing and education development policies aimed at minimizing direct state participation in service provision, with the state playing a regulation role in ensuring the presence of public services instead of directly providing public services.

The second trend is decentralization to localities and public organizations. Provincial governments are given more autonomy over budget, administration, and land as provided for in the Constitution and laws (Doc NA03; Doc NA22; Doc NA23). This structure encourages local governments to be more proactive in finding revenue sources for their budgets, such as land and housing projects in peri-urban areas and local policies controlling rural-urban

migration to manage limited local resources. Furthermore, the ward/commune government is also given expanded authority in many areas, including much stricter enforcement of regulations related to residence registration, household economic activities, granting of land use rights certificates, and housing construction. In addition, promoting the process of decentralization and granting autonomy and self-responsibility to public units such as educational institutions through the mechanisms of “financial autonomy,” “personnel autonomy,” and “market-based prices” has contributed to meeting the increasing demand for childcare of people in these areas (Doc R03; Doc R10).

The third trend is that despite retreating in some economic areas and promoting decentralization, the central government’s power and the CPV’s absolute leadership are always maintained. “A characteristic of the institutional environment in Vietnam is the significant concentration of power at the central level, both in government ministries or agencies and in the banks. This has remained true for decades, despite decentralization to provincial and municipal governments with financial autonomy” (UN-Habitat, 2014, p. 18). Accordingly, the central position of the party-state is demonstrated through the maintenance of democratic centralism principles¹⁰, which emphasizes the unity in the organization and action of the state apparatus and synchronously promote the strength of central and local administrative agencies in peri-urban governance. At the same time, the policy process and public sector human resource work are mainly top-down according to the party’s decisions and directions (Mai, V. B., 2020; Doc P15). While maintaining its power, the party-state focuses on the effectiveness of the management and policy implementation process by promoting public administrative reform. New public management has been emphasized by the party-state in the direction of institutionalization through laws and policies, streamlining and reorganizing the state system, and building e-government. However, they asserted that implementing socialization or restructuring the public sector does not reduce the state’s management and operational role (Nguyen, T. T. T., 2023).

These structural trends, while creating favorable conditions for territorial strategies in peri-urban areas, also present certain obstacles to their success. The downside of the real estate market and poor government intervention has led to a decline in the supply of affordable housing and challenges in social housing development projects. The socialization of education has created a cost burden for low-income families. The trend of party-state centralism has

¹⁰ The principle of democratic centralism is the harmonious combination between the unified, centralized direction of superiors and the expansion of democracy to subordinates, ensuring the improvement of effectiveness and efficiency in state management (Doc P01).

created a cumbersome, rigid administrative apparatus with many shortcomings, such as overlapping powers, abuse of power, and corruption. These constraints are manifested through uneven development, marginalization, and social exclusion on the city's edge, challenging the state's territorial strategies.

5.3.4. Agential selectivities

Similar to the analysis of structural selectivities, peri-urban territorialization strategies also help reveal the power relations between selected agents in these processes. First, these strategies are led by the party-state as the central actor. Specifically, the central state plays the main role in orientation and institution building, while local governments focus on policy implementation and urban governance. At the central level, decision-making is often associated with the institutionalization of CPV directives. The transformation of the Party's policies into state legal documents depends on the opinions of agency members promulgating state legal documents, most of whom are CPV members. The participation and opinions of people outside the party mainly comprise elites, such as leaders, experts, researchers, businesses, local representatives and state media agencies, and supporters of the party's policies (Mai V. B., 2020). In some areas, international development agencies and international organizations also participate in the policy consultation and review process through joint projects with ministries, departments, branches and state research institutes. However, this semi-closed institutionalization process creates many loopholes for crony capitalist groups to lobby and intervene in the policy-making process (Nguyen, S. D, et al., 2017; Nguyen, Q. S., 2022). After the party's guidelines are institutionalized, they are put into practice through the implementation of specific policies and governance. The local party-state is the main actor participating in policy implementation and governance of peri-urban territories. Although local governments are heavily dependent on central decisions, they also have relative authority to implement policies and strategies based on actual conditions in the context of decentralization and decentralization.

In addition, there is increasing participation of diverse enterprises in the peri-urban areas, demonstrated by the sharp increase in non-state investment capital. Besides state-owned enterprises, these areas attract international corporations to open manufacturing and processing plants, in addition to investing in real estate businesses. Furthermore, SMEs also consider this area suitable for their size and business model. The presence of these businesses reflects the value of land, labor markets, and consumption in these areas, creating a competitive environment among businesses while (re)establishing their relationship with the government. Negotiations between private and public actors allowed the formation of public-private coalitions to allocate land for production, real estate and infrastructure projects. It is worth noting that these coalitions were formed in the context of weak institutions related to public-private cooperation (Nguyen, M. D, 2020), creating many "interest groups" formed by

“collusion and collusion between a group of degraded cadres and party members with dishonest businesses to profit from and embezzle land” by “profiting from land prices to compensate low but sell at high prices” and “converting the purpose of using agricultural land into project land” (Nguyen, T. M. H., & Nguyen, V. C., 2020). Similarly, such interest groups can also be found in the social housing and private preschool education sectors (Interviews, E02; A02).

As a result, these coalitions interweave the economic and political interests of powerful elites, controlling institutional formation and implementation through administrative intervention measures and selective enforcement of laws and regulations in peri-urban areas to maximize profit (Government Inspectorate & WB, 2012; Le, H. L., 2015; Nguyen, S. D. et al., 2017). Recent corruption cases show that these crony capitalist groups are leading land recovery projects for commercial housing development and public-private partnership projects to build infrastructure and facilities in peri-urban areas (Interview, a ward leader, A06). The growth of elite-interest coalitions in peri-urban areas has created uneven capital accumulation. Large players with high bureaucratic power, whether state-owned or private enterprises, will gain most of the benefits in land and housing marketization and socialization of public services. Benefits arising from land and other assets in market-led urbanization are unevenly distributed. The gains in circulation may have largely bypassed weaker social groups, typically landless people and migrant workers marginalized in cumulative distribution. At the same time, these subaltern groups also face increasing socio-spatial differentiation between modern and civilized spaces and poor, spontaneous areas in peri-urban areas.

5.4. Retention in the hegemonic project of the civilized and modern socialist city

5.4.1. Territorialization as spatiotemporal fixes

The neo-Marxist urban perspective argues that territorialization can serve as a spatiotemporal fix. This logic also applies to peri-territorialization in HCMC. Peri-urban territorialization directly reflects capital fixation through land and housing marketization, socialization of public services, and increasing public investment in this area. Investing in developing industrial zones, building infrastructure, and real estate projects helps resolve excessive accumulation in city central areas, attracting foreign capital flows. In this context, the development and control of urban territory through housing, schooling, and belonging help the state gain significant land revenue and tax income and save money on welfare spending, which is associated with local regulations on urban space expansion. Therefore, territorialization, or promoting the transformation of suburban areas into urban territories, becomes a new accumulation strategy for local development.

The territorialization of peri-urban areas involves structures formed based on semantic and institutional fixes in the process of orienting and developing the “socialist-oriented market economy” of the CPV. Regarding semantic corrections, a series of new terms emerged from the macro-political will of the CPV and central government to reconcile socialist ideology with the process of economic transformation towards the market in each specific period. For example, the term “land use rights” was established to make the “land owned by the entire people” regime more suitable in the context of promoting land commercialization; “socialization” was used to maintain the role of the state in the privatization process; the meaning of household registration was changed to suit the goal of liberalizing residence rights while still maintaining state control. These strategies of meaning-making serve as solutions for the CPV to address the crisis of legitimacy in market-oriented economic reform processes within socialist ideology, which can be seen as semantic fixes. Additionally, institutional fixes related to territorialization involve the process of institutionalizing the party’s policies and guidelines into law to create a framework for bringing semantic fixes into regulating social relations. In essence, this process ensures political legality, with the party establishing and exercising leadership over the political and social system and the unity of the will of the party and state with a social will. Accordingly, the institutions are general principles that apply to all relevant organizations and individuals nationwide. Therefore, their content is often mainly general without mentioning specific spaces and groups of subjects, such as peri-urban areas and migrant workers.

In short, territorializing peri-urban socio-spatial relationships in the city reflects the process of expanding urban space production to promote growth and stabilize the general accumulation model through the broader structure of related semantic and institutional fixes in the transformation from a centrally-planned to a more market-oriented economy. This serves as a solution to the legitimacy of market-oriented economic reform processes within socialist ideology. Its strategies are embedded in various institutions, such as the national urban development strategy, housing development programs, and planning systems. This process thus bears the expression of a spatiotemporal fix regime. However, this spatiotemporal fix not only promotes transforming traditional rural spaces into modern urban territory but also entails many hidden risks, such as the stratification of social groups, the assimilation of spatial production, the lack of spatial justice, and the loss of traditional values.

5.4.2. Peri-urban territorial governance as regulation-cum-governance

One of the main goals of territorial governance is to promote economic growth and development of a defined territory. Accordingly, local governments in Vietnam focus on improving state governance to promote economic growth (Dang, X. H., 2020). In the peri-urban areas of HCMC, housing governance is related to the development and stabilization of

the real estate market, school management is associated with improving public service quality and growth goals for social equity, and residence management aims at distributing local welfare and competitiveness. The analyzed evidence shows that, in the context of changing economic relations between the state and the non-public sector, with the state's influence being narrowed and the market expanding, the public sector has gradually lost control over resource allocation. Consequently, it has had to approach the non-public sectors (foreign investors, business managers with multiple forms of ownership, etc.) to ensure economic development, leading to a partial shift “from government to governance.” As a result, new modes of governance have emerged, involving privatization, socialization, and public-private partnerships in peri-urban socio-spatial processes. Thus, peri-urban territorial governance represents an increasingly clear shift in the urban governance model in HCMC, which is part of and a response to broader socio-economic changes reflected in the shift from a centrally-planned production system to a more market-oriented economy.

In addition to building a socialist-oriented market economy, Vietnam’s reforms also require a gradual process of institutional adaptation without changing the foundations of the socialist political system based on Marxist-Leninist theory and Ho Chi Minh Thought. That is, the economic development process must not be allowed to harm principles such as the absolute leadership role of the CPV, the people’s mastery, and the principle of democratic centralism. Therefore, in addition to the coordination and interaction between state actors, enterprises, and social organizations, the model of territorial governance in peri-urban areas also reflects the dominant power of the state. This characteristic is evident through a strong government that monitors, directs, and coordinates the governance system by maintaining patterns of social control through administrative and political technologies and selecting and supporting key actors who have direct power over others. In addition, local governments strive to improve the quality of the state apparatus to ensure the effectiveness, efficiency, and consistency of broader governance systems.

In short, the transformation of territorial governance in this case was driven by economic reform, but it also required strong political intervention. It partly reflects the pro-growth urban governance model (Pierre, 2011) or urban regime theory (Stone, 1989; 2008) from an economic perspective. However, it does not reflect the “power to” model compared to the democratic governance model but rather tends towards “power over” to improve “territorial cohesion.” In many cases, the results of applying these forms of governance reflect many limitations, such as not fully embodying good governance models, specifically regarding issues of equity and efficiency, democracy, and accountability. This is also what the CPV realized: “State management has not yet met the requirements of market economy development and

international integration; effectiveness and efficiency are not high; discipline and order are not strict” (Doc P21).

5.4.3. The peri-urban territorial moment of the civilized and modern socialist city

State-led practices related to territorialization and territorial governance serving the “socialist-oriented market economy” model are also part of urban accumulation strategies and the hegemonic project of the modern, civilized socialist city. The imaginaries often appearing in discourses such as CPV congress documents at local levels and forums on urban planning and development are the emergence of images of modern, civilized residential areas that aim to replace the prevalence of self-built housing projects. In particular, the city government orients peri-urban areas to “develop commercial housing according to projects associated with urban development, housing development programs, and encourage investment in apartment housing development” (Doc LG02). Accordingly, large-scale real estate projects increasingly reinforce these images in the city’s peri-urban areas under slogans such as “world-class urban areas,” “livable urban areas,” “modern architecture,” and “international style.” Moreover, “the education and training system is to be standardized, modernized, socialized, democratized, integrated and kept up with advanced education systems in the region and the world” (Doc P32). Additionally, residence management will focus on the “application of technology” (Doc P39) and “incentives for high-quality human resources” (Doc P31). These visions are associated with the overall development strategies of HCMC towards modern civilization, giving top priority to “modern, fast-developing, sustainable urban” (Doc LG02). Accordingly, the state has initiated and applied territorial strategies over a long period to realize this project of urban hegemony.

Analyses of socio-spatial production and governance of peri-urban areas show that these areas have entered a territorial moment in the urban hegemonic project. At this moment, practices of territorialization and peri-urban territorial governance reflect strategies associated with respective modes of regulation that facilitate the accumulation process through strategies on land and construction that promote the encroachment and gradual transformation of rural areas on the urban edge to become part of the city. Moreover, exclusion strategies are also applied in the context of booming rural-urban labor migration and limited public investment resources. This involves inadequate rights to housing, education, health, and access to public services, leading to deprivation and a lack of social cohesion among migrant workers. While spatiotemporal fixes based on territorialization focus on stabilizing accumulation patterns at macro and meso levels, they concentrate on interrelated objects that dominate economic and political power through strategic choices such as prioritizing and privileging. Because of the subaltern status of migrant workers, they are often excluded from housing, education, and social security policies. In short, the territorial moment of peri-urbanization in HCMC reflects

Schindler's (2015) observation: "Rather than integrating territorial management into a larger plan to "improve" the population, transforming the built environment is the primary goal of city government in many 21st century cities" (p. 20).

As analyzed, the agential selectivities in the process of production and governance of social space on the urban edge are discursive and interest coalitions mainly belong to the central and local political-economic elites. Additionally, it is necessary to consider the beneficiaries of this transformation beyond the coalitions that directly benefit. Naturally, peri-urban spaces formed by the process of peri-urban territorialization, such as new urban areas and private schools, mainly serve the emerging middle class, who often follow a high-quality lifestyle that emphasizes security, orderly neighborhoods, and amenities. They also became expandable subjects of the hegemonic coalition of the civilized and modern socialist city.

CHAPTER 6: MIGRANT PLACE-MAKING AND PLACE-BASED GOVERNANCE AS EXPRESSIONS OF URBAN COUNTER-HEGEMONIC PRACTICES

6.1. Spontaneous migrant settlement practices

6.1.1. Workers' boarding houses as a way of life

Perceiving activities

The number of social housing units for workers is still very modest, meeting only 3% of workers' housing needs. Therefore, most migrant workers have to rent rental accommodations built by households and individuals near industrial zones/clusters. A survey by IOM in 2023 shows that approximately 80% of migrant workers live in boarding houses, 16.1% in family homes, and 5.1% in homes provided by their relatives. According to the HCMC DOC's report (2022), the city has about 60,470 housing constructions built by individuals for migrant workers (Table 9). Among them, Binh Tan District and Binh Chanh District are the two localities with the most significant number of workers' boarding houses in the city¹¹, with a total of 65,624 rooms, so they are often called the "workers' boarding house capital" of Vietnam. According to estimates, the number of migrant workers staying in boarding houses in these two localities is up to 85% (Doc R16).

Table 9

Summary of the number of boarding houses in HCMC by districts

No	Districts	Constructions	Independent boarding houses	Housing combined with rental	Total rental area	Rooms
1	Binh Chanh	6,186	4,449	1,737	490,427	63,736
2	Binh Tan	5,276	2,540	2,736	790,757	59,248
3	Hoc Mon	4,883	3,735	1,148	770,429	41,807
4	12	4,425	3,068	1,357	657,209	34,573
5	Tan Binh	4,010	896	3,114	338,755	30,810
6	7	3,871	2,201	1,670	698,212	37,417
7	Cu Chi	3,067	1,991	1,066	744,245	36,311
8	Binh Thanh	2,486	1,085	1,401	369,227	19,436

¹¹ This statistic (Table 9) does not rank Thu Duc City and Go Vap District because they are two localities with many universities. The number of housing rentals reserved for students there is usually higher than for workers. At the same time, the number of boarding houses in Thu Duc City is the highest because it merged into three districts in 2020.

9	Nha Be	1,699	1,608	631	424,497	21,204
10	10	1,640	619	1,201	167,838	8,364
11	8	1,593	958	635	264,176	15,740
12	3	1,141	474	667	110,319	5,293
13	Tan Phu	1,110	497	613	175,048	12,864
14	Phu Nhuan	805	321	484	106,217	4,734
15	6	722	348	374	138,214	7,631
16	4	650	249	401	62,681	3,355
17	11	523	198	325	57,981	4,137
18	5	127	26	101	15,501	959
19	Can Gio	95	82	13	13,441	724
20	1	58	0	58	2,900	167
(*)	Thu Duc City	10,417	7,560	2,857	2,079,215	106,596
(*)	Go Vap	5,696	2,435	3,261	711,999	36,220

Note. The author processed based on HCMC DOC's report (Doc R16)

This type of housing has appeared since the early days of the industrialization process in HCMC and is known as *Nhà trọ công nhân* [worker boarding house]. The boarding house system is mainly composed of small, spontaneous businesses. Typical worker boarding house designs include two main types: independent rental suites and individual houses or individual rooms. Among them are rooms with closed bathrooms or shared bathrooms for many rooms, with or without a kitchen. Each room's area is only about 4–10 m², and the average number of tenants per room is 3.6 people. This kind of housing quality is often not guaranteed, with poor technical infrastructure (HFL, 2020).

Depending on the land resources and location of the boarding house owners, they can take advantage of and promote these resources to convert their functions into rented rooms. In some cases, they use existing facilities such as warehouses or spare rooms to renovate or expand into rooms for rent. In cases of illegal construction, they convert agricultural land into residential land and reserve a part of the land, usually behind their house, to make a few more rooms for rent. In general, houses are built spontaneously, without following construction standards; the available area is always maximized to convert functions into rooms for rent, so the planning for shared space and green space is not followed (HFL, 2020).

Capital sources for investing in boarding houses by individuals and households are diverse, ranging from money from selling land, savings, and borrowing whether from relatives or bank loans. Accordingly, some boarding house owners who can access significant capital can build hundreds of boarding house rooms on many different plots of land. In contrast, other owners may be individual households or small businesses. Retired older adults run small-scale businesses with one or two rooms, taking advantage of the area behind their houses. Because

this is a retail business, households can easily control their budget as they build, expand, or upgrade in stages, depending on their savings and changing needs (WB, 2015; HFL, 2020).

Accommodation prices are based on standard competition between households. Due to low investment costs, average rents in boarding houses today are relatively low compared to other housing types. The IOM's survey (2023) shows that migrant workers pay 1.2 to 1.5 million VND for monthly housing rental costs (accounting for 14.8%–18.5% of their monthly income). In addition, they have to pay for electricity, water, and sanitation. Each room must pay a monthly electricity bill set by boarding house owners based on auxiliary electricity meters, often higher than the state-regulated price. Furthermore, only 48.8% of migrant workers living in boarding houses have access to clean and hygienic water sources. Of these, 65.7% often use drilled well water for bathing, washing, and cooking; 34.1% use tap water. The average water price per room is about 10,806 VND/m³. To reduce rental costs, unmarried workers often live together to share rental fees and other expenses such as electricity, water, garbage, or internet.

The most significant disadvantages of this type of housing are the poor quality of life, unhygienic conditions, and impact on the urban image. According to research results, migrants still suffer from temporary living situations, with many minimum needs (housing, electricity, water, sanitation) not being met well. These houses may be in poor condition, built from substandard materials or low-quality construction. This could be due to several factors. First, low-income boarding house owners lack access to credit or have insufficient savings, so they invest little in construction. Second, they are uncertain about the ownership of their homes and thus are unwilling to make long-term investments. Finally, they use poor-quality materials and hire poor-quality subcontractors due to limited budgets.

Living activities

For a long time, boarding houses have had the “mission” of providing accommodation for migrant workers, and worker boarding houses have become the most common form of housing for migrant workers in the peri-urban area. HFL's survey (2020) shows that most migrant workers stay in boarding houses because the price is reasonable. Indeed, with a modest salary and many expenses to cover, workers far from home often choose cheap boarding house rooms to fit their income. Moreover, other factors they mentioned include the lack of strict opening and closing hours, the option to stay with family or friends, and the proximity to work and the market. Although spontaneous boarding houses lack environmental sanitation and living amenities, they promptly meet the minimum housing needs of migrant workers. As a migrant worker said: “I know this boarding house room is cramped and hot, but I work the whole day and just back here for sleep, so it's okay to stay temporarily like that” (Interview, MW09).

Living in boarding houses also brings the communal atmosphere of multi-class neighborhoods to migrant workers, helping them assert their identity rather than isolating themselves in worker dormitory blocks, which are carefully and closely managed, after a long day of being confined in a factory. This feeling is illustrated by a migrant who claims, “I feel more comfortable living here (in the boarding house); it’s easier to get to know other people, and I can help each other” (Interview, MW22). In addition, the small boarding house space also reflects the regional and ethnic identities of migrants through details such as paintings, photos, wall decorations, and worship objects that speak of their hometown and the original region. A worker living in a boarding house shared: “Even though I live in a rented house, I still think of this as my home, so I also set up an altar to make it cozy” (Interview, MW02). Most of the migrants interviewed who have lived in a boarding house for more than two years said they have a sense of peace and happiness in a suitable living space that brings them a sense of belonging. However, it must also be emphasized that living in boarding houses has become a compulsory “option” rather than a choice for migrant workers. They can choose only different boarding houses, not different housing types.

Worker boarding houses do not give rise to too many negative social consequences but also bring many economic and social benefits. First, companies that hire workers benefit significantly from this boarding house system because it helps avoid paying additional accommodation costs and indirectly keeps workers’ wages at a low level. It creates additional profitable business for boarding house owners from room rentals and several accompanying services. For local governments, they can collect taxes from the boarding house business (Leaf, 2015). This alignment of interests creates a positive perception of workers’ boarding houses, giving them a prominent presence despite their spontaneous nature beyond many legal regulations. Because of these life experiences, the housing issue for workers, despite being overshadowed by the process of peri-urban territorialization, has not yet become a pressing and urgent concern for a long time.

Conceiving activities

The law has not regulated this type of housing. From the authorities’ point of view, a boarding house is a variation of self-built housing. Accordingly, applying for a boarding house construction permit is complicated, so people mainly use a construction permit for individual houses in residential areas. After that, they change the function, moving from self-built housing to rental housing. For a long time, “the people’s committees of districts have permitted households to build individual houses for workers to rent as ordinary individual houses” (Interview, A03).

This type of housing is guided by documents that do not have strict legal implications. A decision of the HCMC People's Committee requires that a house for rent must meet specific technical requirements and standards. These guidance rules stipulate that ready-to-use rental areas, excluding walls, must be at least 9 m² without a toilet and 12 m² if there is a toilet in the room. Furthermore, the width must not be less than 2.4 meters, and the height from floor to ceiling must be at least 2.8 meters, separated by brick walls between rooms. The average usable area should not be less than 5m²/person. The room needs to be airy, with a fan, bed, and windows for the tenant. For buildings with ten rooms or more, tenants must have access to open green spaces of at least 1.5 m² per person. Other hygiene and fire safety standards must be complied with, such as covering walls and partitions between rooms with materials that meet fire prevention and waterproofing requirements. The roof must not be covered with flammable materials and must be guaranteed to be leak-proof. The floor must be tiled or cement mortar and higher than the road leading to the house, the yard, and the sidewalk. There must also be fire and explosion prevention equipment (Doc LG05). However, this edict and the reality of most worker boarding houses frequently do not align (Doc NA14; Doc NA15). In HCMC, the DOC (2022) reported that only 28.5% of rental houses owned by individuals and households met quality requirements (Doc R16).

While the 2006 decision regarding boarding house management for workers who rent in HCMC (Doc LG05) serves mainly as guidance, local authorities' management of boarding houses is still primarily based on the provisions of the Residence Law through the declaration and registration of temporary residence for residents who come to rent. In addition, although most worker boarding houses are informal and do not meet legal requirements and even contravene regulations, boarding house owners are legally required to officially register their businesses (Doc G31). According to the law, people with rental room rental businesses can operate in one of two ways: establishing a business or registering an individual business household. Establishing a business is costly in terms of administration costs, and it is not required by law (Doc NA09), so currently the popular option is registering an individual business household.

6.1.2. The explosion of independent, private childcare groups

Perceiving activities

In Binh Tan and Binh Chanh Districts, the current system of public preschool education facilities cannot meet the demand for childcare. Quality preschools have high tuition fees, and this situation has led to the explosion of a typical preschool education model called "independent, private childcare groups." This form exists mainly around industrial zones or densely populated areas on the city's edge, with a need for small-scale class groups,

competitive prices, and more spartan conditions for establishment than opening a school. According to data from the DOETs, Binh Tan District has 214 independent, private childcare groups, while Binh Chanh District has over 160. It is worth noting that there are currently 116 unlicensed childcare groups (Doc R18; Doc R19).

Unlike private preschools, independent, private childcare groups have low investment costs, simple procedures, and lower tuition fees. These groups are established in different sizes and numbers of children in peri-urban areas. They can be divided into three types: high tuition fee groups, average tuition fee groups, and low tuition fee groups. Corresponding to the tuition fees, these groups differ in the level of investment in facilities, operating costs, and ways of caring for and educating children.

Table.

Summary of types of independent, private childcare groups in Binh Tan and Binh Chanh Districts

Types	Tuition fees (month/child)	Facilities	Caring and educating
High fees	2.500.000đ - 3.500.000đ	- Relatively large area - There is a playground - There are cameras	- Good quality of child care - Basic education program
Average fees	1.500.000đ - 2.500.000đ	- Rent a tube house - Lack of playground	- Mainly taking care of children - The educational program is not up to standard
Low fees	1.000.000đ - 1.500.000đ	- Family housing - There is no playground	- Just childcare

Note. Author collected and compiled from field research

Childcare groups that charge high tuition fees often have significant investments in playgrounds, facilities, modern equipment, and classrooms organized to suit children's ages. Childcare and education programs are also of interest to these establishments. However, they are not strictly controlled in terms of quality for reasons such as insufficient space or the desire to take advantage of the simple procedures of the childcare groups without upgrading to a school. These childcare groups usually only account for a few independent, private childcare groups. Childcare groups with average fees typically operate in moderate rental space, usually of a townhouse type, with small and narrow facilities. There is difficulty renovating due to the structure of the rented space, and there is often a lack of playgrounds, which somewhat affects the children's health and the operational quality of these facilities. These childcare groups mainly take care of children, with little attention paid to children's education. Childcare groups with low fees usually function solely as babysitting services, using family rooms. They lack

toys and utensils, and the kitchen is shared with the family of the group owner. There is no playground to organize activities for children. These groups are located in residential areas with many boarding houses, are spontaneous, and are often run by older people or homemakers who take care of children nearby. These childcare groups are easy to establish but also easy to dissolve, depending on the conditions and needs of the group owner and the children's parents. This model meets the childcare needs of families and parents but should be limited because caregivers are not professionally trained, facilities and nutrition are not guaranteed, and it can only meet the emergency needs of migrant workers. The fees range from 1,000,000 VND to 1,500,000 VND per month per child, making them suitable for many migrant worker families.

The number of independent, private childcare groups with medium and low tuition fees generally accounts for most of these groups in Binh Tan District and Binh Chanh District. With reasonable tuition fees, their primary target audience is the children of migrant workers. The investment capital for these childcare groups is mainly mobilized from individuals and families of the group leaders and members, transferred regularly and challenging to control. In addition, independent, private childcare groups mostly lease houses to organize educational activities, so they do not meet the conditions for bank loans to invest in upgrading facilities. Moreover, this type of preschool education facility has many shortcomings. Firstly, the material conditions of these groups are still deplorable and challenging. Most groups lack space compared to the standards outlined; there is no outdoor playground, and most activities take place in closed rooms. Secondly, some teachers are not trained, especially in small unlicensed childcare groups. Most babysitters have low professional qualifications and lack the skills to handle situations that arise during the care and education process, leading to potential risks in ensuring children's safety. Thirdly, most private independent childcare groups cannot implement the content and educational activities required by the program because of the lack of teachers, along with many children of different ages. Fourthly, the quality of childcare in these groups is difficult to control because the cost of children's meals is often low, and the childcare group owner balances income and expenses based on profitable business and kitchen facilities. Food does not meet food safety and hygiene requirements; people who cook for children do not have the necessary certificates for daily cooking; there is no portion control or nutrition. Lastly, managing the records and books of these childcare groups is not genuinely scientific because many owners do not have expertise. Many of these childcare groups operate unstably and do not have long-term, sustainable development plans (Vu, T.N.M et al., 2016).

Living activities

Independent, private childcare groups often have low and average tuition fees, suitable for the economic conditions of migrant worker families. As a migrant woman shared:

“There are also some public schools around, but they do not accept children under three years old. It is impossible to send our child to private schools because the tuition is higher than the family’s income, so we must send him to a childcare group. Childcare tuition costs around 2 million VND/month, but often having to work overtime, my family has no choice but to cut costs to have money to send our child to school and cover family expenses. When my child turns three years old, my husband and I want to send our child to a public preschool in this area, but we are worried because the schools are mainly prioritized for people with permanent residence” (Interview, MW14). Moreover, these groups can meet migrant workers’ needs for flexible childcare hours and proximity to residential areas where public and private preschools cannot. “At public preschools, parents have to pick up children at 5 p.m. at the latest and have weekends off. But we work overtime until 8 p.m. and work a full week to earn extra income, so we can't come back to pick up our child in time. If I choose to pick up my child at 5:00 p.m., I will only work during office hours and have low wages. At childcare groups, it is possible to pick up my child late, and it is also close to the boarding house” (Interview, MW17). These groups gradually came to play an important role in providing childcare services in peri-urban areas. “The formation of childcare groups is an inevitable requirement of society, meeting the actual needs of migrant workers and partly helping to reduce pressure on the preschool education sector” (Interview, A01).

However, “this type of preschool education facility faces many difficulties, such as inadequate teacher qualifications, inadequate facilities, and inadequate control by local authorities, leading to a lack of management and supervision by the agency authorities, not ensuring the quality of child-rearing and the cause of violence and unsafety for children” (Interview, A01). Although migrant workers know that independent, private childcare groups do not have the necessary conditions and quality for good childcare, they still accept them because private preschool tuition fees are pretty high and the chances of their children entering public schools are low. Many of them feel “uneasy and worried” as they send their children to these groups, knowing about cases of child abuse in some groups via media, but they still have to “accept it because they have no other choice” (Interview, A05).

Despite some negative images of independent, private childcare groups, such as poor service quality and a reputation for child abuse at unlicensed, home-based childcare facilities, as reflected in the mass media (Tuyet & Quynh, 2017), most parties agree that the birth and development of family childcare groups are appropriate and necessary in peri-urban areas. They aim to solve the immediate problem of not having enough schools to care for children so that migrant workers can focus on their work.

Conceiving activities

Because there are large numbers, and on a small scale, managing these childcare groups is a challenge for the local government. They are well aware that without appropriate institutions and intervention models, this type of inequality can quickly lead to disparities in children's education between different preschool education facilities and negatively impact children's safety and health (UNICEF & MOET, 2016; WB, 2020b). Therefore, certain institutionalized activities are necessary for this type.

After a period of existence, the "independent, private childcare group" was explained by the MOET as not being a kindergarten class in a preschool; it is an independent preschool education facility, like a school, but without enough facilities and management apparatus to establish a school. So, an independent, private childcare group is defined as a small-scale private preschool education facility that does not have adequate conditions in which to establish a private preschool or kindergarten (Doc G21). The MOET classifies these groups into those with fewer than seven children and those with more than seven children. Childcare groups with fewer than seven are primarily spontaneous and have many characteristics of a "family-based childcare group." Childcare groups with more than seven children must be licensed to operate.

The Education Law 2005 only recognized the form of childcare groups and kindergarten classes in general (Doc NA10). After that, the Education Law 2019 recognized independent childcare groups in general (Doc NA11). In effect, independent, private childcare groups are not fully legalized. They are mainly only mentioned and integrated into circulars and decisions of the MOET on regulations of private preschools in general, such as the regulations on the organization and operation of private preschools (Doc G21). In these sub-law documents, this type also gradually became more specific. Apart from general regulations such as the requirement that teachers and nannies must be trained or have undergone training classes and have a teaching certificate and that facilities and equipment must ensure safety in childcare and education settings, independent, private childcare group establishments only need to meet a minimum area of 1.5m²/child according to standards and have facilities such as nurturing rooms, equipment, utensils, and toys. Then, they can be approved in writing by the district DOET.

However, these institutionalizations have not met practical requirements, leading to difficulties and inadequacies in implementing these institutional documents in peri-urban districts. First, this type of preschool education facility has many differences compared to private preschools. For example, the living regime established by the group owner does not follow the standards of the preschool education industry; independent, private childcare groups tend to focus on care and nurturing activities rather than educational activities; and the conditions for

establishing and maintaining independent, private childcare are much more manageable. In addition, according to the provisions of the MOET, the number of children in a group or private independent kindergarten class must not exceed 50 (Doc G23). However, in reality, many private independent kindergarten groups in these localities have more than 50 children, and in some cases, over 100 children, due to difficulties in land conditions, facilities, and organizational apparatus to establish preschools (UNICEF & MOET, 2016; WB, 2020b).

6.1.3. Migrants' social networks and sense of belonging

Perceiving activities

Many studies have examined the social network of rural-urban migrant workers in Vietnam, emphasizing its importance for migrants' attachment to their destination (Dang, N. A. 1998; UN-FPA, 2010). These studies show that family, clan, and friends are the center of migrants' social capital and critical actors in helping them integrate into new places. According to UN-FPA (2010), 55% of male and 59% of female migrants learned about their destination from a relative, and 38% of male and female migrants learned about their destination from a friend (with 7% of men and 3% of women knowing about the destination through other means).

Family members often provide material and emotional support throughout the migration process. After living in the city for a few years, after they had become familiar with the area and their work, these migrants brought more relatives to work and live there. A migrant man said: "Back then, the brothers in the family invited each other to come here to work, then showed me this boarding house and stayed there until now. I didn't know anything about this place then, so without anyone I knew, I probably wouldn't have dare to go" (Interview, MW27). Migration decisions, information about accommodation, and job opportunities are frequently based on family members and their social networks (Dang, N. A., 1998; Luong, V. H., 2004). Workers with children also often receive help from their mothers in taking care of their children. The mothers of these workers often come to live in the boarding house to care for their grandchildren when they are under one year old. When the child is over one year old, they are often sent back to their paternal or maternal grandparents in the countryside. In this way, migrant workers can go to work and spend less time with children. In particular, according to the survey report of HFL (2020), migrant workers with family members living in the city long-term tend to be more attached to their place of residence.

Migrant workers often live concentrated in certain areas with close connections regarding clan, friends, fellows, ethnicity, and religion. They form networks to share jobs, help each other, and meet emotional needs. The concentration of migrants based on social networks has promoted the formation of migrant groups and communities. After a period of cohesion, they create

groups, clusters, or sub-communities in different boarding houses, creating a new identity for residents in peri-urban areas. In many neighborhoods, boarding house groups gather people from the Mekong Delta or boarding groups from the North or Central region (Luong, V. H., 2004). Similarly, most Khmer people live alongside each other, forming small communities. Catholic migrant workers also tend to build their communities in neighboring areas.

Moreover, migrant workers build social networks to integrate with local communities. They also interact with local people and communities, such as boarding house owners, employers, and neighbors. According to HFL's survey (2020), migrant workers said that they interacted most with boarding house owners. Meanwhile, they occasionally communicate with employers outside of their work and rarely meet with authorities unless necessary. According to World Bank (2016) survey results, although the participation of migrant workers in state-led community activities is minimal, nearly half of the people surveyed participate in fellowship associations and neighborhood activities, and more than 90% of those interact with neighbors. This means that fellow associations/groups and hobby groups operate very actively at the ward/commune level. Moreover, the vigorous development of information technology has created conditions for more efficiently connecting social networks, including networks of friends and social groups (Interview, E01).

Living activities

Social networks link migrants through close relationships based on kinship, friends, and fellows. These networks help migrants solve many problems, from finding information about their place of residence, work, and income to making introductions, joining social networks, sharing benefits, minimizing risks, protecting each other in new places, and forming migrant communities. As a woman worker living in a shared boarding house room said: "Having many relatives and friends who also work and live around here helps me feel more secure, making it easier to help each other when I get sick. Living so close helps to avoid homesickness, so being here is very familiar" (Interview, MW21).

Boarding house owners are essential actors in the social network of migrants at their destination. HFL (2020) survey results show that migrant workers feel they receive the most support from boarding house owners (compared to other actors after family). In particular, "migrants feel that the owner has management, regularly visits and quickly responds to problems faced by tenants, supports tenants in registering temporary residences according to regulations and uniform standard living rules to create common rules for relationships between rooms and between tenants and owners" (HFL, 2020). In some exceptional cases, boarding house owners can extend or reduce room rates for workers, such as when wages are not received on time, during unexpected financial difficulties, or during the COVID-19 epidemic

when many workers faced challenges and received support from landlords to reduce rent. Many workers said they can sometimes borrow money from owners when encountering challenges (Interviews, MW15; MW18). As mentioned above, migrant workers also prefer to live near the boarding house owner to maintain security and receive better support. In addition, the longer the rental period, the stronger and more durable the bond between the worker and the boarding house owner. This criterion also represents a positive aspect of the migrant workers' spiritual life. The HFL's survey shows that migrants with a rental period of more than one year account for nearly 83% of the total (HFL, 2020).

Friends, colleagues, and neighbors also positively impact the social capital of migrant workers. In the concentrated living areas of essential workers, there is a strong spirit of solidarity. According to HFL survey results (2020), up to 58% of workers responded that they often unite, support, and help each other. "Migrant workers tend to bond and gather according to their profession or hometown. The reason stems from the fact that they are in a weak position, have little capital, are far from home, and have no relatives, so they band together to support each other in times of difficulty. This helps workers create a solid source of social capital, which means the connection between people is promoted" (Interview, E01). In fact, many migrant workers organize and participate in fellowship associations, hobby and interest groups, and self-management boarding house groups.

Social capital from interacting through social networks based on family, fellowship, and local people is especially important to migrant groups with low personal capital because it compensates for this deficiency and helps migrants easily integrate into the new community in all aspects, especially economic and social (World Bank, 2000). However, support from these familiar social networks is relatively limited and does not significantly improve their quality of life or connect them to their new place. Migrant workers often only receive help from familiar social networks in the beginning, such as finding a job, finding a boarding house, or during times of difficulty or tribulation. For issues related to rights and obligations towards the destination locality, they still need more support, not only from boarding house owners and employers but also from the local government network and other socio-political organizations (Interviews A33; E01; E05). In addition, the tendency of migrant workers to connect and cluster in personal networks also leads to spatial and cultural "separation" common in smallholder societies and closed villages. In peri-urban areas, many boarding houses only gather groups of migrants from different regions, ethnic minorities, and different religious groups. As these groups tend to live in clusters and separately, there have been many conflicts in interests, cultural values, and lifestyles between migrant groups, causing disorder and division of solidarity in the community (Interviews A07; A23).

Conceiving activities

Community cohesion in peri-urban areas comes from the village traditions and customs of migrant workers from the countryside. The tradition of “*tình làng, nghĩa xóm*” [village love, neighborliness] becomes a standard that creates community bonds; personal bonds depend on the community. In the boarding houses, residents come from many different regions, with customs and traditions that still bear the mark of rural villages. With a lifestyle that is still bold in terms of community activities, they bring that lifestyle with them to their new place and practice it when entering the urban area. Living, meeting, exchanging, making friends, and forming friendships are extremely meaningful for migrant workers. When coming to a new land, it is easy to understand that people always look for each other and bond to adapt, live, integrate, and develop. In urban areas, groups often link together according to fellowship associations and hobby and interest groups. At the micro level, following the Vietnamese tradition of “*bán anh em xa, mua láng giềng gần*” [A nearby stranger is better than a far-away relative], migrant workers living in boarding houses and colleagues also tend to associate with each other more (Interviews, E01; E04).

Currently, community conventions contribute to preserving traditional ethical standards and are an effective support tool for community cohesion. In a simple, easy-to-understand, easy-to-remember transmission, this special commitment has adjusted many self-management relationships in the community, emphasizing preserving solidarity and attachment to the neighborhood. In addition, informal institutions related to the community cohesion of migrants are also reflected through the covenants of communities/neighborhoods and the regulations of boarding houses. These informal institutions aim to create bonds between migrants and different communities, encouraging them to lead a communal way of life with a sense of respect and harmony with everyone around them (Interviews A08; A09; A016).

6.2. Governing spontaneous migrant settlement

6.2.1. Governing boarding house issues

Governing images

The rules for the management of workers’ boarding houses, as determined by the HCMC People’s Committee in 2006, state that the purpose of boarding house management is to “manage and better meet the accommodation needs of workers and the operation of housing areas for workers by the law, by the city’s goals, planning, and socio-economic development plan; contributing to ensuring the health of workers and employees; contributing to stabilizing production for businesses, maintaining security, social order and safety in the area” (Doc

LG05). However, because this type of housing has not been legislated, and there is almost no specific support policy from the state, the management of housing issues for migrant workers has been complex for many years, effectively being “contracted out” to private sectors, specifically to boarding house owners (Duong, N. H., 2021). Reality shows that, without any preferential policies from the state over a long period, people still build worker boarding houses and turn this type of housing into almost the only source of housing for the target group (Interviews E02; E03). This situation emphasizes the self-governance characteristics of the people in building, organizing service provision, and maintaining housing provision for migrant workers over the past decades.

Ensuring stakeholders’ interests is a core issue in governing the construction and operation of boarding houses. Owners often set up a self-management system with low costs and easy-to-manage processes to make their business profitable. Boarding house management must aim for the most flexibility and convenience for migrant workers. This goal is reflected in the residence management process and the provision of services to residents. Simultaneously, governance must also aim to be suitable to the interests of the boarding house owners in maintaining security and order as much as possible. This process is often adaptable and easy to adjust, as reflected by boarding house rules that are fairly flexible and can be changed to suit the conditions of each boarding house. In addition, it is important to ensure that tenants’ privacy is not violated and that their rights are upheld (Interviews, BHO01-06; BHO07-09).

Governing instrumentation

Although construction and residence laws are vital for establishing a housing governance system in Vietnam, they often do not provide adequate provisions for boarding houses. Therefore, the rules on the management of boarding houses for workers in HCMC serve more as guidelines than legal documents, leading to the implementation of these guidelines not receiving much attention. Most boarding house owners still commit violations such as improper construction and not ensuring security, order, and fire prevention but are rarely penalized for administrative violations. Because spontaneity is relatively high, not all problems of this type of boarding house can be solved based on these laws (interviews, A03; A06; E02). Therefore, many governance actions are mainly based on life experience and “unwritten” rules established by those who perform public duties directly in the locality, such as the urban construction order management team, neighborhood police, and neighborhood group leaders (Interviews, A03; A06).

Informal documents such as boarding house rules and verbal agreements are essential in boarding house management. These rules ensure the safety, order, and quality of life of those in the boarding house. The boarding house owners usually create the rules and

regulations and ask tenants to commit to implementing them. Clear regulations on fines or fines make handling violations by guests easier, fairer, and more effective. Regulations on room rules and verbal agreements between both parties help the landlord control the bad behavior of tenants, minimize possible problems, improve the boarding house's safety, avoid unnecessary troubles in daily life, and avoid legal issues (Interviews, A06; A25).

Social networks also participate in the self-governing system of the boarding house regime. The relationship of the boarding house owner with the local government, especially with the urban construction order management team, the neighborhood police, and the neighborhood leader, is often associated with administrative management activities. The boarding house owner also directly signs contracts with partners providing public services (such as electricity, water, and waste) to operate the boarding house. Additionally, relationships with other boarding house owners and neighbors create a network of information and support for boarding house management. Owners often have one or a group of long-term and close residents who supervise, manage, and ensure order for the tenants. Boarding house brokerage groups and boarding house management groups (outsourced) also participate in this business process (Interviews, BHO04; BHO06; BHO07).

Where the number and scale of boarding houses exceed the management capacity of local authorities, they established a management model called self-managed boarding houses. HCMC is the first locality to develop this model. Self-management groups are a form of voluntary social organization established among migrant workers in boarding houses, especially in boarding houses with 50 rooms or more. These self-governing people's groups are self-managing mass organizations for security and order, which are the core of the movement to protect national security and other local movements. People's self-management groups are established in neighborhoods and hamlets; they have the function of propagandizing and persuading people to implement the party's guidelines and policies and the state's laws to ensure security and order, contributing to the city's economic, cultural, and social development. The group must immediately notify the area police, the police officer in charge, or the head of the neighborhood executive committee of issues related to the state and strangers residing without declaration, reconcile conflicts and disputes and build solidarity relationships within the team. Self-management people's groups are under the leadership of the party committee and ward people's committee, guide the activities of the wards/commune police, and are under the direct management and administration of the neighborhood and hamlet executive board (Doc LG07).

Governing actions

Self-management is a prominent feature of workers boarding houses. This mode of self-governance exists throughout this type of housing, from construction to operation and maintenance. During boarding house construction, owners often select and engage with small local contractors who are generally skilled, resourceful, and entrepreneurial, and local business households that provide materials. Most owners cannot obtain construction permits to build boarding houses; instead, they only receive permits to build individual houses or repair old houses (Interview, LP03). Therefore, they work with contractors to carry out “stealthy” construction or bribe local officials (neighborhood chiefs, construction inspectors) (Interviews, BHO01; BHO02; BHO04). When the authorities discover that the construction works have been completed, they issue decisions to sanction, request dismantling, and enforce these actions. However, it is challenging to dismantle the construction and renovation parts that do not comply with the license (Interview; A02).

Not only are they considered the center of the boarding house construction process, but boarding house owners also play an important role in providing services and operating the boarding house. They must coordinate with other parties to provide tenants with electricity, water, waste disposal, and security services. Although the electricity industry’s regulations allow tenants to sign electricity purchase contracts directly if they register for temporary residence for 12 months or more, most landlords always sign electricity purchase contracts directly. Similar to other services such as water and garbage, the boarding house owners will be the ones who work directly with the suppliers and agree on a price for the tenant, which is usually higher than the original price. Additionally, although the Residence Law stipulates that both the tenant and the boarding house owners must be responsible for registering temporary residences, this is often assumed to be the owner’s responsibility. Informal rental transactions are usually through verbal contracts, not documents because the laws defining agreements between landlords and tenants are undeveloped. Many owners bribe local officials to declare fewer rooms to reduce taxes, leading to some tenants being unable to register for temporary residence and access other benefits when needed. In short, the management of boarding houses is mainly handled by the family members of the house owner, and the households themselves manage and support each other. Only when significant problems such as theft, robbery, or fighting occur will the owners ask the area police and civil defense forces to intervene (Interviews, BHO01-06; BHO07-09).

In addition, self-management groups were also established to ensure security and order for the boarding houses. Although self-management groups are emphasized as a model proposed by local authorities, the role of the boarding house owner remains central, mainly relying on the self-awareness of the boarding house owner and migrant workers. Specifically, this

management model often puts the owner and the deputy security team leader of the residential group directly in charge. Self-management activities help reduce the complexity of security and order, stabilize life, manage property, ensure compliance with boarding house regulations, and enhance solidarity and understanding within the migrant worker's community, thereby improving the living environment of boarding houses (Doc R20).

6.2.2. Governing independent, private childcare groups

Governing images

Unlike the non-profit nature of public preschools, profit is essential for the private sector. However, while private preschools operate as businesses, for many independent, private childcare group owners who consider this work their livelihood, the issue of profit is an essential factor leading to their self-governance process. To be profitable, they must determine the purpose of their management process to ensure quality according to regulations, which is essential to create credibility with parents and help develop scale (Interviews, A01; A05).

Although independent, private childcare groups have not been legalized, the state's guiding viewpoint is to create conditions and improve the efficiency of managing this preschool education facility. A ward-level leader emphasized: "If these groups are banned, where will migrant workers send their children?" (Interview, A06). Therefore, "localities need to create conditions for independent, private childcare group establishments, especially small-scale ones, to operate best. For preschool education facilities, children's safety and comprehensive development must come first" (Interview, A01). To do so, governing independent, private childcare groups must maximize autonomy and take responsibility for group owners in childcare and education activities. At the same time, there needs to be strict supervision and management from professional staff, authorities at all levels, and parent and community participation mechanisms to improve the quality of caring for and educating children (Interviews, A01; A05; A06).

Governing instrumentation

When the type of independent, private childcare group was not legalized, management was mainly based on guiding documents from the education sector. However, these sub-law documents still have many shortcomings, such as lacking specific regulations on the standards of facilities for independent, private childcare groups; no instructions on procedures for transferring ownership for these childcare groups; and no particular regulations on the rights and responsibilities of socio-political organizations and individuals in the community in participating, coordinating, consulting, and supervising independent, private childcare groups. Therefore, there is a significant difficulty in managing and developing networks of

independent, private childcare groups in localities, creating many barriers to these groups' quality management (Doc R11).

The governance apparatus is based on the regulations on the organization and operation of private preschools (Doc G23) and regulates the decentralization of preschool management. Accordingly, the district people's committee performs the function of state management of public and private preschools and kindergartens. However, independent, private childcare groups of less than seven children are a particular type of childcare group, not licensed, and only subject to supervision from the people's committee of communes/wards. According to the rules, independent, private childcare groups are licensed and managed by ward/commune people's committees. In addition, these groups are also under the inspection and supervision of the community and socio-political organizations.

By taking advantage of the legal gray areas, childcare group owners can develop their businesses simply and without many constraints. The gaps in institutions become tools to serve the self-governance activities of these childcare groups. A department leader said: "In many cases, when we received information about a group of unlicensed childcare groups, we came to check, and they said that these children were descendants or children of neighbors who came here to play" (Interview, A03). They can even break the rules to gain business benefits because sanctions are light and insufficient to deter them: "If we don't accept a large number of children, we can't make a profit. But our management records don't show the real number of children. Or if there is an inspection team, if they ask about that, then we can tell an approximate number, and they just ignore it" (Interview, CGO04).

Governing actions

Because it is a spontaneous model, self-governing actions are the main characteristics of independent, private childcare groups. The owner of these childcare groups must be autonomous and responsible for managing within, above, and outside these childcare groups. In particular, the group owner directly manages the group of children regarding human resources, finance, and enrollment and is responsible for the quality of childcare and education. The owner of independent, private childcare groups is the person who directly manages finances and implements revenues and expenditures in the group. Each group owner has different management styles and choices of revenue and expenditure methods. Formally, there is financial transparency. From an economic perspective, if income and expenditure are by the books and reports of the group owner, the tuition fee for a group of children with a maximum number of 50 (according to regulations) is insufficient to cover the cost of premises and salaries for teachers. Therefore, to balance income and expenditure on a profitable business basis, the group owners have found solutions such as accepting children over regulations and accepting

teachers/nannies whose qualifications are below professional standards to pay low salaries (Vu et al., 2016). In addition, in independent, private childcare groups, the group owner directly recruits personnel for the group. Depending on the level of training, professional capacity, seniority, and practical experience of the recruited person, the group owner will negotiate salary and work assignments with them. Due to the specific working environment, the personnel situation in these childcare groups often fluctuates and changes, which also affects the implementation of policies for the team. However, most group owners currently do not have expertise in preschool education. The ability to self-organize training, improve professional capacity, and study to raise training standards is limited. There is also a situation where teachers who care for and educate children at independent, private childcare groups are not up to standard, have not received preschool pedagogical training, and only have preschool professional certificates (Vu et al., 2016).

Local authorities manage independent, private childcare groups according to a decentralized mechanism. In particular, the communes/wards people's committee performs the state education management for these groups. This principle is a situational solution because only those at this level, closest to the people, can fully grasp and understand what is happening in these childcare groups and classes. However, reality shows that state management of these childcare groups is complicated. Each commune/ward people's committee has only one officer in charge of managing independent, private childcare groups, who is often a cultural officer or has to hold multiple jobs and has no expertise in education. The district DOET only has two officers in charge of preschool education in general, so they usually do not intervene in managing independent, private childcare groups (Interviews, A01; A21).

This reality makes it difficult for management agencies to provide in-depth professional direction and inspection, so inspection and supervision of state regulations on the operation of independent, private childcare groups have not yet been implemented closely. The process of appraising and licensing the establishment of independent, private childcare groups is said to have many shortcomings, such as bribes and "buying licenses" (Interviews, CGO01; CGO04). In addition, management activities are often of poor quality. In some places, the licensing appraisal is conducted perfunctorily; for example, health inspections only examine the kitchen, not paying attention to potentially risky places such as classrooms and bathrooms. In some places, licenses are granted but not regularly inspected, leading to shortcomings in implementing the facility's professional regulations (Vu et al., 2016). Moreover, information regarding the governance of independent, private childcare groups faces many limitations, especially those with fewer than seven children (family-based childcare groups). Up to now, the number of facilities and groups of children and families has not been quantified because the number is too large and often unstable (Interviews, A01; A21).

6.2.3. Governing community engagement of migrant workers

Governing images

Currently, the connection of migrant workers to their destination is mainly based on personal networks or migrant communities based on similarities in living and migration situations or professional relationships, careers, hometowns, and acquaintances (Dang, 1998; Luong, 2004). Accordingly, related social organizations such as fellowship associations, hobby, and interest groups, and self-management boarding house groups can govern these networks to “make more playgrounds for workers, helping our group members become more connected” (Interview, A33). Indeed, “the purpose of governing these networks is to operate them more effectively and enhance the social capital of immigrant workers, helping them gradually integrate into urban life” (Interview, E01).

These networks are associated with the image of self-governing groups and self-governing communities. That is, governance activities will not be directly linked to the state or market but rather to civil society. These forms of self-governance can be found in fellowship associations and clan groups in which many migrant workers participate. These are voluntary organizations of people who help each other in times of trouble, exchange experiences, share emotions, protect each other’s interests, and strengthen community cohesion (Interviews, E01; E03). In Vietnam, fellowship associations, volunteering groups, community support groups, and self-governing groups are established without registration, do not need state permission or management, and often operate according to regulations, ethical principles, and customs, making legal status unnecessary for their operation (Nguyen, N. L., 2008). This process emphasizes forms of connection between individuals and social groups that are not based on any political connection but on the civil connection between them—the connection between free members, voluntary, self-governing organizations of communities, and people’s organizations (Interviews, E01; E03).

Governing instrumentation

In addition to community conventions and covenants, informal documents of fellowship associations, and rules of boarding houses, managing the community cohesion of migrant workers often relies on mutual trust between actors. This trust comes from the characteristics of migrants’ social network dependence, in which relationships between individuals and communities or social organizations are connected by trust-based relationships. “I’ve lived here long, and people know my personality. So, the boarding house owner trusts me a lot and entrusts me with managing the order of this boarding house. If there’s a problem, I tell her right away” (Interview, MW27). Besides, the connection between migrants’ social networks also

relies on love and solidarity. “People often jokingly say that I’m the president of the fellowship association, but mainly I organize these and other activities for my brothers and sisters so that everyone can unite and help each other more” (Interview, MW26). Thus, “love and solidarity are not only related to cooperation and mutual support in times of need, such as pandemics and natural disasters but are also two factors that make network management stronger to help form bonds with the community” (Interview, E01).

The main governance apparatuses of these fellowships, clubs, and self-governing groups do not currently have legal status. They share organizational characteristics and operate according to volunteerism, self-management, financial autonomy, and self-responsibility before the law, are not part of the state apparatus system, and operate not for profit (Nguyen, N. L., 2008). Because there is no management system and these organizations operate in a relatively clustered fashion, there is little information to serve governance. This is one of the biggest challenges in governing the community cohesion of migrant workers. The effective management tool that helps connect social networks and communities is virtual social networks. It helps transmit information more quickly and thoroughly information about accommodations, friends, or work. When encountering difficulties, they often support each other through fellowship associations and groups of colleagues on social networks such as Zalo and Facebook (Interviews, A33; E01).

Governing actions

Most of the governing actions in community networks, such as fellowship associations, hobby and interest groups, and self-managed boarding house groups, can work actively, “maintained by “minded” and influential leaders because the social networks are entirely voluntary for its members” (Interview, A33). These organizations are characterized by self-governance, including self-management, administration, and financial independence, and are not dependent on the government’s budget. This characteristic is illustrated through the description of a volunteer group leader: “Some active members of our group, and I often seek proactively different sources of support, mainly from members with economic conditions. Our planning and organizing activities for the group are also flexible because everyone’s time is very different, and communication is mainly through Zalo” (Interview, MW21).

Governing actions related to connecting migrant workers with the community are also associated with the activities of neighborhood executive boards. These boards manage the residential community regarding everyday life practices, build and implement neighborhood conventions, and promote solidarity and mutual support in production and life. They also promote good traditions, acceptable customs, and the implementation of a cultural lifestyle (Interviews, A015, A019; A28). The primary characteristic of neighborhood self-management

is that it is more “flexible” due to voluntary participation, behavior according to contract, agreement, persuasion, and the democratic nature of the community. However, these practices are increasingly bureaucratized, mainly focusing on local people while excluding and discriminating against migrant workers. Governance actions to strengthen the community cohesion of migrant workers are generally fragmented, mainly consisting of self-governance actions within migrants’ communities, such as fellowship associations, family networks, and activities, which are integrated into the community governance activities of the neighborhood executive board.

6.3. Selections of migrant place-making and place-based governance

6.3.1. Place-making through migrant workers’ spontaneous settlement

Migrant workers’ spontaneous settlement activities reflect the survival and coping strategies of migrants and related local people. To survive, they rely on activities beyond state plans, policies, and controls to ensure their livelihoods and daily needs. Migrant workers choose to live in boarding houses and send their children to private childcare groups because they do not have other reasonable alternatives. In addition, their close social networks, including family and relatives, play a key role in helping workers adapt, overcome difficulties, and survive in the city. Furthermore, they implement strategies to cope with marginalization caused by the process of peri-urban territorialization through social networks with their destination, including landlords and neighbors. Meanwhile, for local people, running boarding houses or organizing childcare groups for migrant workers’ children becomes a primary source of income in the context that they no longer have the conditions to produce agriculture and/or their land designated for planning and cannot be sold at market price (Interviews, BHO01-06; BHO07-09; CGO01; CGO04). In addition, coping strategies can be seen in the actions of boarding house owners and childcare group owners. They are forced to navigate the state's territorial policies and regulations on construction and education by engaging in illegal construction, non-compliance with rules on organizing kindergartens, and failure to fully register temporary residences for tenants. These actions often involve corruption, bribery, and personal relationships with local officials.

These strategies not only create places where migrant workers can survive but also help them find temporary safety, relief, and mutual support. Indeed, these strategies provide a better sense of place for migrant workers or, more accurately, create and enhance a sense of place. The convenience, affordability, and availability of boarding houses and childcare groups create positive feelings about these housing and schooling options among migrant workers. Additionally, their sense of belonging is nurtured through direct interaction within their social relationships in the suburban area. Attachment to destination social networks helps them build

a sense of belonging to the destination by integrating themselves and agents such as landlords, friends, and relatives into the local socio-economic institutional structure. Furthermore, through such strategies, place identity is formed. The relative freedom of the boarding houses may have allowed them to maintain agricultural customs and cultural practices from their place of origin. Accordingly, migrants with similar socio-economic attributes tend to form groups within their neighborhoods. In this sense, migrant workers feel connected to the area not only because of livelihoods, housing, and schooling opportunities but also because of familiarity with the agricultural community, fellow compatriots, ethnicities, and religions.

The analyses show that spontaneous practices related to settlement for migrant workers are place-making in nature because places of identity emerge in the intertwined coping and survival strategies of some local peoples and migrant workers. Place-making practices can be seen as social technologies that shape migrant workers' subjectivities in terms of anxiety, trust, love, safety, and belonging, which are formed in their everyday lives. In this, social capital, specifically the social networks and communities around them, shapes individual perceptions and actions about places at the destination of migrant workers. Additionally, the temporal element in the process of social space production plays a significant role in enhancing the cohesion and identity formation of migrant workers because they can expand their life experiences and social networks over time. However, while place-making helps to secure the livelihoods and daily living needs of migrant workers and related local people temporarily, it creates precariousness and uncertainty for their own lives and the socio-spatial configurations of peri-urban space.

6.3.2. Place-based governance of migrant place-making

Patterning governing spontaneous migrant settlement shows that the forms of self-governance are most common in governing arrangements involving boarding houses, independent, private childcare groups, and familiar social networks. Stakeholders such as boarding house owners, independent, private childcare group owners, and association and group leaders take responsibility for decisions and actions in managing issues related to their businesses and interests. Therefore, they play a central role in self-governance. Although this form of self-governance has the character of private governance, it shares public values and provides alternatives to state functions in contexts where public services are inadequate. Self-governance solutions do not necessarily follow institutionalized rules but often arise instantaneously and flexibly based on trust, familiarity, and mutual habits between relevant parties in each specific situation.

These self-management actions are also linked with other external actors, including the state, the community, boarding house owners, childcare group owners, and leaders of other

associations and groups. They interact with each other through the neighborhood environment, under the soft management of neighborhood boards. Essentially, they make decisions based on values, principles, knowledge, and customs specific to their communities. This mechanism helps them identify what is most needed, recognize which state policies are not reasonable, allocate resources effectively for their community, and provide appropriate responses. Thus, this form of governance has the nature of community governance or customary governance.

Both of these interwoven governance forms reflect the characteristics of place-based governance. Accordingly, place-based governance tools can be identified as informal institutions such as community conventions, rules, and regulations established by the community and groups living together in boarding houses or civil society associations and groups. In addition, volunteerism, civic engagement, and social capital are core aspects of place-based governance. Love and solidarity are also critical factors for supportive or mutually protective governing actions among migrants themselves and with local people. Furthermore, self-governance and community governance emphasize the role of social networks and communities as alternatives to the hierarchical power relations that underpin territorial governance. Familiar social networks of migrants and informal networks of interest between people and local officials, often created through bribery cases, also play a specific role in place-based governance actions.

In general, the place-based governance model in the peri-urban area of HCMC relies on the activism of local actors and social networks through several self-governance and community governance mechanisms, with relatively weak interaction with the state. This model facilitates migrant worker place-making practices. In other words, the actions of place-based governance aim to access and mobilize community resources to support the place-making process of migrants. Place-based governance, as a technology of power, is not top-down but shapes, directs, and influences people's minds and behaviors through social networks, communities, and attachments to the place.

6.3.3. Structural selectivities

Exclusion through territorial strategies, as analyzed in the previous chapter, is one of the main structures that motivate migrant workers and relevant local people to engage in place-making activities. Regarding housing, social housing projects have not met the significant needs of low-income people, and migrant workers are not among the priority subjects in these projects. Additionally, the number of worker dormitories is very limited, and their "discipline" is not suitable for many migrant workers. The severe shortage of schools and classrooms, due to planning and development not keeping pace with population growth, affects the educational rights of children, especially those of migrant workers. About 52.6% of female migrant workers

have children under six years old, but public preschools can only meet 15% of childcare needs in Binh Tan and Binh Chanh Districts (OXFAM, 2015; HIDS, 2020). Due to the residence registration system and population management being based on territory, migrant workers are often not actively connected to the government's support system and other official support, making it difficult for them to access socio-political organizations. Studies show that local government and public organizations play a minimal role in migrant workers' decision-making and livelihood processes in HCMC (OXFAM, 2015; HFL, 2020).

The settlement of migrant workers is excluded from the formal urban economy, leading to strategies related to place-making for migrant workers based on the structures of the informal urban economy/everyday economics. These informal urban structures can be found in the everyday acts and practices of spatial production and governance that occur in the gray area between legal and illegal activities. In this context, worker boarding houses are variations of self-built housing or are renovated from local housing to form an informal rental housing market. Initial childcare groups were formed by older local people or those not involved in formal economic activities, who took on babysitting to earn extra income. Since migrant workers do not receive much support from the state's social safety network, organizations associated with the state, and businesses (HFL, 2020), they rely on familiar social networks, such as family, clan, friends, and boarding house owners, to navigate risks and maintain their livelihoods. These strategies and tactics rely on informal urban structures characterized by unpredictability, flexibility, and a chaotic nature associated with self-organized activities of excluded social groups, corruption, and lax management of local authorities. However, they also embody community values such as solidarity and love. In addition, when implementing these strategies and tactics, the subjects believe that the state will soon "legalize" spontaneous activities based on their life experiences with informal urban economic activities, such as self-built housing and land legalization, that have taken place before.

In short, the precarious position and inability to ensure living conditions for migrant workers and a part of the local population due to marginalization by territorial strategies have pushed them to experiment with flexible livelihood and survival activities. These place-making strategies are facilitated by informal urban structures that involve economic, social, and spatial interactions in contexts of loose enforcement of formal urbanism. Such structures allow migrant workers and related local residents to transform certain peri-urban areas into their own places to meet their immediate needs for settling down and working in peace. However, the uncertain nature of these structures prevents them from formally occupying these areas.

6.3.4. Agential selectivities

Migrant worker place-making and place-based governance on the city edge are driven by a coalition of interests at the grassroots level. Some local households and small construction contractors develop self-built housing and convert it into boarding houses for migrant workers. Around these boarding houses, other residents organize independent, private childcare groups, and provide other services to migrant workers. In addition, community leaders, regional police, and civil servants performing public duties at the grassroots level also participate in this coalition based on personal relationships or forms of bribery. What needs to be emphasized here is that the nature of this coalition not only reflects speculation, profiteering, corruption, and power asymmetry but is also intertwined with sympathy and solidarity.

Another group of actors that plays an important role in the process of place-making for migrants and place-based governance is solidarity-based coalitions among migrants and between migrants and some local residents. The nature of this bond is based on social networks or social capital. These networks often include the family, clan, compatriots, friends, and acquaintances of migrant workers. Local actors such as boarding house owners and neighbors also become connection points in the social network of migrants. This group of actors helps migrants secure their livelihoods and provides coping strategies when faced with multiple adverse factors. Although these groups are largely sporadic, they often erupt and coalesce strongly during times of crisis or when threatened by external factors. This mechanism could open up opportunities for these actors to work together through forms of self-governance and community governance to counter the negative effects of marginalization.

In short, the place-making strategies associated with the spontaneous settlement activities of migrant workers demonstrate that they are the main subjects of this process. That is, places are produced to suit their needs, conditions, feelings, and identities. However, analysis of these strategies shows that migrant workers are not the primary agents in the production and governance of their own places. In other words, their participation in this process is not genuinely proactive, and their role in place-based governance mechanisms is still limited. Migrant workers participate in self-governance mechanisms established by boarding house owners, neighborhood and local authorities, associations, and groups. Moreover, they mainly exercise their rights and obligations to the local community indirectly through boarding house owners and employers.

6.4. Expressions of fixing, deterritorialization, and counter-hegemonic practices

6.4.1. Migrant place-making and place-based governance in fixing

Migrant workers' place-making involves not only physical and empirical attributes but also lived experiences, relationships, and socio-spatial emotional meanings. It also emerges as practices that have a role in delaying and temporarily defusing the contradictions created by the process of marginalization and exclusion of migrants, in addition to the appropriation of land from local people through territorialization. Place-making practices have helped stabilize the lives of migrant workers, creating conditions for them to work with peace of mind. Accordingly, boarding houses, independent, private childcare groups, and social networks provide living spaces that meet the needs and financial conditions of migrant workers, creating a sense of identity and belonging while limiting social exclusion. At the same time, local people who have lost land and livelihoods due to urban expansion can also invest in small business activities. This process contributes to reducing social inequality and uneven development in peri-urban areas.

However, this process does not clearly reflect the regulation of capital. Investment sources for place-making practices for migrant workers on the urban edge depend on community resources. Forms of microfinance from individuals and households (mainly local people) are used to build boarding houses and provide services such as independent, private childcare groups for migrant workers in the private sector, thereby improving social capital. The analysis also shows that the process of place creation relies on solid social capital from the familiar social networks of migrant workers, such as family, friends, and boarding house owners, who support and help them live and work on the city's edge.

For a long time, the government did not have preferential policies or legal documents regarding boarding houses and private childcare groups due to limited resources and management constraints. However, people still built worker boarding houses and invested in independent, private childcare groups and social networks that continuously supported belonging. These practices are based on community institutions, even unwritten rules, norms, and taboos observed in relationships between groups of people in the community. However, the absence of formal institutions suggests that these spontaneous activities have not yet been solidified into a concrete mode of spatiotemporal fix.

To sum up, the place-making process led by society helps address or accommodate inequality and exclusion toward migrants. These practices help stabilize specific areas of neighborhoods with high concentrations of migrants, thereby ensuring their ability to participate in labor and avoiding potential conflicts. Thus, migrant place-making can be seen as an expression of fixing

the uneven development produced by peri-urban territorialization. However, these practices do not yet constitute a specific spatiotemporal fix mode because they are not clearly linked to regulatory models and are not yet embedded in formal institutions.

6.4.2. Migrant place-making and place-based governance as deterritorialization

Migrant place-making through spontaneous practices opposes the development orientations of the territory through socio-spatial technologies and projects associated with the vision of the state, investors, designers, and other professional experts, in addition to top-down bureaucratic governance. This process is based on community participation, where the production and management of places are bottom-up, diminishing the political will and dominant authority of the state. Indeed, place-making for migrant workers and place-based governance reflect semi-formal occupation strategies. Actors outside the state, including urban residents, micro-economic actors, and migrant workers, occupy urban spaces without considering the state's planning, turning them into boarding houses and other independent, private childcare groups. These occupation strategies occur in "suspended planning" areas and locations not strictly controlled by the state, such as the administrative boundary area between rural and urban districts. However, unlike some cases in the literature review, this is not a completely illegal squatter space. It is developed semi-officially by former farmers who become small developers to build housing or rent their lands. These strategies took place under the tacit agreement between local authorities and local people over a long period.

These strategies and tactics destabilize territorialization strategies by resisting and transgressing the notion of territorialization through coping and survival strategies, redefining the meaning of the spaces they occupy. They are less concerned with future planning directions, such as the land they live on being used to build parks or modern residential areas, but rather are focused on ensuring their livelihood and meeting their daily needs. These places are their everyday spaces that give identity to migrant workers, and the familiar and authentic everyday horizon will always be heterogeneous according to the general dominant logic of territory-based institutions. Accordingly, the formation of distinct identities in spaces such as workers' boarding houses and childcare groups demonstrates their occupation of these spaces to form places that challenge the peri-territorialization led by the state. In addition, weak state intervention and conflicting functions of local state agencies demarcated according to rural-urban administrative territories further weaken territorial control. As a result, although the state has strengthened its capacity to exercise territorial control through strategies of control, exclusion, and expansion, it still cannot easily realize the planning goals outlined in its ideology.

The above strategies reflect the ongoing process of deterritorialization through the everyday practices of peri-urban life. In this context, the disruption of regulations and the logic of territorialization serve as temporary measures to meet the livelihood needs of migrant workers and locals alike. Alternative place-based logics rely heavily on communal institutions, verbal agreements, and humanistic values such as affection and solidarity. In addition, strategies for making and governing these locations rely heavily on stakeholders' lived experiences to create migrant workers' identities in the destination. These lived experiences in peri-urban areas have created profound spatial images constructed through physical landscapes and daily activities, disrupting territorial logic. Indeed, the bottom-up process of lived experiences creating specific socio-spatial images of place has challenged the imaginaries of the modern, civilized city produced by the ideology of a civilized and modern socialist city.

However, deterritorialization tends to increase spontaneous urban forms as informal urbanism excessively. The places produced for migrant workers, while providing temporary settlement and livelihood solutions, can also create many challenges for long-term urban development related to urban quality, such as poor urban infrastructure, traffic congestion, flooding, pollution, contamination, and disorder. Therefore, failure to properly manage this peri-urban form can exacerbate uneven development and urban inequality.

6.4.3. Expressions of counter-hegemonic practices

In the context of peri-urbanization, practices based on territorial logic tend to marginalize groups of migrant workers, leading to uneven and inequitable development and hidden sources of conflict in specific locations. The spontaneous practice of making places for migrant workers is not just a simple survival strategy but also an example of resistance to claiming these spaces for the individual needs of those excluded from the state's territorial strategy. Among them, boarding house owners seek to overcome established building codes to build boarding houses, independent private childcare group owners seek to limit state intervention in their activities, and migrants limit their contact with local authorities. These coping strategies are often carried out silently through everyday practices, small-scale corruption, and self-management with little formal interaction with local authorities. These conflicting views and actions with state rules on urban development reflect the lack of consensus among migrant workers and local people on dominant urban development models and ideologies.

In rare cases, protest activities manifest in concrete actions. Among them, local people are the prominent participants in movements protesting the state's land use policies when they feel that compensation for land acquisition or the structures that have been built are insufficient, or if their building was forcibly demolished because it was built without a permit. Another notable case was when migrant workers gathered together in neighborhoods and ward/commune

people's committees to protest their lack of government support after the COVID-19 pandemic. Local authorities later explained that they did not know the exact number of migrant workers living in boarding houses to provide financial support (Pham, T. N., 2021; Thanh Nien, 2021). However, most such events are usually resolved by local authorities with a flexible, negotiated, and minimal conflict-based approach.

Although spontaneous activities in migrant place-making are widespread and large-scale, strategies and tactics applying everyday life and informal urbanism in the periphery have not yet developed into a strong social movement that can be considered a counter-hegemonic project. As a result, no counter-hegemonic coalition has been formed. Such strategies and tactics, while "legitimate resistance," are clearly not revolutionary or impactful in terms of obvious social transformation. From a radical social movement perspective, nevertheless, these survival coping strategies can still be seen as forms of resistance by constrained agents, even if they are not ultimately emancipatory because they reflect the erosion of state-society relations in the context of neo-liberalization.

CHAPTER 7: SOCIO-SPATIAL LIMINALIZATION AND MULTI-SPATIAL META-GOVERNANCE IN PRODUCING URBAN SUB-HEGEMONY

7.1. Emerging mixed socio-spatial practices

7.1.1. Dual mechanism in social housing for workers

Conceiving activities

Although social housing development has been identified as an essential solution for low-income people by the government, implementing this policy has not achieved the set goals. There is a lack of supply, leading to most migrant workers having difficulty accessing social housing and using boarding houses built and rented by individuals and households. A paradox arises here: while social housing projects have many incentives, they do not develop much. In contrast, rental housing invested in by households and individuals, which has no support from the government, proliferates (Interviews, E02; A02). However, this type of boarding house is developing spontaneously, is not managed, and lacks standards, leading to inadequate living conditions for residents. There are at least two perspectives on solutions to resolve these paradoxes, as an HCMC leader asserts: “It is said to be social housing, but not everyone can access it because the criteria to be considered for purchase are very strict. Therefore, the city aims to improve the quality of accommodation for workers in many ways, including improving boarding houses and developing social housing for rent” (Doc LG06).

The first trend is to focus more on social housing for workers instead of integrating them as a small group in social housing development policies as before. The CPV clearly specifies that allocating resources and effectively implementing national housing development strategies are innovative methods and models of management and development of social housing, especially housing for workers in industrial zones (Doc P10). Separating housing policies for workers helps create incentive mechanisms to develop different housing types to serve the urgent needs of workers in industrial zones. The government defines social housing for workers as “social housing invested in and built to meet the needs of households and individuals working in industrial zones, a common name including industrial zones, economic zones economic zones, export processing zones, high-tech zones, small and medium-sized industrial clusters, industrial and handicraft production establishments (including exploitation and processing establishments) of all industries and occupations in the following areas: economic sectors” (Doc G11). The government’s documents also define a system of solutions to develop this type of housing for this specific group. In addition, separate policies and programs for this group have also been issued, such as the project “Investment and construction of at least 1 million social housing for low-income subjects and industrial zones workers in the period 2021–2030”

(Doc G09; Doc G11). These solutions show that the housing issue of migrant workers has received more attention in socio-economic development.

After more than 30 years of the appearance of worker boarding houses, the term “boarding house” is often labeled as a form of “rental housing” or “individual housing” in legal documents. However, the terms do not fully reflect the connotation of “worker’s boarding house,” requiring an alternative construction of meaning. There is a significant effort from the MOC to recognize that the housing blocks people build for rent are a form of social housing for workers. They want to erase the boarding house concept, which has a temporary and irregular connotation, with a new concept of “social housing,” with the leading implementers being individuals and households living there across the country (Interviews, E01; E02). Therefore, “the workers boarding house model should be brought into the social housing category to create a legal framework for the state to support households and individuals in capital, planning, construction, and upgrading the boarding house system, ensuring standards and regulations according to regulations — that is, meeting basic living amenities, ensuring safety and security, creating conditions for workers to rest, and regenerating labor in the best way” (Doc G33). Accordingly, the government issued a decree recognizing that worker boarding houses are also a form of social housing, and people who invest in construction for this type of business will also enjoy current incentives (Doc G11). Subsequently, the MOC classifies social housing into three types, which can be divided into two main types: project-type social housing (apartments and low-rise townhouses) implemented by organizations and businesses, and individual social housing invested in by individuals and households (boarding houses) (Doc P19).

However, competent authorities later found it challenging to standardize boarding houses to meet social housing standards. For instance, the minimum standards for boarding houses in some government and MOC documents (Doc P19; Doc G11) conflict with the construction law. Consequently, they promulgated new decrees and circulars (Doc G34; Doc G35) to replace them. In these, the specific minimum standards for boarding houses have been omitted and replaced with “exploiting and managing the use of social housing built by individuals and households is carried out by the provisions of housing law, construction law, and planning law” (Doc G35). Due to the contradictions and gaps between policies, laws, and practices, localities have long lacked a legal basis to carry out state management functions over rented rooms in boarding houses. Individuals and households invest to ensure construction quality, fire safety, and utilities. To overcome this problem, the City DOC has issued documents (Doc LG08; Doc LG09) guiding the implementation of the investment process in building housing for workers and laborers for rent in HCMC. However, these are only guiding documents from specialized agencies, not legal documents for relevant parties to apply.

Perceiving activities

The development of social housing for workers in HCMC is still ongoing; however, so far, the results remain very limited. “In recent times, the city has done things, sometimes promoted them, but in reality, the amount of social housing that has been implemented is very small, not meeting the needs of workers” (Doc LG06). The identified reasons include the fact that “projects have problems with procedures and land funds, and not many investors participate because the profit margin in this segment is not attractive enough” (Doc LG06).

Support for standardizing boarding houses to improve the quality of accommodation for workers is identified as an immediate feasible activity by the city government. Implementing the HCMC Housing Development Program 2021–2030, the city “considers expanding loan support policies for households and individuals investing in new construction or repairing and renovating boarding houses for workers, laborers, and students that meet prescribed standards” (Doc LG02). Specifically, the city government issued an interest-rate support package for boarding house owners borrowing capital from commercial banks and supported electricity and water costs for tenants according to the city’s policy (Doc LG02).

Furthermore, to overcome limitations in capital resources for developing social housing and supporting the standardization of boarding houses, HCMC established and developed the Housing Development Fund. This organization researches and proposes new mechanisms and policies to support low-income people with housing, seeking partners from non-governmental and non-profit organizations to assist the city in developing housing for low-income individuals in various aspects such as construction, loans, administration, and employment, contributing to improving people’s quality of life. The fund also aims to expand loan support policies for households and individuals investing in new construction or repairing and renovating boarding houses for workers, laborers, and students to meet prescribed standards (Doc R16).

Living activities

Regarding the impact of supportive policies and government actions on the level of satisfaction and housing quality of workers, the HFL (2020) report shows that “the analysis results for the support factor of state policies towards workers have not been felt by workers.” Specifically, “the majority of renters know that there are policies to support electricity and water costs for renters. But to enjoy these policies, workers are completely dependent on the landlord. If the boarding house owner aims to support workers, the policy will reach the workers and vice versa” (HFL, 2020).

While the government’s policies and actions in supporting accommodation for migrant workers are implemented indirectly through boarding house owners, these owners have the right to

choose whether to apply these policies to their boarding houses. There are many reasons why they are not keen on these policies, as one owner said: “To meet the standards, I will have to demolish and redo the entire current old boarding house. If you want to do that, you have to borrow money, and suddenly you’re in debt. Not to mention that after new construction, room prices will have to increase, which is a loss for both tenants and owners” (Interview, BHO03). Furthermore, the administrative procedure requirements are quite complicated for households and individuals who own boarding houses. These are the reasons why most boarding house owners are not interested in the loan support policies for investing in new construction or repairing and renovating boarding houses for workers.

7.1.2. Two forms of preschool education facilities

Conceiving activities

In the context that preschool education has not received adequate attention to its essential role, the resolution of the 13th Party Congress continues to emphasize the task of developing preschool education: “Strengthening education, knowledge, and skills to protect children. By 2030, complete universal preschool education for children from 3 to 5 years old” (Doc P08). Accordingly, the education sector aims to ensure that all children of school age can attend school, regardless of whether people have permanent or temporary residence. Thus, developing the public and private preschool system through socialization is the central solution to this task. However, while the preschool system still has many limitations, childcare groups are essential in providing services for migrant workers on the city’s edge. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize these childcare groups as part of the early childhood education system. This recognition emphasizes that independent, private childcare groups must still exist parallel to the preschool form. At the same time, acceptance must come with conditions to standardize these childcare groups (Interview, A31).

Although independent childcare groups have existed for a long time, it was not until 2019 that education law officially recognized this form as a preschool education facility. Regarding independent, private childcare groups, there are sub-legal documents from the MOET (Doc G23; Doc G24) regulating the organization and operation of these schooling types. These documents stipulate that an independent preschool education facility is a preschool education facility that belongs to the national education system, with facilities invested in and guaranteed by investors or the community. In places where the network of preschool education facilities does not meet the needs of sending children to school, individuals can organize childcare groups to meet the nurturing needs, take care of the parent’s children, and register their activities with the ward/commune people’s committees. They also specify the number of children in each group to ensure investment and operation conditions in the educational field of the establishments. In particular, the number of children in an independent, private childcare group should be increased

to no more than 70 children. Supplementary regulations include professional team leaders in an independent, private childcare group and specifications regarding political qualities, professional ethics, training qualifications, and the professional capacity of team leaders managing professional activities.

In parallel with the reform of institutions for independent, private childcare groups, specific policies for areas with industrial zones are also identified. According to the 2019 Education Law, the state prioritizes and attracts other educational investment sources in mountainous regions, islands, areas with ethnic minorities, areas with harsh socio-economic conditions, and industrial zones. To create favorable conditions for workers who work in industrial zones and opportunities for their children to attend preschool, the government issued policies and programs for the development of independent, private childcare groups and support for teachers and children of workers working in industrial zones. One of the first such policies is the project “supporting and developing independent, private childcare groups in industrial zones until 2020” (Project 404) (Doc G08). This project supports, consolidates, and develops independent, private childcare groups in the community, reviews these childcare groups and encourages and supports individuals and organizations with the means to establish these childcare groups to meet the childcare needs of parents, thus ensuring children’s safety. The authorities support and help with facilities, equipment, utensils, and toys; train a team of teachers and childcare providers so that independent, private childcare groups that are not currently licensed to operate can meet the conditions for licensing; and support capacity building for managers, teachers, and caregivers in these childcare groups and parents in industrial zones.

Project 404 also laid the groundwork for the government to issue Decree No. 105/2020/ND-CP on the policy of preschool education development in localities with industrial zones. This decree established three clear policy groups: The first policy group focuses on developing a network of educational institutions, allowing the state to invest in social organizations and individuals participating in development. This group of policies aims to develop a network of quality educational establishments suitable for migrant workers’ incomes and meet the needs of the people. Over time, with research and depending on the state’s conditions, legal frameworks will be supplemented. The second policy group ensures that preschool teachers have a stable income, maintaining their living standards and those of their families and ensuring the right to study and improve their professional qualifications. The third group of policies supports children of industrial zone workers, helping to improve their lives and providing funds to invest in their children’s education. Thus, the new preschool education development policy focuses on workers in industrial zones (Doc G12).

To concretize the central government’s projects and policies, the HCMC People’s Committee issued a plan to implement Project 404 (Doc LG011). The plan aims to improve the quality of

childcare and education at preschool education facilities in the city by increasing investment resources to develop school networks and facilities and provide additional funding for childcare activities for preschool children, preschoolers, and teachers. Special attention is given to building more policies to support preschool education for children of workers, workers employed in industrial zones, and non-public preschool education establishments. Subsequently, the City People's Council issued a resolution to support the provision of facilities for independent, private childcare groups in industrial zones (Doc PC01).

Perceiving activities

The local government continues to ensure that regular state budget spending on education and training accounts for at least 20% of the total annual expenditure. This budget prioritizes building schools in communes/wards around industrial zones that do not have public preschools. By 2020, each ward and commune in Binh Tan and Binh Chanh Districts had at least two public preschools. Additionally, some public preschools have piloted the facilitation of nurturing and caring for children under 36 months old (Doc R09; Doc R11).

Project 404 in HCMC supports and provides facilities, equipment, utensils, and toys; trains a team of teachers and childcare providers so that independent, private childcare groups that are not currently licensed to operate can meet the conditions for licensing; and supports capacity building for managers, teachers, and caregivers in these childcare groups in industrial zones. By 2020, this project had mobilized resources for 151 selected childcare groups with more than 14 billion VND to support equipment and supplies used for studying, toys, and camera installation. In addition, the HCMC Women's Union and the HCMC Confederation of Labor have mobilized businesses to support the cost of sending workers' children to daycare and kindergarten, allowing workers to work with peace of mind. Seven businesses have built three kindergartens and organized four childcare rooms for over 1,000 workers' children. The project in HCMC also coordinated with UNICEF to implement the project "Technical Support for Child-friendly City Initiative in HCMC." However, the support provided is still insufficient compared to the vast needs of migrant workers in urban areas (Doc R11).

Implementing Decree No. 105/2020/ND-CP, the City People's Committee established the level of support based on the local budget capacity. Support policies for preschool education in areas with industrial zones have helped young parents who are workers with additional costs, providing minimum support of 160,000 VND per child per month for actual school months, but not more than nine months per school year. Additionally, it helps independent, private childcare groups with funds to renovate facilities and supplement teaching equipment to ensure standards. According to regulations, independent, private childcare groups receive a minimum

support level of 20 million VND. Teachers working in these groups will receive at least 800,000 VND per month to create a sense of security in their work. (Doc LG011).

Living activities

Through its policies and support programs, the state shows its determination to standardize independent, private childcare groups. Specifically qualified groups will be upgraded to schools for ease of monitoring and management in all aspects; however, developing from “group” to “school” is very difficult. This process is relatively complicated and stressful for these childcare groups. In particular, the issue of land funds suitable for educational planning is critical. Land used to build schools is mainly residential land, agricultural land, land for perennial crops, or land belonging to religious establishments. According to regulations, to be used for schools, the land must be in the educational land planning or must be transferred for educational use. Meanwhile, many landlords and childcare group owners do not want to make this conversion. They are concerned that if they stop investing in education in the future, it will be difficult to transfer the land back to its original use. They cannot use that land for any purpose other than education. Additionally, these groups must also ensure that the facilities meet the minimum scale, such as the number of classrooms, function rooms, equipment, management staff, teachers, and staff (Interviews, A31; A01; A21; CGO04).

Regarding the implementation of Decree No. 105/2020/ND-CP, 84 preschool education facilities are applying for support under this resolution, with Binh Tan and Binh Chanh Districts having just one facility each (Doc R11). The reason for the low number, despite the large number of children of immigrant workers, is that the beneficiaries of this policy are only independent preschool education establishments and children of workers in industrial zones, without considering the cases of workers outside industrial zones. Specifically, preschool educational establishments of the people-founded and private types have been licensed by competent authorities to establish and operate by regulations where at least 30% of children are children of workers in industrial zones with a labor contract. Therefore, many independent, private childcare groups do not receive this support because their parents work in industrial clusters or as informal workers (Interviews, A31; A01; A21).

7.1.3. The combination of networks promotes social cohesion

Conceiving activities

Enhancing the belonging of migrant workers is challenged by the lack of an integrated network between vertical linkages related to residence management by the local state and horizontal linkages of migrant workers based on their social networks. Indeed, the apparatus of community in peri-urban areas is increasingly becoming a part of the vertical network with the

concept of “the extended arm of the ward/commune people’s committee” (Interview, A05) in controlling the population but increasingly “lacks connection with the masses” (Doc P12). To address this situation, the CPV emphasizes completing the organizational apparatus of the Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations by innovating content and operating methods, focusing on the grassroots, attaching to members, and gradually overcoming the “administrative-ization” of operations and “bureaucratization” of officials, especially at the grassroots level. Moreover, it determines that in the coming years, it will be necessary to continue to build and perfect the self-governance model in village communities and residential groups under the chairmanship of the Fatherland Front and ensure the leadership of all levels of party committees and local government (Doc P12).

This policy emphasizes the role of the Fatherland Front in uniting and organizing vertical and horizontal networks at the grassroots level. This change aims to create connection and unity among social networks, the companionship of various organizations, and consensus between leadership, management, and social strata at the grassroots level. Accordingly, the Fatherland Front is determined to continue promoting the role of member associations and unions to create a foundation for building and developing trust and connecting social networks and other people's organizations. This orientation aims to eliminate all discrimination to unite people based on similarities. Great National Unity is the party’s basic policy, building a clean and robust people’s government and diversifying forms of gathering people from all walks of life. On that basis, the Vietnam Fatherland Front is the organization with the most favorable conditions to implement the policy of Great Solidarity and expansion, with the Party being both a member and leader of the Fatherland Front (Doc P12; Doc O01).

According to the Constitution, the Vietnam Fatherland Front is a political coalition, a voluntary union of political, socio-political, and social organizations (Doc NA03). The Vietnam Fatherland Front is the political base of the people’s government; it represents and protects the legitimate rights and interests of the people; gathers and promotes the strength of great national unity, implements democracy, and strengthens social consensus; conducts social supervision and criticism; and participates in building the Party, the state, and people’s foreign affairs activities, contributing to building and protecting the Fatherland. Member socio-political organizations include the Vietnam General Federation of Labor, the Vietnam Farmers’ Association, the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, the Vietnam Women’s Union, and the Vietnam Veterans Association. These are socio-political organizations established voluntarily, representing and protecting the legitimate rights and interests of their members and other member organizations of the Front to coordinate and unify actions within the Vietnam Fatherland Front. Thus, one of the essential characteristics of this political system is the membership

of the Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations. Considering the relationship of the entire political system, the Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations are all members, but political organizations are also members of the Fatherland Front. This multi-level membership of socio-political organizations within the political system and the Fatherland Front has created a unique relationship between the Fatherland Front and political organizations. However, in reality, the function of the Front has often been limited to mobilizing people from all walks of life to implement the party's guidelines and policies and the state's laws and regulations, contributing to completing the task of socio-economic development (Doc P12).

The Vietnam Fatherland Front Law 2015 has two particular points related to the role of the Fatherland Front in social cohesion in residential areas. First, the Vietnam Fatherland Front "unifies and cooperates with legitimate organizations of the people" (Doc NA21). This method gathers and builds excellent national unity by connecting social networks and other legal, social, cultural, and religious organizations and socio-political organization members. This method emphasizes that social networks, which are rich and multidimensional at the grassroots level, should not be politicized or bureaucratized, making them increasingly one-sided and imposed from above. Second, its role in building community is determined. The ward/commune-level Vietnam Fatherland Front Committee established the Front Working Committee in villages, hamlets, residential groups, neighborhoods, city blocks, and other residential communities (Doc NA21). The Charter of the Vietnam Fatherland Front regulates the organization and operations of the Front Working Committee. Thus, it coordinates with local authorities to build solidarity through participating in dialogue and reconciliation and building self-governing communities in residential areas. It participates in developing and implementing the state's social security policies and proposes and implements programs, movements, and campaigns that contribute to taking care of the material and spiritual lives of the people (Doc O01).

Perceiving activities

Activities of the Fatherland Front and its socio-political organizations are increasingly necessary to support migrant workers. The work of taking care of the material and spiritual life, and raising legal awareness and political consciousness for workers has also been carried out by socio-political organizations. For example, the HFL participates in activities that take care of housing for workers with programs such as building worker dormitories and giving "labor union shelters." They established a capital support fund and internal assistance funds in companies to help workers overcome difficulties in times of emergency, develop the family economy, and increase income. In addition, the various care activities of these organizations are available on holidays, funerals, and weddings of

workers; it contributes to improving the quality of life for workers working in export processing zones and industrial parks in HCMC (HFL, 2020). Other organizations also mobilize migrant workers to participate through models such as building civilized boarding houses, self-managed boarding houses, and cultural venues in residential areas with a large number of migrant workers to increase the connection between migrant workers and the local community (Doc P46; Doc P47; Doc P48).

The Fatherland Front and its socio-political organizations are not only formal social networks in the locality and workplace that provide social capital through support for migrant workers but also gather other social networks to promote community solidarity and encourage people to participate in management at their residences. A leader of an organization said: “Because boarding house owners and employers play an essential role in migrant cohesion, we proactively connect with boarding house owners and employers to strengthen support and increase migrants’ engagement in the community” (Interview, A33). Specifically, these organizations, through networks of boarding house owners and employers, provide employment information, rental information, and loans; mobilize boarding house owners to reduce motel prices and not increase electricity and water prices; and, through businesses, provide support activities, information about state policies, and build public works such as sports fields and parks. Some outstanding activities and movements with such cooperation with multi-stakeholders include the Youth Union’s “cultural boarding house” and the Women’s Union’s “boarding house owners’ club” (Doc R17). Linking networks together will increase the ability “to support workers in accessing information and job opportunities, improving professional skills, access to essential social services such as healthcare, going to public schools for children, buying cheap electricity and water, stabilizing room rental prices” (Interview, E01).

At the grassroots level, all these activities fall under the prominent objective of the Fatherland Front, “All people unite to build cultural life in residential areas.” This campaign becomes an umbrella integrated into local and unit annual tasks and plans and the community management process. The activities of this movement aim towards positive change in grassroots cultural life and the cultural environment. Cultural and civilized codes of conduct increasingly penetrate each person’s consciousness, creating a cohesive community (Doc R17). To encourage this idea, public spaces in communities, such as the entrance gate of the residential area, main roads, and neighborhood offices display posters, photos, panels, and posters related to this campaign, along with the state’s movements and programs. Moreover, the Fatherland Front also organizes Great Solidarity festivals and commends citizens who implement relevant policies well.

Living activities

According to OXFAM (2015) survey results, the participation of migrant workers in the Fatherland Front and its socio-political organizations' activities at the boarding houses and workplaces is insignificant (Table 10). Similarly, the survey report of the HFL also commented that “over the past many years, there were many programs, schemes, projects, activities, and movements with many levels, large and small, rich and diverse formality... to take care of, protect and improve the spiritual and material life of workers, to gather, gather and attract workers to participate in community activities, collective activities, to propagate and educate awareness to workers, especially workers in worker dormitories and boarding houses. However, the enthusiasm and positivity of the workers in participation, as measured by in-depth interviews, are not high. Most of the answers say that these activities are formal. This shows that the workers' awareness is not good, and they do not fully understand the meaning of these activities” (HFL, 2020). Therefore, these activities are not substantial and have not created strong connections between these organizations and the social networks of migrant workers.

Table 10

The rate of participation of households in socio-political organization activities

	Permanent residence	Temporary residence	Long-term temporary residence	Short-term stay
HCM Communist Youth Union	17%	6%	6%	7%
Vietnam Women's Union	43%	5%	6%	2%
Vietnam Farmer's Union	13%	1%	1%	0%
Confederation of Labor	19%	27%	28%	25%
Vietnam Association of Veterans	12%	0%	0%	0%
Vietnam Association of the Elderly	15%	0%	0%	0%

Note. OXFAM, 2015

7.2. Emerging hybrid governing practices

7.2.1. Hybrid governing social housing

Governing images

The government has determined that “developing social housing and worker housing is one of the essential contents of socio-economic development policy. Developing social housing for

low-income people and workers is the responsibility, obligation, and morality of the entire political system, of those in charge of state management, of businesses, and of the people, especially the heads of ministries, branches, and chairmen of people's committees of provinces and cities, who must pay attention to promoting and developing genuine, healthy and sustainable social housing" (Doc G18). Therefore, this requirement necessitates a meta-governing perspective to develop social housing and worker housing for migrant workers. This governance process is based on the principles of harmonious coordination between the state, businesses, communities, and supported subjects.

In addition, social and worker housing development needs to emphasize the parallelism between the development of social housing projects and the standardization of boarding houses with standards and conditions regarding space, hygiene, and suitability, creating increasingly civilized environments (Doc LG06). Ensuring a harmonious combination of benefits from these two forms of housing is achieved through urban beautification, planning, land use arrangement, financial policies, social housing support, and regulations on beneficiaries' rights and obligations. This trend promotes new forms of integrated management to replace traditional approaches that mainly rely on the dichotomy of the state's role in developing social housing projects and households in the community regarding boarding house development.

Moreover, the goal of meta-governing social housing for workers is to "maximize the exploitation of public, private, and community resources and cooperate and organize cooperation to develop social housing policies, programs, and projects effectively" (Doc G18). Other objectives include ensuring openness, transparency, and strict inspection and supervision by competent state agencies and the community; ensuring the provision of housing for the right people for the proper purpose; ensuring efficiency, and avoiding loss and waste. Additionally, the management process must comply with the requirements of housing law, construction law, and related laws (Doc G27).

Governing instrumentation

Technical tools for governing activities are continuously improved by adding regulations appropriate to the new context and integrating them into the presented institutional fixes. These legal documents have updated management tools such as forms of state cooperation with businesses (through BT and BOT contracts), investment cooperatives in construction zones, and cooperatives in concentrated social housing. They also include amended and supplemented clear regulations on the authority of the focal point for state management of social housing (Doc NA18; Doc G02; Doc G09; Doc G10; Doc P19). In addition, guiding documents for boarding houses at the local level are important additions to the system of governing tools related to migrant workers' housing.

Since 2020, the housing planning system has also been innovated to form a comprehensive framework that incorporates factors affecting the multi-sectoral housing sector into a strategic management tool, creating a difference from the previous centralized, top-down ordinance planning (Doc G25). The National Housing Development Strategy currently focuses on developing social housing and housing for workers in industrial zones. Accordingly, the housing development program in HCMC is adjusted to suit the National Housing Development Strategy through housing development targets, mainly including social housing and worker housing development targets in the 5-year plan and annual socio-economic development (Doc G02). A unique feature of the city's housing development program is its attention to social housing construction projects and support for standardizing boarding houses. This housing development program system serves as the basis for resource mobilization, investment approval, and meta-governing actions (Doc LG02). Moreover, social housing projects for workers are grouped into a comprehensive national project: "Investment in construction of at least 1 million social housing apartments for low-income people and workers in industrial zones in 2021–2030," which facilitates governance.

The construction authorities remain the main focal point in managing social housing issues. At the central level, the MOC presides over and coordinates with relevant ministries and branches to remove obstacles in mechanisms, policies, and laws and effectively deploy and promote the development of social housing and housing for workers in industrial zones. At the local level, the DOC coordinates with departments and people's committees of districts to review and supplement planning and arrange land funds to develop worker social housing by legal regulations, along with strictly implementing regulations on reserving 20% of land funds for social housing in housing projects and urban areas. In addition, the DOC coordinates with the people's committees of districts to control people's self-investment in building houses for workers to rent, control the quality and conformity of standards of rental houses, and issue licenses to operate boarding houses for residents. Notably, the city is currently piloting the consolidation of the functions of the local construction inspection team under the DOC and the urban management office under the District People's Committee as a step towards apparatus meta-governing (Doc NA15; Doc NA18).

The current weakness in meta-governing is that the social housing data information system is fragmented and lacks connectivity (Doc R02). Because the data regarding boarding houses is not available, it takes a lot of time and resources to check and review the boarding house situation in the area. For example, the inspection and review of boarding houses for migrant workers by the DOC in 2021 took about three months to yield results (Doc R16). Although regulations require boarding house owners to report in writing about the regulation, scale, number of apartments, and business registration with the ward/commune people's committees

and local authorities for monitoring and supervision (Doc NA09), this is not always followed. At the same time, although the DOC currently manages information about social housing projects, access to information about social housing is still limited (Doc R05). Therefore, the lack of complete and unified databases on different housing types for this group has made meta-governing difficult.

Governing actions

The DOC is the central coordinator in meta-governing social housing issues in the locality. This agency is assigned to proactively coordinate with departments, branches, and people's committees of districts to develop, adjust, and supplement the development plan for social housing and worker housing until 2030 for submission. It also advises on the process of shortening the time to carry out administrative procedures for social housing construction projects and reviews commercial and service land funds in industrial zones, export processing zones, and neighboring land funds to build housing for workers to rent, attracting real estate businesses to invest in social housing. In addition, the department proposed to the City People's Committee an interest support package of 100 billion VND for boarding house owners to renovate rooms to meet conditions or equip fire prevention and fighting equipment for the boarding house (Doc R05; Doc R12; Doc R16).

Meanwhile, district people's committees manage boarding house construction activities and business activities through the wards/commune people's committees. Based on the guidance of the City DOC, local authorities intervene in the self-management process of boarding house owners by creating conditions and supporting boarding house owners with procedures for repairing boarding houses and rental houses according to regulations, especially ensuring complete safety regulations on fire prevention and fighting. At the same time, the district is also the focal point for managing infrastructure projects around boarding houses, such as road improvement and drainage systems, which localities have implemented for many years through the "state and people work together" model. Every year, the People's Committees of Binh Tan District and Binh Chanh District assign specific targets to each ward/commune to embellish and renew alleys according to the motto "People donate land to build alleys" to solve the problem of incomplete infrastructure in areas with many boarding houses for migrants. Often, there is no water system in these areas, and the wastewater system is only temporary. The neighborhood executive committees are the primary units conducting the campaign to donate land to expand the alley, and households with boarding houses contribute money to the project to ensure publicity and transparency. The neighborhoods organize many meetings to discuss costs and construction plans with households most reasonably and effectively. During the construction process, there is also supervision by the ward/commune Fatherland Front, community investment supervision board, neighborhood executive board, and representatives

of households. This governance method relies on the “mass mobilization work” of local authorities to exploit resources in society according to the motto “the state and the people work together.” The benefits for all parties help the project improve infrastructure around boarding houses (Interviews, A02; A03; A08; A23; A24).

The decentralization and coordination between the City DOC and the district people’s committees on issues related to housing for migrant workers clearly demonstrate socio-spatial meta-governing. This case also reflects the role of city leaders in the comprehensive development of the social housing sector in the context of the crisis during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, the decisive direction of city leaders has promoted association activities and support for landlords and tenants to improve and enhance the quality of accommodation, combined with development solutions. Social housing for workers, serving those inside and outside export processing zones, industrial zones, and high-tech zones, form an overall strategy for housing development plans. These meta-governing efforts aim to connect and adapt forms of self-governance for accommodation types and incorporate them into tailored forms of territory-based governance to develop housing for migrant workers. However, overall governance actions remain unclear because institutions have not been strictly established and are temporary solutions to deal with the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This has led to strong interactions between different types of governance, but overall governance actions have not yet appeared in specific governance actions such as exploiting and operating housing for workers (Interviews, A02; E01).

7.2.2. Hybrid governing preschool education

Governing images

The process of managing preschool education in peri-urban areas is increasingly complicated by the expansion of public and private school networks and the “blooming” of independent, private childcare groups. Currently, the preschool network has two forms of organizing preschool education facilities: preschools (public and private) and independent groups (public and private, but mainly private). The first group is managed based on administrative territory, and the second group remains spontaneous and loosely managed. Therefore, governing preschool education requires specificity, suitability for each subject, and harmony with the preschool education development policies that the city is implementing (Interview, E01).

There are two goals for preschool education administration in peri-urban areas. The first is to prioritize investment in developing the network of schools and preschool education classes in this area using the state budget and policies to encourage organizations and individuals to invest in developing preschool education. The second goal is to closely monitor and actively support

independent, private childcare groups with a strategy that accepts these childcare groups but does not relax management (interviews, E01; A01, A21). These viewpoints emphasize a dual mechanism in governance aimed at formalizing independent, private childcare groups to transform them into preschools in the future.

At the same time, meta-governing activities need to consider requirements such as qualifying independent, private childcare groups to receive children with low tuition fees suitable for workers; ensuring equality between public and private types of education, and between children of migrants and permanent residents (Doc LG011); harmoniously combining with the planning of the preschool education network to suit the local socio-economic conditions; and moving towards standardization, modernization, socialization, and international integration of preschool education. The ultimate goal is to universalize preschool education for all ages (Doc LG03).

Governing instrumentation

Regulated legal documents such as education laws, decrees, projects, and policies, also play an essential role in forming the meta-governance of preschool education. The most prominent project is “Supporting the development of independent, private childcare groups in industrial zones and export processing zones until 2020,” which has created a framework for agencies and organizations to participate in solving the problems of preschool education for children and migrant workers. Accordingly, many mechanisms and policies to support independent, private childcare groups have been issued by local authorities, and funds for implementation have been allocated in coordination with mobilizing socialized resources to implement the project. Furthermore, these projects and policies have created a network connecting ministries, branches, and central organizations to support the development of these childcare groups, such as fostering childcare skills for childcare group owners and providing financial support to purchase teaching equipment (Doc R04).

The decentralization of territory-based management is also addressed by adding a coordination mechanism. Documents from the MOET (Doc G22; Doc G24) emphasize coordinated management between parties. Some changes include that the DOET will coordinate closely with local authorities in assessing conditions for licensing the establishment of independent, private childcare groups, kindergartens, and preschools (instead of the ward/commune people’s committees having complete decision-making authority). At the same time, the DOET is also responsible for implementing plans to review, inspect, and provide timely support to class groups; strengthening theoretical and practical training in nurturing, caring for, and educating children for teachers; and raising awareness for all types of preschool education facilities.

In addition to decentralization and coordination between vertical networks, coordination mechanisms based on horizontal networks have become essential for the meta-governing of preschool education. First, the preschool network also becomes a governing tool with the policy that each ward/commune has at least one public preschool in parallel with developing a system of private preschools and independent, private childcare groups to reduce pressure on public schools. In particular, the public preschool played a core role, creating a premise for developing the non-public school system and licensed independent, private childcare groups in the localities (Interview, A31). This feature helps create a new governance model in which public preschools are assigned to manage independent, private childcare groups through specialized clusters, including public preschool administrators, to support them with professional assistance. Second is the participation of socio-political organizations at the local level with local management agencies (commune/ward people's committee), such as the health department, women's union, youth union, population committee, and the Fatherland Front, to coordinate and manage independent, private childcare groups (interviews, A01; A21).

Governing actions

One of the essential foundations for meta-governing actions in preschool education is the specific instructions of city leaders regarding fairness among different types of preschool education facilities. The City People's Committee has directed districts to create conditions for independent, private childcare groups to participate in training, professional development, and emulation and reward programs, similar to those available to public preschool schools in the districts (Doc LG012).

The education sector acts as a meta-governor by mobilizing associations, unions, organizations, and individuals to support the organization and operation of independent preschool education facilities. Specifically, the Women's Union supports comprehensive childcare and education, especially for independent, private childcare groups. The project "Supporting the development of independent, private childcare groups in industrial zones until 2020" established childcare group clubs and groups of "core parents" comprising teachers, nannies, fathers, mothers, and grandparents with children in these childcare groups. The Vietnam General Confederation of Labor coordinates with the MOET in organizing, evaluating, and summarizing the results of the project related to kindergartens in areas around industrial zones. They also build a management model and operating mechanism for preschool education facilities in trade union institutions aligned with the project "Investment and construction of trade union institutions in industrial zones." Additionally, they coordinate with UNICEF to implement the project "Technical Support for the Child-friendly City Initiative in HCMC," which provides equipment, toys, and furniture for 49 childcare groups and supports child group owners in

borrowing capital to make necessary repairs to meet industry requirements and equip additional facilities (Doc R04).

At the most direct level, the district DOET is responsible for performing the state management function of education for schools, kindergartens, and independent, private childcare groups. The district DOET leads meta-governing actions by coordinating between parties to manage the preschool education network in the area. On the one hand, the education departments directly manage preschools (both public and private). On the other hand, they coordinate with local authorities at the ward/commune level to inspect, supervise, and provide management and professional advice to childcare group owners, teachers, and nannies. They also propagate legal documents and regulations on childcare and education to establishments. The district DOET guides and organizes professional implementation for independent, private childcare groups, directs public preschools to provide professional support, and supervises these groups, creating a meta-governing mechanism for two types of preschool education facilities (Doc R04; Doc R11).

As part of network-based governance, public preschools are assigned to regularly monitor the operating situation of independent class groups in the area. They create conditions for independent, private childcare group owners and teachers to visit the public preschool learning environment and attend lectures and professional activities to learn from their experiences. Public preschool principals organize support activities regarding management and expertise for preschools, in addition to unexpected public inspections and tests. They take part in caring for, nurturing, educating, and ensuring the safety of children at non-public preschool education facilities and report to the district DOET if the childcare groups do not comply with regulations on teaching and childcare activities (Interviews, A01; A21).

Another meta-governing action is to examine the conditions for establishing and operating independent, private childcare groups. According to regulations, districts have established inspection teams for preschool education facilities in the area. These teams include representatives from the DOET, Women's Union, DOLISA, health departments, preventive health centers, principals of public preschools, and local representatives. They carry out inspection work at private childcare groups and family childcare households. This inspection detects and promptly handles unauthorized childcare groups and closes groups that are unsafe for children. It also supports qualified groups of children in completing their documents to be licensed. In addition, the supervision mechanism for the activities of independent, private childcare groups based on community creates a mechanism to encourage people to supervise child-rearing, care, and education activities for children locally (Interviews, A01; A21).

7.2.3. Hybrid governing social cohesion

Governing images

While residence management (territory-based belonging management) focuses on ensuring security and order for the community, social networks through place-based governance maintain community cohesion by fostering a sense of belonging for migrants. Emerging mixed governing images aim to connect and promote vertical state management networks, horizontal social networks, and different communities to help Vietnam's migration and integration process for migrant workers, easing hardship and effectively promoting belonging. This image of governance is consistent with the mission of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, defined in the law as "solidarity and cooperation with legitimate organizations of the people" and "participate in dialogue, reconciliation, and build self-governing communities in residential areas" (Doc NA21).

Accordingly, the Fatherland Front and its socio-political organizations, such as trade unions, youth unions, and women's unions, often identify themselves as robust participants in linking and coordinating other networks. The feature of this form of integrated governance is the "diversity of networks, content, and forms of connection between different stakeholders such as governments, unions, employers, and boarding house owners to support migrant workers through access to information and increased integration with the destination community of migrant workers" (Interviews, E01; A33). This aims "to promote the strength of the significant national unity bloc in protecting security and order, contributing to maintaining political security, stability, social order, and safety in civilized and modern neighborhoods" (Doc NA21) and to ensure the people's true mastery through the state, the Front, and social-political organizations according to the motto "people know, people discuss, people do, people check, people monitor, people enjoy" (Doc NA21). In addition, this form of governance aims to build people's trust and satisfaction with population and social management in the area, serving the people's lives (Interviews, A05; A07).

Governing instrumentation

In addition to some provisions of the Fatherland Front Law and the Residence Law, social normative documents such as community regulations and conventions play an important role in community management. "The local party committee, authorities, and the Fatherland Front work on consolidating and perfecting self-management models such as the self-management model of boarding house groups and self-management of migrant worker groups regarding security and order by promulgating operating regulations" (Doc P46). However, "drafting

community regulations and conventions has not been carried out in a genuinely democratic and public manner, with the same content as administrative documents” (Interview, E05).

Social development policies have now determined that the focus of activities to create urban social community cohesion must belong to the grassroots level. Therefore, the political system in the community plays a vital role in the mixed governance of social networks and people’s organizations. Since 2015, according to the Vietnam Front Organization Law, “the ward/commune-level Vietnam Fatherland Front Committee has established a Front Working Committee in residential areas. The Charter of the Vietnam Fatherland Front regulates the organization and operations of the Front Working Committee” (Doc NA21). This means the Front Working Committee became an organization that brought together local administrative and political systems and other people's organizations in the community.

In addition, it is necessary to clarify the role of the CPV in the Front Working Committee in residential areas in particular and in community governance in general. The Party’s Platform for building the country during the transition period to socialism (supplemented and developed in 2011) clearly states: “The CPV is both a member and the leader of the Front” (Doc P01). In essence, the relationship between the party and the front is between the party and representatives of the broadest strata of the people, so the party joining the front means immersing itself in the masses. The party leads the front by sending party officials to participate in the front organization, especially the front leadership apparatus. The HCMC CPV determines that “the neighborhood and hamlet cell under the ward and town party committee is the nucleus of political leadership in residential areas, a bridge between the party and the people, and has the function of leading the implementation of the guidelines, policies, and policies of the party and the laws of the state, leading the implementation of tasks assigned by the ward party committee, social affairs, and the affairs of the residential community” (Doc P33). Accordingly, the neighborhood party cells are responsible for leading the residential community, specifically the Front Working Committee, fostering solidarity and mutual support, helping each other in life, maintaining order, and ensuring neighborhood safety. The party cells also assign party members to oversee each residential group and address specific issues. To further strengthen this network, ward/commune party cells in HCMC have dissolved and transferred CPV members who are officials to live in the neighborhood and hamlet party cells to support residential areas. In addition, regardless of their position, all party members must regularly maintain contact with the party organization and actively participate in front work at their residence. The CPV’s network in the community plays a core role in uniting and rallying other networks.

Governance of social cohesion and belonging cannot rely solely on administrative and legal regulations and conventions; it also involves social and cultural institutions and state social

movements. Due to the characteristics of the political system, major social movements in Vietnam are closely linked to the state. Large movements such as “All people unite to build cultural life in residential areas” overseen by the Fatherland Front and “Patriotic emulation” by the CPV act as “soft” tools for promoting community self-governance. In addition, the Front also uses new communication tools to propagate through the “Front Page” and establish groups on Facebook and Zalo to provide information to the community (Doc R17).

Governing actions

The activities of the Front Working Committee in residential areas are essentially general management of networks at the grassroots level. This agency coordinates with parties such as the police and the Neighborhood Management Board to organize different self-management groups, such as neighborhoods, residential groups, and workers’ self-management groups, to maintain security and order in the community. These groups operate under the management of the grassroots government, supervision of the Fatherland Front, guidance, management, and inspection of the police department’s operations in ensuring security, order, and safety, building a movement to protect national security at the grassroots level. They also gather diverse people from different classes, religions, and ethnicities living in the same community to participate in movements such as “All people unite to build cultural life in residential areas,” “For the poor—Not leaving anyone behind,” and “Good people—Good deeds,” thereby promoting “good neighborliness,” “fellow feeling,” and the effective implementation of the “hunger eradication and poverty reduction” movement and other patriotic emulation movements. In addition, in some activities, these socio-political organizations also coordinate with compatriot associations and charity organizations to participate in support activities for migrant workers (Interviews, E05; A33). Therefore, these actions show that the Fatherland Front clearly defines its “presiding role in coordinating with each organization and individual participating in the organization, as well as the necessary conditions and resources for each campaign and each movement in residential areas” (Doc R17). In some cases, they have done quite well in mobilizing the masses, implementing grassroots democracy regulations, promoting the strength of the significant national unity bloc, connecting neighbors and neighbors, and strengthening a consensus society (Doc P31; Doc P32).

However, due to the intertwining of leadership mechanisms between the Front, party cells, and neighborhood management boards, these governance activities raise concerns about bureaucratizing community self-governance activities. At the same time, this apparatus is increasingly enlarged. The number of neighborhoods and residential groups in Binh Tan

District and Binh Chanh District is enormous¹². The total number of people working in neighborhoods and residential management systems as part-time personnel in Binh Tan District is nearly 4,900; in Binh Chanh District, it is 4,326 (Doc R21). This upscaling of the grassroots strategy shows the local government's adaptation to community management in the context of rapid population growth, as the official management apparatus cannot be increased due to general regulations of the organizational state law. This strategy "extends state power to communities through the network of Fatherland Fronts, party cells, and neighborhood management boards and can reduce social autonomy and civil society space" (Interview, E04).

7.3. Selections of socio-spatial liminalization and multi-spatial meta-governance mode

7.3.1. Transformative strategies as spatial liminalization

State strategies for transforming spontaneous activities into semi-formal forms and transforming territorialized activities into more appropriate urban contexts reflect a hybrid spatialization pattern between territorialization and place-making. The series of state interventions in the migrant place-making process, mainly supportive attitudes, soft policies, directive regulations, and less legal ones, have emphasized the liminalization of peri-urban space. That is, they transform the peri-urban space into an in-between space, in other words, a space of transformation. Indeed, each state intervention aims to temporarily balance the spatial, economic, political, and cultural dichotomies on the urban edge, precisely:

- Rural/Urban
- Formal/Informal
- Specificity/Uniformity
- Permanent/Temporary
- Absence of control/Control
- State/Society
- Inclusion/Exclusion
- Insider/Outsider

Peri-urban areas are becoming liminal spaces where the combination of territorialization and migrant place-making practices occurs. Control strategies rely on policies that standardize spontaneous activities to make them controllable. Furthermore, this space helps maintain the *Ho Khau*-based welfare strategy but also limits marginalization by providing support packages

¹² Binh Tan District currently has 130 neighborhoods with 1,666 residential groups, and Binh Chanh District has 106 hamlets with 1,266 residential groups.

for migrant workers. In addition, this process of spatial production represents a blurred spatiotemporal distinction between administrative territories differentiated by urban and rural areas, between peri-urban urbanization and urbanization in general. Furthermore, it relies on ambiguity in the semantic processes of meaning-making and institutionalization to facilitate future reterritorialization. Therefore, this process is also characterized by instability, emphasizing a heterogeneous, unstable, and complex space.

As an emerging form of peri-urban social space production in HCMC, socio-spatial liminalization creates an in-between power space of the state and society. Thus, it is subject to different interpretations and beliefs regarding state and social domination. These spatialization strategies reflect Bernice Martin's (1981) concept of liminality as a transitional stage between two statuses. More precisely, they relate to the reincorporation phase in the way Victor Turner (1967) reconceptualizes liminality. In terms of outcomes, it bears a resemblance to what Ong (1999; 2006) calls "zones of exception" as areas where policies are unevenly enforced or regulations are temporarily relaxed. He describes one of the ways that the state controls space as the construction of "a system of graduated spaces within which different populations are variously subjected to political control and to social regulation by state and non-state agencies" (Ong 1999, p. 219). In essence, it resembles Edward Said's (1978), Homi Bhabha's (2012), and Edward Soja's (1996) concept of "third space," which involves the many translations between binary and oppositional divisions, creating new authority structures that are dynamic, multi-dimensional, and open to different perspectives. However, socio-spatial liminalization, in this case, emphasizes the more processual and strategic nature of peri-urbanization. That is, this process marks a strategic calculation leading to a relative partial consensus between the state and non-state actors on migrant settlement issues based on the specific structures (see 7.3.3) of peri-urbanization.

In short, the process of socio-spatial liminalization on the edge of HCMC reflects the fluid nature of positionality and subjectivity of migrant workers and their places. The spontaneous settlements of migrant workers, after being liminalized, are effectively not recognized as official residential areas of the city but only exist temporarily. Additionally, state support policies for migrants are only short-term and mostly do not help immigrants become recognized as permanent residents or enjoy welfare regimes as official citizens in the city. Therefore, although migrant places are emerging and gradually being considered, they are unlikely to become a complete urban regime in the long term.

7.3.2. Multi-spatial meta-governance of liminal spaces

The process of spatial liminalization emphasizes two dual practices of territorialization and place-making regarding migrant workers' settlements, leading to the recognition of the

complexity of socio-spatial terms concerning the issues of migrant workers on the urban edge. The integrated governance of synthesis appears to minimize conflicts between socio-spatial forces in these areas, that is, the possibility of changing the relative balance between different coordination modes. What is characteristic of this model of integrated governance is that it implicitly identifies the dominance of the logic and practices of territorial governance while accepting place-based practices as an ad hoc solution. In addition, coordinated management is also essential in this case, especially since many socio-spatial practices take place in the gray zone of legal regulations. These characteristic images reflect a multi-spatial meta-governance model.

Neighborhoods are at the root of these meta-governance strategies. By upscaling grassroots organizations or programs, state management networks can intervene more strongly in community and social networks. This integration is based on the relationship between place governance and territorial governance, which has existed for a long time in the history and culture of “*làng-nước*” [relationship between villages and country] in Vietnam. Furthermore, community institutions in Vietnam have been under state management since national unification. Political and social organizations, including community-based organizational structures, are organized or supported by the state in all activities through the Front Working Committees. Therefore, the organization and activities of these institutions, although at different levels, are state-based. There is a strong connection between state institutions and non-state institutions at the local level, such as social norms (conventions, customs), social networks, community organizations, frameworks for interactions between citizens, and between citizens and the state, decision-making mechanisms, and public service delivery at the local level. This reality provides tools for a multi-spatial meta-governance model led by the state.

At the same time, these governance strategies reflect the state’s response toward increased intervention and control. The governing technologies characteristic of this meta-governance mode include expanding the local state apparatus downward and combining it with “soft” zoning of peri-urban neighborhoods based on demographic and socio-economic characteristics, and state-led social movements to impose utopian images to maintain territorial cohesion. Accordingly, the state’s governance principles are made more concrete through the recognition of the self-governing knowledge system of creating places for migrant workers as part of this governance regime. In addition, added technologies such as complementary welfare systems and standardization have adjusted the strategies of local people and migrant workers, gradually returning them to the orbit of formality.

In sum, central to the multi-spatial meta-governance of migrant socio-spatial issues on the city’s edge is the attempt to continue cooperating in a shifting equilibrium of compromising

the logic of territory and place. This process is emphasized through the interaction between community self-governance and state management. Accordingly, it emphasizes balance, not the unfairness of state power, nor does it underestimate the power of customs and community cohesion to create a unique identity for migrant places. At the same time, this process is also placed in the “shadow of the state”; that is, the state continues to play an important role by using its power to bring many financial, technological, and cultural factors into play in peri-urban areas to arrange fragmented spatial networks in a balanced way. The state apparatus is recreated, consolidated, and maintains its rule through these strategies.

7.3.3. Structural selectivities

While marginalized by territorialization, spontaneous place-making activities provide temporary solutions for migrant workers in the short term. However, this form of spatialization and governance also reveals many limitations related to service quality, and the gap in living conditions is getting larger between migrant workers and local people. If the difference and inequality become too significant and prolonged, it will affect local social cohesion and stability. Besides such internal contexts that have fostered spatial liminalization and multi-spatial integrated governance, broader and objective structures also create both enabling and constraining conditions for these transformational strategies.

Firstly, the cost of living in the city is increasing, especially housing, living expenses, and school fees, which are urgent problems for low-income workers. While HCMC is consistently ranked as the locality with the most expensive living standards in the country, the salary of migrant workers is relatively low compared to the general salary, and many people only have a basic income that does not meet the standard for minimum living needs. While spending on housing is 15%, daily food accounts for 33.4% of migrants’ income, and spending on other minimum living needs such as health and education only accounts for a meager percentage: 10.7% (IOM, 2023). Therefore, migrants have no choice but to minimize their personal and family expenses. This situation makes it very difficult for migrant workers to stay in the city.

Second, local competition has become more vibrant since the 2010s. In the early stages of urbanization in Vietnam, only Hanoi and HCMC were the destinations of choice in the migration wave. Up to now, urbanization and industrialization have spread to many other localities. Many previously purely agricultural localities have established industrial zones in rural areas of the province, creating more job opportunities. These localities also have attractive policies to attract labor, creating competition between localities. Meanwhile, the cost of premises and labor in HCMC has increased, prompting businesses to move factories to these localities for cheaper costs. This trend also entails a considerable number of migrant workers going back to their provinces (Interview, E01).

Third, the policy of transforming the city's growth model towards industry and high technology since the 2010s has gradually limited new investment in labor-intensive industries such as leather shoe manufacturing and textile sewing. This trend has led to an increasingly limited number of casual jobs in peri-urban areas. At the same time, according to statistics, the need for labor recruitment in the city for trained, experienced, qualified, and professional workers is increasing. With such requirements, the unskilled workforce from the provinces coming to HCMC to work cannot find positions with high, stable salaries (Doc R14). This situation makes the household registration system even more disadvantageous for big cities like HCMC in competing with smaller cities to attract human capital. However, HCMC is determined to focus on attracting high-quality human resources to transform the growth model towards services and high-tech industry through a program to improve the quality of human resources and preferential policies for skilled human resources.

Fourth, the entire area labeled "migrant worker places" in this study is the area most heavily affected by the COVID-19 pandemic in Vietnam. With a high population density, migrant workers living in shabby, cramped boarding houses and lacking technical and social infrastructure have caused the disease to spread quickly, killing more than 20,000 people. At the same time, tens of thousands of workers and their families had to flee to their hometowns because they could not endure the extreme hardship of life: no jobs and no money to rent a room. According to the GSO's report (2022), the area with the highest rate of workers leaving the city to return to their hometown has more than 520,000 people. The fact that migrant worker locations have become the areas most impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic has directed the state's attention to these places, beginning to promote support solutions and strengthen management. Along with guidelines and policies for socio-economic recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic, the state has policies to support migrant workers (Doc G16; Doc G17).

These contexts show that migrant worker places face the prospect of being dismantled when labor-intensive industries gradually decline or when significant events occur that harm society. The state needs to acknowledge the plight that migrants face and ensure the provision of stable space for them. This structure promotes faster and clearer response strategies, although the CPV's policy of caring for the working class has been emphasized many times before, asserting that the state must "build a legal system on labor and labor market to ensure workers' right to choose their workplace and place of residence" (Doc P05) and "care for the material and spiritual life, housing, and social welfare of workers" (Doc P08).

7.3.4. Agential selectivities

The process of spatial liminalization and multi-spatial integrated governance in peri-urban areas emphasizes more integrated mechanisms of stakeholder participation in peri-

urbanization. Accordingly, non-state actors, including businesses, communities, interest groups, and individuals are invited by the state to become stakeholders in dual processes legitimized through institutional and organizational arrangements. These heterogeneous actors are mobilized from different spatialization and governance strategies that are mutually sustained to achieve the state's navigational goals in the production of peri-urban space. They can be grouped simply as networks or coalitions comprising elite coalitions and community networks, and are integrated into the vertical hierarchy of the state, which is also adapted to this arrangement.

While the role and structure of elite coalitions do not change much in spatial liminalization strategies compared to territorialization strategies, there are increasingly close links between grassroots authorities and local people. These can be seen as a process to expand civic coalitions established to maximize community governance capacity. This civic coalition includes local government agencies, neighborhood management forces, and local people (permanent residents) through the Front Working Committees to unite stable and lasting coalitions through common civil institutions, exchanges, resources, and power. This coalition helps expand the ability of local governments to recognize conflicts and then provide accurate solutions quickly. However, expanding these civil coalitions focuses more on serving the interests of coalition members, i.e., boarding house owners, business owners, childcare groups, and private independent preschool owners, rather than fostering a broader relationship with all people. Accordingly, while government agencies and grassroots communities share resources, combine capabilities, and expand institutional cohesion, this coalition does not genuinely involve migrant workers in decision-making.

The central role of the party-state is emphasized in the strategies of spatial liminalization and multi-spatial integrated governance in the peri-urban area. The state proactively seeks to engage with different actors, from large-scale real estate developers, boarding house owners, childcare group owners, and various communities. However, the state applies different strategies to different social groups. While elite coalitions continue to receive preferential treatment in policies and urban governance mechanisms, peri-urban civic coalitions, despite receiving state recognition for their contributions and calls for supportive policies and programs, remain temporary and fragile. Through its power relations and strategies, the state navigates actor networks to create a threshold space that facilitates community resolution of migrant workers' issues, while controlling these activities so as not to undermine the territorial goals imposed by the state and cooperating with major market actors to implement these goals.

7.4. Expressions of new spatiotemporal fix, reterritorialization, and sub-hegemony

7.4.1. Spatial liminalization and multi-spatial meta-governance as new spatiotemporal fix

The strategies of spatial liminalization and multi-spatial integrated governance create a threshold space in the peri-urban area to maintain spontaneous migrant places that are facing the risk of migrant “place-breaking,” leading to the risk of workers leaving the peri-urban area of the city, while not giving up solutions to expand urban areas to the outskirts in a civilized and modern direction to limit excessive capital accumulation in the central area. More specifically, this space seeks to delegitimize spontaneous place-making strategies in ensuring people’s survival and livelihood needs, while promoting profit-based accumulation strategies and land speculation to achieve both state goals and the interests of private real estate interests. These temporary spatiotemporal solutions can be observed through recent semantic and institutional fixes.

The recognition of the role of migrant workers and some spontaneous place-making activities in political discourses and support programs represent semantic fixes. Before the 2010s, negative views of migrants and spontaneous activities were quite common in public discourses. Many local leaders viewed migrants and the complex and uncontrolled activities required to accommodate them as a burden on urban development. In recent years, they have emphasized the important role of migrant workers as an indispensable workforce in the city’s development (Interviews, E01; E02; E03). At the same time, the system of boarding houses, childcare groups, and community support are all considered necessary solutions to serve the survival needs of migrant workers and the livelihoods of local people.

Associated with these semantic fixes were institutional fixes such as housing development programs and new city planning systems. Migrant place-making practices gradually gained prominence on the agenda and into institutional fixes more generally. Some phenomena labeled “spontaneous” have been legalized and regulated, such as worker boarding houses and private independent childcare groups. At the same time, specific policies for workers in general and migrant workers in particular were also issued. However, institutional recognition is associated with manageable and conditional rules to maintain these practices. In addition, there is an increasing trend of state investment and support for issues such as housing, schooling, and belonging for migrant workers. The state has also issued policies to promote private investment in this field, such as supporting land funds and tax incentives. However, the institutions involved in spontaneous activities are often temporary, have strict conditions attached, and have little legal substance.

These semantic and institutional fixes involve a spatiotemporal fix because they are associated with local labor regulation regimes, urban spatial expansion, and increased competition with other localities. Accordingly, keeping these places in a semi-official status will retain valuable land resources to serve the urban development process according to state planning. Furthermore, these temporary spatiotemporal fixes can help stabilize the unskilled labor market, while aiming for a future labor shift to high-tech industries as the leading city in the national economy. In short, such strategies are consistent with the city's shifting growth model from breadth to depth, thereby helping to stabilize the city's transitioning accumulation regime and ultimately contributing to national goals of social harmony and economic growth.

7.4.2. Reterritorialization of migrant place-making

The process of reconfiguring migrant places formed by spontaneous strategies such as deterritorialization occurs when the state intervenes to fix the meaning and function of these places as liminal spaces. This space facilitates the integration and re-control of these sites into specific territories under the control of the territorial administrative system. These strategies thus demonstrate the state's attempt to gain control over peri-urbanization and reposition the "in-between" of spontaneous practices through technologies of reterritorialization.

The process of reterritorialization includes strategies such as state responses to social resistance through spontaneous activities to build places for migrant workers. Throughout this socio-spatial process, the flexible use of management powers within the state's toolbox of territorial management practices plays an important role. Accordingly, the production process of these locations is flexibly adjusted based on the practical tools of state territorial management, such as master planning, additional welfare support through the administrative system, and expansion of the grassroots apparatus. These flexible strategies help resolve conflicts when the state pursues somewhat different and conflicting directions, while still ensuring coherence in the process of "becoming urban." Such strategies are implemented in localities with distinctive locations under the label of "rapidly urbanizing localities" instead of the traditional "one size fits all" approach of territorialization based on the administrative apparatus.

Reterritorialization, in this case, reflects the view of Deleuze and Guattari (1980 [2004]) as the process of restructuring places that have undergone a process of deterritorialization due to spontaneous place-making activities for migrants. At times, it can be seen as a process of contestation carried out by different actors, including the state, local people, and migrants, to regain territorial control and ownership over the peri-urban space. However, the analysis shows that the state is the dominant party in thresholding space to serve its reterritorialization purposes. This logic is similar to Brenner's arguments for "state reterritorialization" or "state rescaling" as a form of "city-region" regionalization reflecting the "spatial selectivity of the

state” of European states (1999; 2004; 2019). Accordingly, although the process of “rescaling” in the peri-urban area of HCMC is unclear, the liminal space serves as spatial selectivity of the state to facilitate different processes of transforming the city’s growth model and to reaffirm the state’s power through the established administrative territorial governance system.

In short, state control over migrant workers’ placemaking strategies that promote reterritorialization allows the state to maintain a sufficient monopoly over enforcement means to effectively control spontaneous activities as required by state law and policy. By asserting control, these current efforts at territorialization are also predictive in nature and pave the way for future land value realization. At the same time, reterritorialization strategies contribute not only to the “socialist-oriented market” economic base but also to maintaining the legitimacy of the state and helping to expand the scope of its authority to consolidate its dominant order.

7.4.3. Sub-hegemonic project of civilized and modern socialist city

To overcome the inadequacy and exclusion of the dominant imaginary of the civilized, modern city, the city government changed its discourses and orientations toward harmony and empathy with the lived experiences of vulnerable groups. A new slogan that appeared in the early 2010s and has become a new representative image for HCMC is a “civilized, modern, and sentimental city.” Adding the sentimental element implies that the city also values “emotional traditions” in the development process because in addition to material and cultural factors, paying attention to community values, social networks, or “social capital” is also necessary for urbanism. Accordingly, the element of “sentimental” also rationalizes state intervention strategies toward the problems of disadvantaged groups such as migrant workers living in peri-urban areas. This new imaginary is heavily propagated through state media, in most official speeches, and especially through grassroots state movements.

This imaginary reflects a sub-hegemonic project taking place on the urban edge. The process of reterritorializing migrant issues on the urban edge, on the one hand, grants a certain degree of legitimacy to the different and heterogeneous images and practices of place-making practices as temporal moral standards. On the other hand, peri-urban territorialization practices, such as building social housing, expanding schools, and increasing residence control, remain dominant to maintain hegemony toward building a modern, civilized city. Both these trends aim to encourage the process of industrialization and modernization, conversion of agricultural land to urban land, and economic growth, promoting the development of service and industrial sectors with high scientific and technical content. Thus, this sub-hegemony refers to discourses and practices that appear to differ from the dominant hegemonic discourses and practices but are stabilizing “flank mechanisms” (Sum, 2005, p. 17) that protect the hegemony of civilized, modern cities and are compatible with them.

Reterritorializing the issues of migrant workers on the urban edge creates a sub-hegemonic project with an expansion of actors with different visions of action. While the growing elite coalitions will continue to benefit from significant state programs and policies towards migrant workers through participation in housing projects and large-scale schools, there are emerging civil coalitions at the grassroots as expressions of expanding the hegemonic bloc. However, there is no evidence to suggest a connection between these two kinds of coalitions because of differences in the scale and nature of investment and governance activities. Essentially, the expansion of the hegemonic bloc at the grassroots level aims at the possibility of embracing alternative meanings and eliminating resistances to ensure the hegemony's long-term survival. The recognition and standardization of place-making practices benefit various stakeholders. Local people can safely invest in boarding houses and childcare groups. Local governments can collect taxes, reducing the burden of direct management of "worker societies" many times larger than the local population. Employers benefit more from shortening the distance and travel time for workers and avoiding risks. When sharing such benefits, civil coalitions tend to delay challenges to dominant hegemony.

In sum, the sub-hegemonic project concerned with reterritorializing migrant issues on the urban edge reflects strategies for resolving temporal tensions between spatiotemporal fixes to maintain legitimacy on a civilized and modern socialist urban image. This sub-hegemonic project is based on the consensus of elite coalitions and civil coalitions with the state and creates a dual space production mechanism on the urban edge to simultaneously achieve the goals of stabilizing the lives of migrant workers and peri-urbanization in a modern, civilized direction. However, it also continues to subtly exclude migrant workers by putting their ownership of their places in limbo.

CHAPTER 8: A CULTURAL POLITICAL ECONOMY DISCUSSION ON TRANSFORMING THE URBAN EDGE

8.1. Description of transformations on the urban edge

8.1.1. Transforming peri-urban socio-spatial relations

The rapid peri-urbanization process in HCMC promotes a dynamic and complex transformation of social space. Analyzing the dynamic spatialization practices in peri-urban HCMC demonstrates the contrast and tension between two forms of spatialization: peri-urban territorialization and placemaking for migrant workers. While the territorialization strategy is at the core of the government's intention to produce civilized, modern, and controllable peri-urban areas, the placemaking strategies for immigrants directly respond to the marginalization caused by the state-led strategies. In such a context, spatial liminalization has emerged as a temporary solution to the failure and conflict involving excessive focus on one dimension of territory or place. In Lefebvrian terminology, this process involves a simultaneously dialectical relationship between the production of abstract space and the differential space associated with migrant worker settlements on the urban edge. More specifically, it contains a continuous dialectical struggle through various conceiving, perceiving, and living activities led by the state and society. The result of this socio-spatial transformation so far can be labeled as a liminal space.

The production of abstract space demonstrates the party-state-led conceiving activities through political discourses and institutionalization, as well as perceiving activities aimed at maximizing commodified exchange value and spatial homogeneity instead of focusing on the use value appropriate to the specific life actions of migrant workers. These practices can be selected and interpreted as state-led peri-territorialization strategies to develop peri-urban social space through a series of state dispossession, control, and exclusion measures over land, public services, and welfare. These strategies mainly use administrative and market technologies to solve territorial problems instead of focusing on one of each specific social group. This socio-spatial production form leads to the exclusion of groups of migrant workers, creating uneven development and inequality in peri-urban social space.

Meanwhile, spontaneous practices of making settlements for migrant workers express the production of differential space. This process includes everyday practices that focus on perceiving and living activities that are geared toward adapting to the needs of migrant workers' use of social space. These place-making strategies use everyday informal practices from below to provide alternative, place-based urban service solutions for most migrant

workers. As a result, it helps to provide the daily life needs and livelihoods of migrant workers and a part of the local population. However, in the face of a crisis related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the competition attracts labor from other localities, and with increasing living costs, a segment of migrant workers tends to leave these locations. These emerging problems thus show the lack of sustainability in the migrant place-making strategies led by society.

The interaction of these two socio-spatial processes creates a hybrid spatial form that goes beyond territorialization and place-making. This transformation does not happen by accident or simply by converting from abstract space to differential space or vice versa. It reflects a selective set of strategic liminal spatial practices that include perceiving activities characterized by temporary, short-term institutional arrangements adapted by the state to exploit the strengths of these two spatialization activities. In this liminal space, place-making practices continue to be conditionally encouraged through the support and control of the state apparatus. In other words, they reflect the institutional arrangement between formality and informality that can exploit the strengths of two spatialization practices to achieve a temporary consensus and balance. As a result, liminal strategies increasingly create relatively porous spaces, which may benefit the immediate needs of migrant workers' settlement but are still controllable so that they can be retransformed following the predetermined trajectory.

In short, the transformation of socio-spatial relations in peri-urban HCMC involves strategies to reflexively reorganize spatial production processes based on two main socio-spatialization processes: territorialization and migrant place-making. This leads to a temporary, local, and provisional consolidation of liminal spatiotemporal arrangements. Through that, the social space of the peri-urban area is transformed from a rural space into a hybrid rural-urban space and is being restructured to increase the "porosity" of social space to permeate the diversity of social groups, but still within a controlling framework of territorial logic.

8.1.2. Transforming socio-spatial peri-urban governance

In the peri-urban area of HCMC, governing practices related to housing, schooling, and belonging issues can be described in different socio-spatial governance models based on different socio-spatial imaginaries. While state-led governing practices reflect principles of territorial governance, spontaneous migrant settlements are governed more explicitly by place-based governance principles. The contrast and, in some cases, the contradiction of both top-down and bottom-up management regimes have led to the emergence of multi-spatial integrated governance approaches related to migrant workers' issues and peri-urban development.

Territorial governance in peri-urban areas of HCMC mainly relies on decentralizing the top-down political and administrative system. This method is characterized by state management

according to administrative boundaries, including all economic, cultural, social, and security issues for residents living in the territory. It is usually used in parallel and combined with sectoral state management. Two characteristics of territorial governance are images and tools based on the homogeneity of localities and the governance mechanism by exclusion that make it easier for the state to manage and control the peri-urban development. As a result, in this governance model, peri-urban areas are subject to the exact top-down management mechanisms as other areas (urban or rural authorities), and migrant workers are excluded from these social security policies and urban development policies, as well as lack of participation in urban decision-making processes.

In contrast, governing spontaneous migrant settlements related to the responses of migrants and some local people to the exclusionary territorial governance. These governance practices emphasize self-governance, are less prescriptive by informal institutions, and ensure the capacity of particular populations to address delivery needs for urban services and social cohesion for migrant workers through solidarity and community, replacing the deprivation and exclusion of territorial governance. Although such place-based governance practices are akin to community governance, they do not entirely reflect migrant and local people communities' collective actions and sense of identity; they are more related to social networks and manifestations of corruption.

There are some expressions of multi-spatial meta-governance mechanisms to overcome the failures of territorial and place-based governance on the urban edge. Multi-spatial meta-governance as interwoven forms of territorial and place-based governance provides solutions to address transition dilemmas in peri-urbanization. In particular, networking is mobilized to mix the state's vertical networks and broader networks of semi-local governments and socio-political organizations with communities and social groups at the grassroots level. This development constitutes an expanded state management model, a semi-formal but flexible state apparatus in dealing with everyday issues related to rural migrants. This governance transformation is associated with spatial liminalization strategies, which means that these integrated management strategies are temporary, solving situations in the short term.

Transforming socio-spatial governance in peri-urban areas reflects the shift from governance patterns based on one-dimensional imaginaries to multi-spatial meta-governance. This "governance of governance" form presents organizing conditions for mixing peri-urban territorial and place-based governance. This emerging form of governance stems from images shaped by national and local leaders and has partial adjustments at the institutional level. It also reflects the trial-and-error logic of socio-spatial governance regimes and rebalancing through integrated governance. At the same time, this governance transformation also takes place in the "shadow of hierarchy," which emphasizes the role of the state in promoting, resolving, or

reversing problems on the urban edge by reorganizing its system by rearrangement networks within and outside the political and legal apparatus of the state.

8.1.3. Adjustment in the hegemonic project of civilized, modern socialist city

Socio-spatial production and governance practices, which are engraved in spatiotemporal fixes, and socio-spatial governance always underpin hegemonic projects. At the same time, the emergence of competitive and countervailing practices can challenge those hegemonic projects. Thus, in this case, the transformation of peri-urban producing and governing practices may also reflect forces seeking stepwise adjustment and facilitating the continued maintenance of the goals of the hegemonic project.

The modern, civilized socialist city with a regional and global vision has been a dominant urban hegemonic project in HCMC since the *Doi Moi*. Such a project shapes the strategic and tactical calculations of the state to develop its organization, institutions, and apparatus with both unified and ensures the leadership of the party-state, while reforming towards decentralization using public-private partnership instruments, territorial management tools, and techniques that include population management based on household registration, delineation of boundaries by districts and arrondissements (inner city districts), planning according to administrative boundaries, and bureaucratic state administrative management. Thus, spatial and temporal selectivity based on territory often prevails and is prioritized by the state. Indeed, analyses show that the city's peri-urban area is entering a territorial moment of this hegemonic project, expressed through territorial state management, territorial development orientation, and territorial planning, mainly emphasizing changing physical space. Accordingly, peri-urban territorialization and territorial governance are essential in mobilizing resources to help the hegemonic project win broad societal consensus and bring about urban hegemony into life. However, in peri-urban areas, this hegemonic project is being challenged by administrative rigidity, a lack of state resources to invest in developing these areas, and increasing strategies and tactics based on migrant place-making spontaneous practices.

While state-led urban development discourse and practices focus on "territorial" measures to build a civilized and modern socialist city, the rest will be marginalized and potentially reactive resistance. One notable social practice that challenges such hegemonic views is the migrant place-making strategies from spontaneous practices organized mainly by migrants and locals. Through daily life, migrant workers and local people cope with the downside of the urban hegemonic project, survival strategies, love, solidarity, and self-governance to ensure the basic needs of their lives. In this way, they can participate in a counter-hegemonic project. However, there is no evidence of any explicit and significant collective action or social movement related to place-making practices in peri-urban areas that form an actual counter-hegemony project.

The process of reterritorialization and multi-spatial meta-governance aimed at overcoming state and societal failures to address immigrant problems also constructs manifestations of a sub-hegemonic project. By adding the element of “sentimental” to the motto “civilized, modern socialist city,” the state attempted to harmonize the hegemonic project and counter-hegemonic practices. Emerging strategies show that the state has a consensus toward liminal spaces for migrant workers. This trend creates a more open environment when some types of civil society, such as community associations and social networks and privatization of public services, have more conditions to develop. In such a sub-hegemonic project, strategies of socio-spatial liminalization and multi-spatial meta-governance are pursued by the state to create a more porous social space that can absorb the needs of immigrant labor groups but still ensure the ability to pursue the state’s vision of a civilized, modern, global city. This creates dual standards in particular issues in peri-urban development expressed in semantic and institutional fixes at different levels.

8.1.4. Agential transformation as expanding hegemonic bloc

Transforming the urban edge also reflects agential transformation. There are diverse actors in the process of peri-urbanization, but not all are capable enough to become a selective agent or coalitions to participate and form selective strategies mobilized for hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects. Moulaert & Nussbaumer (2005a; 2005b) point out that only the most influential people can mobilize others around a given issue to constitute coalitions. Sum (2005) emphasizes that the location of actors within a larger social structure affects the ability to form coalitions. Thus, transformations in production and governance of peri-urban areas also impact the restructuring of power coalitions.

Analyses have shown that the party-state is central to the hegemonic project of the modern, civilized socialist city. In particular, civil servants and politicians within the complex parallel network between the party and the government from central to local levels are motivated by political pressures on local development. At the same time, political elites are also actively promoting the entrepreneurialism of state-owned, private, and foreign enterprises in public-private partnership initiatives and privatization in various activities, such as real estate projects and industrial park development, infrastructure investment, and public service provision. This trend forms elite coalitions, which include interwoven economic and political interests. This coalition can be considered as the agential selectivity in territorialization strategies. However, because the institutional framework is weak and lacking, these coalitions are characterized by personal interests, crony capitalism, and lack of transparency.

In contrast, migrant place-making practices focus primarily on local people. They cooperate with neighborhood and ward-level officials to create an interest group at the grassroots level

to serve micro-business activities. These practices demonstrate the political potential of local communities using land and micro-capital resources to generate economic income through lodging and providing services to migrants. Besides, there are mutual links among migrant workers and between local people and them as relationships of tenants and landlords, as well as labor and employer. However, research results also show that the interaction between migrant workers and the destination community and locality is relatively weak, and they mainly rely on their familiar social networks, such as their family and friends. Thus, in migrant place-making strategies, micro-interest groups and social networks are agential selectivity. Still, they lack the capacity and resources to form official coalitions to challenge the elite coalition directly.

In the emerging sub-hegemonic project, the party-state seeks to expand the hegemonic bloc by increasingly co-opting social classes beyond the elite coalition. In this case, they are local actors who benefit directly from migrant workers' settlement practices and local growth in general. Accordingly, these local people are connected to the increasingly expanding system of socio-political organizations and semi-governmental self-governing communities in peri-urban neighborhoods. This restructuring at the grassroots level of local government helps to promote more consent to/control over more actors by extending the local state apparatus to the grassroots level and motivating influential actors below to solve migrant settlement issues in their meta-governance mechanism with supportive policies and regulations. Although this agential transformation does not significantly affect the structure of the elite coalition, it strengthens the consensus and management ability of the state towards the grassroots level as the pro-growth coalition from below. However, in this transformation, migrant workers are again excluded from the network of active actors in the transition processes that concern themselves.

8.2. Explanation and interpretation of transforming the urban edge

8.2.1. Transformations as coping with contradictions and dilemmas in capital relations

The views of neo-Gramscian regulationists and neo-Marxist urbanists imply that peri-urbanization reflects the penetration of capitalism into every corner of social life on the city's edge and transforms them. Therefore, these extra-economic issues also tend to be more related to the dynamics of capital accumulation, and at the same time, they are also infused with the contradictions and dilemmas of capitalist and state-capitalist relations. This argument emphasizes a "soft hypotheses" premise that urban edge transformations are related to resolving conflicts and dilemmas through hierarchization, prioritization, spatialization, and temporalization (Jessop, 2020). Transforming peri-urban socio-spatial relations and

governance reflect the limits, contradictions and dilemmas of different patterns of spatialization and governance regimes, which require solutions to overcome them.

Transformations in peri-urban spatial production practices can take on the expression of spatiotemporal fixes associated with semantic and institutional fixes in favor of capital accumulation, leading to the restructuring of peri-urban space. Because spatiotemporal modes have different characteristics when associated with varying practices of spatialization, there are “diverse contradictions, conflicts, dilemmas, marginalization, exclusion, and volatility, both within and among these sociospatial forms” (Jessop, 2019a, p. 65). Peri-urban territorialization practices can be presented as one of the important regulation modes for the growth regime in HCMC and Vietnam in general. However, they are exclusionary and contradictory towards migrants and their spontaneous settlement practices, which can be labeled place-making. The emergence of spatial liminalization strategies plays the role of spatiotemporal fixes to postpone these contradictions by exploiting socio-spatial polymorphic superposition and interpenetration between territorial and place forms.

Similar to arguments on transforming spatialization as spatiotemporal fixes, governance transformation also tends to solve or postpone failures, contradictions, and dilemmas related to accumulation through different forms of governance. In this case, multi-spatial meta-governance aimed to pursue combinations of strengths and minimize the possibility of failures between territorial and place-based governance. This process of transforming socio-spatial governance reflects the logic of regulation-cum-governance mechanisms related to the fragility of failure in the practice of coordination between different sectors to maintain economic growth, leading to the need to readjust the forms of coordination but also to the need to establish flexible institutions of governance.

Besides, the transformation of both spatiotemporal fix and governance-cum-regulation involves restructuring processes associated with the (counter-)hegemonic struggles between the ruling and the subordinate classes. Therefore, an adjustment in the hegemonic project and hegemonic bloc involves solving and delaying crisis trends to establish a spatiotemporal zone of relative stability for the accumulation regime, partly formed by transforming socio-spatial production and governance as a manifestation of a spatiotemporal fix. In addition, this hegemonic order is based on the partial, incomplete, and institutionalized consensus that is always divisive and exclusionary and continuously operates in the shadow of hierarchy and coercion.

To sum up, based on established theories, the transformations of socio-spatial production and governance are the results of contestation, negotiation, and deliberation involving different economic, political, and social forces through their strategies and projects related to capital relations. They occur in certain places and times, operating across one or more scales and

specific temporal horizons to displace or delay crisis tendencies and contradictions, changing the prospects of urban (counter-)hegemonic struggles. However, they “cannot end the structural contradiction and strategic dilemmas of capitalism” (Jessop, 2020, p. 86). In their turn, these are sources of “the instability of institutional and spatiotemporal fixes that are consolidated, if at all, only provisionally and partially and that are always the product of a temporary unstable equilibrium of compromise” (Jessop, 2019a, p. 68). Thus, analyzed and observed complex and dynamic peri-urban socio-spatial transformations can be explained as attempts to cope with and resolve contradictions and dilemmas in capital relations within a specific spatiotemporal horizon. Moreover, it should be noted that this explanation based on this “soft hypothesis” provides an abbreviated answer rather than a detailed one. The following sections will provide broader explanations and interpretations based on the regulation, the state, and hegemony theories.

8.2.2. Pro-growth transformations in the socialist-oriented market economy

This explanation and interpretation rely on one of the fundamental theoretical entry points of the CPE approach related to accumulation regimes and regulation modes. It emphasizes the reasons for transformations as spatiotemporal fixes through peri-urbanization related to resolving crises and dilemmas in the accumulation and national and urban regulation regimes. The context of changing the national economy from a planned following the Soviet regime to the socialist-oriented market economy in Vietnam promotes economic growth and social transformation. Peri-urbanization in such a context is characterized by creating and reproducing distinct urban spaces that serve the growth regime while creating uneven development, contradictions, and dilemmas. Accordingly, different regulation modes emerge to ensure this process runs smoothly and continuously. Thus, transforming peri-urban socio-spatial production and governance can be explained in the articulations with regulation modes to overcome temporary problems related to uneven development, facilitating capital mobility for the continuous accumulation process.

As analyzed, economic growth has become the most crucial driving force in urban development in Vietnam. This dynamic is because the *Doi Moi* process has liberated previously non-circulating assets into capital accumulation, such as the commodification of land ownership, private investment, and the tax system, and is accompanied by policies to promote further the urbanization process and the trend of decentralization between central and local levels, which assigns many responsibilities to urban management. This situation has combined capital and state power as a growth-boosting engine in HCMC, which is the focus of the civilized, modern urban hegemony project. This mechanism is fundamentally similar to concepts such as “growth machine” (Molotch & Logan, 1984), “urban regime” (Stone, 1989), and “urban

entrepreneurialism market” (Harvey, 1989). Local governments coordinate different economic institutions within their jurisdiction to promote city growth (Pierre, 2011; 2014; Stoker, 2000).

Regulation modes related to labor, peri-urbanization, and enhancing local competitiveness have emerged to ensure the city’s growth. Accordingly, the peri-urban area converges different regulation modes from the central to local levels, leading to a series of dilemmas in simultaneously ensuring the local growth machine and maintaining local growth and welfare for the people. This presents local governments with the dilemma that accumulation regimes can help raise wages and improve local welfare while, at the same time, regulation modes do not slow down the local growth engine direction. As a result, local wages and benefits must be kept as low as possible as a logical logic to sustaining development. This leads to exclusion regarding welfare provision for migrants through the *Ho Khau* regime, while in the labor-related regulation modes, migrant workers play an essential role in the growth regime based on cheap labor costs for the production mode of Section I. Complexity and difficulty in resolutions of these dilemmas of regulation modes require different forms of spatiotemporal fixes and, with them, corresponding modes of regulation-cum-governance mobilized into specific sub-hegemonic projects that are possible to prolong the stability of the growth regime.

In such a context of accumulation and regulation, territorialization and territorial governance aim to attract investment capital into peri-urban areas and ensure the transition of the economic growth model from sector I to sector II. These practices also take place through mechanisms of exclusion in terms of the welfare of migrant workers. In a response to this marginalization, migrant place-making, and place-based governance have become ways of providing everyday needs and presenting “the right to the city.” However, place-making and place-based governance spontaneously cannot ensure the stabilization and quality of migrant workers’ life to secure sector I production. Therefore, there is the new shift regulation-cum-governance and spatiotemporal fixes to stabilize the city’s growth further. The liminal strategies of placemaking for migrant workers and multi-spatial meta-governance are hybrid shifts between state intervention and spatial strategies and place-based governance to stabilize overall growth.

In addition, the logic of the strategic relationship approach also shows how actors devise strategies that lead to transformation through their considerations in the face of different complex structures. Accordingly, governance transformations and spatiotemporal fixes involve strategic selectivity based on structural articulation with regulation practices in ensuring growth in HCMC and, more broadly, because of the growth of the socialist-oriented market economy. When growth becomes the common goal, it creates pro-growth transformations as an “umbrella” idea of the strategies pursued by different interest groups. In which “pro-growth governance” and “pro-growth coalition” can provide appropriate explanatory models in this case. On the outskirts of HCMC, civic coalitions formed based on local people with land and

small business interests; those who can benefit directly from growth can be seen as an extension of the pro-growth coalition. This coalition is associated with a governance mode that can exchange with related actors to pursue the goal of economic growth. This pro-growth governance model has little opposition because pro-growth governance declares its goals that most people in the community benefit. However, as Pierre (2011) argues, it carries the most significant potential risk of loss of democracy and jeopardizes transparency and accountability in urban governance.

In sum, a retrospective view of analyzing transformations can provide an explanation based on regulation modes, suggesting that economic development and growth are the main drivers of transforming the urban edge. In this, the conflicts and dilemmas of regulation modes in stabilizing the growth regime of the socialist-oriented market economy have triggered governance transformations and spatiotemporal fixes that temporarily stabilize capital circuits and ensure broader social cohesion. This also means that there is not only one way to explain the economic transformation but also its political and cultural aspects.

8.2.3. Authoritarian neoliberal transformation as the art of the party-state

The following way of explanation and interpretation concerns the state theory perspective as one of the entry theoretical background points of the CPE approach. The SRA emphasizes the state as a social relation, particularly as the set of institutions that ensembles it. This perspective helps better to analyze state power in its articulation with extra-state relations and overcome the dichotomy between the central and local states in the study process. In the case of HCMC, political projects related to peri-urbanization show that the state becomes a more visible agent, even a guiding hand, of this production process; simultaneously, the state power is contingent upon the capital relations mediated through such peri-urbanization. Thus, transforming the urban edge needs to be explained through “institutional ensemble” changes of state power and its relation to the market. This perspective can provide a suitable explanation for this case in the context of the interwoven trajectory between one-party statehood and neoliberal reform taking place in Vietnam.

While the emergence of place-making practices for migrant workers and place-based governance as societal responses to neoliberal urbanism, the state’s return to strategies of socio-spatial liminalization and multi-spatial meta-governance reflects neoliberal elements interwoven with authoritarian centralized control. Accordingly, transformation strategies ensure an economic project organized around liberalization and a political project that seeks to re-intervene the state in targeted forms of governance and spatiotemporal fixes more suitable for a market-oriented, socialist-oriented economy. The contingency, hybridity, and

controllability are the main characteristics of transformations, therefore, also manifestations of authoritarian neo-liberalization.

According to this interpretation, the transition reflects neo-liberal authoritarian strategies through forms of state response to place-making practices for migrant workers, while strategies of territorialization (relying on administrative apparatuses and technologies) have proved ineffective in solving the problems migrants face. One of the most visible response forms is expanding the state system to the grassroots level. The creation of neighborhoods and neighborhood groups as an informal level of state took place in the context of more thorough geographical zoning of social life on the urban edge, creating mechanisms of public control that people are more sophisticated. These strategies help break the potential for alliances among migrant workers and between locals and migrant workers who are increasingly embedded on the urban edge. Furthermore, drawing local populations into the extended growth coalition, or rather a hegemonic bloc, and intervention in social networks also help the state respond more effectively to social unrest issues. Accordingly, these response strategies aim to prevent the possibility of dissent among immigrant workers while facilitating capital accumulation. In doing so, the state attempts to minimize the risks of social tension and social unrest in the context of deepening social inequality and polarization in the socialist-oriented market economy.

This explanatory perspective emphasizes the important role of the state as the primary agent of transformation. Because the state shapes society and social forces shape it through strategic selectivity, it intervenes in transition processes through its dominant power and vast resources. In this case, the authoritarian neoliberal transformation of the urban edge tends to maintain and protect the legitimacy of the party-state in the context of urban neo-liberalism. Moreover, these transformations reshape state institutions. In particular, state institutions are strategically fixed to regulate and reorganize general social and economic relations in spatiotemporal fixes and play the overall coordinator role in a multi-spatial meta-governance model. In other words, transformations occur in the shadow of the party-state and its capital relations.

Explanation and interpretation from such a perspective could be enriched by the ongoing discussion on authoritarian neoliberalism. Transformations on the edge of HCMC reflect both trajectories of these discussions, including: “one focusing on the intertwinement of authoritarian statisms and neoliberal reforms; and another which traces various lineages of transformation of key societal sites in capitalism (e.g., states, households, workplaces, urban spaces), via spatially and temporally uneven yet cumulative neo-liberalization processes that are observable across different cases” (Bruff & Tansel, 2020, p. 239). In the first trajectory, these transformations involve the way the party-state enacts institutional fixes to support and control migrant placemaking practices while simultaneously

safeguarding the hegemonic project of the modern, civilized city by liminalization of these places by combining neo-liberalization and existing mechanisms of authoritarian statecraft. The second trajectory is linked to the processes of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization. Here, specific administrative and legal efforts are aimed at limiting the spontaneous occupation of places by migrants capable of opposing and disrupting the orders of territorialization and facilitating the reorientation of socio-spatial processes back to the orbit of territorialization and state control.

In short, authoritarian neoliberal transformation on the urban edge helps “harmonize” the temporary conflicts and problems caused by the one-party state structure and the market economy. As a result, while allowing temporary and conditionally migrant place-making and place-based governance practices, the state expanded its downward apparatus to neighborhoods and communities, increased part-time personnel, developed a system of communist cells, and strengthened police in neighborhoods to manage places with many migrants. However, although the art of the party-state shows that it tries to refine exclusion, this does not lead to the official recognition of spontaneous migrant places but rather to the maintenance of territorial strategies through more sophisticated restructuring of peri-urban space. Therefore, these strategies of neoliberal authoritarianism can lead to significant democratic deficits.

8.3.4. Transformations as consensus-coercion continuum

The previous two explanations and interpretations of the transformations rely on the soft hypothesis that they are efforts to harmonize the contradictions and dilemmas on the urban edge within the broader context of the socialist-oriented market economy and the party-state system. The third explanation and interpretation emphasize that transformations as solutions move along the consensus-coercion continuum in the urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle. This perspective can help to interpret the nature of power relations in transition more fully.

Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-Neo-Gramscian dialogue provides an argument that in the urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle, different actors try to win support for their interests by mobilizing a coalition around certain discursive-material positions for their hegemonic projects. At the same time, subaltern groups constantly resist and challenge dominant perspectives by discursive-material practices from below. In this study, on the one hand, we can witness a project of territorial hegemony by delimiting boundaries and defining local territories of the state to unify operators and users around goals that have been unified in the imagination of a civilized, modern, integrated, and competitive metropolis. On the other hand, groups of urban citizens who are marginalized, disadvantaged, or negatively affected by marginalization are organizing their socio-spatial practices through survival strategies, self-

creating practices of identity and place, social movements, or even aesthetics as counter-hegemonic projects demanding the “right to the city.” These class contradictions exist within the economic, political, and social relationships that drive the transition on the urban edge, requiring the forming of a broad hegemonic bloc to maintain consensus on the hegemonic project of the party-state. Accordingly, the modes of regulation-cum-governance and spatiotemporal fixes are organized through the intellectual and moral leadership of a ruling “growth coalition” or “local hegemonic bloc” (Jessop, 1997) as a force that rationalizes and legitimizes specific visions of the city while simultaneously suppressing alternative visions.

The expansion of the hegemonic bloc towards the sub-hegemony project leads to continuous negotiations between actors and to the possibilities of remaking or forming a new consensus. As a result, transformations on the urban edge of a consensus continuum from silence and absence to partial acknowledgment and support policies of the state for spontaneous practices. However, the Neo-Gramscian perspective holds that consensus tends to be fragile and that general agreement is never achieved. Transformations thus need to be observed and explained through the dialectical relationship between consent and coercion. Just as operations of consensus, the continuum of coercion is also reworked in response to transformation through hegemonic struggle. This study also shows a gradual increase in managerialism or administrative coercion over spontaneous practices. These transitions are also mediated by coercion or threat implicit in “the shadow of hierarchy.”

Moreover, the interaction between consensus and coercion in the transformations depends “in part on the extent of counter-hegemonic resistance and the relative health of the economy” (Davies, 2011, p. 123). Indeed, a hegemonic project for growth cannot exist solely by purely economic mechanisms but is very closely related to state interventionist institutions, legalities, and society’s consent. However, while emphasizing the changing exercise of dominant power, resistance always exists as an inevitable practice. This resistance originates from migrant workers whose everyday lives, livelihoods, and identities are inextricably linked to specific places. Dealing with this contradiction by harsh state intervention will create conflict risks and profound political inequality. Therefore, they tend to balance consensual and coercive strategies to ensure the long-term conditions of social reproduction. In this case, transformations along the consensus-coercion continuum of socio-spatial production and governance aim to restructure divisions of domination and resistance and facilitate the emergence of new identifications and norms (reterritorialization).

In short, the transition is explained in terms of helping to stabilize the contradictions in the accumulation system, and the state power can be explained further essentially as a consensual mechanism covered in coercion related to class relations. This interpretation suggests that the transformation on the urban edge takes place in the shadow of hierarchy but is also associated

with class conflict. Strong dialectical accounts argue that crisis and struggle in the process of capital accumulation inevitably led to the precariousness of the social order and that state coercion is a permanent condition of the process of social reproduction.

8.3. The future of HCMC's edge in the shadow of capitalism and the party-state

8.3.1. The destruction of migrants' places and what happens next

Based on Marx's theory of capital's reaction to the crisis by destroying a part of the productive forces to restore the balance between investment, production, and consumption, creating conditions for new production, the Neo-Marxists have emphasized its globalized mobility, as well as creative destruction in the service of accumulation (Harvey, 2007; Brenner, 2002). According to such logic, the city's edge will not be an exception to this rule. Indeed, manifestations of this creative destruction have gradually emerged through claims of transforming the urbanization model to a quality-oriented one by shifting from labor-intensive industries to higher value-added and capital-intensive ones taking place in HCMC, as well as urban beautification and renovation activities in some peri-urban areas. As a result, industrial parks and factories will be relocated or demolished, jobs that rely on unskilled labor will no longer be popular, and places for migrant workers will gradually be demolished.

Analysis of transition trends shows that the state's liminal strategies are an expression of preparation for this scenario. In the long-term goal, the hegemony of a civilized, modern city continues to dominate the political discourse of local and central governments. In this hegemonic project, the city will welcome qualified migrants trained by its development orientation and gradually exclude freelance essential workers who do not own official housing. Accordingly, shifting strategies as a sub-hegemonic project aims to resolve the dilemma between providing welfare to migrant workers on the urban edge or continuing to marginalize them to continue the agenda of prioritizing city development. However, whatever the solution, the destruction of their place in peri-urban areas is inevitable in the future.

This situation will lead to further decisions and the following situation. Some migrant workers will return to their hometowns and work there or continue to move to urbanizing areas in other localities and begin a new place-making process. On the contrary, if the social and place attachment of migrant workers is strong enough, they can also organize social movements that express their right to the city in resisting the process of destruction, displacement, and relocate their places. Therefore, path dependence, place-making practices, state response strategies, and transformations in socio-spatial governance are decisive for the future scenarios of migrant workers on the urban edge.

Thus, the contradictory interaction between fixity and movement—between the need to organize territory (territorialization) and the equally fundamental drive toward the creative destruction of social space (reterritorialization) —leads to the potential destruction of places for migrant workers on the urban edge. The CPE view of transformations will emphasize that a strategy for resolving a conflict is formulated that will shape the crises that follow. Therefore, understanding the nature of governance transitions and spatiotemporal fixes can help inform innovative pathways and appropriate options for the future of the urban edge.

8.3.2. New discourses on metropolitan regional development and governance

In fact, with its actual status as a megacity, HCMC has grown beyond its administrative boundaries to “encroach” on neighboring provinces. The primary catalyst of this process is establishing a series of industrial parks and factory complexes in these provinces, attracting hundreds of thousands of freelance workers from other localities. A regional urban area is forming but still needs more necessary institutions to ensure unified development to be called a metropolitan urban area. The resolution of the 12th National Congress of the CPV recognized: “Development between localities in the region and between regions still lacks connection and coordination; the economic space is still divided according to administrative boundaries” (Doc P07). Some recently emerging discourses on metropolitan and regional development show the potential of this model as a new mode of regulation for urban accumulation strategies in Vietnam in the future, as well as being able to participate in solving current rural-urban migration problems.

First, the concept of municipal administration was gradually improved in HCMC after a period of piloting and application. In particular, the central city model and satellite cities are being considered for implementation (Doc NA26). Current discourse suggests that peri-urban areas can establish cities under HCMC by 2040 (Doc P32; Doc P35). Specifically, developing these areas into complex urban areas is associated with regional linkages in many aspects, such as industry, commerce, services, health care, and education, and at the same time, continuing to build urban agriculture associated with the region with improving agricultural land value. Such a metropolitan model will help solve the problem of the dichotomy of urban and rural local governments, helping to improve the state’s management capacity and efficiency.

Second, while the policy on economic regional integration in Vietnam has gradually improved, there has yet to be a document at the law or decree level to promote urban regional integration. This is a natural phenomenon taking place in HCMC and neighboring localities. A positive signal is that this area is gradually being adjusted as one of two urban areas according to the government’s plan to orient urban development in Vietnam until 2030 (Doc G36), with a vision for 2045. Accordingly, the urban region of HCMC includes all eight provinces and cities of the

Southern Key economic region, with HCMC being a nucleus, with a total area of 30,404 km² and a radius of influence from 150–200 km. By 2020, the population of this urban area is expected to be 20–22 million people; the urban population is about 16–17 million people, and the urbanization rate is about 77–80%. Vision for 2050: This urban area will have 28–30 million people, of which the urban population is about 25–27 million, with an urbanization rate of about 90%. This planning is associated with solutions to connect traffic, industrial parks, and policies to reduce population to suburban areas. Accordingly, it has an essential impact on the issue of rural-urban migrant workers.

While the key economic regions have established development steering committees, regional councils, and coordination groups of ministries and provinces, urban regions only appear in plans without a relevant institutional apparatus (Doc G37; Doc G38). As a result, there needs to be more discussion about urban regional governance. By 2022, in the government's action program to implement Resolution No. 06-NQ/TW dated January 24, 2022, of the Politburo on planning, construction, management, and sustainable development of urban regions in Vietnam by 2030, with a vision to 2045, for the first time, the government requires a suitable urban area management model for the period 2022–2030 to research and propose relevant units. Thus, it will take a long time for an urban regional governance model to emerge that can restructure the state system and involve different provinces and cities in solving problems of rural-urban migration, which has long been an inter-local issue.

Thus, metropolitan regional development and governance have been considered a potential model to solve the dilemma of urban accumulation strategies related to rural-urban migration, peri-urbanization, and local competition. However, the current transition towards metropolitan urban areas has mainly occurred in orientations rather than institutional practice and the physical development of the metropolitan regions. Therefore, specific places and communities from below will remain the leading actors in solving this problem. At the same time, local state intervention in migrant place-making practices may also help prolong peri-urban stability in the short term; however, a more radical paradigm shift remains in the long term.

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

9.1. Summary of findings

This study draws on the CPE approach to answer critical realist questions about the dynamic transformation of socio-spatial production and governance in the peri-urban areas of HCMC concerning the settlement issues of migrant workers. This retroductive research account combines fieldwork with theoretical work through a CPE analytical framework concretized in the perspective of urban (counter-)hegemony struggles based on the Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-Neo-Gramscian dialogue to analyze and explain the transformations in the urban edge. First, variation analysis is done through spatial production and governance practices in housing, schooling, and belonging issues. The specific patterns of these practices will then be identified through strategic selectivities based on the structural principles of TPSN and analysis of the structural, agential, technological, and discursive choices that privilege these patterns. Finally, models of socio-spatial production and governance will be examined for their sedimentation in spatiotemporal fixes, governance-cum-regulation models, and, more broadly, hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects. This analysis helps to reveal the insights of transformations in complex and interwoven relationships and provides an explanation based on their articulation into broader cultural, political, and economic contexts.

The analysis of the state-led production of space reveals practices that focus on issues of social housing, public and private preschool development, and household registration systems for people on the city's edge. State-led governing of these socio-spatial production practices is characterized by uniformity across administrative territories, a partial decentralization regime, and increasing participation of the non-state sector. Privileging these strategies of peri-urban territorialization and territory-based governance emphasizes discursive selectivity in the limited discursive space available to political-economic elite coalitions to accommodate the structures of housing marketization, privatizing public services, and liberalization of citizen rights on one side and maintaining decisive state intervention and control on the other in urban territorial expansion. Moreover, their technological selectivities involve laws, policies, master plans, and public administration systems. While the central party-state dominates discourse and institutionalization, local pro-growth coalitions are key actors in material selectivities. In retention, peri-urban territorialization and territory-based governance are embodied strongly in a structurally coherent set of spatiotemporal fixes through marginalization and urban expansion strategies to stabilize the urban accumulation regime as mediations of the hegemonic project toward a modern, civilized socialist city.

Spontaneous migrant settlement practices focus on boarding houses, independent-private childcare groups, and social networks reflecting everyday practices of creating migrant identity and their sense of place. Associated with these spontaneous activities are governing practices based on interest, love, solidarity, community, and self-governing to mobilize resources from below. These place-making and place-based governance patterns are selected through the structures of marginalization and uneven development on the city's edge and shaped by micro-technologies such as guidance rules, community conventions, traditions, customs, and social capital. Furthermore, they reveal the agential selectivity of interest groups between local people who own land and microfinance combined with powerful actors with related interests at the grassroots level. Although these various processes of selectivities reflect partial and temporary fixes to the problems of marginalization and uneven development through survival strategies and resistance strategies, they are not instituted and sedimented to regulation modes and spatiotemporal fixes. Thus, they can be considered expressions of urban counter-hegemonic practices of subaltern actors due to the absence of evidence in related counter-hegemonic project formation.

In the context of increasing living costs, more competition in attracting investment and labor resources between localities, and especially the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, migrant workers tend to leave their place on the edge of HCMC, local and then central authorities have intervened more within migrant settlement practices as reterritorialization strategies. Besides maintaining peri-urban territorialization strategies, the party-state tries to form suitable accounts for migrant place-making activities such as boarding houses and independent-private childcare groups, standardize and partially legalize spontaneous activities, and use policy tools to support capital and improve social capital sources. Hybrid governing practices based on territorial and place-based logic are related to reterritorialization through dual systems and forms of housing, schooling, and belonging. A multi-spatial meta-governance mode is also established based on sub-legislation, coordination networks, and state-social movements. These emerging strategies are selected based on considerations of both spatialization practices' pros and cons. They also introduce discursive selectivities, localized narratives, and scalar discursive practices associated with expanding the downward local state apparatus to mobilize socio-political forces from below. By expanding the hegemonic bloc, employing coping strategies, and interfering through spatial liminalization, these transformations are partly institutionalized and sedimented as a new spatiotemporal fix that serves the sub-hegemonic project of a "civilized, modern, and sentimental city."

The analysis of the dynamic and complex practices, patterns, and spatialization forms of socio-spatial production and governance shows that the transformation on the urban edge is reflected through emerging reterritorialization strategies by mixed practices between territorialization

and place-making toward a liminal space, alongside emerging multi-spatial meta-governance as hybrid governing practices between territorial governance and place-based governance. Such transformations also reflect the adjustment of the hegemonic project of modern, civilized socialist cities to make them more relevant and viable through a sub-hegemonic project in the context of increasing spontaneous practices as manifestations of counter-hegemony. At the same time, they also present a story of shifting coalitions of interests in the trend of expanding the hegemonic bloc to the actors that directly benefit from the transformations. This process emphasizes the complexity, contingency, and hybridity interwoven across different spaces and times. It reflects the path-dependence of the transformation of the accumulation model and, more broadly, the hegemonic project.

Explaining the transformation process with reference to “soft hypotheses,” which derive from the Neo-Gramscian regulationists’ argument as part of CPE, that they may be responses to contradictions and conflicts of capitalism and the strategic dilemmas and problems. In particular, they involve regulation mechanisms that ensure the stability of broader social structures. In economics, the transformation reflects the socialist pro-growth regime, where economic growth is the main driving force of urban development. The complex intersection and dilemma of different modes of socio-economic regulation have triggered governance transformations and spatiotemporal fixes conducive to capital accumulation, which relies on low labor prices and exploitation of available resources. Politically, transformation as the art of the party-state response through strategies of expanding downward the state apparatus aims to prevent the possibility of dissent among migrant workers while also facilitating favorable conditions for growth. At broader orders, transforming the edge involves the dialectical of material and discursive practices that stabilize and reproduce power relations to serve a hegemonic order to maintain the legitimacy of the party-state. This consensus-coercion continuum is characterized by strategies balanced between the one-party state regime and neoliberal-looking economic reforms.

9.2. Contributions of the study

Apart from contributing knowledge through the case study of exploring the dynamic transformation of socio-spatial production and governance in the peri-urban areas of HCMC through the lens of CPE as a post-disciplinary approach to urban studies, this study contributes to the scholarship on critical urban studies/politics in three ways. First, this study contributes to rethinking the concepts related to spatialization and socio-spatial governance. Second, it concretizes the CPE approach through the Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-Neo-Gramscian dialogue to develop theoretical and conceptual frameworks suitable for empirical analysis of patterns of socio-spatial production via the lens of urban (counter-)hegemonic

struggles. Third, the research results help to reimagine theoretical issues in urban politics and urban studies in general.

Rethinking concepts related to socio-spatial imaginaries

Neo-Gramscian regulationists provide some initial abstract concepts and explanations for this study. At the same time, they emphasize the strength of this approach with its articulation method, which can link different perspectives to these middle-level concepts associated with regulatory models. This can help selectively borrow different and diverse ideas and concepts, facilitating the flexible combination of interdisciplinary concepts. In this study, concepts related to spatialization and socio-spatial governance are (re)constructed based on the TPSN scheme, which provides the structuring principles of socio-spatial imaginaries. These principles are articulated with existing accounts from different disciplines. These pre-concepts are then informed, supplemented, and modified through insights through analyses of themselves and their relationships with concepts based on other relevant socio-spatial imaginaries in the case study.

In terms of spatialization patterns, this study discusses specific concepts related to the TPSN scheme, including migrant place-making and peri-urban territorialization. In addition, the case study analysis also adds a form of socio-spatial liminalization to this schema. What is new about these rethinking concepts is that they are reinterpreted to associate with regulation and the accumulation regime. That is, these concepts are significant in helping to analyze the regulations of accumulation regimes and state power as manifestations of spatiotemporal fixes and broader (counter-) hegemonic projects. In this case, these concepts are observed through the dynamic everyday life practices of peri-urbanization and linked to political-economic regulation processes at the local and national levels to stabilize the urban accumulation strategies characterized by a “socialist-oriented market economy” and the party-state system in Vietnam.

Similar to the concepts related to spatialization forms, forms of governance based on socio-spatial images, namely territorial governance and place-based governance, are identified more systematically in this study. Their content is complemented by specific strategies selected to match the capabilities of the actors and the specific context of the case study. In particular, place-based governance is highlighted by the intersection of self-governance modes in private and community governance. In addition, the comprehension of multi-spatial meta-governance is also supplemented through the hybridization between territorial governance and place-based governance, which has existed as a long-standing tradition in agricultural villages and communes in Vietnam. Understanding these concepts, in turn, also questions the transition thesis “government to governance” in governance debates in non-Western contexts.

Concretize the CPE analysis framework

This study reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of CPE-based studies to propose a suitable analytical framework for peri-urban transformation through the perspective of urban (counter-)hegemonic struggles introduced by the Lefebvrian-Foucauldian-Neo-Gramscian dialogue. Based on CPE's interest in analyzing the semiosis and structuration of social transformation, the conjunctural perspective between hegemony and space production can emphasize structural aspects and dialectically discursive-material practices of socio-spatial production and governance in urban (counter-)hegemonic struggles. Accordingly, this framework analyzes complex socio-spatial relations in the variation, selection, and retention of urban hegemony, counter-hegemony, and sub-hegemony. It investigates different and interconnected conceiving, perceiving, and living activities in the production and images, instrumentation, and actions in governance. It then determines their socio-spatial patterns according to the structuring principles of the TPSN schema and explains how these are privileged via discursive, structural, agential, and technological selectivities. In terms of retention, it examines how these patterns are sedimented in a structured coherence.

This framework applies the CPE approach to urban studies/politics by bringing together a materialist analysis with cultural debates and power analysis of strategies enacted by the state, entrepreneurs, planners, and urban practitioners, and at the time, conflictive encounters with other urban users, to propose alternatives through transforming socio-spatial production and governance forms. Moreover, it also emphasizes everyday practices, different selectivities, competing strategies, and their structural coherence into urban hegemonic orders. Therefore, this framework demonstrates the potential of CPE in understanding urbanization and its paradoxes in the complex interaction between micro- and macro-power relations and the dialectical relationship between discourse and material practices in the urban context.

Another potential of this analytical framework is that it can provide a suitable analytical lens for critical studies of urban regimes' ideology and domination. Specifically, it provides a solid foundation for understanding ideology, its impact, and forms of social domination without ignoring marginalized strategies and actors with no authentic voice in the observed conflict. When concretized through critical perspectives on urban governance and urban political economy, this approach can be extended to consider urban political processes that go beyond the challenges of territorial sovereignty perspectives, focusing on the temporal boundaries of hegemonic compromise, including conflicts between privileged common interests of identity, the particular interests of a group of people, and excluded groups in the urban context. This framework thus facilitates the study of transformation rooted partly in the socio-spatial relations of domination and exploitation.

Rethinking theoretical issues of urban studies/politics

Based on a retroductive approach in methodology, this study can contribute to developing theoretical understanding by reflecting captured concrete phenomena in the “empirical” domain of case study with previously discussed theories in the “real” domain. In this study, the specific CPE analyses of peri-urbanization not only identify the dynamic transformation but also help to connect them in further explanations of capital and power relations through hegemonic and counter-hegemonic production processes in the city grounded on “soft hypotheses” provided by pre-theories related to regulation, state theory, and hegemony theory. In addition, drawing on culturally critical explorations of capital, power, and class relations on the urban edge, findings that go beyond these hypotheses can help rethink relevant theoretical issues.

For urban political economy, this study concretizes the CPE perspective and the abstract concepts of Neo-Gramscian regulationists and Neo-Marxist political economy to help analyses of peri-urban transformations move beyond the economic realm, without losing their connection to regimes of accumulation. These considerations above can help bridge the gap between the logic of capitalist accumulation and the concrete, everyday activities associated with specific urban places. Specifically, the results of the study show that other forms of capital, besides the physical form through investment, construction, and trade, are associated with culture and biology, such as social capital (Bourdieu, 1985; Coleman, 1998; Putnam, 2000) and cultural capital (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977) that also participate in spatialization processes and contribute to overcoming social uneven development generated by capitalism’s over-accumulation. That is, it reflects the integration, or at least the influence, of such capital forms in spatiotemporal fixes. Social capital refers to the social resources that people use to achieve their living goals, such as social networks, trust, and norms of reciprocity. In the sustainable livelihood framework, social capital is used as networks and connections, increasing trust between people and the ability to cooperate among members of formal groups and systems of human rules, norms, and sanctions. Furthermore, social capital also helps mitigate the impact of shocks or lack of other capital through informal networks. Regarding rural-urban migrants, social capital is important in assisting immigrants with their livelihood process and promoting their belonging in their new places. Therefore, there is a need to develop more fully the means to understand the benefits and roles of micro-social phenomena for the economy in theories of urban political economy.

For urban politics, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of power relations in the socio-spatial production and governance on the edges of the city and in urban processes more generally. It leverages the strengths of the CPE approach to transcend the gradation between the macro-powers of sovereignty and the state and the micro-powers of governmentality to

investigate how power relations operate in producing and governing peri-urbanization. However, not stopping at pointing out the distinguishable manifestations of “power over” and “power to” in these peri-urban processes, this study also aims to criticize power according to Gramscian theories of hegemony. This perspective emphasizes the consensus-coercion continuum in analysis that can understand the complexity of power. Accordingly, the urban hegemonic struggle perspective helps to rethink why urban politics/governance studies should not start from the assumption that “consent” is possible and why focusing only on “domination” is not enough, nor can it be reduced to the issue of “interest” as in urban regime theory. It thus agrees with the argument that there is a need for an integrative and pluralistic understanding in the analysis and interpretation of urban governance/politics (Haus, 2010b; 2018).

Both such contributions can best be applied to exploring the politics/political economy of a place. As this study has demonstrated, places are sites where practices and strategies take place and shape agential and structural selectivities, thus playing a crucial role in the production and agenda of politics. This approach has the potential to contribute to a rethinking of the diversity of forms of governance for territories that do not represent a simple or straightforward process of decentralization but rather a complex rearrangement of governance responsibilities at different locations within territorial scales (see Le Galès, 1998; Ray, 1998; Healey et al., 2002). In addition, the politics of place emphasizes community identity and the attachment of community members to place, thereby promoting “place-based” struggles against injustice, marginalization, or threats around issues of social reproduction that have become increasingly significant. Furthermore, this struggle needs to be understood as part of a response to other models of spatialization and governance, which are more broadly hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, and sub-hegemonic projects. Accordingly, the importance of place in urban studies/politics could benefit from more coherent theorization and practice through the CPE approach combined with an urban (counter-)hegemonic struggle perspective. Such an understanding of the politics/political economy of place can help overcome the dichotomy in urban studies under the labels of urban formality and informality and respond to the call of scholars in critical urban studies that peri-urbanization is not only a reflection of territorial patterns of domination but also about what is happening in everyday life practices (Roy, 2016), globalizing capitalist processes (Massey, 2007; Amin & Thrift, 2002; 2016), and that it even crosses all boundaries to become planetary urbanization (Brenner, 2014).

9.3. Limitations and future research directions

As discussed above, this study’s contributions have broad applicability in describing and explaining the heterogeneous, contested, and conflictual nature of peri-urbanization, particularly in cities of the Global South. However, the current study has some limitations that

should be acknowledged and improved. Its limitations mainly concern concretizing the CPE approach and the corresponding research methods.

First, a study based on the retroductive research method, besides having strengths in creating certain favorable conditions in the process of research design and data analysis in the complex context of peri-urbanization, cannot avoid its limitations. The building of “soft hypotheses” as a part of this methodology can reduce the effectiveness of ethnographic research because it focuses on mapping observed exchanges of social relations that take place within a defined theoretical framework. In addition, the CPE approach is highlighted by its “non-reductionist” nature, but it still focuses primarily on the relationship between the state and the economy regarding regulation logic and accumulation models. This may also ignore unobserved phenomena, as well as other explanatory mechanisms. Although case study findings have added to enrich pre-theories and made initial conceptualizations increasingly refined and complex, these additional understandings are often provisional, incomplete, subject to revision, and can only be used to explain social problems at a given time in given contexts.

The next issue that needs improvement concerns the explanatory scope of the CPE approach. As Van Heur (2010) argues in the CPE empirical mode, “causal relations are posited, but not investigated” (p. 455), this research does not explicitly point to top-down causality of transformations but rather explains transitions as the product of contingent convergence, structural coherence, and recontextualization related to broader cultural, economic, and political processes. Therefore, this study answers research questions primarily at the macro- and meso-levels related to strategic choices associated with accumulation regimes and socio-spatial regulation patterns rather than micro-level explanations. Furthermore, this approach also provides different explanations based on its rich perspectives of theoretical inputs, leading to diffuse and unfocused explanations sometimes. These limitations are also related to heuristic inquiry in the CPE approach in case studies. Relying heavily on the researcher’s lived experience in investigating a particular phenomenon can also cause subjectivity in the research results.

After discussing this study’s contributions and limitations, it is necessary and valuable to propose future directions related to CPE in urban studies/politics and to further understand the process of peri-urbanization in HCMC and other cities of the Global South. First, the CPE approach in urban studies/politics can be extended to topics beyond the urban imaginary issue in previous CPE-based studies by focusing on the dialectical relationship between materiality and discourse in Lefevre's spatial production perspective and how they shape the development paths of cities. Furthermore, this research perspective also encourages critical studies of dominant power by exploring their interaction with resistance and differences in the perspective of the consensus-coercion continuum.

For the case study in the peri-urban areas of HCMC, future studies could continue to delve deeper into the causal relationships to the transformations taking place in the urban edge and the new issues that this study has raised, such as the nature of the socialist-oriented market economy and the governance art of the party-state in relation to authoritarian neoliberalism, the place-breaking of migrant workers, the relationship between territorial and place-based governance, and class issues in the context of economic reform in Vietnam. Accordingly, these topics can be studied in specific fields, which can apply specific local surveys, observing spatiotemporal means focusing on a particular location or process. At the same time, studies could place more emphasis on solutions such as regional planning and governance to peri-urban problems. However, this study agrees that there can be no one-size-fits-all solution to these problems, and any solution will lead to different tensions and dilemmas. By arguing this way, studies can both offer solutions and set up scenarios for their failures.

Finally, there is a need for more place-centered research on urban studies/politics and issues related to urban peri-urbanization. A “place-centric” perspective might be seen as more appropriate to capture the instability and complexity of peri-urban areas while also questioning dominant notions of capital and power relations in broader contexts. This is achieved by acknowledging the perspectives of the people who inhabit and create that place through everyday life. Furthermore, such studies should define place-based processes in a process-oriented manner, emphasizing their fragmented, incomplete nature. This invites narratives about the flexibility and dynamism of different transitions as responses to broader economic, cultural, and social transformations through strategic selective responses by various actors to resolve conflicts and tensions caused by complex social adjustments. Stories of “becoming urban” in this sense will always remain analytically and politically unfinished, opening up new avenues for further exploration of the nature of our urban era.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Institutional dataset

CPV (Doc P)	
Central CPV	
Doc P01	The CPV Platform
Doc P02	Documents of the 7th CPV congress - 1991
Doc P03	Documents of the 8th CPV congress - 1996
Doc P04	Documents of the 9th CPV congress - 2001
Doc P05	Documents of the 10th CPV congress - 2006
Doc P06	Documents of the 11th CPV congress - 2011
Doc P07	Documents of the 12th CPV congress - 2016
Doc P08	Documents of the 13th CPV congress - 2021
Doc P09	Resolution No. 18-NQ/TW of the Central Committee on continuing to innovate and perfect institutions and policies, improve the effectiveness and efficiency of management and use land, creating motivation for our country to become a developed country with high-income - June 16, 2022
Doc P10	Resolution No. 06-NQ/TW of the Politburo on planning, construction, management, and sustainable development of urban areas in Vietnam to 2030, vision to 2045 - January 24, 2022
Doc P11	Resolution No. 15-NQ/TW of the Central Executive Committee on Some issues on social policies for the period 2012-2020 - June 1, 2012
Doc P12	Resolution No. 18-NQ/TW of the Central Committee on some issues on continuing to innovate and reorganize the apparatus of the political system to be streamlined, effective and efficient - October 25, 2017
Doc P13	Resolution No. 31-NQ/TW of the Politburo on the direction and tasks of developing HCMC to 2030, with a vision to 2045 - December 30, 2022
Doc P14	Resolution No. 16-NQ/TW of the Politburo on the direction and tasks of developing HCMC until 2020 - August 10, 2012
Doc P15	Regulation No. 50-QD/TW of the Politburo on personnel planning - December 27, 2021
Doc P16	Directive 34/CT-TW of Central Secretariat on strengthening the party's leadership over social housing development in the new situation - May 24, 2024
Doc P17	Resolution No. 29-NQ/TW of the Central Executive Committee on fundamental and comprehensive innovation of education and training to meet the requirements of industrialization and modernization in the context of a socialist-oriented market economy and international integration - November 4, 2013
Doc P18	Directive No. 34-CT/TW of the Central Secretariat on strengthening the Party's leadership in social housing development in the new situation - May 24, 2024
Doc P19	Resolution No. 19-NQ/TW of the Central Committee on continuing to innovate the system organization and management system, improving the quality and operational efficiency of public service units - October 25, 2017
Doc P20	Resolution 20-NQ/TW of the Central Committee on continuing to build the Vietnamese working class in the period of promoting industrialization and modernization of the country - January 28, 2008.
Doc P21	Resolution No. 11-NQ/TW of the Central Committee on perfecting the socialist-oriented market economic institution - June 3, 2017

Doc P22	Resolution No. 43-NQ/TW of the Central Committee on continuing to promote the tradition and strength of great national unity, building our country to be increasingly prosperous and happy - November 24, 2023
Doc P23	Resolution No. 17-NQ/TW of the Central Committee on promoting administrative reform, improving the effectiveness and efficiency of state management - August 1, 2007
Doc P24	Resolution No. 42-NQ/TW of the Central Committee on continuing to innovate and improve social policies to meet the requirements of national construction and defense in the new period - November 24, 2023
Doc P25	Resolution No. 05/NQ-TW of the Party Central Committee (12th tenure) on a number of major guidelines and policies to continue to innovate the growth model, improve growth quality, labor productivity, and economic competitiveness - November 1, 2016
HCMC CPV	
Doc P26	Documents of the 5th HCMC CPV congress - 1990
Doc P27	Documents of the 6th HCMC CPV congress - 1995
Doc P28	Documents of the 7th HCMC CPV congress - 2000
Doc P29	Documents of the 8th HCMC CPV congress - 2005
Doc P30	Documents of the 9th HCMC CPV congress - 2010
Doc P31	Documents of the 10th HCMC CPV congress - 2015
Doc P32	Documents of the 11th HCMC CPV congress - 2020
Doc P33	Regulation No.1267/QD/TU of the Standing Committee on the functions, tasks and working relationships of neighborhood and hamlet party cells - September 9, 2009
Doc P34	Regulation No. 2025-QD/TU of the Standing Committee on the functions, tasks and working relationships of neighborhood and hamlet party cells - July 11, 2024
Doc P35	Speech of the Chairman of the People's Committee at the 31st meeting of the City Party Executive Committee - June 13, 2024
Doc P36	Resolutions of the City Party Executive Committee conferences
CVP Districts	
Doc P37	Documents of the 9th BTD CPV congress
Doc P38	Documents of the 10th BTD CPV congress
Doc P39	Documents of the 11th BTD CPV congress
Doc P40	Documents of the 12th BTD CPV congress
Doc P41	Documents of the 9th BCD CPV congress
Doc P42	Documents of the 10th BCD CPV congress
Doc P43	Documents of the 11th BCD CPV congress
Doc P44	Documents of the 12th BCD CPV congress
Doc P45	Resolutions of the Party Executive Committee conferences of districts
CVP Wards/Communes	
Doc P46	Documents of Binh Tri Dong A Ward CPV congress
Doc P47	Documents of Binh Hung Hoa B Ward CPV congress
Doc P48	Documents of Vinh Loc B Ward CPV congress
National Assembly	
Doc NA01	The 1980 Constitution
Doc NA02	The 1992 Constitution
Doc NA03	The 2013 Constitution

Doc NA04	Land law 1987
Doc NA05	Land law 1993
Doc NA06	Land law 2003
Doc NA07	Land law 2013
Doc NA08	Land law 2024
Doc NA09	Law on Real Estate Business 2014
Doc NA10	Education law 2005
Doc NA11	Education law 2019
Doc NA12	Urban Planning Law 2009
Doc NA13	Urban Planning Law 2020
Doc NA14	Construction Law 2014
Doc NA15	Construction Law 2020
Doc NA16	Ordinance on Dwelling Houses in 1991
Doc NA17	Housing Law 2005
Doc NA18	Housing Law 2014
Doc NA19	The Residence law 2006
Doc NA20	The Residence law 2020
Doc NA21	The Vietnam Fatherland Front Law
Doc NA22	Law on Government Organization 2015
Doc NA23	Law on Organization of Local Government 2015
Doc NA24	Resolution No. 54/2017/QH14 of the National Assembly on piloting special mechanisms and policies for the development of HCMC - November 24, 2017
Doc NA25	Resolution No. 98/2023/QH15 of the National Assembly on piloting a number of specific mechanisms and policies for the development of HCMC - June 24, 2023
Doc NA26	Resolution No. 131/2020/QH14 of the National Assembly on organization of municipal administration in HCMC - November 16, 2020
HCMC People's Council	
Doc PC01	Resolution 27/2021/NQ-HDND of the City People Council on policies for developing preschool education in industrial zones in HCMC - December 09, 2021
Doc PC02	Resolution No. 180/NQ-HDND of the City People Council on deploying and implementing social housing projects in HCMC - December 8, 2023
Government	
Central Government	
Doc G01	Decision No. 76/2004/QĐ-TTg of Prime Minister on approving housing development orientation until 2020 - May 6, 2004
Doc G02	Decision No. 2127/2011/QĐ-TTg of Prime Minister on approving housing development orientation to 2020 and vision to 2030 - November 30, 2011
Doc G03	Decree 39/2007/NĐ-CP of Government on governing individuals who are engaged in independent and regular commercial activities not subject to business registration - March 16, 2007
Doc G04	Resolution No. 08/2004/NQ-CP of the Government on continuing to promote decentralization of state management between the Government and the authorities of provinces and centrally run cities - June 30, 2004
Doc G05	Resolution 02/NQ-CP of the Government on several solutions to remove difficulties for production and business, support the market, and resolve bad debts - January 7, 2013

Doc G06	Resolution No. 90/CP of the Government on the direction and policy of socialization of educational, medical and cultural activities clearly stated the contents of socialization - August 21, 1997
Doc G07	Decree No. 127/2018/ND-CP of the Government on stipulates the responsibility for State management of education - September 21, 2018
Doc G08	Decree No. 404/QD-TTg, of Prime Minister on approving the project of “supporting and developing independent, private childcare groups in industrial zones until 2020” - March 20, 2014
Doc G09	Decision 338/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister approving the project of “investment and construction of at least 1 million social housing for low-income subjects and industrial zones workers in the period 2021 – 2030” - April 3, 2023
Doc G10	Decree No. 188/2013/ND-CP of the Government on social housing development and management - November 20, 2013
Doc G11	Decree No. 100/2015/ND-CP of the Government on social housing development and management - October 20, 2015
Doc G12	Decree No. 105/2020/ND-CP of the Government on stipulating preschool education development policies - September 8, 2020
Doc G13	Decree No. 10/2002/ND-CP of Government on the financial regime applicable to non-business units having revenues - January 16, 2002
Doc G14	Resolution No. 05/NQ-CP of Government on stepping up socialization of educational, healthcare, cultural, physical training and sport activities - April 18, 2005
Doc G15	Decree No. 69/2008/ND-CP of the Government on incentive policies for the socialization of educational, vocational, health-care, cultural, sports and environmental activities - May 30, 2008
Doc G16	Resolution No. 42/NQ-CP the Government on measures to support people facing difficulties due to the COVID-19 pandemic - April 9, 2020
Doc G17	Resolution No. 154/NQ-CP of the Government on Additional Beneficiaries Supported Due to the Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic - October 19, 2020
Doc G18	The speech of the Prime Minister at the Conference to promote social housing development for workers and low-income people - August 1, 2023
Doc G19	Circular 20/2016/TT-BXD of the MOC on guiding the implementation of several contents of Decree 100/2015/ND-CP of the Government on housing development and management - June 30, 2016
Doc G20	Decision No. 20/2005/QD-BGD&DT of the MOET on proposed solutions and policy mechanisms to promote educational socialization, emphasizing increasing local initiative and management responsibility for education - June 24, 2005
Doc G21	Decision No. 04/2015/VBHN-BGDĐT of the MOET on promulgation of preschool charters - December 24, 2015
Doc G22	Circular 52/2020/TT-BGDĐT of the MOET promulgating the Charter of Kindergartens – December 31, 2020
Doc G23	Circular 13/2015/TT-BGDĐT of the MOET on amended and supplemented by Circular No. 13/2018/TT- BGĐTĐT in 2018 - May 30, 2018
Doc G24	Circular 49/2021/TT-BGDĐT of the MOET on promulgating regulations on the organization and operation of independent childcare groups with public and private types - December 31, 2021

Doc G25	Circular 12/2016/TT-BXD of the MOC on regulating dossiers of tasks and projects of regional construction planning, urban planning and construction planning of special functional areas - June 29, 2016
Doc G26	Decree 12/2009/ND-CP of the Government on management of construction investment projects - February 12, 2009
Doc G27	Speech by the Deputy Prime Minister at the Conference to collect opinions on the draft Decree detailing a number of articles of the Housing Law on the development and management of social housing - May 27, 2024
Doc G28	Statement of the MOPS at the discussion session on the draft Law on Residence (amended) at the 9th session of the 14th National Assembly - July 28, 2020
Doc G29	Statement by the Representative of the Administrative Police for Social Order (C06) of the MOPS in Huong, L & Nguyen, H. (11 Jul, 2020). Eliminating 39 administrative procedures, people are no longer “bothered” by household registration books. <i>Doi Song & Phap Luat</i> . Retrieved from: https://doisongphapluat.com.vn/xoa-bo-39-thu-tuc-hanh-chinh-nguoi-dan-het-bi-so-ho-khau-hanh-a330193.html
Doc G30	Speech by the Minister of the MOET at the workshop to evaluate the mobilization of preschool children and conditions to ensure the quality of universal preschool education - November 13, 2023
Doc G31	Decree No. 39/2007/ND-CP of the Government on individuals doing trade do not have to register for their businesses in Vietnam - March 16, 2007
Doc G32	National Housing Development Strategy to 2030, vision to 2045
Doc G33	Statement of the Minister of MOC. Thanh Chung. (2014). From “boarding house” to “social housing”. Government News. Retrieved from: https://baochinhphu.vn/tu-nha-tro-sang-nha-o-xa-hoi-102174056.htm
Doc G34	Decree No. 49/2021/ND-CP of the Government amending and supplementing a number of articles of Decree No. 100/2015/ND-CP on development and management of social housing - April 1, 2021
Doc G35	Circular 09/2021/TT-BXD of the MOC on guidelines for implementing a number of contents of Decree No. 100/2015/ND-CP of the Government on development and management of social housing and Decree No. 49/2021/ND-CP of the Government amending and supplementing a number of articles of Decree No. 100/2015/ND-CP of the Government on development and management of social housing - August 16, 2021
Doc G36	Resolution No. 148/NQ-CP of the Government on promulgating the Government’s action program to implement Resolution No. 06-NQ/TW of the Politburo on Planning, construction, management and sustainable development of Vietnamese urban areas to 2030, with a vision to 2045 - November 11, 2022
Doc G37	Decision No. 370/QĐ-TTg of the Prime Minister on approving the Southeast Region Planning for the period 2021 - 2030, with a vision to 2050 - May 4, 2024
Doc G38	Decision No. 252/QĐ-TTg of the Prime Minister on approving the master plan for socio-economic development of the Southern Key Economic Region to 2020, with a vision to 2030 - February 13, 2014
HCMC Government	
Doc LG01	Decision 5086/QĐ-UBND of City People’s Committee on approving HCMC housing development program for the period 2021 - 2030 - November 14, 2018

Doc LG02	Decision 4834/QD-UBND of City People's Committee on approving the project of "building a housing development program in HCMC for the period 2021 - 2030" - December 31, 2020
Doc LG03	Decision No. 02/2003/QD-UB of City People's Committee on approving the planning for developing the city's education and training school network until 2020, determining direction for the period 2020-2030 and vision to 2045 - January 3, 2003
Doc LG04	Decision 6179/QD-UBND of City People's Committee on approving the project to build HCMC into a smart city in the period 2017-2020, with a vision to 2025 - November 23, 2017
Doc LG05	Decision No. 75/2006/QD-UBND of City People's Committee on promulgating the management of housing for workers rented in HCMC - May 17, 2006
Doc LG06	Speech of the Chairman of the City People's Committee in the program "City leaders meet workers in 2024" - May 11, 2024
Doc LG07	Decision No. 40/2024/QD-UBND of the City People's Committee on promulgating the Regulation on organization and operation of neighborhoods and hamlets to regulate the operating regime of neighborhoods and hamlets - July 19, 2024
Doc LG08	Document No. 3979 of City People's Committee on guiding the implementation of the investment process in building housing for workers and laborers for rent in HCMC - April 17, 2020
Doc LG09	Document No. 14598 of City People's Committee on guiding the implementation of the investment process in building housing for workers and laborers for rent in HCMC - December 15, 2020
Doc LG10	Plan No 3771/KH-UBND of City People's Committee on issued the plan to implement Decree No. 105/2020/ND-CP of the Government stipulating preschool education development policies - November 3, 2021
Doc LG011	Directive No. 16/2015/CT-UBND of City People's Committee on promoting solutions to solve the problem of preschools in industrial parks and export processing zones - October 2, 2015
Doc LG012	The speech of Vice Chairman of City People's Committee at the conference to summarize the project of "support and develop private independent child care groups in industrial parks and export processing zones until 2020" for the period 2015-2020 - November 10, 2020
Others	
Doc O01	The Charter of the Vietnam Fatherland Front
Doc O02	Neighborhood covenants and grassroots democracy regulations

Appendix B: Government reports

Central Government	
Doc R01	Report of the MOPS on policy impact assessment in the revised residence law project - 2020
Doc R02	Report No. 86/BC-BXD of the MOC on implementation and proposed solutions to promote policies to support social housing and housing for workers - 2022
Doc R03	Report of the MOET on the implementation results of the preschool education development plan (the period 2018–2025) - 2019
HCMC Government	
Doc R04	Report of the City People’s Committee on the implementation results in the period 2015-2020 of the project “support and development of private independent child care groups in industrial parks and export processing zones until 2020” - 2020
Doc R05	Report of the City DOC on the implementation data of the project “investing in the construction of at least 1 million social housing apartments for low-income people and industrial park workers in the period 2021–2030” - 2023
Doc R06	Reports of the City DOET on the situation of preschool education over the years
Doc R07	Reports of the City DOET on assessment of task performance results according to the document on task performance guidance for preschool education over the years
Doc R08	Report of the City DOET on evaluation of the results of 10 years of implementing universal preschool education for 5-year-old children (2010 –2015) - 2020
Doc R09	Report of the City DOET on the assessment of the impact of policies to support preschool education in the city (the period 2014–2020) - 2021
Doc R10	Report of the City DOET on summary of the implementation of Decision No. 02/2003/QĐ-UB of the City People’s Committee on approving the planning for the development of the school network in the education and training sector of the city 2020
Doc R11	Report of the City DOET on the implementation of Decree No. 105/2020/ND-CP of the Government on stipulating preschool education development policies
Doc R12	Report of the DOET on the implementation of Decision No. 02/2003/QĐ-UB of HCMC People’s Committee approving the planning for developing the city’s education and training school network until 2020, determining direction for the period 2020–2030 and vision to 2045
Doc R13	Report of the DOC on the implementation of the program to develop workers’ accommodation in the HCMC - 2016
Doc R14	Report of the HCMC Center for Forecasting Human Resources Needs and Labor Market Information (FALMI) on labor market analysis and forecast - 2022
Doc R15	Report of the DOC on social housing data in urban area of HCMC - 2018
Doc R16	Report of the DOC on inspection results, review and propose support and management policies for housing for workers and employees rented to live by organizations or households or individuals built in HCMC - 2020
Doc R17	Reports of Vietnam Fatherland Front of HCMC on the results of the Front’s work over the years
Doc R18	Reports of Binh Tan District DOET on preschool education over the years
Doc R19	Reports of Binh Chanh District DOET on preschool education over the years
Doc R20	Reports of the people’s committees of wards/communes on the activities of self-managed boarding house groups over the years
Doc R21	Reports of the People’s Committee of Binh Tan District and Binh Chanh District on the management and use of staff in public agencies and units – 2023

Appendix C: List of interviews

No	Informants	Locations	Date
Binh Tan District			
Migrant workers (MW)			
MW01-04	04 tenants of Mr. T	Kenh ND - Binh Tri Dong A	Aug 05, 2022
MW05-08	03 tenants of Mr. D	Ben Loi - Binh Tri Dong A	Aug 16, 2022
MW09-11	02 tenants of Mrs. Tr	Ben Loi - Binh Tri Dong A	May 28, 2022
MW12-17	05 tenants of Mrs. B	162 Alley - Binh Hung Hoa B	Aug 20, 2022
MW18-20	03 tenants Mrs. U	162 Alley - Binh Hung Hoa B	Aug 18, 2022
MW21-26	05 tenants of Mrs. N	Tran Thanh Mai - Tan Tao	May 28, 2022
Boarding house owners (BHO)			
BHO01	Mr. T	Kenh ND - Binh Tri Dong A	Aug 05, 2022
BHO02	Mr. D	Ben Loi - Binh Tri Dong A	Aug 03, 2022
BHO03	Mrs. Tr	Ben Loi - Binh Tri Dong A	May 28, 2022
BHO04	Mrs. B	162 Alley - Binh Hung Hoa B	Aug 20, 2022
BHO05	Mrs. U	162 Alley - Binh Hung Hoa B	Aug 18, 2022
BHO06	Mrs. N	Tran Thanh Mai - Tan Tao	May 28, 2022
Childcare group owners (CGO)			
CGO01	Mr. P	Tay Lan - Binh Tri Dong A	Aug 16, 2022
CGO02	Ms. H	Tay Lan - Binh Tri Dong A	Aug 16, 2022
CGO03	A Nun	Thien An - Binh Hung Hoa B	Aug 24, 2022
Authorities (A)			
A01	Mr. VT - Department leader	District People's Committee	Aug 17, 2022
A02	Mr. TT - Department leader	District People's Committee	Sep 05, 2022
A03	Mr. VS - Department leader	District People's Committee	Sep 12, 2022
A03	Ms. A - Public servant	District People's Committee	Aug 17, 2022
A05	Mr. T- CPV ward leader	Ward People's Committee	Aug 18, 2022
A06	Mr. T - Ward leader	Ward People's Committee	Aug 19, 2022
A07	Ms. HN - Ward leader	Ward People's Committee	Sep 20, 2022
A08	Mr. HK - Ward leader	Ward People's Committee	Aug 24, 2022
A09-11	03 Community leaders	Ward People's Committee	Aug 19, 2022
A012-14	03 neighborhood leaders	Binh Tri Dong A	Aug 19, 2022
A015-17	03 Community leaders	Binh Hung Hoa B	Aug 24, 2022
A018-20	03 neighborhood leaders	Binh Hung Hoa B	Aug 24, 2022
Binh Chanh District			
Migrant workers (MW)			
MW27-31	05 tenants of Mr. B	Cay Cam - Vinh Loc B	Sep 15, 2022
MW32-34	03 tenants of Mr. N	Lien Ap 123- Vinh Loc A	Sep 11, 2022
MW35-37	03 tenants of Mr. H	1A - Vinh Loc A	Sep 18, 2022
Boarding house owners (BHO)			
BHO07	Mr. B	Cay Cam - Vinh Loc B	Sep 15, 2022
BHO08	Mr. N	Lien Ap 123- Vinh Loc A	Sep 11, 2022
BHO09	Mr. H	1A - Vinh Loc A	Sep 18, 2022
Childcare group owners (CGO)			
CGO04	Mr. T	1A - Vinh Loc A	Sep 17, 2022
CGO05	Ms. TT - Teacher	1A - Vinh Loc A	Sep 17, 2022

Local people (LP)			
LP01	Mrs. L - Business owner	1A - Vinh Loc A	Sep 25, 2022
LP02	Mr. H - Real estate broker	1A - Vinh Loc A	Sep 25, 2022
LP03	Mr. P - Building contractor	1A - Vinh Loc A	Sep 25, 2022
Authorities (A)			
A21	Ms. C - District department leader	District People's Committee	Aug 17, 2022
A22	Mr. T - District department leader	District People's Committee	Sep 27, 2022
A23	Ms. N - Commune leader	Commune People's Committee	Sep 14, 2022
A24	Mr. N - Commune leader	Commune People's Committee	Sep 13, 2022
A25-27	03 Community leaders	Vinh Loc A	Sep 13, 2022
A28-30	03 neighborhood leaders	Vinh Loc A	Sep 13, 2022
City level			
Authorities (A)			
A31	Mr. TM - Department leader	DOET - District 1	Jul 19, 2023
A32	Mr. H - Department leader	Hepza - District 1	Jul 26, 2023
A33	Mr. M - Communist young union	YES center - District 1	Jul 21, 2023
Experts (E)			
E01	Ms. MC - Migrant labor expert	SISS - District 3	Aug 14, 2022
E02	Mr. TH - Urban planning expert	SISS - District 3	Aug 15, 2022
E03	Mr. V - Researcher	SISS - District 3	Aug 09, 2022
E04	Mrs. L - Researcher	SISS - District 3	Aug 09, 2022
E05	Mr. TS - Researcher	SISS - District 3	Aug 09, 2022

Appendix D: Observations

- People's Meeting of Binh Tri Dong A Ward – August 19, 2022
- People's Meeting of Binh Hung Hoa B Ward – August 24, 2022
- People's Meeting of Tan Tao Ward - September 22, 2022
- Voter meeting of Vinh Loc B Commune - September 13, 2022
- CPV cell meeting of Neighborhood 7, Binh Tri Dong A Ward - August 13, 2022
- People's Meeting of Neighborhood 7, Binh Tri Dong A Ward - August 14, 2022
- People's Meeting of Neighborhood 9, Binh Tri Dong A Ward - August 14, 2022
- People's Meeting of Neighborhood 2, Binh Hung Hoa B Ward - August 21, 2022
- People's Meeting of Neighborhood 5, Tan Tao Ward - September 18, 2022
- Voter meeting of Hamlet 1A, Vinh Loc B Commune - September 10, 2022
- Voter meeting of Hamlet 2A, Vinh Loc B Commune - September 11, 2022
- Voter meeting of Hamlet 2C, Vinh Loc B Commune - September 12, 2022
- Great National Solidarity Festival in Binh Tri Dong A Ward - November 13, 2022