

Philosophische Fakultät der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg

**Interstate Treaties in the Classical Greek World: Athens and Sparta from the
Formation of the Delian League to the King's Peace (478/77-387/86 BCE)**

Revised Edition

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Abbreviations

ABSA = *Annual of the British School at Athens*.

Agora 16 = A.G. Woodhead, *The Athenian Agora* vol. 16: *Inscriptions: The Decrees* (Princeton, 1997).

AIO = Attic Inscriptions Online.

AIUK = *Attic Inscriptions in UK Collections* (Evesham, 2018-present).

AJP = *American Journal of Philology*.

ATL = B.D. Meritt, H.T. Wade-Gery, and M.F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, 4 vols. (Princeton, 1939-53).

BCH = *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*.

CAH = *The Cambridge Ancient History*, 12 vols. (Cambridge, 1923-1939).

CAH² = *The Cambridge Ancient History*, 2nd ed., 14 vols. (Cambridge, 1961-2001).

Classen/Steup = *Thukydides*, erklärt von J. Classen, bearbeitet von J. Steup, 3rd to 5th eds. (Berlin, 1900-22).

CPhil. = *Classical Philology*.

CQ = *The Classical Quarterly*.

Davies, *APF* = J.K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 BC* (Oxford, 1971).

Fornara, *Translated Documents* = C.W. Fornara (ed.), *Translated Documents of Greece and Rome* vol. 1: *Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War* (Baltimore and London, 1977).

GRBS = *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*.

HCT = A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes and K.J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 1: *Introduction and Commentary on Book I* (Oxford, 1945); vol. 2: *Books II-III: The Ten Years' War* (1956); vol. 3: *Books IV-V.24: The Ten Years' War* (1956); vol. 4: *Books V.25-VII* (1970); vol. 5: *Book 8* (1981).

Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* = S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 1: *Books I-III* (Oxford, 1991); vol. 2: *Books IV-V.24* (1996); vol. 3: *Books 5.25-8.109* (2008).

IDélos = F. Durrbach et al. (eds.), *Inscriptions de Délos* (Paris, 1926-1950).

IG 1 = A. Kirchhoff (ed.), *Inscriptiones Atticae anno Euclidis vetustiores* (Berlin, 1873).

IG 1² = F. Hiller von Gaertringen (ed.), *Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno anteriores*, editio altera (Berlin, 1924).

IG 1³ = D. Lewis (ed.), *Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno anteriores*, editio tertia, fasc. 1: *Decreta et tabulae magistratum* (Berlin, 1981); D. Lewis, L. Jeffery, and E. Erxleben (eds.), *Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno anteriores*, editio tertia, fasc. 2: *Dedicationes, catalogi, termini, tituli sepulcrales, varia, tituli Attici extra Atticam reperti, addenda* (Berlin, 1994).

IG 2² = J. Kirchner (ed.), *Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno posteriores*, editio altera, pars 1, *Decreta continens*, fasc. 1: *Decreta annorum 403-229 a. Chr.* (Berlin, 1913).

IvO = W. Dittenberger et al. (eds.), *Die Inschriften von Olympia* (Berlin, 1896).

IvPriene = F. Hiller von Gaertringen (ed.), *Die Inschriften von Priene* (Berlin, 1906).

JHS = *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*.

LGPN 2 = M.J. Osborne and S.G. Byrne (eds.), *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names* vol. 2 (Oxford, 1994).

LSJ⁹ = Liddell and Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed., rev. H. Stuart Jones (1925-40); suppl. by E.A. Barber et al. (Oxford, 1968).

ML = R. Meiggs and D. Lewis (eds.), *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C* (Oxford, 1969; revised edition 1988).

OGI = W. Dittenberger (ed.), *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1903-1905).

OR = R. Osborne and P.J. Rhodes (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions 478-404 BC* (Oxford, 2017).

Piccirilli = Piccirilli, L. *Gli arbitrati interstatli greci* vol. 1: *Dalle origini al 338 a.C.* Pisa, 1973.

Princeton Encyclopedia = R. Stillwell (ed.), *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites* (Princeton, 1976).

RFIC = *Revista di filologia e di istruzione classica*.

Rh. Mus. = *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*.

RIDA = *Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquité*.

RO = P.J. Rhodes and R. Osborne (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC* (Oxford, 2003).

SdA² = H. Bengtson (ed.), *Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 700 bis 338 v. Chr.*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1975, 1st ed. Munich, 1962).

TAPA = *Transactions of the American Philological Association*.

TL = E. Gehrish (ed.), *Tituli Lyciae conscripti ex de centum annīs* (Leipzig, 2018).

Tod = M.N. Tod (ed.), *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* vol. 1: *To the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford, 1933; 2nd ed. 1946); vol. 2: *From 403 to 323 B.C.* (Oxford, 1948).

ZPE = *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*.

Conventions

For Greek literary texts, this dissertation uses the two-volume Oxford Classical Texts edition published in 1942 for Thucydides, the Loeb editions for Herodotus, Diodorus, and Plutarch's Lives, and the Teubner edition for Pausanias. The numbering of footnotes begins anew at the beginning of each chapter. Page numbering is of course continuous.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Opening remarks

The earliest traces of interstate treaties can be traced back to the beginnings of recorded history. Already in the 24th century BCE, an agreement between the Sumerian cities of Lagash and Umma, the purpose of which was the resolution of a border dispute, is preserved.¹ The Treaty of Kadesh (ca. 1259 BCE) between Ramesses II of Egypt and the Hittite ruler Hattusili III, for which we have both hieroglyphic and cuneiform versions in existence, established a military alliance and extradition agreement between the Egyptian and Hittite states.² The evidence from the ancient Greek world is, however, especially prodigious: more than 250 interstate treaties from the period between the 8th century BCE and the reign of Alexander the Great are known to us. The Swiss historian Adalberto Giovannini is therefore certainly right to characterize ancient Greece as ‘un champ privilégié pour l’étude des relations entre États.’³ The sheer volume of treaties from Greek antiquity reveals a serious effort to regulate interstate relations through diplomatic, as opposed to purely military, means.⁴

Ancient historians often speak of an ‘epigraphic habit.’⁵ It is also appropriate to ascribe to the ancient Greeks a ‘diplomatic habit’ going back to the Archaic period. One of the earliest Greek interstate treaties – though known only from much later literary sources – is alleged to have been made between the Euboean cities of Chalcis and Eretria during the Lelantine War (ca. 700 BCE).⁶ According to Polybius and Strabo, this agreement – which, Strabo claims, was inscribed and publicly displayed – forbade the use of long-range missiles in combat:⁷

Polyb. 13.3.4: διὸ καὶ συνετίθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς μήτ’ ἀδήλοισ βέλεσι μήθ’ ἐκηβόλοισ χρήσασθαι κατ’ ἀλλήλων, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ συστάδην γινομένην μάχην ἀληθινήν ὑπελάμβανον εἶναι κρίσιν πραγμάτων.

For this reason they entered into a convention among themselves to use against each other neither secret missiles nor those discharged from a distance, and considered that it was only a hand-to-hand battle at close quarters which was truly decisive.

¹ Lesaffer 2018, 43.

² Goelet and Levine 1998; Sánchez Sánchez 2021; Merigui 2023, 466-68.

³ Giovannini 2007, 14.

⁴ Cf. Eckstein 2017, 492; Lesaffer 2018, 47.

⁵ The phrase appears to have been coined by Ramsay MacMullen in the context of imperial Rome: see MacMullen 1982.

⁶ The date of the Lelantine War is disputed: see generally Bradeen 1947; Lambert 1982; Charalambidou 2011; Bershadsky 2018. For ancient sources see Hdt. 5.99; Thuc. 1.15.3; Plut. *Thes.* 5.3.

⁷ For the minority view that the prohibition applied only to a final, decisive duel and not to the war as a whole, see Baltrusch 1994, 109-11.

(trans. W.R. Paton)

Strab. 10.1.12: τὸ μὲν οὖν πλέον ὠμολόγουν ἀλλήλαις αἱ πόλεις αὗται, περὶ δὲ Ληλάντου διενεχθεῖσαι οὐδ' οὕτω τελέως ἐπαύσαντο, ὥστε τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ αὐθάδειαν δρᾶν ἕκαστα, ἀλλὰ συνέθεντο, ἐφ' οἷς συστήσονται τὸν ἀγῶνα. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ Ἀμαρυνθίῳ στήλητις, φράζουσα μὴ χρῆσθαι τηλεβόλοις.

Now in general these cities were in accord with one another, and when differences arose concerning the Lelantine Plain they did not so completely break off relations as to wage their wars in all respects according to the will of each, but they came to an agreement as to the conditions under which they were to conduct the fight. This fact, among others, is disclosed by a certain pillar in the Amarynthium, which forbids the use of long-distance missiles.

(trans. H.L. Jones)

Luckily, some Archaic interstate treaties survive in inscribed form, so their historicity is not in dispute. We have a 100-year alliance between Elis and the obscure Ewaoioi, tentatively assigned by H. Bengtson to the mid-6th century BCE and inscribed on a bronze tablet found at Olympia (*IvO* 9 = *SdA*² no. 110).⁸ Also from Olympia is a perpetual alliance between the Greek city of Sybaris in southern Italy and an otherwise-unattested people called the Serdaioi (*ML* 10 = *SdA*² no. 120): it cannot be any later than 510 because Sybaris was destroyed in that year (*Hdt.* 6.21; *Diod.* 12.10.1).⁹ One of the earliest recorded treaties involving Athens is an alliance concluded with Thessaly around 560 by the tyrant Pisistratus, which we know about because Herodotus (5.63.2-3) tells us that it was activated in 511 in an unsuccessful bid by Pisistratus' son Hippias to stay in power.¹⁰ Turning to Sparta, an early Spartan treaty with the Arcadian city of Tegea (*Plut. Mor.* 292b = *Arist. fr.* 592; *Mor.* 277c; *Hdt.* 1.67) may also belong to the mid-6th century, though the date is debated.¹¹ Altogether, the ancient historian Hermann Bengtson counts no fewer than 31 interstate treaties, attested in Greek and/or Latin sources, which predate the creation of the Delian League in 478/77 BCE – the chronological starting-point of my database – although seven of these do not involve Greek states.¹²

The period 478/77-387/86 BCE witnessed a great increase in the number of attested interstate treaties. My database, which covers this period and includes only treaties of which Athens

⁸ Bengtson misreads the ethnic as Ἐρφαίοις and wrongly identifies them with the Arcadian city of Heraea; Roy and Schofield 1999 have demonstrated that the correct reading is Ἐραιοίος ('Ewaoioi'), who are known only from this inscription. It has been suggested that the Ewaoioi were perioeci of Elis and lived in the region of Elis: Siewert 1994; Roy 1997, 292-95; Ebert and Siewert 1999; *IACP* no. 254, p. 499.

⁹ For this treaty see further Calderone 1963; Lombardo 2008.

¹⁰ Cf. Bouchon and Helly 2015, 232.

¹¹ Dated ca. 550 by Bengtson, comm. *SdA*² no. 112, p. 11 and Yates 2005, 65, who both depict it as the founding document of the Peloponnesian League. However, Cawkwell 1993, 369-70 argues for a date of ca. 490-65.

¹² *SdA*² nos. 101-131.

and/or Sparta were contracting parties (for reasons which will be explained below), contains a total of 63 separate treaties. Two factors are primarily responsible for this density of evidence. First of all, we have surviving historical narratives by authors who were themselves alive during much of this period: I have in mind chiefly Thucydides and Xenophon. Diodorus Siculus is also an important source for the 5th and 4th centuries BCE, and although he lived centuries later (in the 1st century BCE, to be precise), his account of this period is heavily indebted to Ephorus of Cyme (fl. 4th century BCE), who was therefore a near-contemporary of many of the later treaties that appear in my database.¹³ V.J. Gray believes that Ephorus himself relied on the surviving but fragmentary *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* for the period 411-386 BCE, and if this is the case then we must conclude that Diodorus' ultimate source was indeed written very close in time to the events in question.¹⁴ Apart from the literary evidence, there is a relative abundance of surviving epigraphical material concerning interstate relations compared to the preceding Archaic period, particularly at Athens.¹⁵ Hence, the possibility of assembling a large body of evidence, both literary and epigraphic, makes the 5th and early-4th centuries a particularly promising and fruitful area of study.

Research question

This dissertation seeks to understand to which extent historical developments in the period between the formation of the Delian League (478/77 BCE) and the King's Peace/Peace of Antalcidas (387/86 BCE) contributed to the evolution of interstate treaties in the Greek world. I argue that developments in Greek treaties can be measured in six distinct ways. Firstly, the terminology used to describe treaties: did Athens and Sparta reach a common understanding of technical terms such as *σπονδαί*, *εἰρήνη*, and *συμμαχία*? Did their understanding of any of these terms evolve over time? Second, the treaty-making process, including measures intended to prevent the premature breakdown of treaties: how similar was the process of negotiating and approving treaties in Sparta and Athens, and did they take a similar approach to emending treaties and interstate arbitration? Third, the intended duration of treaties: why did Athens and Sparta conclude time-limited treaties in some contexts and unlimited treaties in others? Is there a clear trend towards more generous time limits during this period? Fourth, the inscription and publication of treaties: why did Athens and Sparta differ in their approach to inscribing and publicly displaying treaties, and what factors influenced the decision to inscribe or not to inscribe them? Fifth, the religious and ritual elements of treaties: how did the oaths

¹³ K.S. Sacks, *OCD*⁴ s.v. 'Ephorus,' estimates that he lived from ca. 405-330 BCE. On Ephorus' own sources see Parker 2004.

¹⁴ Gray 1987, 73. For a general assessment of Diodorus' sources including Ephorus see Drews 1962. For the possible authorship of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* see Occhipinti 2016, 2-5 with references.

¹⁵ See especially Liddel 2003.

sworn to ratify treaties, as well as the choice of gods by which the oaths were sometimes sworn, function as a tool of control over subordinate treaty partners? Lastly, the significance of the concept of αὐτονομία in many treaties: did Athens and Sparta understand αὐτονομία differently, and how was their understanding incorporated into treaties?

The topic which I have chosen to examine is important because treaties are a key source for the ‘international law’ of the Greeks. I put this term in quotation marks because the appropriateness of attributing such a thing as international law to the ancient Greeks is contested by modern scholars. M. Wight, writing in the 1970s, plainly asserted that ancient Greece, in stark contrast to the modern West, ‘had no notion of international law,’ nor did such a notion exist at any point in Antiquity.¹⁶ Even Polly Low, who wrote *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power* primarily to argue for the existence of widespread norms of interstate behaviour among the Greeks of the Classical period, admits that there ‘exists no formally defined, authoritative, published “code” of the international law of classical Greece. ... [T]here is, moreover, no evidence to suggest that such a thing existed.’¹⁷ In a similar vein, A.M. Eckstein, in an admittedly pessimistic study of Greek interstate relations in Thucydides, writes:

The international environment in the great age of the independent Greek city-state (750-330 BCE) was an “anarchy” under formal definition. That is, the 200 states of the Aegean world recognized no overarching common government or authority, nor any larger interstate organization, that could exercise control over their independent actions. At the same time, there were no formal international laws that were agreed among them that might constrain behavior.¹⁸

But if the Greeks had no ancient equivalent of the UN Charter, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, or the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, the Greek states nevertheless could and did define and regulate their relations with one another (and occasionally with non-Greek states such as the Persian Empire), and the principal means by which they did this was through interstate treaties. Treaties could be used to achieve a number of goals: they could end a conflict for a stated period of time; they could establish a military alliance between two or more partners, often directed against a specific enemy; and they could regulate relations between an imperial ἡγεμῶν (lit. ‘leader’) such as Athens and a subordinate ally. It is impossible to even begin to study Greek ‘international law’ without examining the evidence contained within the treaties.

Scope of the dissertation

¹⁶ Wight 1977, 51-52.

¹⁷ Low 2007, 84; cf. Plescia 1970, 58; Adcock and Mosley 1975, 121; Ostwald 1986, 119.

¹⁸ Eckstein 2017, 491-92.

This dissertation, as noted already, is restricted chronologically to the period 478/77-387/86 BCE and geographically to treaties in which Athens and/or Sparta were participants. This choice requires justification.

I will begin with the geographic restriction, which is perhaps easier to explain. Simply put, the intense focus of the literary sources on Athens and to a somewhat lesser extent Sparta, and the overwhelming Athenocentrism of the 5th-century epigraphic evidence, means that the majority of all surviving treaties from this period, whether known from literary or epigraphic sources, are treaties in which Athens, Sparta, and sometimes both simultaneously were involved. Therefore, even including *all* known Greek interstate treaties from this period would not add massively to my corpus featured in this dissertation. There is, of course, also a very relevant political justification for focusing on Athens and Sparta. Through Athens' leadership of the Delian League and Sparta's leadership of the Peloponnesian League, they were unquestionably the Greek 'superpowers' of the day: the most important, powerful, and influential of all the Greek city-states. At their peak, the Delian and Peloponnesian leagues together encompassed hundreds of polities spread throughout mainland Greece, the Aegean islands, and coastal Asia Minor.

The chronological scope of the dissertation can be explained as follows: the formation of the Delian League marked the beginning of Athens' ascent to hegemonic status: it was literally the ἡγεμών of the League (Thuc. 1.95.7), just as Sparta headed the Peloponnesian League. The archontic year 478/77 thus marks the beginning of what may be called 'Greek dualism,' the rivalry and shared hegemony over much of the Greek world by Athens and Sparta.¹⁹ The resulting conflicts between Athens and Sparta, such as the 'first' Peloponnesian War (460-446/45 BCE), the Peloponnesian War proper (431-404 BCE) and, in the early-4th century, the Corinthian War (395-387/86 BCE), were all occasions for increased diplomatic activity.

Athens decisively lost its hegemonic status when it surrendered to Sparta, ending the Peloponnesian War, in 404 BCE. Readers may therefore justifiably wonder why I have decided to extend the chronological scope of the dissertation to the King's Peace rather than stopping here. One reason is that Athens did not in fact abandon all hope of empire after 404, but waged the Corinthian War in hopes of reviving its lost power. The Long Walls and the walls of Piraeus, torn down at Sparta's insistence in 404, were rebuilt with Persian funding after the 394 battle of Cnidus, a severe defeat for the Spartan fleet (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9-10; Diod. 14.85.2-3; *IG* 2² 1656 + *IG* 2² 1657 = RO 9). Several Athenian cleruchies lost in 404, such as Imbros, Lemnos, and Scyros, were reconquered at around the same time, and their retention by Athens would later be guaranteed under the King's Peace (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.15; 5.1.31). It was only after the King's Peace

¹⁹ Compare the concept of 'German dualism' (*deutscher Dualismus*), the struggle for supremacy over German-speaking Europe between Prussia and Austria from ca. 1740-1866, on which see generally Schlie 2013.

that the Athenians realized that they could not revive their ἀρχή as it had existed in the 5th century, with the result that the so-called Second Athenian Confederacy established in 379/78 was, at least initially, distinctly milder in character.²⁰ Just as crucially, the King's Peace represents a watershed in the evolution of Greek interstate treaties that simply did not occur in 404. The King's Peace was the first in a series of so-called κοινὴ εἰρήνη ('common peace') treaties, a new kind of diplomatic instrument that did not exist in the 5th century – though as we shall see, certain characteristic elements are found in embryonic form in a number of earlier treaties. The Peace formally enshrined αὐτονομία as a universal political ideal (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31), whereas earlier treaties had only awarded it as specific exceptions within a hegemonic framework. Crucially, while practical enforcement of the Peace was left to Sparta, its formal guarantor was the non-Greek Artaxerxes II of Persia, which foreshadowed the later regulation of Greek interstate affairs by Macedon and, eventually, Rome.

State of research

Greek interstate relations in the Classical period have been extensively examined in earlier scholarship. Key works include **Baltrusch 1994**, who insists – correctly – that the Greeks conceptually differentiated between treaty types. He demonstrates that συμμαχία ('military alliance') and σπονδαί (lit. 'libations,' but more commonly 'armistice' or 'truce' in a diplomatic context) were not interchangeable legal categories, but were clearly distinct from one another. Baltrusch's taxonomy provides the tools to identify continuity and change in treaty forms across successive diplomatic crises and alliances from the earliest times to the end of the Peloponnesian War. **Bederman 2001** provides a framework for thinking about treaties not as isolated texts but as manifestations of shared norms and customary practice in the Greek world. Bederman argues that features such as oath invocations, arbitration clauses, proxeny exchanges, and heraldic immunity reflect proto-legal norms that regulated interstate interaction. His functional definition of 'international law' suggests that even without formal codification, the Greeks cultivated expectations of behavior that would be expressed in treaties. Bederman's work therefore implies that historical developments may have contributed to changes in interstate treaties over time. **Giovannini 2007** offers a comprehensive study of interstate relations in Greek antiquity from the Archaic to the late Classical/Early Hellenistic period (c. 700–200 BCE). Giovannini places treaties and interstate norms within a broader conceptual framework of Greek interstate relations. He does not write a narrow diplomatic or legal history but systematically examines the rules, norms, and institutions that structured

²⁰ As *IG* 2² 43 = *RO* 22 (378/77 BCE), an Athenian decree inviting states to join the Confederacy, reveals, Athens promised to renounce tribute (φόρος), military governors, garrisons, and interference in the internal political affairs of the allies and guaranteed a common allied deliberative assembly (συνέδριον). See further C.J. Tuplin, *OCD*⁴ s.v. 'Second Athenian Confederacy.'

peaceful and conflictual interactions between Greek states, drawing heavily on both epigraphic and literary evidence. One of his key arguments, and one relevant for understanding developments in the period covered by my dissertation, is that the Greek world constituted a pluralist interstate society with shared cultural norms, moral expectations, and unwritten laws that underlay interstate conduct. This echoes the approach taken by **Low 2007**, whose attention focuses on moral discourse as a constitutive element of diplomacy. Treaties, in her view, are not merely legal texts but performative acts embedded in normative language: justice (*δικαιοσύνη*), reciprocity, honour, and shame. Low examines how poleis justified their external actions and how reputational incentives shaped expectations of compliance.

Baltrusch's focus on legal forms and categories means he tends to take treaties as given rather than as responses to shifting geopolitical pressures. Meanwhile, scholars like Bederman, Giovannini, and Low generally stop short of a periodized narrative; their focus is structural and comparative rather than chronological. Other scholarly studies seldom take a unified approach to treaties. Instead, they tend to be either case studies of individual treaties – or perhaps of a small group of treaties – or institutional histories without an overarching model of evolution. My approach, on the other hand, is to *combine* chronological analysis with a thematic/structural analysis of Greek interstate treaties. Rather than merely examine general trends in the historical development of interstate treaties, I seek to examine precisely how *each treaty individually* was influenced by preceding treaties and itself influenced subsequent treaties. Over the course of my dissertation, therefore, it is my hope that it becomes clear to the reader that treaties were not mere passive responses to historical developments, but actively informed and shaped them.

Structure of the dissertation

The main body of the dissertation (that is, everything excluding the introduction and conclusion) is divided into 10 chapters. Chapters 2-6 are devoted to a chronologically-organized examination of individual treaties; chapters 7-11 proceed with a thematic analysis. Each treaty included in this dissertation has a unique identifier beginning with **D**, standing for 'diplomacy.' **D 1.1 – D 1.16** correspond to treaties examined in Chapter 2, **D 2.1 – D 2.13** to those in Chapter 3, and so on. Each entry includes one or more testimonia, which are divided into **LT** ('literary testimonium') and **ET** ('epigraphic testimonium') based on the nature of the evidence. These are numbered for each entry based on the order in which they appear. If both **LT** and **ET** exist for the same treaty, **ET** is always listed first. For **LT**, the order of appearance is determined by authorial chronology: e.g., Thucydides always appears before Diodorus, and Diodorus before Plutarch. Testimonia, whether **LT** or **ET**, are always displayed in the original Greek or Latin with

an English translation below. **ET** normally also include a selective *apparatus criticus*. See **Index of Testimonia** for a full list of treaties and the sources from which the testimonia are derived. For **ET**, two editions are sometimes listed in the main entries: the edition marked with an asterisk (*) is the edition followed in the dissertation. Additional editions are catalogued in **Concordance of Inscriptions**.

When referring to treaties within the main body of the text, I commonly include both the standard reference to the relevant text as well as the equivalent within the system developed for this dissertation. For example, a reference to a passage of the Peace of Nicias might appear as Thuc. 5.18.1 = **D 2.12 LT 1** (the latter being consistently **bolded**); a reference to a line from an inscription might be recorded as *IG* 1³ 89 = **D 2.10 ET 1** l. 5.

Translations, whether my own or borrowed from a published source, are credited individually for each testimonium.

Outlook

In 387/86, the King's Peace, 'presented to the Greeks by the King of Persia and ... enforced by the Spartans, backed by the threat of Persian power,' in the words of T.T.B. Ryder, was promulgated.²¹ While this event represents the chronological terminus of the present study, the Greek states of course continued to make treaties throughout the 4th century and well beyond. The development and refinement of κοινή εἰρήνη treaties during the 4th century, building upon the existing work of Ryder 1965 and Jehne 1994, would be a most profitable and interesting field of future inquiry. There was certainly no shortage of such treaties in the decades following the King's Peace: κοινή εἰρήνη treaties, or treaties exhibiting at least some κοινή εἰρήνη elements, are attested in 371 (two treaties), 365, 362, 346 (Peace of Philocrates), and 338/37 (League of Corinth).²² Future investigation should also focus on the role and interpretation of interstate treaties created within the framework of new 'supranational' entities such as the Second Athenian Confederacy established 379/78 BCE.²³ Geographically, an analysis of 4th century interstate treaties should move beyond an exclusive focus on treaties involving Athens and/or Sparta but should broaden its scope to include Thebes, which replaced Sparta as the most powerful Greek state following the battle of Leuctra in 371, and Macedon,

²¹ Ryder 1965, 39.

²² Momigliano 1934; Ryder 1965, 124-63 (appendices II-X); Cawkwell 1961; Jehne 1994, 31-138; Zahrnt 2000, 314-21; Rhodes 2006, 189-203 (a general overview of the κοινή εἰρήνη phenomenon); Rhodes 2008; P. Low, *OCD*⁴ s.v. 'Common Peace.' Note that Cawkwell and Zahrnt are focused on the κοινή εἰρήνη of 365 BCE. For the League of Corinth (not to be confused with what I call the anti-Spartan 'Alliance of Corinth' of 395, on which see Diod. 14.82), see chiefly *IG* 2³ 1.318 = RO 76 with Diod. 16.89 and Just. 9.5.1-4.

²³ For the Second Athenian Confederacy (a modern appellation, like the 'Delian League'), see Cargill 1981; Badian 1995; Harding 1995; Rhodes 2006, 226-43.

which began its rise to power with the accession of Philip II in 359, playing an enormous role in the diplomatic manoeuvres of the second half of the 4th century.

There is much room for further discussion of the thematic aspects of treaties within a 4th century context. The continued evolution of treaty terminology in the age of the κοινή εἰρήνη would make for a worthwhile field of inquiry. Future research should also evaluate whether the establishment of the Metroon influenced the contents of inscribed Athenian interstate treaties in the post-King's Peace period. The further development of the concept of αὐτονομία and its role in interstate treaties demands careful evaluation, especially in light of ambitious and far-reaching autonomy guarantee found in the rescript of the King's Peace (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31). Other thematic elements considered in this dissertation in a 5th and early-4th century context, such as the contents of treaty oaths, the inclusion of arbitration and amendment clauses, the destruction of treaty stelae, and the negotiatory role of envoys and embassies, are also worthy of study as applied to the post-King's Peace era.

Chapter 2

Treaties of the Pentecontaetia (478/77-433/32 BCE)

Introduction

The ‘Pentecontaetia’ (lit. ‘period of 50 years’) refers to the time from the battle of Plataea (478 BCE) up to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431.¹ Diplomatically this was a very active period of Greek history, more so, in fact, than any preceding time.² While the conflict with Persia was the first to draw in a large number of Greek states simultaneously, the First Peloponnesian War, which belongs to the Pentecontaetia, was the first large-scale intra-Hellenic conflict in Greek history, as well as the first direct military confrontation between Athens and Sparta.

The present chapter begins with the establishment of the Delian League under Athenian leadership in 478/77 and includes numerous treaties connected with the League’s internal affairs. Several treaties concerning Athens’ relations with states outside the Delian League, including the highly significant Thirty Years’ Peace of 446/45 (**D 1.11**), are also discussed.

D 1.1

Establishment of the Delian League

478/77 BCE

The predecessor of the Delian League was the so-called Hellenic League created to repulse Xerxes’ invasion of Greece. It was formed in 481 and comprised approximately 30 Greek states, the most important of which were Sparta – the League’s leader – as well as Athens and Corinth (Hdt. 7.132.2, 145.1, 148; *FGrH* 115 Theopompus F 153; cf. ML 27 = *Syll.*³ 31 with Thuc. 1.132.2-3 and Plut. *Them.* 20.3).³ The League was not dissolved after the battle of Plataea but continued to pursue the retreating Persians. The forces of the League campaigned in Cyprus and around Byzantium in 478, led by the Spartan regent Pausanias, but he was accused of collaboration with Persia and recalled to Sparta to face trial (Thuc. 1.128-130; Diod. 11.44; Plut. *Arist.* 23). The author of the *Athenaiōn Politeia* claims that the initiative was taken by the Athenian Aristides (**LT 2** = [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 23.4), which is a plausible assertion: Athens now had the opportunity to

¹ The term ultimately derives from Thuc. 1.118.2 ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα μάλιστα μεταξύ τῆς τε Ξέρξου ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου and is used explicitly by the scholiasts (Σ Thuc. 1.89.1, 97.2, 118.2).

² Cf. Lewis 1992b, 136, in the context of the Peace of Callias: ‘On our evidence, this is the first generation which had to face the problems of regulating peace outside the framework of an alliance or permanent friendship.’

³ On the League see Brunt 1953; Tronson 1991; Nielsen 2007; Yates 2015. The testimonia are compiled by Bengtson at *SdA*² no. 46.

collect tribute and, by forming a separate alliance, to step out of the Spartan shadow cast by the Hellenic League. Whether or not the Athenians were already consciously prepared to gain new allies by force (though this did not take long: see **D 1.2** on Carystus) is impossible to determine.⁴

None of this necessarily contradicts Thucydides' statement (1.95.1, **LT 1** = 1.96.1) that the League's formation was urged by the Ionians and other Greeks recently liberated from Persia. The Greek cities of Asia Minor and the Aegean islands had reasonable grounds to fear a renewed Persian attack, and their fear would certainly have been still greater if Pausanias really did have, or was plausibly suspected of, pro-Persian leanings. Lastly, Athens was both Ionian – indeed, the reputed metropolis of the Ionians (Solon F 4a West; Hdt. 1.147; Thuc. 1.2.6, 12.4; Paus. 7.1.9-2.5) – and already possessed a powerful navy that could protect the allies.

LT 1: Thuc. 1.96.1

παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκόντων τῶν συμμάχων διὰ τὸ Πausανίου μῖσος, ἔταξαν ἅς τε ἔδει παρέχειν τῶν πόλεων χρήματα πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον καὶ ἅς ναῦς· [2] πρόσχημα γὰρ ἦν ἀμύνεσθαι ὧν ἔπαθον δηρῶντας τὴν βασιλέως χώραν. καὶ Ἑλληνοταμίαι τότε πρῶτον Ἀθηναίοις κατέστη ἀρχή, οἳ ἐδέχοντο τὸν φόρον· οὕτω γὰρ ὠνομάσθη τῶν χρημάτων ἡ φορά. ἦν δ' ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεὶς τετρακόσια τάλαντα καὶ ἐξήκοντα, ταμιεῖόν τε Δῆλος ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ αἱ ξύνοδοι ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν ἐγίνοντο. [97.1] ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν συμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων τοσάδε ἐπῆλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων μεταξύ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ, ἃ ἐγένετο πρὸς τε τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς σφετέρους συμμάχους νεωτερίζοντας καὶ Πελοποννησίων τοὺς αἰεὶ προστυγχάνοντας ἐν ἐκάστῳ.

In this way the Athenians took over the hegemony, with the willing agreement of the allies prompted by their hatred of Pausanias. They then determined which of the cities should provide money and which should provide ships in furtherance of the war against the barbarians: the ostensible purpose was to retaliate for their own losses by ravaging the King's territory. It was now that there was first instituted at Athens the office of 'Treasurers of the Greeks,' with responsibility for receiving the tribute (This was the term given to the contributions in money). The original tribute was assessed at four hundred and sixty talents. The treasury was the island of Delos, and the meetings of the allies took place in the temple there. At first the Athenians were the leaders of autonomous allies who met together to make their policy in common. But in the period intervening between the Persian War and this war there was huge Athenian activity in the prosecution of war and the management of political affairs, activity undertaken

⁴ Scharff 2016, 91 believes that the allies at any rate did not yet suspect this, which may explain their readiness to conclude an apparently perpetual alliance (see below on the symbolic importance of the μύδρου). For a similar view see Raaflaub 2009, 93-94.

against the barbarians, against their own rebellious allies, and against any Peloponnesian state which crossed their path at any time in their various ventures.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 2: [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 23.4

ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπόστασιν τὴν τῶν Ἰώνων ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων συμμαχίας Ἀριστείδης ἦν ὁ προτρέψας, [5] τηρήσας τοὺς Λάκωνας διαβεβλημένους διὰ Πausανίαν. διὸ καὶ τοὺς φόρους οὗτος ἦν ὁ τάξας ταῖς πόλεσιν τοὺς πρώτους, ἔτει τρίτῳ μετὰ τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν, ἐπὶ Τιμοσθένους ἄρχοντος, καὶ τοὺς ὄρκους ὤμοσεν τοῖς Ἰωσιν, ὥστε τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν εἶναι καὶ φίλον, ἐφ' οἷς καὶ τοὺς μύδρους ἐν τῷ πελάγει καθεῖσαν.

But the secession of the Ionian states from the Lacedaemonian alliance was promoted by Aristides, who seized the opportunity when the Lacedaemonians were discredited because of Pausanias. Hence it was Aristides who assessed the tributes of the allied states on the first occasion, two years after the naval battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Timosthenes [478/77 BCE], and who administered the oaths to the Ionians when they swore to have the same enemies and friends, ratifying their oaths by letting the lumps of iron sink to the bottom out at sea.

(trans. H. Rackham)

LT 3: Diod. 11.47.1

εὐθύς οὖν ὁ μὲν Ἀριστείδης συνεβούλευε τοῖς συμμάχοις ἅπασιν κοινὴν ἄγουσι σύνοδον ἀποδείξαι τὴν Δῆλον κοινὸν ταμιεῖον, καὶ τὰ χρήματα πάντα τὰ συναγόμενα εἰς ταύτην κατατίθεσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Περσῶν ὑποπτευόμενον πόλεμον τάξει φόρον ταῖς πόλεσιν πάσαις κατὰ δύναμιν, ὥστε γίνεσθαι τὸ πᾶν ἄθροισμα ταλάντων πεντακοσίων καὶ ἐξήκοντα. [2] ταχθεὶς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν διάταξιν τῶν φόρων, οὕτως ἀκριβῶς καὶ δικαίως τὸν διαμερισμὸν ἐποίησεν ὥστε πάσας τὰς πόλεις εὐδοκῆσαι. διὸ καὶ δοκῶν ἐν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἔργων συντετελεκέναι, μεγίστην ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνη δόξαν ἐκτήσατο καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δικαιοσύνης δίκαιος ἐπωνομάσθη. [3] ὑφ' ἑνα δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἢ μὲν τοῦ Πausανίου κακία τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν ἡγεμονίας ἐστέρησε τοὺς πολίτας, ἢ Ἀριστείδου δὲ κατὰ πᾶν ἀρετὴ τὰς Ἀθήνας τὴν οὐκ οὕσαν στρατηγίαν ἐποίησε κτήσασθαι.

At once, then, Aristides advised all the allies as they were holding a general assembly to designate the island of Delos as their common treasury and to deposit there all the money they collected, and towards the war which they suspected would come from the Persians to impose a levy upon all the cities according to their means, so that the entire sum collected would amount to five hundred and sixty talents. And when he was appointed to allocate the levy, he distributed the sum so accurately and justly that all the cities consented to it. Consequently,

since he was considered to have accomplished an impossible thing, he won for himself a very high reputation for justice, and because he excelled in that virtue he was given the epithet of 'the just.' Thus at one and the same time the baseness of Pausanias deprived his countrymen of the supremacy on the sea, and the all-round virtue of Aristides caused Athens to gain the leadership which she had not possessed before.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather)

LT 4: Plut. *Arist.* 25

ὁ δ' Ἀριστείδης ὥρκισε μὲν τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ ὥμοσεν ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μύδρους ἐμβαλὼν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀραῖς εἰς τὴν θάλατταν.

Aristides did, indeed, bind the Hellenes by an oath, and took the oath himself for the Athenians, to mark his imprecations casting iron ingots into the sea.

(trans. Bernadotte Perrin)

The author of the *Ath. Pol.* (= LT 2) claims that Aristides required the League's members to swear 'to have the same enemies and friends.'⁵ According to Rhodes, this indicates a full offensive and defensive alliance (συμμαχία) under which the allies would have to support Athens even in offensive campaigns, while the dropping of iron weights into the sea symbolically expresses the intended perpetuity of the alliance (for the same ritual in a different context cf. Hdt. 1.165), since these would forever remain at the bottom.⁶ Though not directly attested by the surviving testimonia, the oath of the allies, suggests Russell Meiggs, may have included a clause 'to remain loyal and not desert': it is found in later Athenian treaties imposed on allies that had rebelled, notably Erythrae (OR 121 = **D 1.6 ET 1**).⁷ I would add another point in support of this: if the allies swore not to defect from the League, they could have no grounds for complaint if Athens would, and did, bring them back into the fold by force (see e.g., **D 1.3**).

Thucydides writes that some allies contributed ships (e.g., Chios, Lesbos, Samos) while others paid a cash tribute from the beginning; and the very first tribute assessment reportedly amounted to 460 talents.⁸ Finally, the allies affirmed their submission to the decisions of the Hellenotamiae, lit. 'treasurers of the Greeks': καὶ παραδώσω τοῖς Ἑλληνοταμίαις ἐν Δήλῳ. These were financial officials of the Delian League who received the tribute from the allies and

⁵ A speculative reconstruction of the allied oath is given at Scheibelreiter 2013, 250-53.

⁶ Rhodes 2017, 260; cf. Chambers 1990, 251. The historicity of the 'friends and enemies' clause is doubted by Bayliss (Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 206-07) on the grounds that it is not otherwise attested until the 430s. Cf. Bolmarcich 2008.

⁷ Meiggs 1972, 45-46.

⁸ Perhaps an optimistic assessment that was not realized in full: Rhodes 1985, 7-8.

were responsible for depositing the first-fruits or ἀπαρχή, i.e., 1/60th of the tribute of each ally, to the treasury of Athena in Athens.⁹

The primary historical significance of the Delian League's foundation lies in the fact that it inaugurated the period of the 'Greek dualism' of the fifth century, which lasted until 404, and which was dominated by Athens as leader of the Delian League on one side and Sparta as leader of the older Peloponnesian League on the other. For the rest of the century, the Greek world would be effectively split in two, and while the hundreds of small- and middle-ranking Greek πόλεις obviously continued to exist, their political history would become increasingly intertwined with that of the two great powers.

D 1.2

Surrender of Carystus

ca. 476-469 BCE

Carystus lay on the southern tip of the island of Euboea. In 490 it was besieged and its territory ravaged by Persia before being forced to surrender (Hdt. 6.99.2). There were Carystians serving in the Persian army in 480 (8.66.2), which resulted in the imposition of an indemnity by Themistocles after Salamis (8.112.2; cf. 8.121.1). A war between Carystus and Athens in the early years of the Pentecontaetia is recorded by both Herodotus (9.105 = **LT 1**) and Thucydides (1.98.3 = **LT 2**) but cannot be precisely dated. R. Brock suggests a range of 476-69 BCE, E. Badian between 476/75 and 471/70, while M. Ostwald reckons that the war began ca. 472 and ended in 469 with the forcible admission of Carystus into the Delian League which (Ostwald argues) precipitated the revolt of Naxos (**D 1.3**, below).¹⁰ But while Thucydides' narrative does indeed place the reduction of Carystus before the events on Naxos, Hornblower cautions against '[seeking] to bring every one of our handful of facts for this period into causal relationship when Th. does not expressly authorize it.'¹¹

LT 1: Hdt. 9.105

τοῦτον δὲ τὸν Ἑρμόλυκον κατέλαβε ὕστερον τούτων, πολέμου ἐόντος Ἀθηναίοισι τε καὶ Καρυστίοισι, ἐν Κύρνῳ τῆς Καρυστίας χώρας ἀποθανόντα ἐν μάχῃ κεῖσθαι ἐπὶ Γεραιστῶ.

⁹ On the Hellenotamiae see further Woodhead 1959.

¹⁰ Ostwald 1982, 38; Badian 1993, 100; Brock 1996, 359.

¹¹ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 1, 150-51.

This Hermolycus on a later day met his death in a battle at Cynus in Carystus during a war between the Athenians and Carystians, and lay dead on Geraestus.

(own trans.)

LT 2: Thuc. 1.98.3

πρὸς δὲ Καρυστίους αὐτοῖς ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων Εὐβοέων πόλεμος ἐγένετο, καὶ χρόνῳ ξυνέβησαν καθ' ὁμολογίαν.

They [sc. the Athenians] also made war on Carystus, independently of the rest of Euboea, and the Carystians eventually agreed to terms.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

The first manifestations of Athenian military aggression in the Delian League era predate or are roughly contemporaneous with the forcible incorporation of Carystus: Eion was captured from the Persians ca. 476 (Thuc. 1.98; Plut. *Cim.* 7) and the island of Scyros was conquered, and an Athenian cleruchy established there, ca. 474 (Thuc. 1.98.2; Plut. *Cim.* 8). However, since Eion was a Persian stronghold, its capture was perfectly aligned with the League's anti-Persian objectives, while the seizure of Scyros only marginally involved the League.

The fate of Carystus fundamentally differs because nothing in the League's 'charter,' insofar as we know from our sources, could have justified it. If Eion was Persian-controlled and Scyros was possibly piratical, the war on Carystus was apparently unprovoked and its capture undertaken purely to advance Athens' strategic and economic objectives.¹² If Thucydides' narrative ordering of events corresponds to historical reality, then it comes as little surprise that Naxos was sufficiently alarmed by Athens' conduct to revolt.

D 1.3

Surrender of Naxos

ca. 470-465 BCE

Naxos, the largest of the Cycladic islands, was a very early and possibly founding member of the Delian League and initially contributed ships to the alliance (Thuc. 1.98.4, 99 = **LT 1**). While Rhodes places the revolt of Naxos within a range of 475-70, a date in the first half of the 460s,

¹² For Scyros as possibly piratical see Meiggs 1972, 73-75. Carystus paid a large tribute of 12 talents upon its first recorded assessment in 454/53 BCE (*IG* 1³ 259.2 l. 16).

before the battle of the Eurymedon (ca. 465), corresponds more neatly with Thucydides' narrative.¹³

LT 1: Thuc. 1.98.4

Ναξίους δὲ ἀποστᾶσι μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπολέμησαν καὶ πολιορκία παρεστήσαντο, πρώτη τε αὕτη πόλις ξυμμαχίς παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ἐδουλώθη, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἐκάστη ξυνέβη.

After this came the revolt of Naxos: the Athenians went to war and blockaded the Naxians into submission. This was the first allied state to lose its freedom – something quite contrary to Greek norms which would subsequently happen to the others one by one.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

Unlike Carystus, which was not in the Delian League before the Athenian conquest, Naxos was an existing League member. If, as is possible, the oaths administered by Aristides at the League's foundation explicitly forbade defection from Athens, the suppression of the Naxians' rebellion was strictly justified. Nonetheless, it must have sent a chilling message to any other League members that might be contemplating revolt: defect, and you will be punished severely.

Regrettably, Thucydides does not specify the terms imposed on Naxos. Later, Athens frequently punished rebellions by stripping allies of their ships and imposing tribute or cleruchies (e.g., Thasos = **D 1.4**; Samos = **D 1.15**; Lesbos = **D 2.3**). If correctly restored, Naxos appears in the tribute lists beginning in 450/49 (*IG* 1³ 263.4 l. 35). At some point between 453 and 448, 500 Athenian cleruchs were settled on Naxos (Plut. *Per.* 11.5-6; Diod. 11.88.3; Paus. 1.27.5; Pl. *Euthphr.* 4c; Aeschin. 2.175).¹⁴

D 1.4

Surrender of Thasos

463 BCE

Thasos was an early, wealthy, and ship-contributing member of the Delian League, but it defected in 466/65 over a dispute concerning trading and mining rights on the mineral-rich strip of mainland territory (περαία) that it controlled (Thuc. 1.100.2).¹⁵ The Athenians quickly

¹³ Rhodes 1985, 12-13; Brock 1996, 359 n. 7; cf. Stylianou 1992.

¹⁴ Figueira 1991, 229 ascribes this to the Athenian general Tolmides, who also established cleruchies on Andros and Euboea around the same time: cf. 220, with references.

¹⁵ On the mines see Green 2006, 139. On the date of the revolt see *IACP* no. 526, p. 779.

defeated the Thasians on land and subjected the city to a prolonged siege; Spartan promises of to assist Thasos were thwarted by the Laconian earthquake of 464 and the subsequent Helot revolt (101.1-2).¹⁶ This enabled the Athenians to subject Thasos to a punitive settlement.

LT 1: Thuc. 1.101.3

Θάσιοι δὲ τρίτῳ ἔτει πολιορκούμενοι ὠμολόγησαν Ἀθηναίοις τεῖχος τε καθελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες, χρήματά τε ὅσα ἔδει ἀποδοῦναι αὐτίκα ταχάμενοι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν φέρειν, τήν τε ἥπειρον καὶ τὸ μέταλλον ἀφέντες.

The Thasians, now in the third year of the siege, capitulated to the Athenians. Under the terms of agreement they demolished their walls, surrendered their ships, undertook the payment assessed for immediate indemnity and future tribute, and gave up their rights in the mainland and the mine.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 2: Diod. 11.70.1

ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων ἀποστάντες Θάσιοι ἀπὸ Ἀθηναίων, μετάλλων ἀμφισβητοῦντες, ἐκπολιορκηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἠναγκάσθησαν πάλιν ὑπ' ἐκείνους τάττεσθαι.

In this year [464/63] the Thasians revolted from the Athenians because of a quarrel over mines; but they were forced to capitulate by the Athenians and compelled to subject themselves again to their rule.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather)

LT 3: Plut. *Cim.* 14.2

ἐκ δὲ τούτου Θασίους μὲν ἀποστάντας Ἀθηναίων καταναυμαχήσας τρεῖς καὶ τριάκοντα ναῦς ἔλαβε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐξεπολιόρκησε καὶ τὰ χρυσεῖα τὰ πέραν Ἀθηναίοις προσεκτήσατο καὶ χώραν, ἣς ἐπῆρχον Θάσιοι, παρέλαβεν.

And after this, when the Thasians were in revolt from Athens, he [sc. Cimon] defeated them in a sea-fight, captured thirty-three of their ships, besieged and took their city, acquired their gold mines on the opposite mainland for Athens, and took possession of the territory which the Thasians controlled there.

¹⁶ Athenian operations against Thasos are also attested epigraphically in a list of Athenian war-dead, dated by the editors of *IG* 1³ to ca. 464: *IG* 1³ 1144 ll. 43, 130.

(trans. Bernadotte Perrin)

Some kind of formal agreement is implicit in Thucydides' use of the verb ὠμολόγησαν, whose nominal cognate ὁμολογία can mean 'agreement' or 'compact.'¹⁷ As Thucydides himself states, this agreement entailed at least the demolition of the walls, the surrender of the Thasian ships, payment of an indemnity (χρήματά τε ὅσα ἔδει ἀποδοῦναι αὐτίκα; cf. Thuc. 1.117.3 on the indemnity imposed on Samos in 439), and agreement to pay tribute in the future.¹⁸ Plutarch adds that Thasos had to relinquish the περαία. Epigraphic sources reinforce the literary testimonia on the abolition of the Thasian fleet, since a Thasian named Simos is attested serving in the Athenian fleet in the late-5th century (*IG* 1³ 1032 l. 431).

Athenian property ownership in Thasos is attested in an inscription from 414/13 (*IG* 1³ 426 ll. 45, 144), and it is possible, though by no means certain, that this privilege existed since the time of Thasos' surrender. The Thasians appear in the tribute lists on fourteen occasions between 454/53 (*IG* 1³ 259.5 l. 14) and 429/28 (*IG* 1³ 282.2 l. 17), initially paying three talents, increased to 30 talents by 446/45 (*IG* 1³ 266.3 l. 8) and an enormous 60 talents by 425/24 (*IG* 1³ 71.3 l. 155).¹⁹ C. Pébarthe explains the relatively low initial tribute by the loss of the economically productive mines of the περαία, and the later dramatic increase by its recovery.²⁰

D 1.5

Athenian alliance concerning the Delphic Amphictyony

ca. 462-447 BCE

The precise date of the present treaty, which is epigraphically preserved, has been hotly debated by scholars. Tracy notes that the round letters were cut with special tools no longer used after 450, but he declines to propose a more specific date.²¹ We must find a more precise date through historical arguments. Athens concluded an alliance with the Thessalians, who collectively held a majority on the amphictyonic council, around 462/61 (Thuc. 1.102.4). M. Sordi plausibly sets this as the inscription's *terminus post quem*, suggesting that Athens was now in a position to exercise influence over the Amphictyony through its Thessalian allies. At the battle of Tanagra in 457, however, the Thessalian cavalry defected to the Spartans; Sordi assumes that this spelt the end of the Athenian-Thessalian alliance and voided the present

¹⁷ LSJ⁹ s.v. ὁμολογία.

¹⁸ On the tribute paid by Thasos to Athens see Picard 1998.

¹⁹ *IACP* no. 526, p. 779,

²⁰ Pébarthe 1999, 131; cf. Artner 1913, 12; *ATL* 3, 259, 301-02; Pleket 1963, 71-72; Vinogradov 1973, 117.

²¹ Tracy 2016, 217; cf. Raubitschek 1951.

treaty.²² But Athens soon won the subsequent battle of Oenophyta, which gave Athens control of Boeotia, Phocis, and Opuntian Locris, which also controlled Amphictyonic seats (Thuc. 1.108.3). Meritt therefore believes that this event represents a more attractive date for the present treaty.²³ Furthermore, while Sordi assumes that all Thessaly turned against Athens after Tanagra, this is not at all clear, and Athens' intervention in ca. 454 on behalf of Orestes, the exiled 'king' (βασιλεύς) of the Thessalians (Thuc. 1.111.1), 'confirms that there were divisions among the Thessalians' according to Osborne and Rhodes.²⁴

Another possible context for the present treaty is in the early-440s, during the so-called Second Sacred War. The historical arguments, while not airtight, are strong enough to outweigh the epigraphic evidence for a *terminus ante quem* of ca. 450. In 449, the Phocians tried to take control of the resources of the Delphic sanctuary; the Spartans intervened militarily to prevent this and transferred the sanctuary to the Delphians, but after they left the Athenians returned and gave it back to the Phocians (Thuc. 1.112.5; *FGrH* 328 Philochorus F 34). Gomme speculates that the present treaty, or at least a renewal of it, is connected with this episode and was intended to ensure secure the Phocians possession of the sanctuary of Delphi.²⁵ We must in any case accept a *terminus ante quem* of 447, for Athens was defeated by the resurgent Boeotians at the battle of Coronea in that year and was forced to abandon Boeotia (Thuc. 1.113), which will have also made Athens' position in Phocis and Opuntian Locris untenable.

In my opinion, virtually any date between 462 and 447 BCE can be supported on an equally plausible historical and epigraphic basis, and I find myself unable to fully endorse anything more specific than this 15-year chronological range.

ET 1: IG 1³⁹ = OR 116*

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens (south slope)

Lettering: Attic with some archaic features (three-barred *sigma*, v-shaped *upsilon*)

Layout: *stoichedon* 24

[ἔδοχσεν τῆι βο]λξι καὶ τῶ[ι δέμ]-

[οι· ...ντις ἐπρ]υτάνευε, Αἰ[...]

²² Sordi 1958, 49-50.

²³ Meritt 1954, 372; cf. Meiggs 1972, 175.

²⁴ Comm. OR 117, p. 89; cf. comm. OR 116, 86.

²⁵ *HCT* 1, 337; cf. 409.

[... ἐγραμμάτ]ευε, Μένυλλ[ος ἐ]-
 πεστάτε, ..⁵..]ίεις εἶπε· χσ[υνθ]-
 5 ἐσθαι μὲν τὲν χ]συμμαχίαν [καθ]-
 [ἀπερ ἦοι ἐκ τῆς] Πυλαίας ἀπ[αγγ]-
 [έλλοσιν ἡάπασ]ι τοῖς Ἀμφι[κτί]-
 [οσι ἠοῖσπερ μέ]τεστιν τῶ ἠ[ιε]-
 [ρῶ, ἐμμενῆν τε ὀ]μόσαντας ἐν [τῆ]-
 10 [ι χσυνμαχίαι νὲ τ]ὸν Ἀπόλλο [κα]-
 [ι τὲν Λετὸ καὶ τὲν] Ἄρτεμιν ἐ[χσ]-
 [όλειάν τε καὶ ἠα]υτοῖς ἐπαρ[ομ]-
 [ένοσ ἐὰν παραβαί]νομεν· φσε[φί]-
 [.....¹⁴..... πά]τριον π[...]-
 15 [.....¹⁷.....]ῆς Πυλ[αί]-
 [.....¹⁹.....]φισ[...]-

2 Αἰαντίς or Λεοντίς required by stoichedon. 13-end φσε[φί|ζεσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὸ πά]τριον π[ερ|ὶ ἡαπάντων ἠὰ ἦοι ἐκ τ]ῆς Πυλ[αί|ας ἀπαγγέλλοσιν ἠεφσε]φισ[μέ|να - -] /G 1³, included in trans., in brackets.

The council and the people decided. [Aiantis or Leontis] was the prytany. A— was secretary. Menyllos was chairman. —ies proposed: [to agree] on the alliance, [as the men from] the Pylaea announce, for [all] the Amphictyons who have a share in the [sanctuary], swearing [to abide by] the [alliance by] Apollo [and Leto] and Artemis, invoking ruin on ourselves if we transgress. [A decree shall be made in accordance with?] tradition [concerning all the things which the men from?] the Pylaea [announce as having been?] decree[d ...?]

...

(trans. Stephen Lambert and P.J. Rhodes, adapted)

Interpreting this inscription is complicated by its fragmentation. Nonetheless, it clearly describes an alliance in which the Delphic Amphictyony is involved in some way: if the restored ἐν [τῆ | ι χσυνμαχίαι] at ll. 9-10 leaves room for doubt, [τὲν χ]συμμαχίαν at l. 5 does not. An

amphictyonic context is clear, first of all, from l. 6 $\text{hoi } \acute{\epsilon}\kappa \tau\acute{\epsilon}\xi\text{]} \text{ Πυλαίας}$, referring to the Πυλαία (or $\text{Πυλαία } \acute{\alpha}\gamma\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}$), a biannual assembly of the Amphictyony.²⁶ The amphictyons themselves (member-tribes of the Amphictyony) are mentioned at ll. 7-8 $\text{h}\acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\sigma\text{]} \text{ τοῖς Ἀμφι[κτί]οσι}$. Lastly, the three deities to whom the oath contained in the inscription is sworn – Apollo, Leto, and Artemis – constitute the Delphic triad (cf. *Choix de Delphes* 1 l. 10 = 4.1 l. 8).

Both Meritt and Sordi argue that ll. 7-9 $\text{h}\acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\sigma\text{]} \text{ τοῖς Ἀμφι[κτί]οσι ho\text{̄}o\text{̄}p\epsilon\rho \mu\acute{\epsilon}] \text{τεστιν τῷ h[ι]ε|ρῷ}$ implies that certain members of the Amphictyony have been excluded. This is best expressed by Sordi: ‘L’invito a $\text{συμμάχε\text{̄}ιν}$ rivolto ad Atene dagli Anfizioni nel documento che stiamo esaminando va dunque considerate certamente come un invito a prendere su di sè la direzione e il peso di una Guerra anfizionica. Contro chi era diretta questa Guerra? Con ogni probabilità, contro gli Anfizioni esclusi dal Santuario e contro i loro eventuali sostenitori.’²⁷ In a similar vein, Meritt explains, ‘If Athens made an alliance with all members of the Amphiktyonic League, Sparta and other enemies of Athens must have been excluded.’²⁸ But it is not at all certain that this is how these lines should be interpreted, and Osborne and Rhodes reject it as ‘unnecessary and ... unwarranted.’²⁹

D 1.6

Athenian treaty with Erythrae

ca. 452 BCE

The stone containing OR 121 = **ET 1**, found on the Acropolis in the late-18th century by the Frenchman Louis Sébastien Fauvel, is no longer extant, and the inscription is now known only from later transcripts based on Fauvel’s copies.³⁰ Of these, an excellent 19th-century transcript by K.S. Pittakys was discovered by G.E. Malouchou in the archives of *Inscriptiones Graecae*, which ‘[takes] us nearer to the original than we have been for a long time.’³¹ Lambert 2020, 36 = **ET 2** does survive and, like **ET 1**, is concerned with affairs in Erythrae; its lettering (angular *beta*, tailed and tailless *rho*; three-barred *sigma*) is also similar to that of (transcripts of) **ET 1**. It is therefore highly likely that both inscriptions belong to the same context, even if it cannot be proven that they are two fragments of the same decree.³² Tracy examines neither **ET 1** nor **ET 2**,

²⁶ Comm. OR 116, p. 86.

²⁷ Sordi 1958, 53.

²⁸ Meritt 1948, 314.

²⁹ Comm. OR 116, pp. 86-87.

³⁰ See Lambert 2020, 37 n. 136 with Malouchou 2014, suggesting that **ET 1** was probably excavated from the Erechtheum in 1788 or 1789.

³¹ Comm. OR 121, p. 116.

³² Lambert 2020, 37; cf. comm. OR 121, p. 116.

though Lambert is in any case skeptical regarding the ability of letter-forms to pinpoint their date: ‘Letter-forms cannot be used to adjudicate conclusively between dates less than twenty years apart,’ but allows that a date before ca. 450 BCE is more likely on epigraphic grounds than a later date.³³

Erythrae was a mainland Ionian city opposite Chios and a probable founding or early member of the Delian League.³⁴ If *ATL*’s restoration of **ET 1** l. 2 Λ[υσι]κ[ράτες ἐ~ρχε· is correct, then that inscription at least could be definitively assigned to 453/53 (see *apparatus criticus*). However, other epigraphic evidence suggests a slightly later date: in the tribute quota lists, Erythrae and its neighbours are sometimes listed collectively as Ἐρυθραῖοι καὶ συντελεῖς (*IG* 1³ 259.5 l. 19; 263.2 l. 17; 264.3 l. 30; 265.1 l. 62). However, Erythrae is absent from the list of 453/52, while nearby Boutheia, which elsewhere paid only 1000 drachmae (*IG* 1³ 272.2 l. 17; 283.3 l. 29), is assessed three talents (*IG* 1³ 260.10 l. 5). The conclusion that Meiggs and the editors of *ATL* drew from this is that Erythrae had defected while Boutheia, ‘reinforced perhaps by refugees, continued to support the League.’³⁵ This is relevant because **ET 1** and **ET 2** clearly belong to the aftermath of an anti-Athenian revolt or at least of some kind of unrest. An occasion for this would have been furnished by the failure of the Athenian campaign in Egypt in the late-450s (Thuc. 1.109-110) and, as we shall see in the commentary below, was perhaps fomented by Persia.

ET 1: *IG* 1³ 14 = OR 121*

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens (now lost)

Lettering: early Attic (based on *CIG* copy)

Layout: possibly *stoichedon* 47

[ἔδοχσεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι δέμοι. ----- ἐπρυτάνευε· -----]

[...] ἐπεστάτε· Λ[...] Γ [- ἐγραμάτευε· ----- εἶπε· Ἐρ]-

[υθραί]ος ἀπάγεν σ[ῖ]το[ν] ἐς Παναθῆναια τὰ μεγάλα ἄ[χ]σιον μὲ ὀλέ]-

[ζον]ος ἔ τριῶν μνῶν καὶ νέμε[ν] Ἐρυθραῖον [τ]ο[ῖ]ς παρῶσι| [. . .]

5 [.. τ]ὸ[ι]ς ἱεροπο[ι]ὸς ΑΠΗΔΙΝΟΝΜΙΘΑΝΟΙ· ἐὰν δὲ ἀπαγ ... [....]

³³ Lambert 2020, 37. At 37 n. 141 he adds: ‘[S]ignificantly forward-leaning nus, of which there are examples in this fragment [i.e., my **ET 2** ll. 16-35], do not occur on inscriptions dated by Tracy to after the early 440s.’

³⁴ Lambert 2020, 37.

³⁵ Meiggs 1972, 112; cf. *ATL* 3, 252. The quotation is Meiggs’.

[...]h ἄχσια[.] ἔ ΤΙΠΟΣΜΝΕΟΚΑΙΑΤΑΣΕ..ΕΝΗΑΠΡΙΣΘΑΙΒΙ [..^{c.4}..]
 [...]ΣΗΒΛΚΕΑΤΜΟΝΗΟ . ΟΥΧΙΟΨΟΝΟΣΣΤΙΝΑΧΑΝΡΛΧ[...^{c.9}.....]
 [...]ΡΕΟΝΟΣ . ΟΑΣ[....]λον τῶι βολομένοι Ἐρυθραίων...[....]
 [. κ]υάμον βολέγ ΟΝΑΚ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας· τὸν δὲ κ[υαμ]-
 10 [ε]υθέντα ΘΕ . ΘΕ . ΘΔΟΤΝ . ἐν τῆι [β]ολῆι καὶ ΕΝΟΣΕΟΟΝ ἔ~ναι βολε[ύε]-
 [ν μ]ἔ ὄλεζον ἔ τριάκοντα ἕτε γεγονότα· δίοχσιν δ' ἔ~ναι [τῶ...]
 ΟΣΕΙΧΟΕΝΟΣ. βολεύεν δὲ μὲ ἐντὸς τεττάρων ἐ[ι]τῶν [δῖς. ἀπο]-
 κυαμεῦσα[ι δ]ἔ καὶ καταστῆσαι τῆν μὲν νῦν βολὲν τὸς τ' [ἐπισκ]-
 ὄπος καὶ [τὸν] φρ[ό]ρραρχον, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τῆν βολὲν καὶ τὸν [φρόρ]-
 15 αρχον, μὲ ὄλεζον ἔ τριάκοντα ἡμέρας πρ[ι]ν ἐχσιέναι [τῆν βολ]-
 ἐν· ὀμνύναι [δὲ? Δ]ία κα[ι] Ἀπόλλο καὶ Δέμε[τρα] ἐπαρομένο[ς ἐχσό]-
 λειαν ἐφ[ιορκῶντι τε κ]αὶ παι[σ]ιν ΕΧΣΟ[.]Ο[.]ΝΔΕΠΟΝΟΝΟ[..⁴⁻⁵..]
 [..]ΚΑΙΑ[.]ΙΕΚΟΝ[..²⁻³..]ΕΙΣΟΝΝΟΕΓΟΝ δὲ βολὲν ΝΒΟΛ[.]ΤΤΟΝΕΑΤΑ[..¹⁻²..]
 [.]ΟΝ|ΑΚΑΙΝΕΓΚΟΝ δὲ μὲ ἔ~ναι ζεμιῶσαι [..]ΛΕ[.]ΣΑΝΑΤ[...^{c.7}...]
 20 ΟΑΝΕΟΔΕΜΟΕΟΝΝΣΟΕΝΟΝ δῆμον κατακαίεν μὲ ὄλεζον[...^{c.6}...]
 ὀμν[ύ]να[ι δ]ἔ [τά]δε [τῆν] βολὲν· βολεύσο ἦν [δύ]νομαι ἄριστ[α .]
 [.]ΔΕΚΑ[..]ΤΑ Ἐρυθραίων τῶι πλέθει καὶ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν [χσυ]-
 νμά[χ]ον· [κ]αὶ οὐκ [ἀποσ]τέσομαι Ἀθηναίων τῶ π[λ]έθος οὐδὲ [τῶν]
 χσυνμάχον τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐτ' αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὐτ' ἄλλοι πε[ί]σομαι
 25 ἀφισ[τα]μένο[ι] οὐτ' αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὐτ' ἄλλον [.]ΕΙ[.....^{c.10}..... οὐδὲ]
 τῶν φ[υγ]άδον [κατ]αδέχομαι οὐδ[ὲ] ἠένα ΟΥΤΟΠΟΙΚΑΙΝΑ[..⁵..]
 ΙΠΕΙΣ[.]Θ[.]Α[..¹⁻²..τῶν ἐς] Μέδος φευγόν[ον] ἄνευ τῆ[ς] βολῆς τ[ῆς] Ἀθε[ι]-
 ναίων καὶ τῶ δέμο· [ο]ὐδὲ τῶν μενόντων ἐχσελῶ [ἄ]νευ τῆς βολῆς
 τῆς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τ[ῶ] δέμο. ἐὰν δὲ τις ἀποκτένει [.....¹⁰.....]
 30 ΕΟΣ ἕτερον ΕΡΤΟΙ[..^{c.4}..]ΟΝ, τεθ[ν]άτο ἐὰν [γν]οσθεῖ· ἐ[ἄ]ν Δ[...⁶...]
 [.] γνοσθεῖ, φευγέτο ἡπάσσαν τῆν Ἀθηναίων χσυνμαχίδ[α, καὶ τ]-
 ἄ χρέματα δεμόσ[ια ἔσ]το Ἐρυθραίων. ἐὰν δὲ τις [.]ΒΟ[.....⁸.....]
 ΟΣ[..] τὸς τυράννος ΤΕΜΝΑΝ[..¹⁻²..]ΟΣ Ἐρυθραίων καὶ [αὐτ]ῶς [...^{c.6}...]

ΧΑΠΙ τεθνάτο [κ]α[ι] παῖδες ἦοι ἔχς ἐκένο ΕΓ . ΝΕΟ[.....¹⁰.....]

35 ΕΙΟΘΕΜΙΛΕΘ[.]ΕΧΟΣ[..^{c.5}..]παῖδες [η]οι ἔχς [έ]κέν[ο^{c.10}.....]

ἐρυθραίο[.] καὶ [...]ν Ἀθηναίον ΑΠΟΣΑΝΟΝ, τὰ δὲ χρῆματα [αύ]τῷ Τ?

traces of ten further lines, including

42 [...⁶...]ΝΑΜΕΝΕΙ[.]ΤΟΜ[.]ΟΡ[.]ΟΝ τροχότας ΔΕΚΑΤΑ[.]ΟΙ[.]ΟΟΣΕΝ

45 [...]βολε[....]ΚΑΝΑ[..¹⁻².]ΟΑΣΙΕΡΑ ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς ἡεκάστες Χ[..³⁻⁴..]

2 Λ[υσι]κ[ράτες (453/52) ἐ~ρχε· γνώμε τῶν χουγγραφῆον] *ATL*. 6-7 ἄχσι[ον] ἔ τριθ[ον] μν[δ]νκατὰ τὰ εἰ[ρη]μένα πρί<α>σθαί σῖ[το]ν Kirchoff. 11-12 [τῷ μέ | δ]οκιμασθέν[τος Malouchou; [κατὰ τ]ῶν ἐλε[γ]χο[μ]ένον Kirchoff; [κατὰ τ]ῶν ἐλεχθέν[το]ν *ATL*. 17-18 ἐχσο[ρ]κ[δ]ῶν δὲ τὸν φρό[ραρ]χο[ν]? κατὰ [η]ιερῶν [τελ]εί[σον] Malouchou; ἐχσό[λ]ε[ια]ν. [τὸ]ν δὲ νό[ρ]κον ὀ[μ]νύνα[ι] κατὰ [η]ιερῶν καιομένων *ATL*. 18-19 μὲ ὄλ[ε]ζον κατα[καί]εν ἔ β[δ]ῶν τὰ ηιερεῶ· ἐάν δὲ μέ *ATL*; μὲ ὄλ[ε]ζον κατα[καί]εν Malouchou. 20 [ι, καὶ ἡ]ό[τ]αν ἡο δέμος ὀμνύει τὸν δέμον *ATL*; highly improbable Malouchou. 26-27 οὗτ' ἄλ[λ]ον καταδ[έ]χεσθα[ι] πείσο[μ]α[ι] τῶν ἐς] Μέδος φευγόν[το]ν Malouchou in commentary. 32-33 ἐάν δέ τις [.]ΒΟ[....⁸....]ΟΣ[.] τὸς τυράννος τεχνά[ζει] ἐν Ἐρυθραῖς οἱ ἐς Ἐρυθρά[ς] Malouchou in commentary; ἐάν δέ τις [ά]λῶ[ι προ|δι]δὸς το[τ]ῆς τυράννοις τήμ πόλιν [τ]ῶν Ἐρυθραί[ο]ν Kirchoff; [τ]ῆν Ἐρυθραί[ο]ν Kirchner (*SIG*³).

[The council and the people decided. — was in prytany. — was] charirman. [— was secretary. — proposed?]: that the Erythraeans shall bring grain to the Great Panathenaea, to the value of not less than three minas, and distribute it to those of the Erythraeans who are present ... religious officials ... if they bring ...

...

...

... whoever of the Erythraeans wishes. There shall be a council appointed by lot of a hundred and twenty men; a [man who is appointed shall be examined?] in the council, and ... shall be possible to be a councillor if he is not less than thirty years old; [anyone rejected in the examination?] shall be prosecuted. No one shall be a councillor twice within four years. The overseers (?) and the garrison commander shall allot and install the council for now, and in future the council and the garrison commander shall do it, not less than thirty days before the council's term of office ends. They shall swear by Zeus and Apollo and Demeter, invoking ruin on one who breaks the oath and his children; [the garrison commander shall administer the oath over perfect victims?]; and the council shall [sacrifice as victims not less than a cow, or if not it shall?] be possible to punish ... the people shall burn no less. The council shall swear as follows: 'I shall be a councillor as best and most justly (?) I can for the mass of the Erythraeans and of the Athenians and of the allies; and I shall not defect from the mass of the Athenians or of the allies

of the Athenians myself, nor shall I be persuaded by another who defects myself nor shall I persuade another; nor shall I take back any single one of the exiles, nor [shall I be persuaded to take back?] any of those who have fled to the Medes, without the permission of the council and the people of the Athenians; nor shall I exile any of those who remain without the permission of the council and the people of the Athenians.' If any of the [Erythraeans kills another Erythraean?], let him be put to death if he is condemned; but if ... is condemned let him be exiled from the whole alliance of the Athenians, and let his property become public property of the Erythraeans. If anyone contrives ... the tyrants in Erythrae, he ... let him be put to death ... sons born from him ... the sons born from him ... of the Erythraeans and ... Athenians ... his property ...

5 lines traces

... archers ...

2 lines traces

... from each tribe ...

(trans. Stephen Lambert and P.J. Rhodes, adapted)

ET 2: IG 1³ 15 = Lambert 2020, 36*

Findspot: Athens (not further specified)

Lettering: inconsistent Attic

Layout: ll. 16-35 uncertain *stoichedon*; l. 36sq. probably *stoichedon* 47³⁶

16 [- - ..⁵..]α χιλ[ι - - -]

[- - ..⁵..]ον τριῶν - - -

[- - ..⁵..]ικον τῶν τε| - - -

[- - ἐ]πισκόπος αὐτο - - -

20 [- - ..⁵..]αιος καὶ τᾶλλα - - -

[- - φ]ρόραρχον καθάπ[ερ - - -]

* Lambert's edition comprises fragment *a* (ll. 16-35) only; for fragment *d* (l. 36sq.) I reproduce the *IG* edition.

³⁶ See Lambert 2020, 37-38: 'Fr. *d* is compatible with **2** [i.e., fragment *a*] and is probably to be restored with the same line length as OR 121 [ET 1] (47 letters).'

... thousand ... three ... of the ... overseers ... and in other respects ... garrison commander just as ... it shall not be permitted for the Erythraeans (?) ... nor archers ... the guards ... and Erythrae- ... in the presence of ... adjudicate for the Erythraean (?) ... Erythraean(s?) to the ... adjudicate, deposit- ... of the court fees (?) ... adjudicate ... just as ... shall be ...

lacuna

[... shall swear the oath over burnt victims by Zeus and Apollo and Demeter] before [the council of Erythrae and the garrison commander], cursing themselves [and their children] to destruction [if they perjure. And the people shall swear] as follows: 'I shall not revolt from [the mass of the Athenians or the allies] of the Athenians, neither I myself [nor shall I be persuaded by anyone else, but] I shall be persuaded by the opinion of the Athenians; [and to inscribe these things and the?] oath on a stone stele [and set it down at Athens on the Acropolis] and at Erythrae on the acropolis ... these things.

(trans. Stephen Lambert, adapted)

I noted above the likelihood of revolt or civil strife (στάσις) in Erythrae in the late-450s. Lambert sees allusions to this at **ET 1** ll. 13-14 ([ἐπισκι] | ὄπιος: note the restorations), ll. 26-28 (referring to exiles and pro-Persian partisans), and l. 33 ('the tyrants in Erythrae').³⁷ The Erythraeans may not receive back 'those who have fled to the Medes,' i.e., the Persians, without Athenian permission, and according to Osborne and Rhodes the 'tyrants' of l. 33 are likely the leaders of the Persian-backed regime that had led the defection.³⁸

ET 1 is particularly significant because, as L. Lazar notes, it is one of the few indisputable cases of Athens imposing a democratic regime on a subject ally (see esp. ll. 2-16).³⁹ The Erythraeans must establish a democratic Boule based on the Athenian model, though with some peculiar features.⁴⁰ The reference at **ET 1** l. 22 to the 'mass' (πληθος) of the Erythraeans, in the view of Osborne and Rhodes, 'is probably used in order to emphasise the democratic nature of Athens and of the regime imposed on Erythrae.'⁴¹ While the literary sources are fond of associating Athenian foreign policy with the imposition of democracy and Spartan foreign policy with the

³⁷ Lambert 2020, 37. Gehrke 1985, 66 n. 4 is more cautious in accepting Erythrae's revolt as historical.

³⁸ Comm. OR 121, p. 118.

³⁹ Lazar 2024, 63 n. 196.

⁴⁰ Members of the Erythraean Boule, as at Athens, were to be selected by lot and had to be at least 30 years old (for the age requirement at Athens see [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 43.2, 62.3; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.35). But in Erythrae the Boule has 120 rather than 500 members, and councillors could serve once every four years rather than only twice in a lifetime as at Athens. Welwei 1986, 181 characterizes Athens' intervention in Erythrae – rightly – as an '[Orientierung] der Verhältnisse in Erythrai bis zu einem gewissen Grade an athenischen Institutionen.'

⁴¹ Comm. OR 121, pp. 117-18.

imposition of oligarchy (Thuc. 3.82; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.14, 16; 3.10-11; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.2; *Pol.* 1307b22-24; Lys. 2.56), Athens was not systematic in doing so even if, as the evidence indicates, a considerable proportion of Athens' allies did in fact have democratic constitutions.⁴² But if, as Meiggs argues, the ἀπόστασις of Erythrae was led by an oligarchic faction uncomfortable with the Athenian turn towards radical democracy in the 450s, the imposition of democracy by Athens should come as no surprise in this case.⁴³

The Erythraeans must accept the involvement of an Athenian garrison-commander (φρούραρχος) and 'overseers' (ἐπίσκοποι).⁴⁴ According to J.M. Balcer, the task of the φρούραρχος and ἐπίσκοποι was to ensure Erythraean adherence to the regulations imposed by Athens, to maintain general order, and to set up a democratic government.⁴⁵ If correctly restored, the φρούραρχος is also found administering the Erythraean oath of loyalty to Athens and taking charge of its inscription and erection on the acropolis of Erythrae (ET 2 ll. 38, 44), suggesting a more than purely military function.⁴⁶ The ἐπίσκοποι, of which an unknown number were sent to Erythrae, appear in this treaty as assistants to the φρούραρχος, although Balcer and A. Moroo believe that they were temporary officials, present only until the situation settled and the regulations were carried out, whereas the φρούραρχος (and, by implication, the Athenian garrison which he commanded) were permanent (cf. Ar. Av. 1022-1052; Harp. E 113 s.v. Ἐπίσκοπος).⁴⁷

D 1.7

Truce of Cimon

451 BCE

Cimon, the preeminent Athenian statesman of the mid-5th century, was ignominiously ostracized in 461 after leading an expedition of 4000 hoplites to Ithome to assist the Spartans against a helot uprising, only to be unceremoniously rebuffed (Plut. *Cim.* 15.3, 17.3; Pl. *Grg.* 516d). Under normal circumstances he would have been allowed to return to Athens only in 451, but one tradition (LT 2 = *FGrH* 115 Theopompus F 88; LT 5 = *Per.* 10.3; LT 6 = *Nep. Cim.* 3.3; Plut. *Cim.* 17.5-6) holds that he was recalled prematurely in order to bring the ongoing First Peloponnesian War to an end. Cimon's recall is supposed by Theopompus to have occurred 'not yet five years' (οὐδέπω δὲ πέντε ἐτῶν) after his ostracism (cf. *Nep. Cim.* 3.3 *post annum quintum*). But Connor notes that it

⁴² Robinson 2011, 188-89; Lazar 2024, 63.

⁴³ Meiggs 1972, 116.

⁴⁴ For Athenian garrisons in the 5th century see generally Nease 1949.

⁴⁵ Balcer 1976, 277.

⁴⁶ Low 2017, 101.

⁴⁷ Balcer 1976, 277; Moroo 2014, 100 with n. 11.

would be strange for Cimon who, Theopompus writes, was recalled specifically to make peace with Sparta and its allies, would wait for several years after his return to Athens to actually do so.⁴⁸ While it is possible that Cimon had tried unsuccessfully for several years to make peace, it is surely easier to imagine that a statesman of his stature was rather speedier in achieving favourable results. The ‘Truce of Cimon’ should therefore be dated to 451, expiring immediately prior to the resumption of active fighting in 446 (LT 1 = Thuc. 1.114.1-2; Diod. 12.5; Plut. *Per.* 22), by which point Cimon was already dead.⁴⁹

LT 1: Thuc. 1.112.1

ὕστερον δὲ διαλιπόντων ἐτῶν τριῶν σπονδαὶ γίνονται Πελοποννησίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πεντέτεις. [2] καὶ Ἑλληνικοῦ μὲν πολέμου ἔσχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐς δὲ Κύπρον ἐστρατεύοντο ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν συμμάχων Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος.

Three years later the Peloponnesians and the Athenians established a five-year treaty. The Athenians now refrained from any Greek war, but sent an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred of their own and allied ships under the command of Cimon.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 2: FGrH 115 Theopompus F 88

οὐδέπω δὲ πέντε ἐτῶν παρεληλυθότων πολέμου συμβάντος πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ὁ δῆμος μετεπέμψατο τὸν Κίμωνα, νομίζων διὰ τὴν προξενίαν ταχίστην ἂν αὐτὸν εἰρήνην ποιήσασθαι. ὁ δὲ παραγενόμενος τῇ πόλει τὸν πόλεμον κατέλυσε.

Not as yet had five years passed when war broke out against the Lacedaemonians and the people sent for Cimon, thinking that because of (his status as) *proxenos* he would make peace most swiftly. And when he arrived, he brought the war to an end for the city.

(trans. William S. Morrison)

LT 3: Diod. 11.86.1

ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις πενταετείς ἐγένοντο σπονδαί, Κίμωνος τοῦ Ἀθηναίου συνθεμένου ταύτας.

⁴⁸ Connor 1968, 24-30. LT 1 = Thuc. 1.112.1 places the truce ‘three years after’ (ὕστερον δὲ διαλιπόντων ἐτῶν τριῶν) Pericles’ campaign in the Gulf of Corinth (described at 1.111.2-3), but this is virtually useless because, like so much of the Pentacontaetia, that campaign is not dated precisely.

⁴⁹ Kagan 1969, 124; Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 502. LT 3 = Diod. 11.86.1 places the truce in the archonship of Ariston (454/53).

During this time, there was a truce for five years between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, with Cimon the Athenian having negotiated it.

(own trans.)

LT 4: Plut. *Cim.* 18

εὐθύς μὲν οὖν ὁ Κίμων κατελθὼν ἔλυσε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ διήλλαξε τὰς πόλεις·

Therefore, immediately after Cimon's return, he terminated the war and reconciled the cities.

(own trans.)

LT 5: Plut. *Per.* 10.3

κάκεϊνος κατελθὼν εἰρήνην ἐποίησε ταῖς πόλεσιν.

And he [sc. Cimon], after returning, made peace for the cities.

(own trans.)

LT 6: Nep. *Cim.* 3.3

Itaque post annum quintum, quam expulsus erat, in patriam revocatus est. Ille, quod hospitio Lacedaemoniorum utebatur, satius existimans contendere Lacedaemonem, sua sponte est profectus pacemque inter duas potentissimas civitates conciliavit. [4] Post, neque ita multo, Cyprum cum ducentis navibus imperator missus, cum eius maiorem partem insulae devicisset, in morbum implicitus in oppugnando oppido Citio est mortuus.

Cimon was recalled to his native land only four years after his banishment. Then, having a guest-friendship with the Lacedaemonians, and thinking it better to go to Lacedaemon, he set out on his own responsibility and brought about peace between two powerful states. Afterwards, but not much later, being sent as commander-in-chief to Cyprus with two hundred ships, after conquering the greater part of the island he was taken ill and died in the town of Citium.

(trans. J.C. Rolfe)

None of the surviving testimonia discuss the details of the Truce except for the fact that its duration was fixed at five years. Since Thucydides and Diodorus write of a truce with the *Peloponnesians*, and given that we hear nothing of Athenian-Peloponnesian hostilities until Boeotia rose up in 447, the Truce probably involved not just Sparta but its allies too. According to Kagan, Athens would have had to abandon its existing alliance with Argos (Thuc. 1.102.4; cf.

1.107.5) as a condition of the Truce. This is probably the context in which the Argives, now isolated, concluded a peace treaty for thirty years with Sparta (Thuc. 5.14.4). The truce with the Peloponnesians also allowed Athens to return to a 'Cimonian' policy of hostilities with Persia (Thuc. 1.112.1-4; Diod. 12.3-4; Plut. *Cim.* 18-19; Nep. *Cim.* 3.4) but tranquil (or at least not openly hostile) relations with Sparta.⁵⁰

D 1.8

30-year truce between Argos and Sparta

ca. 451/50 BCE

Sparta and Argos had been bitter rivals since the Archaic period, culminating in the battle of Sepeia (494 BCE), a crushing Argive defeat. Perhaps because of this, Argos remained neutral during the Persian Wars. Argos and Athens entered into an alliance ca. 461 BCE, at the beginning of the First Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.102.4).

Finding an at least approximate date for the present treaty is not difficult. As Thucydides notes (LT 1 = 5.14.4), one of the reasons the Spartans wanted to make peace with Athens in winter 422/21 was because their own thirty-year peace treaty with Argos was nearing expiry, although Thucydides does not state precisely *when* it was due to expire. He repeats this point at 5.28.2, by which point we have moved on to the summer of 421, so the treaty with Argos cannot have been made earlier than summer 451.

The present treaty must be considered in connection with the Truce of Cimon. I argue that the Truce of Cimon is the earlier treaty and explains why the Argives chose to seek a separate armistice with the Spartans, since Argos was now deprived of its strongest ally, namely Athens.

LT 1: Thuc. 5.14.4 (winter 422/21)

ξυνέβαινε δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους αὐτοῖς τὰς τριακοντούτεϊς σπονδὰς ἐπ' ἐξόδῳ εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλας οὐκ ἤθελον σπένδεσθαι οἱ Ἀργεῖοι, εἰ μὴ τις αὐτοῖς τὴν Κυνουρίαν γῆν ἀποδώσει (ἀδύνατα δ' εἶναι ἐφαίνετο Ἀργεῖοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἅμα πολεμεῖν).

A further circumstance was that their [sc. the Spartans'] thirty-year treaty with the Argives was about to expire, and the Argives would not renew it if the land of Cynuria was not returned to them: the Spartans thought it impossible to fight Argos and Athens at the same time.

(trans. Martin Hammond, adapted)

⁵⁰ Kagan 1969, 105.

We can say little about the terms of the Spartan-Argive treaty besides its 30-year time limit. **LT 1** implies that the disputed border territory of Cynuria was held by the Spartans in 422/21, on the basis of which Bengtson speculates that the present treaty contained a clause ensuring that Cynuria remained in Spartan hands.⁵¹ The treaty lasted its full 30 years, and even though it was ultimately not renewed, this is genuinely impressive by Greek standards.

D 1.9

Peace of Callias

ca. 449/48 BCE

The date and, indeed, the very historicity of what ancient historians call the Peace of Callias are the subject of intense scholarly debate.⁵² Its authenticity was already disputed in Antiquity, notably by the fourth-century BCE historian Theopompus (**LT 6** = *FGrH* 115 F 154), who allegedly denounced it as a fourth-century forgery because the relevant stele was not inscribed in 'Attic letters' (Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασιν), i.e., the script typically used in Athenian inscriptions before the orthographical reforms of 403/02 under the archon Euclides.⁵³ However, it is not beyond dispute that Theopompus, whose passage appears in the testimonia for this treaty, was discussing the Peace of Callias at all.⁵⁴ Even in the event that he was, this is hardly fatal to the historicity of the Peace, since we have surviving examples of several 5th century Athenian public inscriptions in Ionic script. These include the treaties regulating Athenian relations with Phaselis (**D 2.5 ET 1** = OR 120) and Eretria(?) (**D 1.13 ET 1** = *IG* 1³ 39); the accounts of the Delian temples (*IG* 1³ 401 = OR 147); and (albeit only partially) the Athena Nike priestess decree (*IG* 1³ 36 = OR 156).⁵⁵ It is also possible that the original stele was destroyed at some point and reinscribed after 403/02 in the new official alphabet. This could have occurred under the regime of the Thirty, known for their iconoclasm towards public inscriptions (cf. *IG* 2² 6, 8, 9), in 404/03; or perhaps even earlier, for example in 412 when Athens and Persia resumed hostilities over the former's support for the rebel satrap Amorges, effectively terminating the Peace.⁵⁶

⁵¹ Comm. *SdA*² no. 144, p. 47.

⁵² For bibliography see Parmeggiani 2020, 7-8 n. 1.

⁵³ It is far from certain that the stele in question was even the one that contained the Peace of Callias: for a skeptical view, with alternative treaties proposed, see Krentz 2009. On the orthographic reforms, which entailed the adoption of the Ionic alphabet, see OR, xxix and comm. OR 156, p. 341 with Parmeggiani 2020, 13 n. 18.

⁵⁴ For alternative suggestions, see Krentz 2009.

⁵⁵ Woodhead 1981, 18-19 with n. 11; Pownall 2008, 122.

⁵⁶ Meiggs 1972, 137-38; cf. Stockton 1959, 62.

Aside from the objections of Theopompus, doubt about the treaty's historicity stems from the silence of Thucydides, and it is admittedly odd that Thucydides could have omitted this important treaty even in his compressed account of the half-century between Plataea and Potidaea.⁵⁷ Indeed, there are no explicit 5th-century references to the Peace of Callias in any source, literary or epigraphic, which only added fuel to the skeptics' fire.⁵⁸ However, Dr. de Lisle has suggested to me that Thucydides intended to commence his ninth book with a Persian 'archaeology,' modelled on the Sicilian archaeology at the beginning of Book 6. I think this is a compelling theory: although Sicilian events feature in the first half of Thucydides' *History*, most notably in Book 3, Sicily only takes on a central role with the launching of Athens' expedition in 415. Persia, although key to much of Book 8, was to play a still larger role in the events after 411, as Xenophon's *Hellenica* makes clear. Surely a Persian 'archaeology' would have made a fitting introduction to Book 9, just as its Sicilian counterpart opened the sixth. This would have been an ideal occasion to discuss the Peace of Callias in much greater detail than would have been possible within the compressed chronological structure of Book 1.

Today, the historical evidence for the Peace of Callias is considered sufficiently sound that the basic fact of its historicity is now generally accepted; the last study to seriously question it was Meister 1982.⁵⁹ R. Meiggs is correct to emphasize that, apart from (possibly) Theopompus and another historian of the 4th century BCE, Callisthenes of Olynthus (*FGrH* 124 F 16), no ancient source outright denies its existence.⁶⁰ However, the problem of the Peace of Callias' date remains. This is complicated further by the possibility, sometimes mooted in scholarly circles, that there were in fact several Athenian peace treaties with Persia. Badian argues that peace was initially made with Xerxes shortly after the Athenian naval victory at Eurymedon (not precisely dated, but thought to have taken place in the first half of the 460s), then reaffirmed following Xerxes' murder and the accession of Artaxerxes I in 465. This was at a time when Cimon, whom Badian deems central to the Peace, was still influential in Athens. In Badian's account, the Athenians renounced the Peace after Cimon's ostracism in 461 but reactivated it around 449 after Cimon's return, successful campaign in Cyprus, and death.⁶¹ There exists some literary evidence that may support Badian's theory: Herodotus (7.151) mentions an Athenian embassy to the court of Artaxerxes led by Cimon's brother-in-law Callias son of Hipponicus (namesake of the Peace); however, Herodotus explains neither the embassy's date nor its purpose. Cawkwell is skeptical of the passage's value, noting that Callias could have made several trips to Susa: Callias's grandson, also named Callias, is known to have gone on at least

⁵⁷ Meiggs 1972, 131; Cawkwell 1997, 121.

⁵⁸ Rung 2008, 31; Thompson 1981.

⁵⁹ Cf. Parmeggiani 2020, 7-8 n. 1.

⁶⁰ Meiggs 1972, 130; cf. Bosworth 1990, 5-10.

⁶¹ Badian 1987, largely reproduced with appendices as Badian 1993, 1-72. His thesis is endorsed by Green 2006, 182-83 n. 19.

three separate diplomatic missions, in his case to Sparta, by 371 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.4).⁶² Also, the possibility of a peace treaty made ca. 465 appears to be contradicted by Thucydides 1.102.4 εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ἀνεχώρησαν, ἀφέντες τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἀργεῖοις τοῖς ἐκείνων πολεμίοις ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο. This occurred ca. 460, and scholars agree that the ξυμμαχία is a reference to the Spartan-led ‘Hellenic League’ formed in 481.⁶³ This implies that Athens technically remained a member of the Hellenic League even after the foundation of the Delian League and, as such, was at least formally at war with Persia until ca. 460. This, according to G. Cawkwell, invalidates Badian’s argument for an earlier date for the Peace of Callias.⁶⁴

I argue that there was only one Peace of Callias, and that it dates to the very early 440s. The chronological arrangement of Diodorus (LT 8 = 12.4.4-6, cf. LT 9 = 12.26.2) leaves the impression, surely justified, that a treaty between Athens and Persia was made in the archon-year 449/48 and was the result of Cimon’s successful campaign in Cyprus. C. Fornara and L.J. Samons plausibly suggest that fourth-century sources, which place the Peace in the 460s, have simply conflated Cimon’s victory at Eurymedon with his later activities in Cyprus.⁶⁵ Furthermore, there is no evidence that Athenian policy towards Persia suddenly changed after Eurymedon. On the contrary, Athenian expeditions to Egypt in the first half of the 450s and to Cyprus around 450 attest to continuing Athenian-Persian hostilities. After 450, however, direct confrontation ceases almost entirely until 413/12, when Athens’ support for the rebel satrap Amorges prompted Persia to ally with Sparta in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 8.19.2).⁶⁶

LT 1: Isoc. 4.118

ὥστε μὴ μόνον παύσασθαι στρατείας ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς ποιουμένους ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αὐτῶν χώραν ἀνέχεσθαι πορθουμένην, καὶ διακοσίαις καὶ χιλίαις ναυσὶ περιπλέοντας εἰς τοσαύτην ταπεινότητα κατεστήσαμεν, ὥστε μακρὸν πλοῖον ἐπὶ τάδε Φασήλιδος μὴ καθέλκειν, ἀλλ’ ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς περιμένειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ παρουσίᾳ δυνάμει πιστεύειν. ... [120] μάλιστα δ’ ἂν τις συνίδοι τὸ μέγεθος τῆς μεταβολῆς, εἰ παραναγνοίῃ τὰς συνθήκας τὰς τ’ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν γενομένας καὶ τὰς νῦν ἀναγεγραμμένας. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς φανησόμεθα τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν βασιλέως ὀρίζοντες καὶ τῶν φόρων ἐνίους τάπτοντες καὶ κωλύοντες αὐτὸν τῇ θαλάττῃ χρῆσθαι.

They [sc. the Persians] not only ceased from making expeditions against us, but even endured to see their own territory laid waste; and we brought their power so low, for all that they had once

⁶² Cawkwell 1997, 116.

⁶³ Wickert 1964, 50; Ste. Croix 1972, 380; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 1, 159.

⁶⁴ Cawkwell 2005, 281.

⁶⁵ Fornara and Samons 1991, 85, 172.

⁶⁶ There was one minor exception, namely the intervention of the Lydian satrap Pissuthnes in support of the rebels during the Samian War of 440/39 (Thuc. 1.115.4). See also Eddy 1973; Cawkwell 1997, 115; Rung 2008, 33.

sailed the sea with twelve hundred ships, that they launched no ship of war this side of Phaselis but remained inactive and waited on more favorable times rather than trust in the forces which they then possessed. ... One may best comprehend how great is the reversal in our circumstances if he will read side by side the treaties which were made during our leadership and those which have been published recently; for he will find that in those days we were constantly setting limits to the empire of the King, levying tribute on some of his subjects, and barring him from the sea.

(trans. George Norlin)

LT 2: Isoc. 7.80

οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι τοσοῦτον ἀπειῖχον τοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πραγμάτων, ὥστε οὔτε μακροῖς πλοίοις ἐπὶ τὰδε Φασήλιδος ἔπλεον οὔτε στρατοπέδοις ἐντὸς Ἄλυος ποταμοῦ κατέβαινον, ἀλλὰ πολλὴν ἡσυχίαν ἤγον.

The barbarians were so far from meddling in the affairs of the Hellenes that they neither sailed their ships-of-war this side of the Phaselis nor marched their armies beyond the Halys River, refraining, on the contrary, from all aggression.

(trans. George Norlin)

LT 3: Isoc. 12.59

ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἡμετέρας δυναστείας οὐκ ἔξην αὐτοῖς οὔτ' ἐντὸς Ἄλυος πεζῶ στρατοπέδω καταβαίνειν οὔτε μακροῖς πλοίοις ἐπὶ τὰδε πλεῖν Φασήλιδος.

In the time of our supremacy, the barbarians were prevented from marching with an army beyond the Halys River and from sailing with their ships of war this side of Phaselis.

(trans. George Norlin)

LT 4: Dem. 19.273

ἐκεῖνοι τοίνυν, ὡς ἅπαντες εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἀκηκόατε, Καλλίαν τὸν Ἱππονίκου ταύτην τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων θρυλουμένην εἰρήνην πρεσβεύσαντα, ἵππου μὲν δρόμον ἡμέρας πεζῆ μὴ καταβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν βασιλέα, ἐντὸς δὲ Χελιδονίων καὶ Κυανέων πλοίω μακρῶ μὴ πλεῖν, ὅτι δῶρα λαβεῖν ἔδοξε πρεσβεύσας, μικροῦ μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς εὐθύταις πεντήκοντ' ἐπράξαντο τάλαντα.

I am sure you have all heard the story of their treatment of Callias, son of Hipponicus, who negotiated the celebrated peace under which the King of Persia was not to approach within a day's ride of the coast, nor sail with a ship of war between the Chelidonian islands and Cyaneae. At

the inquiry into his conduct they came near to putting him to death, and mulcted him in fifty talents, because he was said to have taken bribes on embassy.

(trans. C.A. Vince and J.H. Vince)

LT 5: Lycurg. 1.73

οὐ τὸ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τρόπαιον ἀγαπήσαντες ἔστησαν, ἀλλ' ὄρους τοῖς βαρβάροις πήξαντες τοὺς εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, καὶ τούτους κωλύσαντες ὑπερβαίνειν, συνθήκας ἐποιήσαντο, μακρῶ μὲν πλοίῳ μὴ πλεῖν ἐντὸς Κυανέων καὶ Φασηλίδος, τοὺς δ' Ἕλληνας αὐτονόμους εἶναι, μὴ μόνον τοὺς τὴν Εὐρώπην ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας.

And to crown their victory, not content with erecting the trophy in Salamis, they [sc. the Athenians] fixed for the Persian the boundaries necessary for Greek freedom and prevented his overstepping them, making an agreement that he should not sail his warships between Cyaneae and Phaselis and that the Greeks should be free not only if they lived in Europe but in Asia too.

(trans. J.O. Burt)

LT 6: FGrH 115 Theopompus F 154

Θεόπομπος δ' ἐν τῇ κε' τῶν Φιλippικῶν ἐσκευωρήσθαι τὰς πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον συνθήκας, <ὡς> οὐ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασιν ἐστηλίτευνται, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τῶν Ἰώνων.

Theopompus in Book 25 of the Philippika says that the treaties with the barbarian were fabricated since they were not inscribed on the stele in Attic letters, but in Ionian.

(trans. William S. Morrison, adapted)

LT 7: FGrH 104 Aristodemus F 13.2

οὗτος ὁ Καλλίας ἐσπέισατο πρὸς Ἀρταξέρξην καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς Πέρσας. ἐγένοντο δὲ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε· ἐφ' ᾧ ἐντὸς Κυανέων καὶ Ἰνέσσου ποταμοῦ καὶ Φασηλίδος, ἣτις ἐστὶν πόλις Παμφυλίας, καὶ Χελιδονέων μὴ μακροῖς πλοίοις καταπλέωσι Πέρσαι, καὶ ἐντὸς τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδόν, ἣν ἂν ἵππος ἀνύσῃ διωκόμενος, μὴ κατιῶσιν. καὶ σπονδαὶ οὖν ἐγένοντο τοιαῦται.

This Callias made a peace treaty with Artaxerxes and the rest of the Persians. The terms of the treaty were as follows: the Persians could not sail in warships beyond Cyaneae, the Nessus River, and Phaselis, which is a Pamphylian city, and the Chelidonian islands. Nor could they approach within a three days' journey of the coast, as a horse could cover at a gallop. Such therefore was the treaty.

(trans. Ian Worthington)

LT 8: Diod. 12.4.4

Ἀρταξέρξης δὲ ὁ βασιλεὺς πυθόμενος τὰ περὶ τὴν Κύπρον ἐλαττώματα, καὶ βουλευσάμενος μετὰ τῶν φίλων περὶ τοῦ πολέμου, ἔκρινε συμφέρειν εἰρήνην συνθέσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. ἔγραψε τοίνυν τοῖς περὶ Κύπρον ἡγεμόσι καὶ σατράπαις ἐφ' οἷς ἂν δύνωνται συλλύσασθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. [5] διόπερ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ Μεγάβυζον ἔπεμψαν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας πρεσβευτὰς τοὺς διαλεξομένους περὶ συλλύσεως. ὑπακουσάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ πεμψάντων πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορας, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Καλλίας ὁ Ἴππονίκου, ἐγένοντο συνθήκαι περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας, ὧν ἐστὶ τὰ κεφάλαια ταῦτα· αὐτονόμους εἶναι τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀπάσας, τοὺς δὲ τῶν Περσῶν σατράπας μὴ καταβαίνειν ἐπὶ θάλατταν κατωτέρω τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδόν, μηδὲ ναῦν μακρὰν πλεῖν ἐντὸς Φασήλιδος καὶ Κυανέων· ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐπιτελούντων, μὴ στρατεύειν Ἀθηναίους εἰς τὴν χώραν, ἧς βασιλεὺς ἄρχει. [6] συντελεσθεισῶν δὲ τῶν σπονδῶν Ἀθηναῖοι τὰς δυνάμεις ἀπήγαγον ἐκ τῆς Κύπρου, λαμπρὰν μὲν νίκην νενικηκότες, ἐπιφανεστάτας δὲ συνθήκας πεποιημένοι. συνέβη δὲ καὶ τὸν Κίμωννα περὶ τὴν Κύπρον διατρίβοντα νόσω τελευτῆσαι.

Artaxerxes the king, however, when he learned of the reverses his forces had suffered at Cyprus, took counsel on the war with his friends and decided that it was to his advantage to conclude a peace with the Greeks. Accordingly he dispatched to the generals in Cyprus and to the satraps the written terms on which they were permitted to come to a settlement with the Greeks. Consequently Artabazus and Megabyzus sent ambassadors to Athens to discuss a settlement. The Athenians were favourable and dispatched ambassadors plenipotentiary, the leader of whom was Callias the son of Hipponicus; and so the Athenians and their allies concluded with the Persians a treaty of peace, the principal terms of which run as follows: all the Greek cities of Asia are to be autonomous; the satraps of the Persians are not to come nearer to the sea than a three days' journey and no Persian warship is to sail inside of Phaselis or Cyanaeae; and if these terms are observed by the king and his generals, the Athenians are not to send troops into the territory over which the king is ruler. After the treaty had been solemnly concluded, the Athenians withdrew their armaments from Cyprus, having won a brilliant victory and concluded most noteworthy terms of peace. And it so happened that Cimon died of an illness during his stay in Cyprus.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather, adapted)

LT 9: Dioid. 12.26.2

οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πέρσαι διττὰς συνθήκας εἶχον πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, τὰς μὲν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους αὐτῶν, ἐν αἷς ἦσαν αἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις αὐτόνομοι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ὕστερον ἐγράφησαν, ἐν αἷς τούναντίον ἦν γεγραμμένον ὑπηκόους εἶναι τοῖς Πέρσαις τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι πρὸς ἀλλήλους

ὑπῆρχεν εἰρήνη, συντεθειμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων σπονδὰς τριακονταετείς.

For the Persians had two treaties with the Greeks, one with the Athenians and their allies according to which the Greek cities of Asia were to live under laws of their own making, and they also concluded one later with the Lacedaemonians [i.e., the King's Peace], in which exactly the opposite terms had been incorporated, whereby the Greek cities of Asia were to be subject to the Persians. Likewise, the Greeks were at peace with one another, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians having concluded a truce of thirty years.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather)

LT 10: Plut. *Cim.* 13.4

τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον οὕτως ἔταπεινώσε τὴν γνώμην τοῦ βασιλέως, ὥστε συνθέσθαι τὴν περιβόητον εἰρήνην ἐκείνην, ἵππου μὲν δρόμον ἀεὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀπέχειν θαλάσσης, ἔνδον δὲ Κυανέων καὶ Χελιδονίων μακρᾶ νηΐ καὶ χαλκεμβόλῳ μὴ πλέειν. καίτοι Καλλισθένης οὐ φησι ταῦτα συνθέσθαι τὸν βάρβαρον, ἔργῳ δὲ ποιεῖν διὰ φόβον τῆς ἡττης ἐκείνης, καὶ μακρὰν οὕτως ἀποστῆναι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὥστε πεντήκοντα ναυσὶ Περικλέα καὶ τριάκοντα μόναις Ἐφιάλτην ἐπέκεινα πλεῦσαι Χελιδονίων καὶ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς ναυτικὸν ἀπαντῆσαι παρὰ τῶν βαρβάρων. [5] ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν, ἃ συνήγαγε Κρατερός, ἀντίγραφα συνθηκῶν ὡς γενομένων κατατέτακται. φασὶ δὲ καὶ βωμὸν εἰρήνης διὰ ταῦτα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἰδρύσασθαι, καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν πρεσβεύσαντα τιμῆσι διαφερόντως.

This exploit [sc. the battle of Eurymedon] so humbled the purpose of the King that he made the terms of that notorious peace, by which he was to keep away from the Greek sea-coast as far as a horse could travel in a day, and was not to sail west of Cyanaeae and the Chelidonian isles with armored ships of war. And yet Callisthenes denies that the Barbarian made any such terms, but says he really acted as he did through the fear which that victory inspired, and kept so far aloof from Hellas that Pericles with fifty, and Ephialtes with only thirty, ships sailed beyond the Chelidonian isles without encountering any barbarian navy. But in the decrees collected by Craterus there is a copy of the treaty in its due place, as though it had actually been made. And they say that the Athenians also built the altar of Peace to commemorate this event, and paid distinguished honors to Callias as their ambassador.

(trans. Bernadotte Perrin, adapted)

Attempts to reconstruct the terms of the Peace of Callias must by necessity be strung together from a multiplicity of ancient testimonia. The terms were advantageous to Athens, but Artaxerxes must have found them sufficiently conciliatory so as to reconcile him to coexistence

with the Athenian ἀρχή.⁶⁷ H. Bengtson, who accepts a date of 449/48, identifies four principal clauses of the Peace: the Greek cities of Asia Minor were to be autonomous; Persian land forces were not to come nearer than a three days' march by land to the coast of Asia Minor; Persian warships were not to sail southwards beyond the Chelidonian Islands or northwards beyond the Cyanean Rocks in the Bosphorus; and the Athenians were not to attack territory possessed or claimed by Artaxerxes, including Egypt and Cyprus.⁶⁸

Wade-Gery speculates that an additional clause, inserted at Athens' insistence, required the cities of the Ionian Dodecapolis (cf. Hdt. 1.142) to pull down their walls.⁶⁹ The Ionian cities were certainly unwallled by 427 at the latest (Thuc. 3.33.2), so this is plausible. It might be objected that, since the πόλεις of Ionia were dependent on Athens from 479 to 412, they were of no concern to Persia. But Herodotus (6.42) claims that the Persian tribute assessment for Ionia of 493, levied in the aftermath of the Ionian Revolt, was still legally in force when he wrote, and some scholars suggest that the Persians maintained this claim as late as 412 (cf. Thuc. 8.5.5), even if Athenian power in the region meant that they could not, in fact, collect the tribute.⁷⁰ And while stripping Ionia of its walls naturally made the cities easier for Athens to control, it also made them more vulnerable to the Persians should they decide to play a more active role in the area, as they did in 412.⁷¹

Addendum: Peace of Epilycus

Of the three treaties made between Sparta and Persia in 412/11, the second is unusual in that reference is made not only to the reigning king, Darius II, but to his sons also (Thuc. 8.37.1 πρὸς βασιλέα Δαρεῖον καὶ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς βασιλέως). E. Lévy argues that this was done to ensure that the agreement did not expire upon Darius' death, or would not be honoured by his successor.⁷² This is relevant to the Peace of Callias because Artaxerxes I, king in 449/48, died at some time between December 424 and February 423 and was succeeded by his son Darius II.⁷³ Some scholars have proposed that the Peace of Callias was subsequently renewed to ensure that Athens and Persia maintained peaceable relations; this is often called the 'Peace of

⁶⁷ Hyland 2018, 15.

⁶⁸ Bengtson 1975, 68-69. Parmeggiani 2020, 17 interprets Diod. 12.4.5 μὴ στρατεύειν Ἀθηναίους εἰς τὴν χώραν, ἧς βασιλεὺς ἄρχει to mean that the Athenians formally recognized Cyprus as the King's land. This is a reasonable inference from the language used by Diodorus, but it is far from certain that the original treaty was so phrased.

⁶⁹ Wade-Gery 1958, 219-20; cf. Cawkwell 2005, 140-41.

⁷⁰ Lewis 1977, 87; *HCT* 5, 16-17; Debord 1999, 121-23; Rubinstein at *IACP*, p. 1057.

⁷¹ Cf. Meiggs 1972, 148-51.

⁷² Lévy 1983b, 227.

⁷³ Rhodes 1998, 242; Rhodes 2016, 179.

Epilycus' after its supposed Athenian negotiator, Epilycus son of Teisander.⁷⁴ An oft-cited piece of evidence for this is *IG* 1³ 227 = OR 157 l. 18 τὰσπονδὰς [τὰς πρὸς βασιλέα (but τὰσπονδὰς [τὰς γενομένης suppl. Wilamowitz ap. *IG* and τὰσπονδὰς [τὰς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν suppl. Culasso Gastaldi; l. 16 βασιλέως is secure, however).⁷⁵ This is part of an Athenian honorary decree for a man named Heraclides of Clazomenae (his origin is confirmed by the final line of the inscription, l. 28). Heraclides must have been eventually granted Athenian citizenship, for he is later attested as an Athenian general (Pl. *Ion* 541d) and as the proposer of a decree increasing pay for attendance at meetings of the Assembly ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 41.3).⁷⁶ Rhodes and others see the references to the (Persian) king, and ll. 14-18 more generally (which appear to laud Heraclides for cooperating with Athenian ambassadors to Persia, resulting in a treaty between Athens and the king), as pointing to a renewal of the Peace of Callias.⁷⁷ However, the honorary decree does not actually explain the purpose of the embassy in which Heraclides was involved, and the only explicit testimony for a renewed Athenian-Persian peace treaty appears in the spurious *De Pace* (Andoc. 3.29). It is notable that Thucydides not only fails to mention such an embassy, but actually informs his readers that an Athenian embassy sent to the Persian court in winter 425/24 *turned back* upon learning of Artaxerxes' death before reaching its destination (Thuc. 4.50.3).⁷⁸ I therefore find myself in agreement E.M. Harris: 'There is no reason to believe that an inscription granting *proxenia* to Heracleides of Clazomenae has anything to do with a treaty between Athens and the king of Persia negotiated by Epilycus because such a treaty never existed.'⁷⁹ Ultimately, the reliable evidence points to only one Peace of Callias, concluded ca. 449/48.

D 1.10

Athenian-Boeotian peace treaty

⁷⁴ On this speculative treaty see Connor 1968, 77-94; Bosworth 1990, 11f.; Krentz 2009, 231-32; Rhodes 2016. Not only is *De Pace* the only source to mention Epilycus, but the arguments against the authenticity of the speech, notably Harris 2000 and Harris 2021 (*contra* Rhodes 2016, 182-85), are in my view compelling. However, the argument for a renewal of the Peace of Callias must still be considered in light of *IG* 1³ 227.

⁷⁵ For alternative proposals on the identity of τὰσπονδὰς cf. Culasso Gastaldi 2004, 35-55 (alliance of the 390s BCE between Athens and Artaxerxes II; cf. Harris 2021, 37 n. 46 but *contra* Rhodes 2016, 178-82).

⁷⁶ See also Ath. 11.560a; Ael. *VH* 14.5. It is possible to assign at least a rough *terminus ante quem* to the honorary decree, since assembly pay (initially set at one obol) was only introduced after 403, and was raised to three obols before the premiere of Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae* in 391 (Ar. *Eccl.* 289-311). For further speculation regarding the date of the honorary decree and examination of textual issues see Harris 1999, 123-26; Culasso Gastaldi 2004, 36; comm. OR 157, p. 344.

⁷⁷ Köhler 1892; Meiggs 1972, 135; Badian 1993, 196; Rhodes 2016, 182.

⁷⁸ Rhodes 2016, 182 objects, unconvincingly in my view, 'Darius' claim was contested at first, so the Athenians would probably have waited for him to consolidate his position.' Cf. comm. OR 157, p. 345.

⁷⁹ Harris 2021, 37.

447/46 BCE

As a consequence of their victory at the battle of Oenophyta in 457, the Athenians drove out oligarchic governments from the cities of Boeotia and replaced them with friendly democracies.⁸⁰ But in 447 Boeotia experienced an oligarchic revival triggered by the return of the exiled oligarchs, who quickly captured Orchomenus and Chaeronea. Athens responded by sending the general Tolmides into Boeotia with 1000 Athenian hoplites and allied contingents with the goal of bringing the cities back under Athenian influence. This was initially successful and Chaeronea was captured, but Tolmides' army was ambushed by an oligarchic force at Coronea and decisively defeated: Tolmides and many of his troops were killed, while a large number became prisoners (Thuc. 1.113.1-2; cf. 4.92.6; **LT 2** = Diod. 12.6.2). This is the context of the present treaty.

LT 1: Thuc. 1.113.3

καὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐξέλιπον Ἀθηναῖοι πᾶσαν, σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι ἐφ' ᾧ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιοῦνται. καὶ οἱ φεύγοντες Βοιωτῶν κατελθόντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες αὐτόνομοι πάλιν ἐγένοντο.

The Athenians then withdrew from the whole of Boeotia, making a treaty to that effect conditional on the recovery of their captured men. The exiled party was restored, and all Boeotians became autonomous again.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 2: Diod. 12.6.2

τῶν δὲ Βοιωτῶν συστραφέντων καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὸν Τολμίδην ἐνεδρευσάντων, ἐγένετο μάχη καρτερὰ περὶ τὴν Κορώνειαν, καθ' ἣν Τολμίδης μὲν μαχόμενος ἀνηρέθη, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων οἱ μὲν κατεκόπησαν, οἱ δὲ ζῶντες ἐλήφθησαν. τηλικαύτης δὲ συμφορᾶς γενομένης τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ἠναγκάσθησαν ἀφεῖναι τὰς πόλεις ἀπάσας τὰς κατὰ τὴν Βοιωτίαν αὐτόνομους, ἵνα τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἀπολάβωσιν.

And when the Boeotians gathered their forces and caught Tolmides' troops in an ambush, a violent battle took place at Coroneia, in the course of which Tolmides fell fighting and of the remaining Athenians some were massacred and others were taken alive. The result of a disaster of such magnitude was that the Athenians were compelled to leave all the cities throughout Boeotia autonomous in order to get back their captured citizens.

⁸⁰ On the situation in Boeotia after Oenophyta see Buck 1979, 147-48.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather, adapted)

From our sources it is unclear whether Athens made the present treaty with the Boeotians as a single unit, with the Boeotian cities individually, or only with the most powerful city Thebes. H.M. Hansen dates the beginning of the ‘First Boeotian Federation’ to Athens’ expulsion from Boeotia in 447/46, lasting until the King’s Peace of 387/86, even in the absence explicit evidence for a Boeotian federal structure prior to the Peloponnesian War (cf. Thuc. 4.91; 5.38.2).⁸¹ The evidence of a later treaty may be illuminating: when a Theban embassy came to Athens in 395, at the beginning of the Corinthian War, to request an alliance, the resulting treaty – which is epigraphically preserved – was made with the Boeotians rather than with Thebes alone (**D 4.3 ET 1** = RO 6 ll. 2-3 [συμ]μαχία Βοιω[τῶν καὶ Ἀ]θηναί[ων ἐς τὸ |ν ἀεὶ] χρόνον).

The treaty between Athens and the Boeotians may have contained some further clauses not explicitly recorded in the surviving testimonia. Kagan remarks that the Athenians’ withdrawal from Boeotia also made their control of neighbouring Phocis and Locris, which Athens had also controlled since Oenophyta, untenable.⁸² There may have been a clause specifically instructing Athens to evacuate these territories as well as Boeotia.

R.J. Buck speculates that, in return for Athens agreeing to leave Boeotia, the Boeotians agreed not to assist the Euboeans who, if they were not yet already in open revolt against Athens (Thuc. 1.114.1), were certainly restless: this is suggested by the fact that no record exists of any Boeotian assistance to the Euboeans against Athens. Secondly, Buck continues, the Boeotians will have allowed Athenian forces to pass through Boeotian territory for military purposes, as this was necessary to reach Chalcis on Euboea as well as Pegae (near Megara, which also soon revolted). Finally, Athens evidently retained control over Oropus (cf. Thuc. 2.23.3) and perhaps other settlements near the border with Attica.⁸³

D 1.11

Thirty Years’ Peace

446/45 BCE

⁸¹ Hansen in *IACP*, p. 432.

⁸² Kagan 1969, 124.

⁸³ Buck 1979, 153. According to Thucydides (1.114.1), Euboea revolted ‘soon after’ (οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον) the events in Boeotia. On the Athenians’ Boeotian route to Pegae and Chalcis see *HCT* 1, 342.

The importance of Euboea within the Athenian ἀρχή is difficult to overstate, as it was not only home to numerous key tribute-paying cities (Chalcis, Eretria, Histiaea/Oreos, Carystus) but lay in a strategically key location.⁸⁴ Unsurprisingly, Athens reacted swiftly to the island's revolt in 446 and Pericles led an Athenian force across the Europus. But now the city of Megara, under the control of Athens since 461 (Thuc. 1.103.4), also revolted. The Megarians, reinforced by troops from Corinth, Sicyon, and Epidaurus, slaughtered most of the Athenian garrison and forced the survivors to take refuge in the port of Nisaea (1.114.1). Subsequently, Peloponnesian forces led by Sparta invaded Attica but then prematurely turned back (1.114.2).⁸⁵ Athens, as Kagan observes, had pressing reasons to seek peace. Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris had been lost and were unlikely to be recovered. Even retaking Megara would have been a highly difficult and costly undertaking.⁸⁶

No epigraphic testimonia survive for the Thirty Years' Peace, which **LT 8** = Diod. 12.7 places in the archonship of Callimachus (446/45). But Pausanias did see the stele at Olympia and described its contents in highly abbreviated form (**LT 9** = Paus. 5.23.4). Any attempt to reconstruct the clauses of the treaty must be cobbled together from the scattered and sometimes ambiguous testimonia of ancient literary sources, chiefly Thucydides.

LT 1: Thuc. 1.115.1

ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἀπ' Εὐβοίας οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τριακοντούτεις, ἀποδόντες Νίσαιαν καὶ Πηγὰς καὶ Τροιζῆνα καὶ Ἀχαιῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ εἶχον Ἀθηναῖοι Πελοποννησίων.

Shortly after their return from Euboea the Athenians made a thirty-year treaty with the Spartans and their allies, under which they handed back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea: these were the places which they had taken from the Peloponnesians.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 2: Thuc. 1.35.1 (speech of the Corcyraeans at Athens)

⁸⁴ Cf. Knoepfler 1997, 352.

⁸⁵ As we learn from Plut. *Per.* 22-23, the Spartans accused Pleistoanax, who with his advisor Cleandridas led the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, of having taken bribes from Pericles to withdraw. Pleistoanax was sentenced to a fine, but as he could not pay it he was forced into exile; Cleandridas immediately went into self-imposed exile and was sentenced to death *in absentia*. Kagan 1969, 125 rejects the accusation of bribery, suggesting that Pericles instead offered Pleistoanax a peace treaty advantageous to Sparta if he withdrew.

⁸⁶ Kagan 1969, 125.

λύσετε δὲ οὐδὲ τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων σπονδὰς δεχόμενοι ἡμᾶς μηδετέρων ὄντας συμμάχους. [2] εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν αὐταῖς, τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων ἧτις μηδαμοῦ συμμαχεῖ, ἐξεῖναι παρ' ὀποτέρους ἂν ἀρέσκηται ἐλθεῖν.

A further point is that in accepting use you will not be breaking the treaty with the Spartans. We are not allied to either side: and the treaty states that any Greek city with no alliance elsewhere is free to join whichever side it wishes.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 3: Thuc. 1.40.2 (speech of the Corinthians at Athens)

εἰ γὰρ εἴρηται ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς, ἐξεῖναι παρ' ὀποτέρους τις βούλεται τῶν ἀγράφων πόλεων ἐλθεῖν, οὐ τοῖς ἐπὶ βλάβῃ ἑτέρων ἰοῦσιν ἢ ξυνηθήκη ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅστις μὴ ἄλλου ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερῶν ἀσφαλείας δεῖται καὶ ὅστις μὴ τοῖς δεξαμένοις, εἰ σωφρονοῦσι, πόλεμον ἀντ' εἰρήνης ποιήσει: ὁ νῦν ὑμεῖς μὴ πειθόμενοι ἡμῖν πάθοιτε ἄν.

Although the treaty does make provision for any non-signatory state to join whichever side it wishes, this article of agreement is not there for those whose purpose in alliance is the injury of other states, but for those looking for security who will not be defecting from others, nor likely to bring their sponsors (if they think about it carefully) war rather than peace.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 4: Thuc. 1.67.4

καὶ ἄλλοι τε παριόντες ἐγκλήματα ἐποιοῦντο ὡς ἕκαστοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς, δηλοῦντες μὲν καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα διάφορα, μάλιστα δὲ λιμένων τε εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀγορᾶς παρὰ τὰς σπονδὰς.

Several came forward to make their various charges, not least the Megarians: among a good number of other complaints they declared that, in contravention of the treaty, they were being barred from all ports in the Athenian empire and from the Athenian market itself.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 5: Thuc. 1.78.4 (speech of the Athenian envoys at Sparta)

λέγομεν ὑμῖν, ἕως ἔτι αὐθαίρετος ἀμφοτέροις ἢ εὐβουλία, σπονδὰς μὴ λύειν μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὄρκους, τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκη λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ξυνηθήκην.

We urge you now, while we both still have the freedom to make the best decisions, not to break the treaty or contravene your oaths, but to let our differences be resolved by arbitration under the agreement.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 6: Thuc. 1.140.2 (speech of Pericles)

εἰρημένον γὰρ δίκας μὲν τῶν διαφορῶν ἀλλήλοις διδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, ἔχειν δὲ ἑκατέρους ἃ ἔχομεν, οὔτε αὐτοὶ δίκας πω ᾗτησαν οὔτε ἡμῶν διδόντων δέχονται.

The terms of the treaty are that in cases of dispute both sides should go to arbitration, retaining their respective holdings in the interim. They have never yet asked for arbitration nor accepted our offer of it.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 7: Thuc. 7.18.2

ἐν γὰρ τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ σφέτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς καί, εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνηθείαις ὄπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν, ἦν δίκας ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

They [sc. the Spartans] recognized that in the earlier period of war the initial transgression had been more on their side, in that Thebans had entered Plataea in time of peace, and they themselves had refused the Athenians' challenge to arbitration when the previous treaty expressly prohibited recourse to arms if there was an offer of arbitration.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 8: Diod. 12.7

σπονδὰς δ' ἐποίησαν τριακονταετείς, Καλλίου καὶ Χάρητος συνθεμένων καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην βεβαιωσάντων.

They made a thirty-year truce, with Callias and Chares negotiating and confirming the peace.

(own trans.)

LT 9: Paus. 5.23.4

ἔστι δὲ πρὸ τοῦ Διὸς τούτου στήλη χαλκῆ, Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων συνθήκας ἔχουσα εἰρήνης ἐς τριάκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμόν. ταῦτα ἐποίησαντο Ἀθηναῖοι παρασησάμενοι τὸ δεύτερον

Εὐβοίαν, ἔτει τρίτῳ τῆς τρίτης πρὸς τὰς ὀγδοήκοντα ὀλυμπιάδος, ἦν Κρίσων Ἰμεραῖος ἐνίκα στάδιον. ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις καὶ τότε εἰρημένον, εἰρήνης μὲν τῆς Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων τῆ Ἀργείων μὴ μετεῖναι πόλει, ἰδίᾳ δὲ Ἀθηναίους καὶ Ἀργείους, ἦν ἐθέλωσιν, ἐπιτηδεῖως ἔχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. αὗται μὲν λέγουσι τοιαῦτα αἱ συνθήκαι.

In front of this Zeus there is a bronze slab, on which are the terms of the Thirty Years' Peace between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians. The Athenians made this peace after they had reduced Euboea for the second time, in the third year of the eighty-third Olympiad, when Crison of Himera won the footrace. One of the articles of the treaty is to the effect that although Argos has no part in the treaty between Athens and Sparta, yet the Athenians and the Argives may privately, if they wish, be at peace with each other. Such are the terms of this treaty.

(trans. W.H.S. Jones and H.A. Ormerod)

Based on the above testimonia, G.E.M. de Ste. Croix identifies seven individual clauses of the Thirty Years' Peace: 1) The treaty had a time limit of 30 years; 2) Athens relinquished control of Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea;⁸⁷ 3) unprovoked attacks by either side were prohibited – they first has to submit to arbitration; 4) with the exception of the places named in clause 2, each side retained what it held at the time of the treaty's ratification; 5) allies of Athens and Sparta were bound to the same terms as Athens and Sparta proper; 6) neutral states could make an alliance with either Athens or Sparta; 7) as an exception to clause 6, neutral Argos was prohibited from allying with Athens (as this might threaten the Argive Thirty Years' Peace).⁸⁸ Kagan additionally proposes that Naupactus, not mentioned in the testimonia, was allowed to remain an ally of Athens.⁸⁹ This is highly probable: in 456/55 the Athenians took away Naupactus from the West (Ozolian) Locrians and settled it with exiled Messenians (Thuc. 1.103.3; Diod. 11.84.7) who fought alongside Athens in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.9.4; 3.75.1; Diod. 12.48.1; 13.48.6). A clause guaranteeing the autonomy of Aegina, suggested by de Ste. Croix, is more doubtful.⁹⁰

The relationship of the Thirty Years' Peace to the Megarian Decree (or decrees⁹¹) is unclear. The Athenians passed this decree in the 430s in response to the alleged illegal Megarian cultivation of sacred land on the Attic border. Its effect was to bar the Megarians from the Athenian agora and the ports of the Athenian ἀρχή (Thuc. 1.139; Diod. 12.38-39; Plut. *Per.* 31-32; Ar. *Ach.* 515-39, *Pax* 601-27). de Ste. Croix takes the Megarians' complaint at Thuc. 1.67.4 to presuppose a

⁸⁷ Notably, Boeotia is not mentioned in the territorial clause (Thuc. 1.115.1), presumably because the question had already been settled by the Athenian-Boeotian treaty of 447/46.

⁸⁸ Ste. Croix 1972, 293. On clause 7 cf. Badian 1993, 137.

⁸⁹ Kagan 1969, 128; cf. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 1, 187.

⁹⁰ Ste. Croix 1972, 293-94. *Contra* Figueira 1990, 73; Badian 1993, 137-38.

⁹¹ For the possibility of several decrees see Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 1, 110-12; Brunt 1993, 1-16.

‘free trade’ clause in the Thirty Years’ Peace (referred to here as τὰς σπονδάς), of which the Megarian Decree was a violation.⁹² Actually, the Megarian Decree may rather speak *against* the Thirty Years’ Peace having contained an explicit free trade clause. As E.W. Robinson argues, ‘A novel act like a trade embargo can hardly have been envisaged by the Thirty Years’ Peace, which guaranteed protection of the allies of each side only from actual attack.’ However, Robinson adds that, while the Megarian Decree may not have violated the *letter* of the Thirty Years’ Peace, it certainly went against its *spirit*.⁹³

The Thirty Years’ Peace confirmed the abandonment of Athens’ attempt to establish a land-based empire in central mainland Greece and the Peloponnese, but did not in any way endanger Athenian interests in the core regions of its maritime ἀρχή including Euboea, the Thraceward region, the Hellespont, and Ionia. While the loss of Boeotia (although not, strictly, a consequence of the Thirty Years’ Peace) and of Megara left Attica much more vulnerable to invasion from the Peloponnese, this was not an immediate concern so long as there was peace, and this lasted until 431. Furthermore, Sparta had neither the resources nor the inclination to threaten Athenian command of the seas.⁹⁴ In one isolated case, the Spartans in 440 did consider aiding rebellious Samos against Athens but were dissuaded by their allies the Corinthians (Thuc. 1.40.5). While the Thirty Years’ Peace was a failure in one essential sense – it only lasted half of its intended 30-year duration – it at least gave the Greek world some respite from the great Athenian-Spartan enmity that is one of the defining aspects of the 5th century.

D 1.12

Athenian treaty with Chalcis

446/45 BCE

The present treaty, which is remarkably well-preserved, is inscribed by what Tracy identifies as a unique hand not attested elsewhere, and concludes that it must date to some point between ca. 450 and ca. 400 BCE.⁹⁵ Tod, Meiggs and Lewis, the editors of *IG 1*³, and Lambert all assign it to 446/45 on historical grounds.⁹⁶ After the withdrawal of Pleistoanax and his Peloponnesian force from Attica in 446, Pericles returned to Euboea and successfully suppressed the revolt there. Thucydides (1.114.3) writes that terms were reached with the Euboean cities ‘by agreement’ (ὁμολογίᾳ) except for Histiaea/Oreos, whose inhabitants were forcibly removed to Macedonia and replaced by Athenian cleruchs. According to Plutarch (*Per.* 23.2), the Histiaeans

⁹² Ste. Croix 1972, 294.

⁹³ Robinson 2017, 119.

⁹⁴ Lewis 1992b, 137; cf. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 1, 186-87.

⁹⁵ Tracy 2016, 30.

⁹⁶ Comm. Tod 42; comm. ML 52; Lambert 2017, 28-31.

had massacred the crew of an Athenian ship that washed ashore and were punished especially harshly for this reason (cf. Thuc. 7.57.2; 8.95.7; Diod. 12.7.1; *IG* 1³ 41). In the present treaty, the Athenians promise not to expel the Chalcidians or otherwise harm their city (**ET 1** = OR 131 ll. 4-6), a clear allusion to the fate of Histiaea/Oreos. The reference to an earlier oath with the Eretrians (ll. 42-43) also places it chronologically later than the Athenian regulations for Eretria(?) (**D 1.13 ET 1**).⁹⁷

The case has also been made for a date of 424/23, albeit less convincingly in my view.⁹⁸ A fragment of the Atthidographer Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F 130) records an Athenian campaign in Euboea during the archonship of Isarchus (424/23). This is arguably supported by a passage from Aristophanes' *Equites*, produced in 424:

Ar. Eq. 235-238: οὔτοι μὰ τοὺς δώδεκα θεοὺς χαίρησεν, | ὅτι ἡ 'πὶ τῷ δήμῳ ξυνόμνυτον
πάλαι. | τουτὶ τί δρᾷ τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν ποτήριον; | οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐ Χαλκιδέας ἀφίστατον.

'By the twelve gods! Woe betide you, who have too long been conspiring against Demos. What means this Chalcidian cup? No doubt you are provoking the Chalcidians to revolt.'

(trans. Eugene O'Neill Jr.)

A man named Hierocles appears at l. 66, identified by Osborne and Rhodes as the oracle-monger from Histiaea/Oreos (!) attested in Eupolis' comedy *Poleis*, written in the late-420s (*PCG* fr. 231), as well as in Aristophanes (*Pax* 1047, 421 BCE), and this *might* be taken as support for assigning the present treaty to the 420s, but one need not be alive or active in public life to appear in a comedy.⁹⁹ More seriously, both Chalcis and Eretria saw their tribute assessments suddenly raised to 15 and 10 talents respectively in 425 (*IG* 1³ 71.1 ll. 67, 71), which could potentially be a source of discontent eventually leading to open revolt.¹⁰⁰ But whatever unrest did occur was evidently not important enough to merit mention by Thucydides, and Lambert suggests that even if the campaign mentioned by Philochorus did occur, it was not necessarily to put down a rebellion but may have been undertaken to fortify Euboea against the nearby Spartan colony of Heraclea in Trachis, which was founded in 426 (cf. Thuc. 3.92-93).¹⁰¹

All things considered, the evidence for 446/45 remains more convincing than for 424/23, and I accept the earlier date.

ET 1: *IG* 1³ 40 = OR 131*

⁹⁷ Cf. Balcer 1978, 35; Ostwald 2002, 136.

⁹⁸ Mattingly 1961a; Mattingly 2002; Sosin 2014, 293-94.

⁹⁹ Cf. comm. OR 131, pp. 179-80. I thank Dr. de Lisle for stressing this point.

¹⁰⁰ Raubitschek 1943, 33; Mattingly 2002, 337-39; Mattingly 2010, 102-04; cf. Mattingly 1976, 40.

¹⁰¹ Lambert 2017, 30 with n. 38. On Heraclea cf. Sommerstein 1981, 155; Moreno 2007, 135-36.

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens (built into south wall)

Lettering: Attic, but H = η at l. 77

Layout: *stoichedon* 32, except ll. 1-2, 80

ἔδοχσεν τῆ[ι β]ολῆι καὶ τῶι δέμοι, Ἀντιοχίς ἐ[πρυτ]-
 άνευε· Δρακ[ον]τίδες ἐπεστάτε, Διόγνετος εἶπε·
 κατὰ τάδε τὸν ἠόρκον ὁμόσαι Ἀθηναίον τ-
 ἔν βολὲν καὶ τὸς δικαστάς· οὐκ ἔχσελῶ Χα-
 5 λκιδέας ἔχ Χαλκίδος οὐδὲ τὲν πόλιν ἀνά-
 στατον ποέσο οὐδὲ ἰδιότεν οὐδένα ἀτιμ-
 ὄσο οὐδὲ φυγῆι ζεμιόσο οὐδὲ χσυλλέφσο-
 μαι οὐδὲ ἀποκτενῶ οὐδὲ χρέματα ἀφαιρέ-
 σομαι ἀκρίτο οὐδενὸς ἄνευ τῶ δέμο τῶ Ἀθ-
 10 εναίον, οὐδ ἐπιφσεφιῶ κατὰ ἀπροσκλέτο
 οὔτε κατὰ τῶ κοινῶ οὔτε κατὰ ἰδιότο οὐδ-
 ἔ ἑνός, καὶ πρεσβείαν ἐλθῶσαν προσάχσο
 πρὸς βολὲν καὶ δῆμον δέκα ἑμερῶν ἠόταν
 πρυτανεύο κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. ταῦτα δὲ ἑμπι-
 15 [ε]δόσο Χαλκιδεῦσιν πειθομένοις τῶι δέ-
 [μ]οι τῶι Ἀθηναίον. ἠορκῶσαι δὲ πρεσβεία-
 [ν] ἐλθῶσαν ἔχ Χαλκίδος μετὰ τῶν ἠορκοτῶ-
 ν Ἀθηναίος καὶ ἀπογράψαι τὸς ὁμόσαντ-
 ας. ἠόπος δ ἂν [ὀ]μόσοσιν ἀπαντες, ἐπιμελ-
 20 ὄσθον ἠοι στ[ρ]ατεγοί *vacat*
 κατὰ τάδε Χαλκιδέας ὁμόσαι· οὐκ ἀπο[σ]τέ-
 σομαι ἀπὸ τῶ [δ]έμο τῶ Ἀθηναίον οὔτε τέ[χ]ν-
 ει οὔτε μεχανῆι οὐδεμιᾶι οὐδ ἔπει οὐδὲ
 ἔργοι οὐδὲ τῶι ἀφισταμένοι πείσομαι, κ-

25 αὶ ἐὰν ἀφιστῆι τις κατεροῦ Ἀθηναίοισι, κ-
 αὶ τὸν φόρον ὑποτελοῦ Ἀθηναίοισιν, ἡὸν
 ἂν πείθο Ἀθηναίος, καὶ χσύμμαχος ἔσομα-
 ι ἡοῖος ἂν δύνομαι ἄριστος καὶ δικαιοῦ-
 ατος καὶ τῶι δέμοι Ἀθηναίων βοεθέσ-
 30 ο καὶ ἄμυνῶ, ἐὰν τις ἀδικεῖ τὸν δέμον τὸν
 Ἀθηναίων, καὶ πείσομαι τῶι δέμοι τῶι Ἀθ-
 εναίων. ὁμόσαι δὲ Χαλκιδέον τὸς ἡεβῶντ-
 ας ἡάπαντας· ἡὸς δ ἄμ με ὁμόσει, ἄτιμον αὐτ-
 ὸν ἔναι καὶ τὰ χρέματα αὐτῶ δεμόσια καὶ
 35 τῶ Διὸς τῶ Ὀλυμπίο τὸ ἐπιδέκατον ἡιερό-
 ν ἔστο τῶν χρεμάτων. ἡορκῶσαι δὲ πρεσβε-
 ῖαν Ἀθηναίων ἐλθῶσαν ἐς Χαλκίδα μετὰ τ-
 ὸν ἡορκοτῶν τῶν ἐν Χαλκίδι καὶ ἀπογράφ-
 σαι τὸς ὁμόσαντας Χαλκιδέον.

vacat

40 Ἀντικλῆς εἶπε· ἀγαθῆι τύχει τῆι Ἀθηναί-
 ὸν πο῔σθαι τὸν ἡόρκον Ἀθηναίος καὶ Χαλ-
 κιδέας, καθάπερ Ἐρετριεῦσι ἐφσεφίσαι-
 ο ἡο δέμος ἡο Ἀθηναίων· ἡόπος δ ἂν τάχιστ-
 α γίγνεται, ἐπιμελόσθον ἡοι στρατεγοί.
 45 ἡοίτινες δὲ ἐχσορκόσσοι ἀφικόμενοι ἐ-
 ς Χαλκίδα, ἐλέσθαι τὸν δέμον πέντε ἂνδρ-
 ας αὐτίκα μάλα. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἡομέρον ἀποκ-
 ρίναςθαι Χαλκιδεῦσιν, ἡότι νῦμ μὲν Ἀθε-
 ναίοις δοκεῖ ἐἂν κατὰ τὰ ἐφσεφισμένα· ἡ-
 50 ὸταν δὲ δοκεῖ βολευσάμενοι πο῔σσοι τέ-
 ν διαλλα[γ]έν, καθότι ἂν δοκεῖ ἐπιτέδειο-

ν ἔναι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Χαλκιδεῦσιν. τὸς δ-
 ἐ χσένος τὸς ἐν Χαλκίδι, ἡόσοι οἰκῶντες
 μὲ τελοῖσιν Ἀθέναζε, καὶ εἴ τοι δέδοται ἡ-
 55 ὑπὸ τῷ δέμο τῷ Ἀθηναίον ἀτέλεια, τὸς δὲ ἄ-
 λλος τελεῖν ἐς Χαλκίδα, καθάπερ ἡοι ἄλλο-
 ι Χαλκιδέες. τὸ δὲ φσέφισμα τόδε καὶ τὸν
 ἡόρκον ἀναγράφσαι, Ἀθένεσι μὲν τὸν γρα-
 μ[α]τέα τῆς βολῆς ἐστέλει λιθίνει καὶ κ-
 60 αταθῆναι ἐς πόλιν τέλεσι τοῖς Χαλκιδέ-
 ον, ἐν δὲ Χαλκίδι ἐν τῷι ἡιερωῖ τῷ Διὸς τῷ
 Ὀλυμπίῳ ἡε βολὲ Χαλκιδέον ἀναγράφσασ-
 α καταθέτο. ταῦτα μὲν φσεφίσασθαι Χαλκ-
 ιδεῦσιν. ^{vvvv} τὰ δὲ ἡιερά τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρεσμ-
 65 ὦν ἡυπὲρ Εὐβοίας θῦσαι ὡς τάχιστα μετὰ
 ἡιεροκλέος τρεῖς ἄνδρας, ἡὸς ἂν ἔλεται ἡ-
 ε βολὲ σφῶν αὐτῶν· ἡόπος δ' ἂν τάχιστα τυθ-
 εῖ, ἡοι στρατεγοὶ συνεπιμελόσθον καὶ τ-
 ὸ ἀργύριον ἐς ταῦτα [π]αρεχόντων. *vacat*
 70 Ἀρχέστρατο[ς] εἶπε· τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ Ἀ-
 ντικλῆς· τὰς δὲ εὐθύνας Χαλκιδεῦσι κατ-
 ἂ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἔναι ἐν Χαλκίδι καθάπερ Ἀθ-
 ἔνεσιν Ἀθηναίοις πλὲν φυγῆς καὶ θανάτ-
 ο καὶ ἀτιμίας· περὶ δὲ τούτον ἔφεσιν ἔνα-
 75 ι Ἀθέναζε ἐς τὲν ἐλιαίαν τὲν τῶν θεσμοθ-
 ετῶν κατὰ τὸ φσέφισμα τῷ δέμο· περὶ δὲ φυ-
 λακῆς Εὐβοίας τὸς στρατηγὸς ἐπιμέλεσ-
 θαι ἡὸς ἂν δύνονται ἄριστα, ἡόπος ἂν ἔχε-
 ι ἡὸς βέλτιστα Ἀθηναίοις.

80 ἡόρκος.

Resolved by the council and people. Antiochis was the *prytany*; Dracontides was the chairman. Diognetus proposed. The Athenian council and jurors shall swear an oath on the following terms: 'I shall not expel Chalcidians from Chalcis, nor shall I uproot their city; I shall deprive no individual of civic rights nor punish any with exile nor take any prisoner, nor execute any, nor confiscate the money of anyone not condemned in court without the authority of the Athenian people; whenever I am a *prytanis* I shall not put anything prejudicial to the interests of an individual or the community to the vote without due notice, and any embassy that is sent I shall bring before the council and people within ten days, as far as I can; I shall maintain this while the Chalcidians obey the Athenian people.' An embassy is to come from Chalcis with the commissioners for oaths and administer the oath to the Athenians and list the names of those who have sworn; the generals having responsibility to see that all take the oath. The Chalcidians shall swear an oath on the following terms: 'I shall not revolt from the people of Athens by any means or device whatsoever, neither in word nor in deed, nor shall I obey anyone who does revolt, and if anyone revolts I shall denounce him to the Athenians, and I shall pay to the Athenians whatever tribute I persuade them to agree, and I shall be the best and fairest ally I am able to be and shall help and defend the Athenian people in the event of anyone wronging the Athenian people, and I shall obey the Athenian people.' All the Chalcidians of military age and above shall swear. If anyone does not swear he is to be deprived of his civic rights and his property is to be confiscated and a tithe of it dedicated to Zeus Olympios. An embassy shall go from Athens to Chalcis with the commissioners for oaths and administer the oath in Chalcis and list those of the Chalcidians who have sworn.

Articles proposed. For good fortune for the Athenians: the Athenians and Chalcidians shall make the oath just as the Athenian people voted for the people of Eretria, and the generals shall have responsibility to see that that happens as quickly as possible. The people as soon as possible shall choose five men to go to Chalcis to exact the oaths. And on the matter of hostages, they shall reply to the Chalcidians that for the moment the Athenians have decided to leave matters as decreed. But whenever they decide they will deliberate and draw up an agreement [or 'exchange'] on conditions which seem suitable for the Athenians and the Chalcidians. The foreigners who live in Chalcis – except as many as pay no taxes to Athens, and if someone has been given tax exemption by the Athenian people – the rest shall pay taxes in Chalcis, just like the other Chalcidians. The secretary of the council shall write up this decree and oath at Athens on a stone stele and set it up on the Acropolis at the expense of the Chalcidians, and let the council of the Chalcidians write it up and deposit it in the sanctuary of Zeus Olympios at Chalcis. This is the decree about the Chalcidians. *Uninscribed space* Three men, chosen by the council from their own number, shall go with Hierocles to carry out the sacrifices required by the oracles about Euboea as quickly as possible. So that this happens as quickly as possible the generals shall take joint responsibility and provide the money for it.

Archestratus proposed. In other respects as Anticles had proposed, but *euthynai* are to be in the hands of the Chalcidians by themselves in Chalcis, just as of the Athenians at Athens except in cases involving exile, execution or loss of civic rights. On these matters there shall be appeal to Athens to the court of the *thesmothetai* in accordance with the decree of the people. As to guarding Euboea, the generals shall take responsibility for doing that as best they can in the best interests of the Athenians.

Oath.

(trans. Robin Osborne and P.J. Rhodes)

Commentators such as J.M. Balcer suggest on physical grounds that the surviving stele was originally attached to another stele containing further provisions for Chalcis, for which the allusion to earlier decrees at ll. 49 and 76 of the surviving inscription, and the unusual absence of the name of the γραμματεὺς in its prescript, have been taken as support.¹⁰² But the physical evidence is disputed by Lambert: 'The shallow cutting in the top of the stone probably served as a socket for the tenon of a decorative finial rather than the clamp that would be expected if there was an adjoining stele.'¹⁰³

Lambert demonstrates that all three decrees recorded in the present inscription were likely passed on the same day: the prytany (Antiochis) and its chairman Dracontides are mentioned in the prescript of the first decree only (ll. 1-2), while decree 3 (l. 70ff.) is a rider to decree 2; and Dracontides, while not identifiable, was in office for one day only.¹⁰⁴ We can therefore conclude that the whole of the inscription belongs to precisely the same historical context.

Decree 1, proposed by a certain Diognetus (ll. 2-39), stipulates the contents of the Athenian oath to the Chalcidians and the procedure for administering it, followed by the contents and procedure of the Chalcidian oath to the Athenians. Decree 2, proposed by Anticles (ll. 40-69), makes several provisions for Chalcis regarding hostages, taxation, inscribing the decree, and sacrifices.¹⁰⁵ Finally, decree 3 (ll. 70-79), proposed by Archestratus, allows Chalcis to retain an independent judicial system, with one notable exception: cases potentially involving the

¹⁰² Balcer 1978, 55-65, 83-101 with Fig. 1, depicting a putative reconstruction of the inscription's original physical arrangement. Cf. Lawton 1992, 248-50, but *contra* comm. OR 131, p. 174.

¹⁰³ Lambert 2017, 21 with n. 28.

¹⁰⁴ Lambert 2017, 22.

¹⁰⁵ According to Ostwald 2002, 139, the Chalcidian hostages discussed at ll. 47-52 were presumably captured in the course of the revolt of Euboea and kept in Athenian custody as bargaining chips ahead of negotiations with Chalcis; they likely consisted of politically influential members of the Chalcidian upper class who could command a high ransom. On the taxation provisions of ll. 53-54 cf. Pébarthe 1999, 142-46 and Pébarthe 2005.

punishment of death, exile, or deprivation of civic rights (ἀτιμία) are subject to review by the Athenian courts.¹⁰⁶

In the view of L. Kallet, the present treaty ‘attests unequivocally to a “hardened” *archē*, not unfamiliar to readers of Thucydides,’ and represents an unmistakable assertion of Athenian power.¹⁰⁷ It is certainly an unequal treaty in certain respects: unlike the oath of the Erythraeans, there is no mention of Athens’ allies, with the Chalcidians swearing loyalty to Athens alone. All Chalcidian citizens are required to swear, and failure to do so is punishable by the severe penalties of ἀτιμία and confiscation of property (ll. 32-36). Furthermore, the Chalcidian oath includes the promise not only to refrain from revolt in future, but to denounce any attempt to defect from Athens (ll. 24-25). Finally, the Chalcidians themselves must bear the costs of inscribing the treaty, both the Athenian copy (ll. 57-60) and the copy at Chalcis (ll. 61-64).¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, there is still a degree of reciprocity. The Athenians swear not to expel the Chalcidians (ll. 4-5), doubtless an allusion to the unenviable recent fate of Histiaea/Oreos, while ll. 26-27 suggest that the rate of tribute to be paid by Chalcis is negotiable.¹⁰⁹ And while it has sometimes been argued that Athens now imposed a democracy on Chalcis, Lambert believes that Chalcis was already democratic before the revolt: ‘If Chalkis was already democratic, it would also help explain why, despite its revolt, it was able to reach an agreement with the Athenians which left it relatively unscathed.’¹¹⁰ And M. Ostwald emphasizes that Athens, in the present treaty, asserts control over Chalcis by judicial but not political means.¹¹¹

D 1.13

Athenian treaty with Eretria(?)

446/45 BCE

Eretria presumably joined Chalcis in the revolt of 446 (cf. Thuc. 1.114.1-3). This is supported by a reported decree of 442/41 requiring Eretrian hostages to be sent to Athens (Hesych. E5746; Phot. E1908), and a late-5th century account of the πωληταί attests the existence of a sacred precinct (τέμενος) in Eretria, possibly a punitive measure (*IG* 1³ 418 ll. 2, 9). The evidence of the tribute lists is also suggestive, albeit fragmentary. Eretria apparently paid six talents’ tribute in

¹⁰⁶ Ostwald 2002, 139 argues that this provision was meant to protect Chalcidians who had remained loyal to Athens from being prosecuted by the Chalcidian courts. Antiph. 5.47, in a speech of ca. 420, implies that all allied cities were bound by this provision: see comm. OR 131, p. 179.

¹⁰⁷ Kallet 2017, 76; cf. Low 2005; Lambert 2017, 22.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. **D 2.1 ET 1** ll. 38-40 with Ostwald 2002, 136.

¹⁰⁹ Lambert 2017, 23; Lazar 2024, 49.

¹¹⁰ Lambert 2017, 27. *Contra* ATL 3, 153 with n. 17; Balcer 1978, 24.

¹¹¹ Ostwald 2002, 138.

448/47 (*IG* 1³ 264.4 l. 11, partially restored). It is then absent from the lists until 443/42, when it paid a (completely restored) tribute of 3 talents (*IG* 1³ 269.5 l. 30), a figure first securely attested in the list of 430/29 (*IG* 1³ 281.2 l. 51). The editors of *ATL* contend that the reduced tribute was compensation for the land confiscated from Eretria following the revolt.¹¹²

Despite this, it is not certain that the present treaty actually has anything to do with Eretria, since references to it in the inscription are restoration-dependent: the editors of *IG* 1³ detect a possible *alpha* at ll. 3-4 Ἐρε|τρι]ας, but J.D. Sosin cannot see it in the squeezes and photographs and proposes Χαλ|κίδ]ος instead. He suggests, albeit with some reluctance, that **D 1.12 ET 1** is actually a reaffirmation and expansion of **D 1.13 ET 1** (Samos: see below).¹¹³ Matthaiou, for his part, proposes that Athens' treaty partners are in fact the Diacrians, a minor Euboean community (cf. *IG* 1³ 71 ll. 93-94 with *apparatus criticus*).¹¹⁴ However, there is an explicit reference to an Athenian agreement with Eretria in the Chalcis treaty (**D 1.12 ET 1** ll. 42-43 καθάπερ Ἐρετριεῦσι ἐφσεφίσατ|ο ho δῆμος ho Ἀθηναίων), and the oath sworn by Athens' partners in the present treaty (ll. 7-12) is identical with the oath sworn by the Chalcidians (**D 1.12 ET 1** ll. 21-27).¹¹⁵

ET 1: *IG* 1³ 39

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens

Lettering: Ionic

Layout: non-stoichedon

[- ----- ταῦτα δὲ ἐμπεδώσω Ἐρε]-
 [τρι]εῦσιν [πει]θ[ομένοις τῶι δήμωι τῶι Ἀθην]-
 [αίω]ν· ὀρκῶσα[ι] δ[ὲ] πρεσβείαν ἐλθῶσαν ἐξ Ἐρε]-
 [τρι]ας μετὰ τῶν ὀρκωτῶν Ἀθηναίος καὶ ἀπογρ]-
 5 [άψαι] τὸς ὁμόσαντας· ὅπ[ως δ' ἂν ὁμόσωσιν ἅπαν]-
 [τες] ἐπιμελόσθ[ω]ν οἱ στ[ρατηγοί]· κατὰ τάδε]
 [αὐτ]ὸς ὁμόσαι· οὐκ ἀποστ[ήσομαι ἀπὸ τῶ δήμ]-

¹¹² *ATL* 1, 438; 2, 80; cf. Balcer 1978, 24.

¹¹³ Sosin 2014, 295 n. 98.

¹¹⁴ Matthaiou 2014-2019.

¹¹⁵ Schweigert 1937; *IACP* no. 370, p. 653; cf. Sosin 2014, 294-95 with n. 94, but placing the Eretria and Chalcis treaties in 424/23.

[ο τ]ῶ Ἀθηναίων οὔτε τέ[χνη] οὔτε μηχανῆ οὐδ]-
 [ε]μιᾶ οὐδ' ἔπει οὐδὲ [ἔργω] οὐδὲ τῶι ἀφισταμ]-
 10 [έν]ωι πείσομαι, καὶ ἐὰ[ν ἀφιστῆ] τις κατερῶ]
 [Ἀθ]η[να]ίοις, καὶ τὸν φό[ρον ὑποτελῶ τοῖς Ἀθην]-
 [αίοις ὃ]ν [ἄν] πείθω [Ἀθηναίος - - - - -]

1-2 [Χαλ]κιδ]εῦσιν Matthaίου. 1-4 [ταῦτα δὲ ἐμπεδώσω Χαλ]κιδ]εῦσιν [πει]θ[ομένοις τῶι δήμωι τῶι
 Ἀθην]αίω]ν· ὀρκῶσα[ι] δ[ὲ] πρεσβείαν ἐλθῶσαν ἐχ Χαλ]κίδ]ος Sosin 2014. 3-4 [Δια]κρί]ας Matthaίου.
 6-7 [Δια]κρί]ος Matthaίου.

... [just as?] the [Eret]rians *or* [Chalcid]ians, obeying the Athenian people; and an [embassy is to
 come from Eretri]a *or* Diakri]a [and administer the oath to the Athenians] with the
 commissioners for oaths [and list the names] of those who have sworn; and the generals shall
 take care [that all take the oath]. The — shall swear [in the following terms]: I shall not revolt
 [from the people] of Athens, by any means [or device] whatsoever, neither in word [nor in
 deed], nor shall I obey [anyone who does revolt]; and if [anyone revolts I shall denounce him] to
 the Athenians, and I shall [pay to the Athenians] whatever tribute I persuade them to agree ...

...

(trans. Stephen Lambert, adapted)

Lines 1-3 record the end of the Athenian oath to the Eretrians, the remainder of which originally appeared in the lost text above I. 1. Evidently the Athenians have sworn to uphold the settlement if the Eretrians refrain from rebellion. This is followed, at ll. 3-5, by instructions for the Eretrian embassy and the Eretrian oath-administrators (ὀρκωταί) present in Athens. At ll. 5-6, the Athenian generals are tasked with ensuring that the oath is sworn by the Eretrians. The provisions of the Chalcis treaty suggest that all adult male Eretrian citizens were expected to swear, and the Eretrian oath itself is preserved at ll. 7-12.

D 1.14

Athenian alliances with Rhegium and Leontini

ca. 444/43 BCE

Rhegium was a Greek city on the ‘toe’ of Italy, opposite Sicily, while Leontini was Sicilian and located to the north of Syracuse.¹¹⁶ In 427, Leontini and Rhegium were among the cities that sought Athenian intervention against Syracuse and its allies, themselves aligned with the Spartans. Athens accepted, which Thucydides ascribes to the Athenians’ desire to cut off the Peloponnesians’ grain supply, which was sourced from Sicily, as well as to probe the possibility of conquering Sicily outright (Thuc. 3.86). The appeal of the Leontinians and their allies was based both on common Ionian descent and ‘an old alliance’ between Athens and Leontini (3.86.3 ἐς οὖν τὰς Ἀθήνας πέμψαντες οἱ τῶν Λεοντίνων ξύμμαχοι κατὰ τε παλαιὰν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ὅτι Ἴωνες ἦσαν). This is almost certainly an allusion to **D 1.14 ET 2**, the Athenian alliance with Leontini, which I consider here in association with **D 1.14 ET 1**, an alliance with Rhegium.

The revised prescripts of both stelae, inscribed over an erasure (**ET 1** ll. 1-8; **ET 2** ll. 1-15) are securely dated to the same day in the archon-year 433/32 (archonship of Apseudes), indicating that we are dealing with renewals of existing alliances.¹¹⁷ But when were the alliances originally concluded? Osborne and Rhodes suggest that both alliances were originally contracted in the mid-440s BCE in the context of the Athenian-led foundation of the formally panhellenic Thurii on the site of the destroyed Sybaris (on the Gulf of Taranto in Southern Italy) in 444/43 (Plut. *Per.* 11.5, *Nic.* 5.2; Diod. 12.10.3-4. Athens was possibly also involved the refoundation of Neapolis around the same time: *FGrH* 566 Timaeus F 98).¹¹⁸ Leontini at least must have considered Athens a powerful potential protector against nearby Syracuse (Rhegium’s motives are more obscure, but then again Rhegium was nearer Thurii than Leontini).

It is in any case unlikely that the original enactments are exactly contemporaneous. Firstly, the dimensions of the respective stelae differ considerably: **ET 1** is 0.318m tall, 0.228m wide, and 0.092m thick. The line length is *stoichedon* 34 for the prescript and *stoichedon* 33 for the original text. Both the prescript and the original text use developed Attic lettering. **ET 2** is 0.74m tall, 0.423m wide, and its thickness varies from 0.155m at the centre to 0.13m at the edges. The prescript’s line length is *stoichedon* 18 and (mostly) *stoichedon* 17 in the earlier text. Unsurprisingly, the prescript is inscribed in the same hand as the prescript of IG 1³ 53, but the original text mixes older forms of *nu* and *upsilon* with elements of developed Attic lettering such as four-barred *sigma* and the absence of *h*.

As for the context of the reaffirmations, in 435/34, there was an episode of *stasis* in Thurii regarding the identity of its oecist. The matter was referred to the Delphic oracle, which

¹¹⁶ Cf. *IACP* no. 33, pp. 209-11 (Leontini); no. 68, pp. 290-93 (Rhegium).

¹¹⁷ Cf. Lambert 2020, 53.

¹¹⁸ Comm. OR 149, p. 287.

declared the oecist to be Apollo himself (Diod. 12.35.1-3).¹¹⁹ T. Wick argues that this is what prompted the reaffirmation of the Rhegium and Leontini alliances:

It seems sure that Rhegium and Leontinoi benefitted from the original alliances by an understanding that if they should be hard pressed by their western antagonists, particularly Syracuse, Athens would support them, just as apparently they were obliged to support Thourioi under similar circumstances. However, in light of Thourioi's repudiation, the Rhegines and Leontines could no longer be confident of Athenian support.¹²⁰

ΕΤ 1 (Rhegium): IG 1³ 53 = OR 149A*

Findspot: not recorded (probably Acropolis, Athens)

Lettering: developed Attic

Layout: *stoichedon* 34 (ll. 1-8); *stoichedon* 33 (ll. 9sqq.)

[θεοί. πρέσβες ἐκ Ῥεγίο η]οὶ τὲν χσυμμαχίαν
 [ἐποέσαντο καὶ τὸν ἠόρκ]ον· Κλέανδρος Χσεν-
 [.....¹⁹.....]τίνο, Σιλενὸς Φόκο,
 [.....¹⁵..... . ἐπ' Ἀφ]σεύδος ἄρχοντος κ-
 5 [αὶ τῆς βολῆς ἡῖ Κριτιά]δες πρῶτος ἐγράμμ-
 [άτευε. ^{vv} ἔδοχσεν τῆ βολ]ῆι καὶ τῷ δέμοι. Ἀ-
 [καμαντὶς ἐπρυτάνευε· Χ]αρίας ἐγραμμάτευ-
 [ε· Τιμόχσενος ἐπεστάτ]ε. Καλλί- *vacat* 10
 [αὺς εἶπε· χσυμμαχίαν εἶν]αι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ
 10 [Ῥεγίνοις. τὸν δὲ ἠόρκο]ν ὁμοσάντων Ἀθηνα-
 [ῖτοι ἡίνα ἐ̃ι ἡάπαντα πι]στὰ καὶ ἄδολα καὶ ἡ-
 [απλᾶ παρ' Ἀθηναίων ἐς αἴ]διον Ῥεγίνοις, κα-
 [τὰ τάδε ὀμνύντες· χσύμ]μαχοι ἐσόμεθα πισ-
 [τοὶ καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ἰσ]χυροὶ καὶ ἀβλαβῆς

¹¹⁹ The original oecist had been an Athenian, Lampon, according to Plut. *Mor.* 812D.

¹²⁰ Wick 1976, 299.

15 [ἐς ἄϊδιον Ῥεγίνοις, καὶ] ὀφελέσομεν ἐ[άν τ]-

[ο δέονται -----]

1 [θεοί. πρέσβες ἐκ Ῥεγίο cf. OR 149B 1-2 [θ]εοί : πρέσβες ἐγ Λεον[τ] | ίνον. 1-9 inscribed in an erasure.

Gods. Envoys from Rhegium who made the alliance and the oath, Cleandrus son of Xen—, — son of —tinus, Silenus son of Phocus, [— son of —]. In the archonship of Apseudes (433/2) and under the council for which Critiades was first secretary. The council and the people decided. Akamantis was the prytany. Charias was secretary. Timoxenus was chairman. Callias proposed: there shall be an alliance between the Athenians and the Rhegians. The Athenians shall swear the oath [in order that everything may be] in good faith and without deceit and [straightforward on the part of the Athenians] for all time towards the Rhegians, [swearing as follows]: ‘we shall be faithful allies, [just] and strong and unharmed [for all time to the Rhegians, and] we shall oblige them if they [need anything]’ ...

...

(trans. Stephen Lambert and P.J. Rhodes, adapted)

ET 2 (Leontini): IG 1³ 54 = OR 149B*

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens (south slope)

Lettering: developed Attic (ll. 1-15); careless and older Attic (ll. 16sqq.)

Layout: *stoichedon* 18 (ll. 1-15); mostly *stoichedon* 17 (ll. 16sqq.)

[θ]εοί : πρέσβες ἐγ Λεον[τ]-

ίνον ἡοὶ τὲγ χουμμαχί-

αν ἐποέσαντο καὶ τὸν ἡ-

όρκον· Τιμένον Ἀγαθοκ-

5 λέος, Σῶσις Γλαυκίο, Γέ-

λον Ἐξεκέστο, γραμμα-

τεὺς Θεότιμος Ταυρίσ-

κο. ἐπ' Ἄφσεύδος ἄρχοντ-

ος καὶ τῆς βολῆς ἠῆι Κρ-

10 ιτιάδες ἐγραμμάτευε.

ἔδοχσεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ

τῶι δέμοι. Ἀκαμαντὶς ἐ-

πρυτάνευε· Χαρίας ἐγρ-

αμμάτευε· Τιμόχσενος

15 ἐπεστάτε. Καλλίας ε-^{vv}

ἴπε· τέμ μὲν χσυμμαχία-

ν εἶναι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ

Λεοντίνοις καὶ τὸν ὄρ-

κον δῶναι καὶ δέχσασ-

20 [θαί. ὁμός]αι δὲ Ἀθηναί-

[ος τάδε· σύ]νμα[χ]οὶ ἐσόμ-

[εθα Λεοντ]ίν[οις ἀΐ]διο-

[ι ἀδόλος κ]αὶ [ἀβλα]βῶς.

[Λεοντίνο]ς ὁ[μῶς ὀ]μός-

25 [αι· σύ]νμαχοὶ ἐσόμ]εθα

[Ἀθηναίοις ἀΐδιοι] ἀδό-

[λος καὶ ἀβλαβῶς. π]ερὶ

[.....¹⁴.....]μπο

[.....¹⁴.....]ενα

30 [.....¹⁴.....]δεε

[.....¹⁵.....]σθ

[.....¹⁵.....]οπ

lacuna

[- - - -]ι[- - - -]

[- - - -]εαθ[- - - -]

35 [- - -]τοι υ[- -]

vacat

1 [[θε]] οι [[:]] /G 1³ (i.e. the cutter originally inscribed θεοί). 1-15 inscribed in an erasure.

Gods. The envoys from Leontini who made the alliance and the oath: Timenor son of Agathocles, Sosis son of Glaucias, Gelon son of Execestus; secretary Theotimus son of Tauriscus. In the archonship of Apseudes (433/2) and the council for which Critiades was secretary. The council and the people decided. Akamantis was in prytany. Charias was secretary. Timoxenus was chairman. Callias proposed: that there shall be the alliance between the Athenians and the Leontinians, and they shall give and receive the oath. The Athenians shall swear as follows: 'We shall be allies of the Leontinians for all time, without deceit and un harmfully.' The Leontinians shall swear likewise: 'We shall be allies of the Athenians for all time, without deceit and un harmfully.' Concerning ...

...

(trans. P.J. Rhodes, adapted)

The Callias who is recorded as proposer of both reaffirmations is almost certainly the same man, but the name is extremely common. The proposer of the original Rhegium alliance, if correctly restored, has a name ending in -ας (**ET 1** l. 9) and is possibly the same person.¹²¹ The θεοί-heading is present in the Rhegium alliance only by restoration but is securely attested in the Leontini alliance, making this one of its earliest certain occurrences (it appears also in /G 1³ 50, which may be slightly earlier, but its date is not secure).¹²²

The surviving texts do not offer much in the way of concrete treaty provisions. In the Rhegium treaty, these were probably recorded on the now-lost lower section of the stele. The provisions of the Leontini treaty occupy the extremely fragmentary ll. 27ff., beginning with π]ερί, but far too little survives to make any sense of it. We at least have all or part of the oaths: the Rhegium treaty records part of the Athenian oath before breaking off, while the Leontini treaty records the oaths of both the Leontinians and the Athenians in full; the oath formulae of both treaties reveal that the alliances were concluded, as restored, for all time (**ET 1** l. 12 [ές άϊ]διον; l. 15 [ές άϊδιον]; **ET 2** ll. 22-23 [άϊ]διο | [ι]; l. 26 [άϊδιολ]). While it might seem odd that anybody felt the

¹²¹ Lambert 2020, 54 n. 189. *Contra* ATL 3, 277. The name-ending is evidently preserved from the final line of the original text of both treaties.

¹²² Comm. OR 149, p. 286; Lambert 2020, 55.

need to reaffirm what were already perpetual alliances, this can be explained by the geopolitical context of 433/32, as discussed above.

The Rhegian envoy Silenus died at Athens and was commemorated with an epigram in an inscribed monument in the Ceramicus in which reference is made to his diplomatic activities there (*IG* 1³ 1178).

D 1.15

Athenian treaty with Samos

439 BCE

The Samian War of 440/39 began with an armed conflict between Samos and Miletus, both Delian League members, over the town of Priene, leading to Athens' intervention on the Milesians' behalf against Samos (Thuc. 1.115.2; Diod. 12.27.1; Plut. *Per.* 24-25). Samos was besieged by the Athenians for nine-months before its surrender, called a ὁμολογία by Thucydides (1.117.3 = **D 1.15 LT 1**).

The details of the reparations fortuitously survive in epigraphic form (*IG* 1² 293 + 1³ 363 + 1³ 454 = OR 138). The inscription reproduced below (**ET 1**), while highly fragmentary, clearly belongs to the same context. It consists of four fragments (*a-d*) which were first combined by A. Wilhelm, followed by Wade-Gery.¹²³ C. Fornara argues for the exclusion of fragments *c* and *d* due to anomalies in lettering and punctuation when compared with *a* and *b*, but A.P. Bridges subjected the four fragments to close inspection and determined on both physical and textual grounds that they all likely belong to the same inscription.¹²⁴ B.D. Meritt excludes fr. *b* only, on the basis that l. 7 Πελο]ποννεσ[— (rejected by OR) and l. 4 Λεμν— (both suppl. Pittakys) are nonsensical within a Samian context.¹²⁵ But even if Pittakys' restorations are correct, this does not disqualify fr. *b* from being included since some Peloponnesian League members, notably Sparta, considered supporting Samos (Thuc. 1.40.5); and we know that the Athenians placed Samian hostages on Lemnos, though the Samians later recovered them (Thuc. 1.115.3, 5).¹²⁶

The fragments were arranged in the order *b, c, d, a* by Matthaiou 2014 and this is followed in the OR edition. This yields a pattern consistent with other preserved treaties: terms of the treaty proper (fr. *b*); then, following a lacuna, the oaths of the Samians and Athenians

¹²³ Wade-Gery 1931, 309-13; cf. comm. OR 139, p. 224.

¹²⁴ Fornara 1979, 14-19; Bridges 1980, further reinforced by the autopsy undertaken by Bolmarcich 2009.

¹²⁵ Meritt 1984, 133 n. 31.

¹²⁶ Comm. OR 139, p. 227.

respectively (fr. c); and finally the list of swearers, of which only the Athenians are preserved (frs. d and a).*

ET 1: IG 1³48 = OR 139*

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens

Lettering: developed Attic

Layout: perhaps *stoichedon* 37

fragment b

--ο--

--απι--

--- Σαμῖος δὲ οἰκῆν [αὐτονόμος οἰ τὲν πόλιν τὲν ἑαυτῶν ? ---

--- Λῆμνο[ν --- οἰ --- ἐν] Λέμνο[ι ---

5 ---ι καθαπ[ερ ---

--οι κατασ--

--- ?καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν νέσ[ον ---

--- δὲ ἐν τῆ[ι ---

--σοι δὲ κα[θελῆν ---

10 --- τῶ λοιπῶ] χρόνον ὑπάρ[χ? ---

--- παραδῶναι δ' αὐτὸς Ἀθην[αί]-

[οἰσι τὰς ναῦς ἐς τὸν ἐσιόντα ἔνια]υτὸν : ἡσ[α δ' Ἀ]-

[θυναῖοι χρέματα ἐ Σάμοι ἀνέλοσα]ν ἀποδ[ῶναι Σ]-

[αμῖος ἐς τὸν εἰρεμένον χρόνον· ἄνδρα]ς [δὲ ?ἡομέ]-

[ρος (e.g. ἑκατὸν) δῶναι αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίοις —]

lacuna

fragments cda

* IG 1³ uses continuous line numbering, but OR restarts the numbering from 0 at fr. c, which I follow in my reproduction.

[...⁸... κατὰ τάδε Σαμῖος ὁμόσαι· δρᾶσο καὶ ἐ]-
 [βρῶ καὶ βουλευέσο ἡό τι ἄν δύνομαι ἀγαθόν, [καὶ οὐ]-
 [κ ἀποστέσμοι ἀπὸ τῶ δέμο τῶ Ἀ]θENAῖον οὔτε λ[ό]-
 [γοὶ οὔτ' ἔργοι ?οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν] χσυμμάχον τῶν Ἀ-
 [θENAῖον, βοεθέσο δὲ καὶ ἀμυνῶ τ]ῶι δέμοι τῶι Ἀθ-
 5 [ENAῖον. τὰδ' ὁμόσαι ἈθENAῖος· δρ]ᾶσο καὶ ἐρῶ καὶ
 [βουλευέσο ἀγαθὸν τῶι πλέθει τῶι] Σαμῖον ἡό τι ἄν
 [δύνομαι ἀδόλος ποιόντων τῶν Σα]μῖον κατὰ ἡὰ χ]-
 [συνέθεντο τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τοῖς] ἈθENAῖον.. [..]
 [.....²⁹.....]κράτε[.....]
 10 [στ]ρατεγο[ὶ ἈθENAῖον ἡοῖδε ὄμοσαν· ..] | [... Ἔρε]-
 χθεῖδος : Δεμ[..⁵.. Αἰγεῖδος : ?Ἄγνον : Φορμίον Πα]-
 νδιονίδος : Χ[αρισανδρίδες Λεοντίδος : Περικλ]-
 ἔς : Γλαύκον Ἀ[καμαντίδος :¹⁷.....]
 [..]ίδος : Χσ[.....¹⁶..... ?ἡο]ίδ[ε ταχσίαρχ]-
 15 [οὶ¹⁶..... ?Ἀντικλ]ῆς : Τλεμπ[όλεμος]
 [.....²⁴.....]ς : βολὲ ἐ~ρχε !Q[..
 [.....¹⁸..... πρῶτ]ος ἐγραμμάτευε Ἰα-
 [μνόσιος. *vacat*] *vacat*
Vacat

b 7 Πελο]ποννησ[-] Pittakys. *cda* 0-1 init. *IG* 1². 12 Χ[αρισανδρίδες Λεοντίδος only possible restoration with *stoichedon* 37 OR. 14-15 other possibilities ἡο]ίδ[ε τριέραρχοι, ταχσ]ια[ρχοὶ ἡοῖδε OR. 15-16 Ἀντικλ]ῆς : Τλεμπ[όλεμος cf. Thuc. 1.117.1.

... [the Samians] shall live [in independence *or* in their own city (?)] ... Lemnos ... [and the] other islanders (?) ... apply for the time [to come (?)] ... they [shall hand over the ships] to the Athenians [for the coming] year. The money which [the Athenians spent on Samos the Samians] shall repay [by the time stated. They shall give (e.g. a hundred) men as hostages to the Athenians (?)] ...

lacuna

[The Samians shall swear as follows: 'I shall act and speak and counsel what] good I can, [and I shall not defect from the people] of Athens either by word [or by any (?) deed, nor] from the allies of the Athenians, [and I shall help and defend] the people of Athens.' [The Athenians shall swear as follows:] 'I shall act and speak and [counsel what good I can for the mass] of the Samians insofar as I [am able, as long as] the Samians [act without deceit in accordance with what they agreed with the] Athenian [generals.]' ... [These Athenian] generals [swore]: — of Erechtheis; Dem— [of Aegeis; Hagnon(?); Phormio] of Pandionis; Charisandrides of Leontis; [Pericl]es; Glaucou of Akamantis; [—] of —is; X—. These [taxiarchs]: Anticles(?); Tlempolemus. ... The council in office ... of Rhamnous was first secretary.

(trans. Robin Osborne and P.J. Rhodes, adapted)

LT 1: Thuc. 1.117.3

καὶ ναυμαχίαν μὲν τινα βραχεῖαν ἐποίησαντο οἱ Σάμιοι, ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀντίσχειν ἐξεπολιορκήθησαν ἐνάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογίᾳ, τεῖχος τε καθελόντες καὶ ὁμήρους δόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες καὶ χρήματα τὰ ἀναλωθέντα ταξάμενοι κατὰ χρόνους ἀποδοῦναι.

The Samians offered some brief resistance at sea, but were unable to hold out long and in the ninth month of the siege were forced to capitulate. The terms of agreement were the demolition of their walls, the giving of hostages, the surrender of their ships, and the payment of full reparations in regular instalments.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 2: Diod. 12.28.3

ἐνεργῶς δὲ πολιορκήσας τὴν πόλιν καὶ ταῖς μηχαναῖς καταβαλὼν τὰ τεῖχη κύριος ἐγένετο τῆς Σάμου. κολάσας δὲ τοὺς αἰτίους ἐπράξατο τοὺς Σαμίους τὰς εἰς τὴν πολιορκίαν γεγενημένας δαπάνας, τιμησάμενος αὐτὰς ταλάντων διακοσίων. [4] παρέλειπε δὲ καὶ τὰς ναῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ τεῖχη κατέσκαψε, καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν καταστήσας ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα.

After punishing the ringleaders of the revolt, Pericles exacted of the Samians the expenses incurred in the siege of the city, fixing the penalty at two hundred talents. [4] He also took from them their ships and razed their walls; then he restored the democracy and returned to his country.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather, adapted)

Athens had attempted to impose a democracy on Samos immediately before the outbreak of the rebellion (Thuc. 1.115.3). Whether these plans were carried through after its suppression is unclear.¹²⁷ Neither the surviving parts of the inscription nor Thucydides say anything on the matter, but Diodorus (12.28.4 = **LT 2** καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν καταστήσας ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα) is explicit that democracy was imposed, this time successfully, in 439.¹²⁸ As W. Schuller notes, the presence of oligarchic exiles from Samos in nearby Anaia during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 3.32.2; 4.75.1) strongly implies that Samos itself was democratic.¹²⁹

The Athenians do not swear the present treaty on an equal basis with the Samians, but this is to be expected in what is very clearly an unequal treaty. As restored, the Samians swear not to defect from Athens. There is understandably no similar promise made by the Athenians, and while they swear to ‘act and speak and counsel what good [they] can’ for the Samians, this is dependent on the Samians abiding by the stipulations of the treaty. We do not know who swore for the Samians, and in spite of the severity of the revolt the Athenians probably did not go so far as to demand oaths from the entire citizen body: G. Shipley suggests a total population of 30,000-50,000 in the 5th century, and even subtracting women, slaves, and resident aliens from this figure leaves an unwieldily high citizen population.¹³⁰

D 1.16

Athenian defensive alliance with Corcyra

433 BCE

The city of Epidamnus on the Adriatic coast (located in the territory of present-day Albania, far from the Classical Greek heartland) experienced a democratic revolution around 437.¹³¹ The exiled aristocratic faction (οἱ δυνάτοί: Thuc. 1.24.5) sought support from Corcyra, the mother-city of Epidamnus, while in 435 the new democratic government also appealed to Corcyra but was rebuffed (1.24.5-7). Epidamnus subsequently turned to Corinth, itself the mother-city of Corcyra, which reinforced Epidamnus with new colonists from Corinth, Leucas, and Ambracia (1.27.1), prompting Corcyra and the exiled Epidamnian aristocrats to besiege Epidamnus

¹²⁷ For debate see Bolmarcich 2009, 60-62 with references. At 62 she concludes: ‘This decree does not suggest that the Athenians established a democracy at Samos from 439-412; it suggests that if they interfered in Samian affairs, they did so to establish a pro-Athenian and stable government, which may very well not have been a democracy.’

¹²⁸ The subject of Diod. 12.28.4 is Pericles. The testimony of Diodorus is accepted by *HCT* 1, 381; *ATL* 3, 151; Barron 1966, 81; Kagan 1969, 176; Legon 1972, 155-57.

¹²⁹ Schuller 1981, 285; cf. Gehrke 1985, 142 n. 8.

¹³⁰ Shipley 1987, 12-15.

¹³¹ Gehrke 1985, 60-62; *IACP* no. 79, p. 330.

(1.26.5).¹³² At 120 ships, Corcyra's navy was, according to Thucydides, the largest in Greece after that of Athens (1.25.4, 33.1), and the Corinthian fleet sent to attack Epidamnus was badly defeated at Leucimne. Undeterred, Corinth prepared an even larger naval expedition (1.28-30). This alarmed the Corcyraeans, and in 433 they sought an alliance with Athens. This fact alone is remarkable, as Corcyra is not known to have previously nurtured formal diplomatic ties with any of the major Greek states.¹³³ According to de Ste. Croix, it was imperative that Athens not let the large Corcyraean fleet fall into the hands of the Corinth, a formidable naval power in its own right.¹³⁴ There may have been economic motives for the alliance as well: Corcyra lay in a key position along the Ionian Sea trade route to Italy and Sicily, a point emphasized by Thucydides see **LT 1**, below). Embassies from Corinth and Corcyra travelled to Athens and addressed the Assembly, the first trying to dissuade Athens from aiding the Corcyraeans, the latter naturally encouraging it.

LT 1: Thuc. 1.44.1

τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι εἶπον. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἀμφοτέρων, γενομένης καὶ δις ἐκκλησίας, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ οὐχ ἦσσαν τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέγνωσαν Κερκυραίοις ξυμμαχίαν μὲν μὴ ποιήσασθαι ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν (εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ Κόρινθον ἐκέλευον σφίσιν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ξυμπλεῖν, ἐλύοντ' ἂν αὐτοῖς αἰ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους σπονδαί), ἐπιμαχίαν δὲ ἐποιήσαντο τῇ ἀλλήλων βοθηεῖν, ἐάν τις ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἴη ἢ Ἀθήνας ἢ τοὺς τούτων ξυμμάχους. [2] ἐδόκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμος καὶ ὡς ἔσσεσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν ἐβούλοντο μὴ προέσθαι τοῖς Κορινθίοις ναυτικὸν ἔχουσαν τοσοῦτον, ξυγκρούειν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις, ἵνα ἀσθενεστέροις οὔσιν, ἦν τι δέη, Κορινθίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ναυτικὸν ἔχουσιν ἐς πόλεμον καθιστῶνται. [3] ἅμα δὲ τῆς τε Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς ἡ νῆσος ἐν παράπλῳ κεῖσθαι.

Such was the speech of the Corinthians in their turn. The Athenians listened to both sides and held two assemblies. At the first assembly the Corinthians' arguments won at least equal favour, but on the next day opinion swung to an alliance with Corcyra: not a full offensive and defensive alliance (which would cause a breach of their treaty with the Peloponnesians, if the Corcyraeans required them to join a naval attack on Corinth), but they did make a purely defensive alliance providing for reciprocal help if any attack was made on Corcyra or Athens or the allies of either. Their thinking was that they would face war with the Peloponnesians in any case, and they did not want Corcyra and its powerful navy to pass to Corinth: rather, they intended to engineer as far as possible a full collision between the two sides, so that, if the need came, they would enter

¹³² Despite the fact that Corinth was Corcyra's mother-city (Hdt. 3.49.1; Thuc. 1.25.3, 38.1), relations between the two were poor (Plut. *Them.* 24.1). See further Parmeggiani 2016.

¹³³ Lewis 1992a, 374.

¹³⁴ Ste. Croix 1972, 75.

the war with both Corinth and the other naval powers weakened. At the same time they thought that the island of Corcyra lay nicely on the coastal route to Italy and Sicily.

The response to the duelling embassies was unusual and novel and represented a compromise between the Corinthian and Corcyraean positions. The Athenians agreed to an alliance, but it was explicitly defensive in nature, for which Thucydides uses the term *ἐπιμαχία* in contrast with *ξυμμαχία*. This is in fact the first such alliance for which we have evidence.¹³⁵ As Thucydides himself makes clear, the Athenians believed that an *ἐπιμαχία* would enable them to assist Corcyra against Corinth, a Peloponnesian League member, without violating the Thirty Years' Peace.¹³⁶ And numerous scholars have argued that the *ἐπιμαχία* did not, in fact, violate the Peace, since it was Corinth, not Athens, that had despatched its fleet first.¹³⁷ Under the Corcyraean *ἐπιμαχία*, Athens was not required to join in any aggressive action by the Corcyraeans, and the Athenian fleet was explicitly instructed to engage the Corinthians only if they attempted to land on Corcyra or territory controlled by Corcyra (Thuc. 1.45.3).¹³⁸

In Thucydides' portrayal, by 433 many Athenians already considered war with Sparta and its allies to be increasingly probable or at least possible (Thuc. 1.44.2: *ἐδόκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίου πόλεμος καὶ ὡς ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς*). The so-called Callias decrees (*JG 1³ 52 = OR 144*), if they are to be dated to the late-430s, may reinforce Thucydides' observation. The purpose of the decrees was to create a Treasury of the Other Gods, i.e., of gods other than Athena, and to concentrate the temple treasuries of the rural demes and the lower city in the Acropolis, which may imply preparations for war.¹³⁹ In light of this, it seems that the intention behind the Corcyraean *ἐπιμαχία* was not genuinely to avoid an all-out war between Athens and the Peloponnesian League, but rather to be able to credibly portray the Peloponnesians as the aggressors when the war did come.¹⁴⁰ The motives which Thucydides (1.44.1) ascribes to the Athenians, summarized by P.A. Stadter, will be familiar to students of the realist theory of international relations:

According to Thucydides five factors influenced Athens' decision: (1) she did not want to break the treaty, (2) war with the Peloponnesians was coming, (3) she did not want the Corcyraean

¹³⁵ Lewis 1992a, 374 calls the *ἐπιμαχία* 'new, perhaps unprecedented.'

¹³⁶ Cf. comm. *SdA*² no. 161, p. 81.

¹³⁷ Ste. Croix 1972, 79; Lewis 1992a, 374; Robinson 2017, 120. Stadter 1983 goes so far as to argue that the Athenians deliberately limited the extent of their support for Corcyra to prevent it from becoming too powerful.

¹³⁸ Kagan 1969, 242; Salmon 1984, 286; Lewis 1992a, 374-75.

¹³⁹ Rhodes 1987, 164; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 1, 87.

¹⁴⁰ A surviving inscription (*JG 1³ 364 = OR 148*) records payments from the treasury of Athena for the naval expeditions to Corcyra. The name Apseudes (archon 433/32) appears twice completely restored (ll. 1-2, 13), but the identification is guaranteed from other inscriptions: see comm. OR 148, p. 278.

navy to fall under Corinthian control, (4) she wanted Corinth and Corcyra to clash as much as possible, (5) Corcyra seemed a good way-station on the route to Italy and Sicily.¹⁴¹

Corcyra could not be allowed to fall to Corinth because, Stadter continues, 'Athens' position as a super-power on a part with Sparta depended on the superior size and expertise of her fleet. The transfer of Corcyra into the Peloponnesian sphere of influence would nullify that strength.'¹⁴² Viewed this way, the ἐπιμαχία with Corcyra was a clear strategic necessity for Athens.

¹⁴¹ Stadter 1983, 133.

¹⁴² Stadter 1983, 134.

Chapter 3

Treaties of the Archidamian War (430/29-421 BCE)

Introduction

The Archidamian War, which refers to the phase of the Peloponnesian War lasting from the outbreak of that conflict in 431 until the Peace of Nicias in 421, which temporarily suspended hostilities between Athens and Sparta, abounds in diplomatic activity precisely because there was so much *military* activity occurring in parallel with it. Many of the treaties examined in this chapter were a direct consequence of military campaigns, as shall be seen. The Peace of Nicias was preceded by a one-year ceasefire between Athens and Sparta (the latter joined by several other Peloponnesian League members) and followed by a military alliance intended to reinforce the Peace, which was immediately compromised by the refusal of several key Spartan allies to accept it.

D 2.1

Athenian treaty with the Colophonians

ca. 427 BCE

The Ionian city of Colophon was a member of the Delian League, first recorded on the tribute list of 454/53 paying three talents (*IG* 1³ 259.3 l. 21).¹ Some scholars suggest that Colophon's absence from the tribute lists of 450/49 to 447/46 inclusive points to a revolt, not otherwise attested, which was resolved by the present treaty in ca. 446 as soon as the Thirty Years' Peace allowed Athens to turn its attention to its rebellious ally.² Mattingly and Piérart, however, argue for 427 based on the testimony of Thucydides.³ Colophon was conquered by Persia in 430 after which the Colophonians fled to nearby Notium, but στάσις erupted there between pro- and anti-Persian factions of Colophonians and in 427 the latter called on the Athenians under Paches, who expelled the pro-Persian Colophonians and awarded Notium to the anti-Persian faction (Thuc. 3.34.1-4). Athens did not retake Colophon itself until 409 (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.4), but already in the tribute list of 428/27 the Colophonians are recorded alongside the Notians (*IG* 1³ 283.3 ll. 23-24).⁴ According to Matthaïou, there must have been two separate and distinct

¹ *IACP* no. 848, p. 1078.

² *ATL* 3, 282-84; Bradeen and McGregor 1973, 94-99; comm. *ML* 47, pp. 121-25.

³ Mattingly 1961, 175; 1963, 267, 272; 1974, 44-46; 1992, 132-33; Piérart 1984, 168-71.

⁴ On the date of *IG* 1³ 283 see Mattingly 1978, 83-85.

communities inhabiting Notium at the same time, the Κολοφώνιοι and the Νοτιεῖς, which were both loyal to Athens, and consequently under Athenian control.⁵

Additionally, Matthaiou's restoration of ll. 48-49 of the present treaty, which is part of the oath sworn by the Colophonians, reads [κ]αὶ φιλέσο τὸ[ν δέμον τὸν Ἀθηναῖον καὶ οὐ μνεσικα] | κέσο. Specifically, the phrase οὐ μνεσικα] | κέσο (the verb μνησικακῶ means 'remember past injuries; hold a grudge') is more suitable when used in connection with domestic στάσις, such as that experienced among the Colophonians in the period 430-427, than revolt against Athens (cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 39.6; *Andoc.* 1.90).⁶

ET 1: IG 1³37

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens

Lettering: careless Attic with strong Ionic influence

Layout: non-*stoichedon*; line length varies from 39-42 letters

[ἔδοξεν τῆι βολεῖ καὶ τῶι δέμοι· ...^{c.9}... ἐπρυτά]-
 [νευε, ..^{c.8}...]ος [ἐγραμμάτευε, ..^{c.7}.. ἐπεστάτε, .^{c.2}.]
 [...] εἶπε· κ[ο]λ[ο]φο[ν] -----
 [..^{c.7}..]ς -----
 5 [...]εσ ἈθENA -----
 [...]EONT[.] αὐτο -----
 [.²⁻³.]αι δὲ ταῦτα π -----
 [..] ἐ[χ]ς ἄλλες [π]όλε[ος] -----
 [. κ]ολοφῶνα ο[ι] πο -----
 10 [.²⁻³.] κατ -----
lacuna
 [.....¹⁵.....]αι τρισπίο ε -----
 [...⁸.... ψέφ]ισμα γένεται, ὅς -----

⁵ Matthaiou 2010, 22.

⁶ Gehrke 1985, 80-81; Matthaiou 2010, 23-24.

[..⁵.. ἐν τούτ]οι τῶι χρόνοι δὲ Λ -----
 [...⁹.... Κο]<λ>οφονίον καὶ τῶ[ν -----τῆ]-
15 [ς Ἀθηνᾶς τῆς] Ἀθηνῶν μεδεόσ[εσ -----]-
 [...¹⁰....]α δ' ἐκένο τῶι ἐ -----
 [...¹⁰....] Κολοφονίον π -----
 [...¹¹.....] δὲ γένεται ἐπ -----
 [..⁵.. Ἀθην]αῖοι ἐὰμ μέ τις αὐ[το -----]
20 [...⁸.....]· οἱ δ' αἰρεθέντες πέ[ντε οἰκισταὶ οἱ ἐς Κο]-
 [λοφῶνα τ]ά τ' ἐψεφισμένα φρα[ζόντων τῆσι πόλεσι κα]-
 [ι ἐπιμελ]εθέντων, ὅπος ἂν -----
 [οἱ οἰκέτ]ορες μετὰ τῶ δέ[μο τῶ -----]-
 [...⁷...] ἱερῶν τῶν παρ' α[υτοῖς· τῶν δὲ αἰρεθέντων λα]-
25 [μβανέτο] ἕκαστος τῆς ἐμ[έρας ἐκάστες ἐς ἐφόδια δρ]-
 [αχμέν· τὸ] δὲ ἀργύριον ὀφε[λόντων Κολοφόνιοι καὶ Λ]-
 [εβέδιο]ι καὶ Διοσιρῖται κ -----
 [..⁶... Κ]ολοφονίον μ -----
 [... γέν]εται ὃ [τ]ι ἂν δί[καιον -----]-
30 [..⁶...]μ[.]ε[.] ἐκαστῶ -----
 [..⁶...] ὅταν δὲ γέ[νεται? -----]-
 [... τὰ ὀ]νόματα? -----
 [... το]ῖς δὲ Κ[ολοφονίοις ? -----]-
 [...⁸.....]οι -----

lacuna

35 [..⁶...]οι·ν -----
 [Κολοφ]ῶνι ἀρο -----
 [...]νασλε -----
 [τὸ] δὲ ψέφισμ[α τότε καὶ τὸν ὄρκον ἀναγραψάτο ὁ γραμ]-
 [μα]τεὺς ὁ τῆς β[ολῆς ἐστέλει λιθίνει ἐμ πόλει τέλει]-

40 [ι τ]οῖς Κολοφο[νίον· Κολοφῶνι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν ὄρκ]-
 [ον] ἀναγράψαν[τες ἐστέλει λιθίνει οἱ ἐς Κολοφῶνα]
 οἰκισταὶ κατα[θέντων ἐν τόποι ὅτοι τάττει Κολοφ]-
 ονίον ὁ νόμος· [Κολοφονίος δ' ὁμόσαι· δράσο καὶ ἐ]-
 ρῶ καὶ βολεύσο [ὅ τι ἂν δύνομαι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν πε]-
 45 ρὶ τὸν δῆμον τ[ὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀποικί]-
 [α]ν καὶ οὐκ ἀποστ[έρομαι τῷ δέμο τῷ Ἀθηναίων οὔτε]
 [λ]όγοι οὔτ' ἔργ[οι οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἄλλοι πείσομαι]
 [κ]αὶ φιλέσο τ[ὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ οὐκ αὐτομο]-
 [λ]έσο καὶ δεμο[κρατίαν οὐ καταλύσο Κολοφῶνι οὔτ' α]-
 50 ὑτὸς ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἄ[λλοι πείσομαι οὔτ' ἐς ἄλλεν ἀφιστά]-
 μενος πόλιν ο[ὔτ' αὐτόθι στασιάζον, κατὰ δὲ τὸν ὄρκ]-
 ον ἀλεθεῖ [τ]αῦτ[α ἐμπεδόσο ἀδόλος καὶ ἀβλαβῶς νὲ τὸν]
 [Δ]ία καὶ τὸν Ἀπό[λλο καὶ τὴν Δέμετρα, καὶ εἰ μὲν ταῦτ]-
 [α] παραβ<α>ίνοιμι[εξόλες εἶεν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ γ]-
 55 [έ]νος τὸ ἐμὸν [ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, εὐορκῶντι δὲ εἶε]
 μοι πο[λλὰ καὶ [ἀγαθὰ -----]]

vacat?

15 Ἀθενῶν μεδὲ ὅσ[ε]ς ATL. 26-27 [. . τὸ] δὲ ἀργύριον ὄφε[λόντων Νοτιῆς καὶ Κολ]οφόνιο]ι καὶ Διοσιρῖται Mattingly. 41-42 κατὰ [τάδε Κολοφονίος ὁμόσαι καθότι | Κολοφ]ονίον ὁ νόμος [κελεύει] Hiller; κατὰ [τάδε Κολοφονίος ὁμόσαι, καθ' ἃ Κολοφ]ονίον ὁ νόμος [κελεύει κατὰ ἱερῶν καιομένον ...] Kolbe 1938, 257. 43-47 δράσο καὶ ἐ]ρῶ καὶ βολεύσο [ὅ τι ἂν δύνομαι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν πε]]ρὶ τὸν δῆμον τ[ὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ περὶ τὸς ξυμμάχος αὐτ]ὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀποστ[έρομαι τῷ δέμο τῷ Ἀθηναίων οὔτε | λ]όγοι οὔτε ἔργ[οι οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐγὼ - - - ATL. 43-45 καὶ βολεύσο [ὅς ἂν δύνομαι ἄριστα καὶ δικαιοτά]τα πε]ρὶ τὸν δῆμον τ[ὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸ πλεῖθος τῶν χσυ]μμάχων Hiller, Hondius; καὶ βολεύσο [ὅ, τι ἂν δύνομαι δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν πε]]ρὶ τὸν δῆμον τ[ὸν Κολοφονίον καὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναί]ο]ν Kolbe; [ὅ, τι ἂν δύνομαι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν πε]]ρὶ τὸν δῆμον τ[ὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ περὶ τὸς ξυμμάχος αὐτ]ὸν Meritt and Wade-Gery. 48-49 [κ]αὶ φιλέσο τ[ὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ οὐ μνεσικα]]κέσο Matthaiou.

[The council and people decided. — was the prytany]; —os [was the secretary; — was chairman; —] proposed: Colophon ... Athens ... this ... these things ... from another city ... Colophon ...

Lacuna[

... of Triopion ... there would be a decree ... at this time ... [of the] Colophonians and the ... [of Athena], who rules over Athens ... that to the ... of the Colophonians and the ... but would be ... the Athenians, if not one The five elected [founders of the settlement for Colophon] should present the decree [to the cities and] ensure that ... the settlers together with the people of the ... of their sanctuaries. Each [of those elected shall receive a drachma] for each day [as travel allowance]; the money shall be paid [by the Colophonians, Lebedians] and Diosirites ... of the Colophonians ... there would be whatever is lawful ... every ... whenever it may happen ... the names ... to the Colophonians ...

lacuna

... in Colophon ... the secretary of the council [shall record] this decree [and the oath on a stone stele on the Acropolis] at the expense of the Colophonians. [In Colophon] the founders of the settlement sent to Colophon shall record [this and the oath on a stone stele], and they shall set them up [in the place specified by] the Colophonian law. [The Colophonians shall swear: 'I will act and] speak and decide in council [whatever I can that is good] for the [Athenian] people [and the] colony, and I will not revolt [from the Athenian people] in word or deed, [neither myself nor by following another], and I will love the [Athenian people and I will not] defect and I will not [overthrow] the democracy [in Colophon, neither] myself nor [by following] another, [neither] revolting in favour of [another] city nor [in favour of someone stirring up civil strife there, but in accordance with the] oath I will truly [keep] this [without deceit or malice], by Zeus and Apollo [and Demeter; and if I] transgress [this, may I be destroyed, myself and] my family, [for all time; but if I keep the oath], much [good] will come to me ...'

vacat

(own trans., based on the German trans. of Klaus Hallof)

It bears repeating that the Athenians under Paches expelled the pro-Persian Colophonians and formally gave Notium to the anti-Persian faction; this is described by Thucydides at 3.34.4: Κολοφωνίοις δὲ Νότιον παραδίδωσι πλὴν τῶν μηδισάντων. καὶ ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι οἰκιστὰς πέμψαντες κατὰ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νόμους κατώκισαν τὸ Νότιον, ξυναγαγόντες πάντας ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, εἴ ποῦ τις ἦν Κολοφωνίων. The present treaty, like Thucydides, mentions οἰκισταί (l. 42), who according to the historian were brought in 'later' (ὕστερον), so that while 427 is a *terminus post quem* for the treaty it need not necessarily date to that year, but could potentially have occurred at any point before the Athenian recapture of 'old' Colophon in 409. Mattingly suggests that the role of the Athenian οἰκισταί was to help the anti-Persian Colophonians settle Notium in 427. He also restores ll. 26-27 [. . τὸ] δὲ ἀργύριον ὄφε[λόντων Νοτιῆς καὶ Κολ|οφόνιο]ι καὶ Διοσιρῖται, excising any mention of Lebedos, which he deems 'gratuitous,' and replacing it with Notium, which better fits the situation of 428/27 known from

the literary sources. Furthermore, Colophon, Notium, and the Diosiritae are grouped together in the tribute list of 428/27 and nowhere else (*IG* 1³ 283.3 ll. 23-25).⁷

The Colophonians swear allegiance to the Athenian δῆμος, without reference to the allies (but see the proposed restorations of ll. 43-47 by *ATL*, and of ll. 43-45 by Hiller and Hondius) and pledge to uphold the democratic regime in place. The invocation of the triad Zeus, Apollo, and Demeter is identical with the invocation seen in the Erythrae treaty (*OR* 121 l. 16), although in the case of Colophon [τὲν Δέμετρα] is restored.

D 2.2

Athenian alliance with Camarina

ca. 427 BCE

Camarina was an ethnically Greek city on the southern coast of Sicily which was founded as a colony of Syracuse (*Thuc.* 6.5.3). On the basis of Thucydides (6.75.3 = **LT 2** κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Λάχητος γενομένην ξυμμαχίαν), the alliance between Athens and Camarina must have been made during the Athenian general Laches' Sicilian campaign of 427-25 BCE, although Thucydides does not disclose its existence until much later in his narrative.⁸ Camarina at this time was also allied with Leontini (3.86.2).

LT 1: Thuc. 6.52.1 (415 BCE)

ἐσηγγέλλετο δὲ αὐτοῖς ἕκ τε Καμαρίνης ὡς, εἰ ἔλθοιεν, προσχωροῖεν ἄν, καὶ ὅτι Συρακόσιοι πληροῦσι ναυτικόν. ἀπάση οὖν τῇ στρατιᾷ παρέπλευσαν πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ Συρακούσας· καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἠῦρον ναυτικόν πληροῦμενον, παρεκομίζοντο αὖθις ἐπὶ Καμαρίνης, καὶ σχόντες ἐς τὸν αἰγιαλὸν ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο. οἱ δ' οὐκ ἐδέχοντο, λέγοντες σφίσι τὰ ὄρκια εἶναι μῶν νηὶ καταπλεόντων Ἀθηναίων δέχεσθαι, ἢν μὴ αὐτοὶ πλείους μεταπέμπωσιν. [2] ἄπρακτοι δὲ γενόμενοι ἀπέπλεον.

They [sc. the Athenians] began to receive reports from Camarina that if they went there the people would come over to them: reports too of the manning of a Syracusan fleet. So they sailed with their entire force down the coast to Syracuse first of all. Finding no evidence of a fleet being manned, they carried on round towards Camarina, where they put in to the open beach and sent a herald to the city. The Camarinaeans refused to admit them, saying that their sworn agreement was to receive any Athenian visitation in a single ship, but greater number only at their own invitation. Thus frustrated, the Athenians sailed away.

⁷ Mattingly 2010, 100 with *Thuc.* 3.34; cf. *ATL* 3, 282-84; *HCT* 2, 297; comm. ML 47, p. 124.

⁸ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 489; cf. Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 593.

LT 2: Thuc. 6.75.3 (415/14 BCE)

καὶ πυνθανόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐς τὴν Καμάριναν κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Λάχητος γενομένην ξυμμαχίαν πρεσβεύεσθαι, εἴ πως προσαγάγοιντο αὐτούς, ἀντεπρεσβεύοντο καὶ αὐτοί· ἦσαν γὰρ ὕποπτοι αὐτοῖς οἱ Καμαριναῖοι μὴ προθύμως σφίσι μῆτ' ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην μάχην πέμψαι ἃ ἔπεμψαν, ἕς τε τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ οὐκέτι βούλωνται ἀμύνειν, ὀρῶντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῇ μάχῃ εὖ πράξαντας, προσχωρῶσι δ' αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν προτέραν φιλίαν πεισθέντες.

They [sc. the Syracusans] heard that the Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina in an attempt to win the people over on the strength of their former alliance, made under Laches: so they sent a counter-embassy of their own. They had their suspicions that the Camarinaeans had not been particularly enthusiastic in sending what help they did for the first battle, and might be unwilling to give any more support in the future, now that they saw the Athenians successful in that battle: they could be persuaded to renew the old friendship and join the Athenian side.

R.A. Bauslaugh's argument that Camarina was not only neutral in 415, but that no Athenian alliance Camarina actually existed, is not acceptable in light of Thucydides' testimony.⁹ While it is difficult to determine the precise clauses of the alliance, it is fairly certain that the Athenians could only put in at Camarina with one ship, whereas additional vessels could be introduced only if the Camarinians expressly requested them (cf. **LT 1**).¹⁰ If the alliance had any time limit at all, it had evidently not yet expired in 415, since otherwise the Athenians would have had no reason to expect the Camarinians to cooperate when the fleet landed there.¹¹

Camarina ultimately did not honour its alliance with Athens. At Thuc. 6.88.2, the Camarinians reveal that they have a separate alliance with Syracuse and declare their neutrality.¹² Thucydides does not disclose when the alliance between Syracuse and Camarina was made, but I think the most plausible context is at the Congress of Gela in 424: this would explain why Camarina readily supported Athens in 427 but was reluctant to do so in 415. And while it is true that an Athenian embassy of 422 led by Phaeax once again 'won over' the Camarinians in 422 (Thuc. 5.4.6: τοὺς μὲν Καμαριναίους πείθει; cf. Diod. 13.4.2), this was part of an abortive attempt to build an anti-Syracusan alliance which came to naught when Gela (an ally of Camarina: 4.58) refused to join, and Camarina must have either quickly returned to the Syracusan fold or, if Camarina and Syracuse were not already allies, made an alliance now.

⁹ Bauslaugh 1990, 156-60.

¹⁰ *HCT* 4, 317.

¹¹ Since Thuc. 6.52.1 records that the Athenians landed at Camarina not with a single ship, but with their whole fleet, the Camarinians were within their treaty rights to refuse them entry.

¹² Cf. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 431-32.

D 2.3

Athenian treaties with the Lesbian cities

427 BCE

Lesbos at the time of the Mytilenean-led revolt consisted of five separate πόλεις (cf. Hdt. 1.151.2): Mytilene (the most important and powerful), Pyrrha, Antissa, Eresus, and Methymna, of which only the last remained loyal to Athens in 428/27. When the rebellion was suppressed in 427, Mytilene avoided the execution of its entire citizen male population by the narrowest of margins (Thuc. 3.28.1-2; Diod. 12.55.7). But the island was still punished severely, with over a thousand rebels being executed from among an estimated adult male population of 22,000 for the entire island including Methymna.¹³ Additional punitive measures were subsequently undertaken, as recorded by Thucydides.

LT 1: Thuc. 3.50.1

τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἄνδρας οὓς ὁ Πάχης ἀπέπεμψεν ὡς αἰτιωτάτους ὄντας τῆς ἀποστάσεως Κλέωνος γνώμη διέφθειραν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (ἦσαν δὲ ὀλίγω πλείους χιλίων) καὶ Μυτιληναίων τεῖχη καθεῖλον καὶ ναῦς παρέλαβον. [2] ὕστερον δὲ φόρον μὲν οὐκ ἔταξαν Λεσβίοις, κλήρους δὲ ποιήσαντες τῆς γῆς πλὴν τῆς Μηθυμναίων τρισχιλίουσ τεττακοσίουσ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ἱεροῦσ ἐξεῖλον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλοὺσ σφῶν αὐτῶν κληρούχοὺσ τοὺσ λαχόντασ ἀπέπεμψαν· οἷσ ἀργύριον Λέσβιοι ταξάμενοι τοῦ κλήρου ἐκάστου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύο μνᾶσ φέρειν αὐτοῖ εἰργάζοντο τὴν γῆν. [3] παρέλαβον δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ πολισίματα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅσων Μυτιληναῖοι ἐκράτουσ, καὶ ὑπήκουον ὕστερον Ἀθηναίων.

On Cleon's motion the Athenians executed the men sent to Athens by Paches as the prime movers of the revolt (these numbered just over a thousand): and they demolished the Mytilenaeans' walls and took over their ships. After that they did not impose tribute on the Lesbians, but instead divided the island (apart from the territory of Methymna) into three thousand allotments, of which they dedicated three hundred to the gods: for the rest they sent out individual landlords from their own citizens, choosing them by lot. The Lesbians agreed to pay the landlords a yearly rent of two minas for each allotment, and worked the land themselves. The Athenians also took over the towns on the mainland which had been under Mytilenaeon control, and these then became subject to Athens.

¹³ Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 528.

Thucydides' account implies that the Athenians made a single treaty with the Lesbian cities collectively, but it is more likely that separate agreements were concluded: Mytilene's attempt to execute a synoecism and transform Lesbos into a single πόλις had been largely responsible for the revolt (Thuc. 3.2.1-3.1), so there is little reason that Athens would deign to treat Lesbos as a single unit now; and a later inscription (**D 3.9 ET 1**), which abolished the cleruchy, was contracted with Mytilene alone. It can be assumed that no treaty was made with loyal Methymna, and as it is attested supplying ships in the Sicilian campaign of 415-13 (Thuc. 6.85.2; 7.57.5) it evidently did not suffer a reduction in status.

The demolition of walls was by now the usual course of action undertaken by Athens after an allied revolt (e.g. Thasos and Samos). The seizure of Mytilene's περαία (on which cf. Thuc. 4.52.3) also echoes the treatment of Thasos. The Athenian decision to establish cleruchies on Lesbos rather than impose φόρος was likely strategically motivated, since cleruchs could act as an unofficial garrison force to keep an eye on the local population.¹⁴

D 2.4

Athenian treaty with Hermione

ca. 425 BCE

Previously it was fashionable to assign the Athenian treaty with Hermione, a city located in the eastern part of the Argolid, to ca. 450 largely on the basis of the three-barred *sigma*.¹⁵ And there is also some historical evidence in favour of an early date, since Athens occupied nearby Troezen during the First Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.115.1). A further Athenian incursion into the Argolid occurred in 430 (2.56.5), but the strongest candidate is 425, when Athens was again militarily active in the area (4.45). Mattingly, who supports a date of ca. 425, writes, 'Whereas all Sparta's Argolid allies were raided by the Athenians in 430 BC, Hermione alone was spared in 425 BC the more serious raiding from Methana.'¹⁶ This was likely a result of the present treaty, even if Thucydides does not specifically mention Hermione in connection with the 425 campaign.

Curiously, the surviving fragment was recovered in the Agora and not, as we should expect, on or in the immediate vicinity of the Acropolis. Because there is no surviving publication formula,

¹⁴ *HCT* 3, 327 speculates that only members of the two lowest property classes at Athens, the θῆτες and ζευγίται (cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 7.3-4), were eligible for selection as cleruchs. This is explicit at *JG* 1³ 46 = OR 142 (foundation of an Athenian colony at Brea, ca. 440-32 BCE), ll. 43-46, but it bears emphasizing that in the case of Brea the Athenians were being sent off as ἀποικοί ('colonists') and not as κληροί. For a recent study of Athenian cleruchies see Igelbrink 2015.

¹⁵ Oliver 1933, 494-97.

¹⁶ Mattingly 2010, 100; cf. Mattingly 1961b, 173-74; Mattingly 2000.

we cannot determine with certainty where it was originally displayed, but 5th century public documents were overwhelmingly concentrated on the Acropolis, as indicated by findspots and/or surviving publication formulae, and it is more likely than not that the present treaty was set up there before being brought down to the Agora at a later time, perhaps as building material.

ET 1: IG 1³31

Findspot: Agora, Athens

Lettering: mid-5th century Attic

Layout: ll. 1-2 in larger letters; l. 3sqq. *stoichedon* 35

[Θ]εόδωρος Πρασιεύς ἐγραμμάτευε.

vacat

[χσ]υνθῆκαι : Ἑρμιονέον : καὶ Ἀθηναίω[ν].

vacat

[ἔ]δοχσεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι δέμοι· Ἀντιοχ[ῆς ἔ]-

[π]ρυτάνευε, Θεόδωρος ἐγραμμάτευε, Σι[. .⁵ .]-

5 [.] ἐπεστάτε *vacat*

[Λ]έον εἰ[ῖ]π[ε]- χσυνθέσθαι ἡὰ οἱ Ἑρμιω[νῆς]

[.....¹⁶.....]ρ[. .⁵ ..]φψ[.....¹¹.....]

6-7 Ἑρμιω[νῆες καὶ | οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι χσυν]ν[έ]β[αλον] Jameson.

Theodorus of Prasiae was the secretary.

vacat

Alliance of the Hermionians and Athenians.

vacat

The council and people decided; Antiochis was the prytany; Theodorus was the secretary; Si— was the chairman; Leon proposed: that a treaty be made, which the Hermionians ...

...

(own trans., adapted from the German trans. of Klaus Hallof)

The clauses of the present treaty are unfortunately not preserved, since the lower part of the stele is lost, but they are likely to have been similar to those of the Athenian treaty with Halieis (see below) which, I will argue, emerged in the same context. The Halieis treaty allowed Athens to set up a garrison and/or naval base in Halieis, to be maintained for the duration of the war, and forbade the reception of hostile forces within its territory in return for protection against attack – a real possibility as Sparta and its allies might be expected to retaliate in light of Halieis’ defection to Athens. The Hermione treaty thus helped consolidate Athens’ position in the Argolid, securing the Athenians a foothold in the Peloponnese that was useful both for harassing the Spartans and their allies and as a bargaining chip in potential peace negotiations.

Mattingly suggests that Leon, the proposer of the present treaty (l. 6; the Λ is restored), may be identical with the Athenian swearer of the Peace of Nicias and the subsequent alliance as recorded by Thucydides (5.19.2 = **D 2.12 LT 1**; **D 2.13 LT 1** = 5.24.1).¹⁷

D 2.5

Athenian treaty with Phaselis

ca. 425 BCE

Phaselis, a city on the southern coast of Asia Minor, was conquered by Cimon in ca. 469 and forced into the Delian League (Plut. *Cim.* 12.3-4). It is mentioned in the Peace of Callias as the westernmost limit within which the Persian fleet was permitted to operate (Diod. 12.4.5). The connection with Athens lasted until 411 at the latest, by which point Phaselis is attested under Spartan occupation (Thuc. 8.99).¹⁸ It is not known to have reverted to Athenian control before 404.

The stele was found in the 18th century at the Monastery of St. John the Baptist on Mt. Hymettos, far from the Acropolis where inscriptions of this kind tend to be recovered.¹⁹ Also unusual is its Ionic lettering which, in the opinion of Meiggs and Lewis ‘no doubt [r]eflects the

¹⁷ Mattingly 1992, 133-34; Mattingly 2010, 100.

¹⁸ On Phaselis’ 5th-century history see further *IACP* no. 942, p. 1140.

¹⁹ James 2023, 133 n. 1, with publication history.

fact that the Phaselites paid for the stone themselves' (cf. **ET 1** ll. 26-27).²⁰ An intriguing but by no means definitive historical argument for a range of 469-462 is based on ll. 18-19 *καταδικάσ[ει]* ('give judgement or sentence against a person, condemn')²¹ Wade-Gery argues that this clause gives the Athenian magistrates, such as the polemarch mentioned at l. 10, a judicial power going well beyond what is attested by the later orators, notably Lysias (15.2-3). Thus, he assigns the Phaselis decree to a period when magistrates still had the power to pronounce verdicts, whose abolition he associates with the reforms of Ephialtes in 462. Therefore, the chronological range of the present treaty must be 469-462.²² C. Hignett notes the fully developed prescript (ll. 1-5) and associates this too with Ephialtes' reforms.²³ But the connection with Ephialtes is disputed by R. Sealey based on the very limited amount of securely dated material with which to document the development of Athenian decree prescripts before 462; and no surviving ancient source documents the expansion of the powers of the popular court, which Sealey suggests may have been a gradual evolutionary process and not a sudden transformation spearheaded by a solitary reformist figure such as Ephialtes.²⁴

More recent scholarship has, rightly I think, assigned the treaty to the 420s. J. Blok prefers a date of 425/24 partly because a Leon (**ET 1** l. 4) also appears as the proposer of the Hermione treaty and as a swearer of the Truce of Laches.²⁵ Beretta Liverani notes that a 10,000-drachma fine would be an anomaly before 450, but is in line with other decrees of the 420s.²⁶

ET 1: IG 1³ 10 = OR 120*

Findspot: Mt. Hymettos, Athens

Lettering: Ionic

Layout: *stoichedon*, uncertain line length

[ἔδο]ξεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι δ[ή]-

[μωι· Ἀ]καμαντὶς [ἐ]πρυτάνευε,

²⁰ Comm. ML 31, p. 67.

²¹ LSJ⁹ s.v. καταδικάζω.

²² Wade-Gery 1958, 183-84. At 183 n. 2 he argues that Ephialtes' reforms are reflected in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, first performed in 458: at the preliminary trial of Orestes, Athena carries out the interrogation (397-489) but does not pronounce a verdict (470-79), and restricts herself to directing procedure during the main trial (582ff.).

²³ Hignett 1952, 397.

²⁴ Sealey 1964, 16-17.

²⁵ Blok 2022, 98-99.

²⁶ Beretta Liverani 2013.

[.]γάσιππος έγγραμμάτευε, Νε-
ο[κ]λέδης έπεστάτει, Λέω[ν ε]ĩ-
5 [πε· τοĩ]ς Φασηλίταις τὸ ψ[ήφ]ι-
[σμα άν]αγράψαι· ὅ τι ἄμ μέ[ν] Ἄθ-
[ήνησι ξ]υ[μβ]όλαιον γένηται
[πρὸς Φ]ασηλιτ[ῶ]ν τινα, Ἄθή[ν]η-
[σι τὰς δ]ίκας γίνεσθαι παρ-
10 [ὰ τῶι πο]λεμάρχῳ, καθάπερ Χ-
[ίοις, καὶ] ἄλλοθι μηδὲ ἀμῶ· τῶ-
[ν δὲ ἄλλω]ν ἀπὸ ξυμβολῶν κατ-
[ὰ τὰς ὅσας] ξυμβολὰς πρὸς Φα-
[σηλίτας] τὰς δίκας ἐ~ν[α]ι· τὰς
15 [...⁷...]το[ς] ἀφελῆν. ἐὰν δέ τ-
[ις ἄλλη τῶ]ν ἀρχῶν δέξεται δ-
[ίκην κατὰ] Φασηλιτῶν τινος
[παρὰ τόδε ? ε]ἰ μὲν καταδικάς-
[ει, ἢ καταδίκη] ἄκυρος ἔστω. ἐ-
20 [ὰν δέ τις παραβ]α[ί]νηι τὰ ἐψη-
[φισμένα, ὀφ]ε[λέτ]ω μυρίας δ[ρ]-
[αχμὰς ἱερ]ὰς τῆι Ἀθηναίαι· τ-
[ὸ δὲ ψήφισ]μα τό[δε] ἀναγραψά-
[τω ὁ γραμμ]ατεὺς ὁ τῆς βολῆς
25 [έστήληι λιθί]νηι καὶ καταθ-
[έτω ἐμ πόλει τ]έλεσι τοῖς τῶ-
[ν Φασηλιτῶν]. *vacat*
vacat

The council and the people decided. Akamantis was in prytany. [Mnasippus *or* Onasippus] was secretary. Neocleides was chairman. Leon [proposed]: to inscribe the decree for the Phaselites. Whatever cause of action arises at Athens [against] any of the Phaselites, [the] trials are to be held at Athens [before the] polemarch, as for the Chians, [and] nowhere else. Of the other cases covered by judicial conventions, the trials shall be held in accordance with the existing judicial conventions with the Phaselites. The — shall be abolished. If any of the [other] officials accepts a case [against] any of the Phaselites [contrary to this?], if he condemns, [the condemnation] shall be invalid. If [anybody] contravenes what has been decreed, he shall owe ten thousand drachmas sacred to Athena. Let the secretary of the council inscribe this decree on a stone [stele] and set it down [on the Acropolis] at the expense of the [Phaselites].

(trans. Stephen Lambert and P.J. Rhodes, adapted)

The present treaty is favourable to the Phaselites in certain respects: it is inscribed ‘for the Phaselites,’ as de Ste. Croix was already willing to acknowledge many decades ago.²⁷ Athenian officials who violate the terms of the treaty are threatened with a 10,000-drachma fine, and at ll. 10-11 the Phaselites are promised the same treatment as the Chians who, far from being defectors, were loyal allies of Athens.²⁸ Finally, James’ emendation of ll. 8-9 would require only Phaselites *already in Athens* to submit legal disputes with an Athenian to the Athenian polemarch.

If ll. 10-11 are correctly restored, it appears that the same regulations which are here imposed on the Phaselites were also previously imposed on the Chians. Chios, though a member of the Delian League, was formally autonomous (Thuc. 3.10.5; 6.85.2; 7.57.4), whereas the Phaselites, who were brought into the League by force, probably were not. But Phaselis and Chios enjoyed a friendship of long standing (Plut. *Cim.* 12.3), which may lay behind the mention of the latter here.

10,000 drachmas (ll. 21-22) is an enormous sum, equivalent to almost two talents. James suggests that the fine here envisioned ‘probably applies to any Athenian official who violates the decree rather than to a Phaselite who might go to the wrong official for his suit.’²⁹

D 2.6

²⁷ Ste. Croix 1961, 105.

²⁸ Cf. Meiggs 1972, 232.

²⁹ James 2023, 134-35.

Pylos ceasefire

425 BCE

In 425, a storm drove an Athenian fleet under the command of Demosthenes ashore onto Pylos in Messenia. The Athenians subsequently fortified the area, alarming the Spartans who soon despatched their fleet to Pylos. The initial Spartan assault failed and Athenian reinforcements, consisting of approximately fifty triremes, arrived and trapped 420 Spartan hoplites on the nearby island of Sphacteria. This made the Spartan authorities desperate to negotiate a solution with Athens (Thuc. 4.2-6, 8-15), and a localized ceasefire was hastily arranged.

LT 1: Thuc. 4.16.1

δεξαμένων δὲ τῶν στρατηγῶν τὸν λόγον ἐγίνοντο σπονδαὶ τοιαίδε· Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν τὰς ναῦς ἐν αἷς ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ πάσας, ὅσαι ἦσαν μακραὶ, παραδοῦναι κομίσαντας ἐς Πύλον Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν τῷ τειχίσματι μήτε κατὰ γῆν μήτε κατὰ θάλασσαν, Ἀθηναίους δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἀνδράσι σῖτον ἕαν τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἠπειρῷ Λακεδαιμονίους ἐσπέμπειν τακτὸν καὶ μεμαγμένον, δύο χοίνικας ἐκάστῳ Ἀττικὰς ἀλφίτων καὶ δύο κοτύλας οἴνου καὶ κρέας, θεράποντι δὲ τούτων ἡμίσεια· ταῦτα δὲ ὀρώντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐσπέμπειν καὶ πλοῖον μηδὲν ἐσπλεῖν λάθρα· φυλάσσειν δὲ καὶ τὴν νῆσον Ἀθηναίους μηδὲν ἤσσαν, ὅσα μὴ ἀποβαίνοντας, καὶ ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν τῷ Πελοποννησίων στρατῷ μήτε κατὰ γῆν μήτε κατὰ θάλασσαν. [2] ὃ τι δ' ἂν τούτων παραβαίνωσιν ἐκάτεροι καὶ ὀτιοῦν, τότε λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδὰς. ἐσπεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὰς μέχρι οὗ ἐπανεέλθωσιν οἱ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις· ἀποστεῖλαι δὲ αὐτοὺς τριήρει Ἀθηναίους καὶ πάλιν κομίσει. ἐλθόντων δὲ τὰς τε σπονδὰς λελύσθαι ταύτας καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀποδοῦναι Ἀθηναίους ὁμοίως οἷα σπερ ἂν παραλάβωσιν. [3] αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγένοντο, καὶ αἱ νῆες παρεδόθησαν οὔσαι περὶ ἐξήκοντα, καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀπεστάλησαν.

The generals accepted their [sc. the Spartans'] proposal, and a truce was worked out on the following terms. The Spartans would bring to Pylos and hand over to the Athenians the ships they had used in the battle and all other warships in Laconia, and they would not take arms against the fort either by land or by sea. The Athenians would allow the Spartans on the mainland to send over to their men on the island a set quantity of prepared food, for each man two Attic quarts of kneaded barleymeal, one pint of wine, and a piece of meat, with half that ration for their attendants: the sending of supplies would be done under Athenian supervision, and no board should approach the island without their consent. The Athenians would continue to guard the island as before, but would not land on it: and they would not take arms against the Peloponnesian forces either by land or by sea. If either side deviated from these conditions in any way whatever, then the truce would be at an end. The truce would last until the Spartans' envoys returned from Athens: the Athenians would convey them there and back in a trireme. This truce would end on their return, and the Athenians would hand back the ships in the same

state in which they had received them. The truce was agreed on these terms, the ships (about sixty in number) were handed over, and the envoys were dispatched.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

P. Cartledge emphasizes the one-sidedness of the terms of the truce, of which only one clause, prohibiting an Athenian landing on Sphacteria, limits the Athenians in any way.³⁰ Hornblower regards the Spartans' agreement to temporarily surrender their warships, of which there were 'about sixty' (Thuc. 4.16.3 = **LT 1** *περὶ ἑξήκοντα*) as a surprising concession.³¹ According to Cartledge, 4.16.1 *τὰς ναῦς ... τὰς ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ πάσας* probably included ships docked at Asine, which was technically in Messenia, and possibly Gytheum as well.³² All this attests to the desperation of the Spartan situation. The overall number of trapped soldiers was small – 420 hoplites, of whom only 120 were of the Spartiate class (Thuc. 4.8.9; Diod. 12.63.3) – but the sheer panic that this caused at Sparta has been taken by some as evidence that Spartan oliganthropia – depletion of the Spartiate population – had already progressed to an advanced stage by 425.³³

The truce was geographically limited, so that hostilities between Athens and Sparta were suspended in the area of Pylos only; this is clear from Thuc. 4.15.2 *σπονδὰς ποιησαμένουσ τὰ περὶ Πύλον*.³⁴ It was also time-limited, but the time-limit is expressed in a novel way: it was to expire upon the return of the Spartan envoys from Athens, whenever that might occur. Ultimately, the Athenians refused to return the warships on account of supposed, unspecified violations of the truce by the Spartans. This comes across as all too convenient, and one suspects that the Athenians were simply exploiting their superior position to the fullest. As foreseen by the truce, fighting resumed when the Spartan envoys returned to Pylos (4.23.1), setting the stage for Cleon's personal intervention and the final defeat of the Spartan force at Sphacteria (4.23.2-41).

D 2.7

Athenian treaty with Cythera

424 BCE

³⁰ Cartledge 1979, 241.

³¹ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 169. Wilson 1979, 92f. suggests that the total number of Spartan warships in Laconia proper was perhaps as little as ten.

³² Cartledge 1979, 242.

³³ Cartledge 1987, 407; Decety 2018; Doran 2018, 28. The captured Spartans would not be returned until 421 (Thuc. 5.34.2).

³⁴ Cf. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 169.

Cythera was invaded by Athens in 424 as part of the expedition led by the general Nicias and two colleagues (Thuc. 4.53.1). The island was perioecic territory of Sparta, which despatched an annual magistrate known as the Κυθηροδίκης and maintained a garrison of hoplites there (4.53.2). Cythera's strategic value lay in its use as a landing-point for merchant vessels from Egypt and Libya and as a base for Spartan anti-piracy operations (4.53.3; cf. Hdt. 7.235). Considered alongside Athens' contemporary actions at Pylos, the Corinthiad, the Argolid, and Megara (Thuc. 4.42-45, 66-74, 109.1), the capture of Cythera by Nicias should be seen as part of an Athenian strategy to increasingly hem in Sparta in the Peloponnese and its environs.

LT 1: Thuc. 4.54.2: καὶ μάχης γενομένης ὀλίγον μὲν τινα χρόνον ὑπέστησαν οἱ Κυθήριοι, ἔπειτα τραπόμενοι κατέφυγον ἐς τὴν ἄνω πόλιν, καὶ ὕστερον ξυνέβησαν πρὸς Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς ξυνάρχοντας Ἀθηναίους ἐπιτρέψαι περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν πλὴν θανάτου. [3] ἦσαν δὲ τινες καὶ γενόμενοι τῷ Νικίᾳ λόγους πρότερον πρὸς τινὰς τῶν Κυθηρίων, δι' ὃ καὶ θᾶσσον καὶ ἐπιτηδειότερον τό τε παραυτίκα καὶ τὸ ἔπειτα τὰ τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐπράχθη αὐτοῖς· ἀνέστησαν γὰρ ἂν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Κυθηρίους, Λακεδαιμονίους τε ὄντας καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ Λακωνικῇ τῆς νήσου οὕτως ἐπικειμένης. [4] μετὰ δὲ τὴν ξύμβασιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν τε Σκάνδειαν τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ λιμένι πόλισμα παραλαβόντες καὶ τῶν Κυθήρων φυλακὴν ποιησάμενοι. ... [57.4] ἦγον δὲ τινὰς καὶ ἐκ τῶν Κυθήρων ἄνδρας ὀλίγους, οὓς ἐδόκει ἀσφαλείας ἔνεκα μεταστῆσαι. καὶ τούτους μὲν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβουλεύσαντο καταθέσθαι ἐς τὰς νήσους, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Κυθηρίους οἰκοῦντας τὴν ἑαυτῶν φόρον τέσσαρα τάλαντα φέρειν, Αἰγινήτας δὲ ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας ὅσοι ἐάλωσαν διὰ τὴν προτέραν αἰεὶ ποτε ἔχθραν, Τάνταλον δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Λακεδαιμονίους καταδῆσαι.

In the ensuing battle the Cytherans held their ground for a short while, but then turned and fled to their upper city. Thereafter they came to terms with Nicias and his fellow commanders, agreeing surrender to the Athenians at their full discretion short of the death penalty. There had in fact been some earlier communication between Nicias and some of the Cytherans, which speeded the agreement and moderated its immediate and subsequent effect: otherwise the Athenians would have expelled the Cytherans, on the grounds that they are Spartans and their island lies that close to Laconia. With the terms agreed, the Athenians took over Scandeia, the town by the harbour, and installed a garrison to secure the island. ...

Taken to Athens at the same time were a few men from Cythera, whose removal was thought necessary on grounds of security. The Athenians decided to deposit these men in the islands; to allow the rest of the Cytherans the continued occupation of their own land on payment of a tribute of four talents; to kill all the captured Aeginetans in view of their constant previous hostility; and to imprison Tantalus in the company of his fellow Spartans from the island.

Thucydides describes the preliminary agreement made on the spot between Nicias and the inhabitants of Cythera. It contains only one specific clause, namely that no Cytherans were to be

executed. Thuc. 4.57.4 seems to describe the formal decree of the Athenian δῆμος and includes additional provisions: the forcible relocation of some Cytherans (those considered most likely to foment unrest, as Thucydides implies); permission for the remainder to ‘inhabit their own land’ (οἰκοῦντας τὴν ἑαυτῶν) on condition of paying tribute; the execution of the Aeginetans found on the island (Aegina itself had been depopulated and turned into an Athenian cleruchy in 431: Thuc. 2.27.1); and the imprisonment of the Spartan garrison.³⁵ Rhodes identifies ‘the islands’ of 4.57.4 as the Cyclades; and the imposition of tribute ‘indicates that Cythera was to be treated as a member of the Delian League, a humiliation for Sparta.’³⁶ The sum of four talents is considerable, and may reflect Cythera’s wealth from the purple dye trade.³⁷ On the basis of this passage, Cythera is restored paying four talents on the tribute list of 418/17 (*IG* 1³ 287.1 l. 18): although the Athenians were expected to return Cythera to Sparta under the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.18.7 = **D 2.12 LT 1**), they did not in fact do so.³⁸

D 2.8

Athenian treaty with Halieis

424/23 BCE

Halieis, in the southern Argolid, was strategically significant owing partly to its natural harbour, which, in the 5th century, not infrequently drew the attention of Athens (Thuc. 1.105.1; 2.56.4-5; cf. *IG* 1³ 1147 l. 3).³⁹ In 425, Cleon demanded the Spartans return nearby Troezen and other territories relinquished by Athens under the Thirty Years’ Peace (Thuc. 4.21.3). When this was not forthcoming, the Athenians launched an incursion into the Argolid (Thucydides specifically mentions Halieis among the cities attacked), walled the isthmus of the Methana peninsula, and established a garrison (φρούριον) there (4.45.2).

The lack of an archon-date in the surviving inscription means that dating it is not entirely straightforward, but there are both epigraphical and historical grounds for assigning it to 424/23. Both the alphabet and orthography are typically late Attic, with four-barred *sigma*.⁴⁰ We have the name of the secretary, Neocleides (**ET 1** ll. 2, 4).⁴¹ The tribe in prytany is preserved

³⁵ Cf. *HCT* 3, 512.

³⁶ Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, p. 550.

³⁷ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 219.

³⁸ Thuc. 7.57.6 with *HCT* 4, 399: the presence of Cytheran forces alongside the Athenians at Syracuse in 413 indicates that Athens still controlled the island at this time.

³⁹ Cf. Lambert 2018a, 9. *IACP* no. 349, p. 609 identifies Halieis as a member of the Peloponnesian League in the 5th century (cf. Diod. 11.78.2).

⁴⁰ Lambert 2018a, 7.

⁴¹ At l. 2, the name is fragmentary but restored as [Νε]οκλειδ[ε]ς, but I am aware of no alternative suggestion, and at l. 4 the name recurs fully preserved. Another surviving inscription, *IG* 1³ 36 (Athenian decree regarding the cult

at l. 3 only as -ς, but the stoichedon format of the inscription mandates a name containing six letters, so the only possibilities are Aigeis (Αἰγηΐς) or Oineis (Οἰνηΐς). We know from the so-called Thudippus decree of 425/24 (*IG* 1³ 71 = OR 153) that the secretary during the prytany of Aigeis in that year was an -ιπ-, restored in both OR and *IG* 1³ as Φίλιππος (ll. 54-55), which obviously cannot be reconciled with Νεοκλείδης. If the present treaty does in fact date to 425/24, then it must have been approved during the prytany of Oineis. But if it dates to 424/23, then both Αἰγηΐς and Οἰνηΐς are perfectly possible.⁴²

Meritt and Davidson argue that **ET 1** ll. 17-18 (their ll. 16-17) imply that the Archidamian War was still ongoing when it was made, therefore it cannot postdate the Peace of Nicias unless we are willing to accept a late date of 419/18 when, the Athenians might have argued, the Peace had been broken.⁴³ Under the Peace of Nicias, the Athenians relinquished their hold on Methana (Thuc. 5.18.7 = **D 2.12 LT 1**), probably bringing an end to the Athenian presence in the southern Argolid, so assigning the Halieis treaty to after 421 is difficult to square with what we know of Athenian activities there.⁴⁴ In any case, 418 is a definite *terminus ante quem* because Laches, the treaty's proposer (l. 4), was killed that year at Mantinea (Thuc. 5.74).⁴⁵ The *terminus post quem* is almost certainly summer 425 when the Athenian incursion reported by Thucydides took place: as Lambert writes, 'The fortification of the Methana peninsula was used as a basis for raids on other cities in the area, including Halieis, supplying a plausible context in which Athens might have exerted political pressure on Halieis to make this agreement.'⁴⁶

ET 1: *IG* 1³ 75 = Lambert 2018a, 7-8*

Findspot: fragments *acd* and possibly *e*: between Theatre of Dionysus and Odeon of Herodes Atticus; fragment *b*: Acropolis, Athens

Lettering: developed Attic

Layout: ll. 1-2 in larger letters; l. 3sqq. *stoichedon* 42

of Athena Nike) dates to the same prytany of the same year (ll. 2-3): see further Meritt and Davidson 1935 and cf. Matthaïou 2009, 164.

⁴² Cf. Meritt and Davidson 1935, 65-67; Meritt 1945, 98-105; Lambert 2018a, 10.

⁴³ Meritt and Davidson 1935, 66. This is based on the incident recorded by Thucydides (5.56.3, summer 419) in which Alcibiades persuaded the Athenians to amend 'the Laconian stele' (which could have been either the Peace of Nicias itself or the subsequent Spartan-Athenian alliance) with the additional inscription that the Spartans had not kept their oaths.

⁴⁴ See, however, Thompson 1971, 120-21, who proposes a post-421 date on the argument that ἡ πόλις [λεμος] (ll. 17-18) refers to a hypothetical not actual war; we may compare the general way in which ὁ πόλεμος is used in the Quadruple Alliance of 420 (Thuc. 5.47.3, 7 = **D 3.2 LT 1**).

⁴⁵ The proposer of the Halieis treaty is identified as the general by Lambert 2018a, 10. See Thuc. 3.86.1 for his patronymic and Pl. *Lach.* 197c for his demotic.

⁴⁶ Lambert 2018a, 10.

[θ ε ο] ί·

[Νε]οκλείδ[ε]ς ...⁸⁻⁹... ἔγρα]μμάτευε.

ἔδοχσεν τῷ [βολῆι καὶ τῷ δέμοι· Αἰγεί]ς ἐπρυτάνευε,

Νεοκλείδης [ἔγραμμάτευε, ...⁷... ἐπε]στάτε, Λάχης ε-

5 ἴπε· χσυνθέκα[ς τε πρὸς ἡαλιᾶς καὶ σπονδὰ]ς ἔ~ναι <ἀ>δόλο-

ς Ἀθηναίοι[ς¹³..... κατὰ τάδε· πα]ρέχεν ἡαλι-

ᾶς Ἀθηναί[οις τε φρορὰν καθιστάναι καὶ εὔ πο῔?]ν Ἀθεγ-

αῖος καὶ λ[ειστάς μὲ ἡυποδέχεσθαι μεδ' α]ὐτός [λε]ίξε[σ]-

θαι μεδὲ χσ[υστρατεύεσθαι μετὰ τῶν πο]λεμίον ἐπ' [Ἀθε]-

10 ναῖος μεδ' ἐ[πὶ τὸς χσυμμάχος τὸς Ἀθηναί]ον μεδὲ χρ[έμ]-

ατα παρέχε[ν τοῖς πολεμίοις μεδ' ἐς τὰ τ]εῖχε ἡυποδέχ-

εσθαι φρ[ορὰν τῶν πολεμίον μεδεμίαν· ἐ]ὰν δὲ τις ἴει π-

[ολέμιος ἐπὶ ἡαλιᾶς, βοεθῆν Ἀθηναῖος ἡαλ]ιεῦσιν ἔτο-

[ίμος καὶ ἡό τι ἂν δύνονται ὀφελῆν ? ἡαλι]ᾶς· ἡόσα δὲ ἔχο-

15 [σι ἡαλιῆς ἔἂν ἔχεν ἐς τὸ λοιπόν· ? ἀδικ]ῆν δὲ μεδὲν ἡαλι-

[ᾶς μεδὲ περιορᾶν ἐὰν ἀδικέσει τις ? τ]ῶν πολεμίον· Ἀθε-

[ναῖος δὲ καθιστάναι ἐς ἡαλιᾶς φρορ]ὰν ἡέος ἂν ἡο πόλ-

[εμος εἶ, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐρένε γένεται ? τ]ῆν σφετέραν αὐτῶ-

[ν φυλάτ]τ[εν ἡαλιᾶς· ἐὰν δὲ τινος ἄλλ]ο δέονται δικαίο

20 [ἡαλιῆς παρὰ τῷ δέμο τῷ Ἀθηναῖον ἡε]υρισκόσθον. ^{www}

[κατὰ τάδε ὄμοσαν ἡαλιῆς· χσύμμαχο]ι ἐσόμεθα Ἀθηναί-

[οις¹⁸..... καὶ παρέ]χσομεν Ἀθηναίοι-

[ς φρορὰν τε καθιστάναι καὶ εὔ πο῔σ?]ομεν Ἀθηναῖος κα-

[τὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἐμ παντὶ καιρῷ καὶ ἐ]μμενῶμεν ταῖς χσ-

25 [υνθέκαις ἡαῖς χσυνεθέμεθα Ἀθηναί]οις· ὀμνύντον δὲ

[καὶ] α[ὐ]τῶ[ν πρέσβες ? καὶ ἐχσό]λειαν ἐπ[αράσθον εἰ μὲ ἐμμ-

[έ]νοιεν [ἐν τοῖς ἡόρκοις ἡὸς ὀμομόκα]σιν ἡαλιῆς· ὄμ[οσ]-

[αν δ'] αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναίων ἡ βολὴ καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἔμμε-
 [νέν ἐ]ν ταῖς χσυνθ[έ]κ[αις ἡὰς χσυνέθεντ]ο πρὸς ἡαλιᾶς
 30 [ἡοὶ ἐπ]ὶ τὰ χσυγκε[ίμενα· τὰς δὲ χσυνθέ]κας ἀναγράφσα-
 [ι ἐστέλε]ι λιθίνε[ι τὸν γραμματέα τῆ]ς βο[λ]ῆς καὶ κατα-
 [θῆναι ἐμ πόλει· οἱ δὲ κολακρέται δόντ]ον [τὸ] ἀργύριον·
 [ἡαλιᾶς δὲ θέντον τὲν στέλεν ἐς τὸ ἡιερόν] τῷ Ἀπόλλων-
 [ος· πρέσβες ἡοῖδε ὄμνουον τὲν χσυμμαχ]ίαν· ν Νέον ν Α[...]
 35 [.....^{c. 32}.....]ος Ἀγακ[λ...]
 [.....^{c. 31}.....] *vacat*
 ----- *traces* -----

5 Matthaiou, cf. Thuc. 5.18.9, 8.37.1; χσυνθέκα[ς καὶ χσυμμαχίαν καὶ ἡόρκος] *IG* 1³. 6 πεντέκοντα ἔτε κατὰ τάδε· οἱ τριάκοντα ἔτε κατὰ τάδε. ^v Matthaiou; Ἀθηναῖοι[ς καὶ ἡαλιεῦσιν κατὰ τάδε· ^v *IG* 1³. 7 Matthaiou, cf. Thuc. 4.45.2; Ἀθηναί[οις ναύσταθμον καὶ προθύμος ὄφελέ]ν *IG* 1³. 16-17 Matthaiou, cf. Isoc. 14.19; Ἀθε[|]ναῖος δὲ φυλάττεν ἐν ἡαλιεῦσι φρορ]ᾶν *IG* 1³; ἐν Μεθάνοις φρορ]ᾶν Mattingly, cf. Thuc. 5.18.7. 18-19 [ἐρένες δὲ γενομένες τ]ὲν σφετέραν αὐτῶ[|]ν φυλάτ]τεν ἡαλιᾶς·] *IG* 1³. 23 ναύσταθμον καὶ προθύμος ὄφελ[έ]σομεν *IG* 1³. 29 πιστῶς καὶ ἀδόλος Ἀθηναῖοις· *IG* 1³.

Gods. Neokleides of — was secretary. The council and people decided. [Aigeis] was the prytany, Neokleides was secretary, — presided, Laches proposed. There shall be an agreement between Athens and Halieis and a truce [for — years?] without deceit on the following terms: the Halieians shall permit the Athenians [to establish a garrison and shall do well?] to the Athenians and [shall not receive raiders] or themselves carry out raids or [campaign with] the Athenians' enemies against the Athenians or [the allies of the Athenians], or supply money [to the enemies] or receive [any enemy garrison] within the walls. And if any enemy attacks Halieis, the Athenians shall help the Halieians readily [and do whatever they can to oblige?] the Halieians. And whatever the Halieians hold [they shall be allowed to hold for the future?]. And no one shall harm the Halieians, [or overlook it if any of their enemies] harms them. And the Athenians [shall establish a garrison in Halieis] for as long as the war [lasts, but when peace is restored, the Halieians shall guard] their own land. And if the Halieians need anything else which is justifiable from the Athenian people, they shall obtain it.

The Halieians swore as follows: 'We shall be ... allies to the Athenians and permit the Athenians to establish a garrison and shall do well to the Athenians as far as we can at every opportunity and shall abide by the agreement which we have made with the Athenians.' And [their envoys?] shall swear and shall invoke destruction on any Halieians who do not abide by the oaths which

they have sworn. And for the Athenians, [the council] and the generals swore to abide by the agreement which they made with the Halieians responsible for making terms. And the secretary of the council shall inscribe the agreement on a stone stele and set it down on the Acropolis, and the *kolakretai* shall give the money; and the Halieians shall place the stele in the sanctuary of Apollo. [The following envoys swore to the] alliance: Neon ... Agakl— ...

(trans. Stephen Lambert)

The stele containing the Athenian treaty with Halieis exists today in six fragments, though they are labelled *a-e* because fragment *d* actually consists of two joining fragments.⁴⁷ Most of the surviving fragments were recovered near but not directly on the Acropolis, between the Theatre of Dionysus and the Odeon of Herodes Atticus; but fr. *b*'s findspot is directly atop the Acropolis itself. The θεοί-heading, of which only the *iota* survives, is inscribed in larger and more widely spaced letters relative to the rest of the inscription.

Line 7, under Matthaiou's restoration, permits Athens to establish a garrison ([φρορᾶν]) in Halieis (cf. Thuc. 4.45.2). The Athenians, Lambert notes, frequently established forts or garrisons in or near allied cities, sometimes directly within enemy territory, before and during the Peloponnesian War. Athens is known to have established garrisons in Chalcis (OR 131 ll. 76-79 = **D 1.12 ET 1**), Eretria (Thuc. 8.95.6), Pylos (4.41), and eventually in Attica itself in response to the Spartan occupation of Decelea (Sounion in 413/12: Thuc. 8.4; Thoricus in 409: Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.1).⁴⁸ However, *IG* 1³ instead supplies ναύσταθμον (naval station), which Lambert rejects without, however, explaining his reasoning.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, I think Lambert and Matthaiou are right to prefer φρορᾶν to ναύσταθμον: there is some evidence for the word elsewhere on the stone, for example l. 12 φρ[ορᾶν] and l. 17 [φρορ]ᾶν, and the stoichedon format makes these two restorations, which none of the editors dispute, all the more probable. Since a viable Athenian garrison in Halieis, a coastal settlement, would have depended on an accompanying naval presence, I suggest that the word ναύσταθμον would not have been strictly required, but that a naval presence was assumed under φρορᾶ (cf. Thuc. 4.45.2 on the Athenian φρούριον at Methana, which was also coastal).

The following clauses forbid the Halieians from campaigning with the enemies of Athens (ll. 8-9), assisting them financially (ll. 10-11), or allowing them to install a garrison in Halieian territory (ll. 11-12). In exchange, Athens pledges to defend Halieis if attacked (ll. 12-14). The Athenians restate their right to maintain a military presence in Halieis, but agree to leave once

⁴⁷ Matthaiou 2009, 164.

⁴⁸ Lambert 2018a, 11 with n. 49. On the Spartan fortification of Decelea see Thuc. 6.93.2, 7.27-28.

⁴⁹ Lambert 2018a, 11.

the war is over (II. 16-19).⁵⁰ This is clearly incompatible with a positively-expressed time limit, whether thirty or fifty years, which Matthaïou supplies at I. 6 (see *apparatus criticus*). If we must attempt to restore this line, the proposal of *IG 1³*, Ἀθηναίοι[ς καὶ ἡαλιεῦσιν κατὰ τάδε· ὅ] is to be preferred, as this does not contradict the other provisions of the treaty. This is followed at II. 19-20 by Athens giving the Halieians the right to appeal to the Athenian δῆμος.

The oath-taking provisions imply, as Lambert observes, that the oaths were sworn at Athens only: for the Athenians by the Boule and the generals (a total of 510 men, which is a significant number), and for the Halieians by the envoys who have come to Athens to negotiate the treaty.⁵¹ Two copies of the treaty were inscribed, an Athenian copy to be set up on the Acropolis (I. 32), and a Halieian copy erected at the sanctuary of Apollo in Halieis (II. 33-34), the existence of which has been confirmed by archaeological excavations.⁵²

D 2.9

Truce of Laches

423 BCE

The Spartans, or at least some of them, had been interested in peace since the Pylos debacle in 425, but the peace proposal which they proffered at the time was rejected by the Athenians under the influence of Cleon (Thuc. 4.41).⁵³ However, by 423 the geopolitical situation had changed considerably and now the Athenians had pressing reasons to seek a truce, not least owing to their defeat by the Boeotians at Delium in 424 (4.96-97.1), shortly followed by the conquest of Amphipolis by Brasidas (4.102-08). At 4.117.1, Thucydides explains that the Athenians' immediate purpose in seeking out a truce was to stop Brasidas' highly successful campaign in the northeast, which had caused the defection of many Athenian allies in the area. The Spartans' thinking follows at 4.117.2, but much of the text is corrupt, some words may be missing, and the overall sense is difficult to retrieve; but what Thucydides may be trying to say is that the Spartans were reluctant to allow Brasidas' success in the northeast to continue lest

⁵⁰ At II. 16-17, whereas both Lambert (Ἀθε|[ναίος δὲ καθιστάναι ἐς ἡαλιᾶς φρορ]άν) and *IG 1³* (Ἀθε|[ναίος δὲ φυλάττεν ἐν ἡαλιεῦσι φρορ]άν), as well as Meritt and Davidson 1935, 67-69 and Meritt 1945, 245 place the Athenian garrison in Halieis, Mattingly 1977, 372 n. 17 thinks the reference is to the garrison in Methana and restores I. 18 ἐν Μεθάνοις φρορ]άν. But given that this is a treaty with Halieis and not Methana, and given the opinion of all other editors, Mattingly's hypothesis is improbable.

⁵¹ Lambert 2018a, 11 with n. 53.

⁵² Jameson 1974, 71-72; Lambert 2018a, 11.

⁵³ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 197 sees Ar. Eq. 794-96, performed in 424, as an allusion to this incident. The text reads: Ἀρχεπτολέμου δὲ φέροντος | τὴν εἰρήνην ἐξεσκέδασας, τὰς πρεσβείας τ' ἀπελαύνεις | ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ῥαθαπυγίζων, αἱ τὰς σπονδὰς προκαλοῦνται ('Archeptolemus brought peace and you tore it to ribbons; the envoys who come to propose a truce you drive from the city with kicks in their arses.' Trans. Eugene O'Neill Jr.).

the Athenians retaliate by executing the Spartan prisoners in their custody; or they were worried that Brasidas might finally be defeated and the Athenians would lose their motivation to make peace.⁵⁴

Kagan writes that the truce ‘shows evidence of considerable negotiation, and discussion must have occurred over a period of time to produce the final document’; similarly, Rhodes assumes that preliminary discussions took place between the Athenians and Peloponnesians before the latter formally submitted the peace proposal recorded at Thuc. 4.118.1-10.⁵⁵ That negotiations had been going on for some time is implicit at Thuc. 4.118.10 οἱ δὲ ἰόντες τέλος ἔχοντες ἰόντων, ἧ̃περ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμᾶς κελεύετε.⁵⁶

Chronologically, the Truce of Laches is the first treaty to be quoted verbatim by Thucydides. It is not a replica of a single document composed at one point in time but, as E. Bickerman, H. Bengtson, and A. Giovannini all recognized, a collation of three separate documents.⁵⁷ The first document, the Peloponnesian peace proposal, contains the actual provisions of the truce. It begins with stipulations regarding the sanctuary of Delphi (Thuc. 4.118.1-3), moves onto territorial clauses (4.118.4), followed by a clause which restricts the Peloponnesians’ use of warships (4.118.5), a guarantee of safe conduct for embassies to negotiate a longer peace (4.118.6), a prohibition against the reception of deserters (4.118.7), an arbitration clause (4.118.8), and finally an amendment clause (4.118.9-10). 118.11-12 is the Athenian decree proposed in the Assembly by Laches and confirms Athens’ acceptance of the Peloponnesian proposal. Finally, 119.1-2 records the date of ratification and the list of oath-takers. 119.3 is a postscript written in Thucydides’ authorial voice and is not part of the treaty proper, but I have decided to include it among the testimonia below.

LT 1: Thuc. 4.118.1

περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαντείου τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Πυθίου δοκεῖ ἡμῖν χρῆσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἀδόλως καὶ ἀδεῶς κατὰ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους. [2] τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις ταῦτα δοκεῖ καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς παροῦσιν· Βοιωτοὺς δὲ καὶ Φωκέας πείσειν φασὶν ἐς δύναμιν προσκηρυκευόμενοι. [3] περὶ δὲ τῶν χρημάτων τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιμέλεσθαι ὅπως τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἐξευρήσομεν, ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρώμενοι καὶ ὑμεῖς καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ βουλόμενοι, τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρώμενοι πάντες. [4] περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων

⁵⁴ Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 560; cf. *HCT* 3, 594. On the textual issues see *HCT* 3, 594-96.

⁵⁵ Kagan 1974, 305; Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 560; cf. *HCT* 3, 601. Among the members of the Peloponnesian League, only Sparta, Corinth, Sicyon, Megara, and Epidaurus ratified the Truce (Thuc. 4.119.2). We are not told (as we are for the Peace of Nicias: 5.17.2) that any state expressly rejected it, though the objection of Boeotia and Phocis is implied at 4.118.2 (see below).

⁵⁶ I am grateful to Dr. de Lisle for raising this point.

⁵⁷ Bickerman 1952; comm. *SdA* no. 184, pp. 108-09; Giovannini 2007, 256-57.

ἔδοξε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις κατὰ ταῦτα· τάδε δὲ ἔδοξε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις ἔαν σπονδὰς ποιῶνται οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῶν μένειν ἑκατέρους ἔχοντας ἅπερ νῦν ἔχομεν, τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ Κορυφασίῳ ἐντὸς τῆς Βουφράδος καὶ τοῦ Τομέως μένοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἐν Κυθήροις μὴ ἐπιμισγομένους ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, μήτε ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς μήτε αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τοὺς δ' ἐν Νισαίᾳ καὶ Μινώᾳ μὴ ὑπερβαίνοντας τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ Νίσου ἐπὶ τὸ Ποσειδώνιον, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Ποσειδωνίου εὐθύς ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν τὴν ἐς Μινῶαν (μηδὲ Μεγαρέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ὑπερβαίνειν τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην) καὶ τὴν νῆσον, ἣν περ ἔλαβον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔχοντας, μηδὲ ἐπιμισγομένους μηδετέρους μηδετέρωσιν, καὶ τὰ ἐν Τροιζῆνι, ὅσα περ νῦν ἔχουσι, καθ' ἃ ξυνέθεντο πρὸς Ἀθηναίους· [5] καὶ τῇ θαλάσῃ χρωμένους, ὅσα ἂν κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους πλεῖν μὴ μακροῦ νηί, ἄλλω δὲ κωπήρει πλοίῳ, ἐς πεντακόσια τάλαντα ἄγοντι μέτρα. [6] κήρυκι δὲ καὶ πρεσβείᾳ καὶ ἀκολούθοις, ὅποσος ἂν δοκῆ, περὶ καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου καὶ δικῶν ἐς Πελοπόννησον καὶ Ἀθήναζε σπονδὰς εἶναι ἰοῦσι καὶ ἀπιούσι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. [7] τοὺς δὲ αὐτομόλους μὴ δέχεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, μήτε ἐλεύθερον μήτε δοῦλον, μήτε ὑμᾶς μήτε ἡμᾶς. [8] δίκας τε διδόναι ὑμᾶς τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς ὑμῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, τὰ ἀμφίλογα δίκη διαλύοντας ἄνευ πολέμου. [9] τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ταῦτα δοκεῖ· εἰ δέ τι ὑμῖν εἴτε κάλλιον εἴτε δικαιότερον τούτων δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἰόντες ἐς Λακεδαίμονα διδάσκετε· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἀποστήσονται, ὅσα ἂν δίκαια λέγητε, οὔτε οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὔτε οἱ ξύμμαχοι. [10] οἱ δὲ ἰόντες τέλος ἔχοντες ἰόντων, ἥπερ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμᾶς κελεύετε. αἱ δὲ σπονδαὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἔσονται. [11] ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ· Ἀκαμαντὶς ἐπρυτάνευε, Φαίνιππος ἐγραμμάτευε, Νικιάδης ἐπεστάτει. Λάχης εἶπε· τύχη ἀγαθῆ τῇ Ἀθηναίων· ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν καθ' ἃ ξυγχωροῦσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν καὶ ὠμολόγησαν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ· τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν εἶναι ἐνιαυτόν. [12] ἄρχειν δὲ τήνδε τὴν ἡμέραν, τετράδα ἐπὶ δέκα τοῦ Ἐλαφβολιῶνος μηνός. [13] ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ἰόντας ὡς ἀλλήλους πρέσβεις καὶ κήρυκας ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους, καθ' ὅτι ἔσται ἡ κατάλυσις τοῦ πολέμου. [14] ἐκκλησίαν δὲ ποιήσαντας τοὺς στρατηγούς καὶ τοὺς πρυτάνεις πρῶτον περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης βουλευσασθαι Ἀθηναίους καθ' ὅτι ἂν ἐσίῃ ἡ πρεσβεία περὶ τῆς καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου. σπεύσασθαι δὲ αὐτίκα μάλα τὰς πρεσβείας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὰς παρούσας ἢ μὴν ἐμμενεῖν ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς τὸν ἐνιαυτόν.

[119.1] ταῦτα ξυνέθεντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ὠμωσαν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις μηνός ἐν Λακεδαίμονι Γεραστίου δωδεκάτη. [2] ξυνετίθεντο δὲ καὶ ἐσπένδοντο Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν οἶδε· Ταῦρος Ἐχετιμίδα, Ἀθήναιος Περικλείδα, Φιλοχαρίδας Ἐρυξилаῖδα· Κορινθίων δὲ Αἰνέας Ὠκύτου, Εὐφάμιδης Ἀριστωνόμου· Σικυωνίων δὲ Δαμότιμος Ναυκράτους, Ὀνάσιμος Μεγακλέους· Μεγαρέων δὲ Νίκασος Κεκάλου, Μενεκράτης Ἀμφιδώρου· Ἐπιδaurίων δὲ Ἀμφίας Εὐπαιῖδα· Ἀθηναίων δὲ οἱ στρατηγοὶ Νικόστρατος Διειτρέφους, Νικίας Νικηράτου, Αὐτοκλῆς Τολμαίου. [3] ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐκεχειρία αὐτὴ ἐγένετο, καὶ ξυνῆσαν ἐν αὐτῇ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων σπονδῶν διὰ παντὸς ἐς λόγους.

Concerning the sanctuary and the oracle of Pythian Apollo we resolve that any who wish should have access according to the established laws, without fraud or fear. This is resolved by the Spartans and their allies here present: and they undertake to use all diplomatic means to persuade the Boeotians and Phocians likewise. Concerning the money belonging to the god, it is resolved that we shall be diligent to discover the guilty parties, properly and justly in accordance

with the established laws, both you and we and those others who so wish, all in accordance with the established laws. These are the resolutions of the Spartans and their allies in the matters aforesaid. A resolution of the Spartans and their allies in the event of the Athenians making a treaty. Both parties to remain within their own territory, retaining possession of what we each now hold: the Athenians at Coryphasium to stay within the bounds of Bouphras and Tomeus; those in Cythera to have no communication with the Peloponnesian alliance, neither we with them nor they with us; at Nisaea and Minoa not to go beyond the road leading from the gates at the shrine of Nisus to the temple of Poseidon, and then directly from the temple of Poseidon to the bridge over to Minoa (nor should the Megarians or their allies cross this road); the Athenians to keep the island of Minoa which they have captured, but with no communication in either direction; and at Troezen the Athenians to retain what they now control, as agreed with them by the Troezenians. In the use of the sea, the Spartans and their allies may sail in their own and allied coastal waters in any oared vessel of a capacity up to five hundred measures, but not in warships. There shall be safe conduct both by land and by sea for any herald or embassy (with attendants as appropriate) travelling to or from the Peloponnese or Athens in diplomacy to end the war or settle disputes. During this period there shall be no reception of deserters, either free or slave, either by you or by us. You shall be legally accountable to us, and we to you, according to established practice, and any matters of contention shall be resolved by arbitration without recourse to war. These are the resolutions of the Spartans and their allies. If you reach better or fairer resolutions than these, come to Sparta and explain them to us. Neither the Spartans nor their allies will refuse to consider any fair proposals which you make. Those who come should come with full executive authority, as you required of our spokesmen too. The truce shall be for one year.

A resolution of the council and people. Prytany Acamantis, secretary Phaenippus, president Niciades. Proposer Laches. May it be to the good of the Athenians. Resolved to conclude the truce on the terms agreed by the Spartans and their allies and confirmed by them before the people: the truce to be for one year, and to begin on this day, the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion. During this period ambassadors and heralds shall travel between the two parties to discuss terms for the ending of the war. The generals and the prytaneis shall first convene an assembly to consider a permanent peace: thereafter, if it is agreed to send and receive embassies concerning an end to the war, the Athenians shall deliberate on any proposals made. The embassies here present now shall immediately ratify the truce before the people, and swear to abide by it for the year.

This was agreed between the Spartans and their allies and the Athenians and their allies on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius. The agreement was made and ratified by the following: for the Spartans, Taurus the son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus the son of Pericleidas, Philocharidas the son of Eryxilaïdas; for the Corinthians, Aeneas the son of Ocytus, Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus; for the Sicyonians, Damotimus the son of Naucrates, Onasimus the son of Megacles; for the Megarians, Nicastus the son of Cecalus, Menecrates the son of Amphidorus; for the Epidaurians, Amphias the son of Eupaeidas; and for the Athenians the

generals Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes, Nicias the son of Niceratus, Autocles the son of Tolmaeus.

So this truce was made, and throughout its duration they continued negotiations for a longer-lasting treaty.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 2: Diod. 12.72.5

Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους σπονδὰς ἐνιαυσίου ἐποιήσαντο κατὰ ταύτας τὰς ὁμολογίας, ὥστ' ἔχειν ἑκατέρους ὧν τότε κύριοι καθειστήκεσαν.

The Athenians made a one-year truce with the Lacedaemonians based on the agreement that each of them should hold what they controlled at the time.

(own trans.)

Thuc. 4.118.1-2 is broadly concerned with the important panhellenic sanctuary of Delphi. The first clause implies that Athenian access to Delphi was limited on account of the war, though scholars note that even visitors from the Peloponnese may have encountered difficulties travelling there due to disturbed conditions in the Gulf of Corinth.⁵⁸ There is no evidence that the Athenians in particular were ever *formally* barred from Delphi, but Hornblower suggests that the hostility of Boeotia and Phocis, allies of Sparta whose territory encompassed much of the land route from Athens to Delphi via the Sacred Way, may have made the pilgrimage hazardous, as implied by a passage of Aristophanes' *Aves* (188-89): ἦν ἰέναι βουλόμεθα | Πυθῶδε, Βοιωτοὺς δίοδον αἰτούμεθα ('If we want to go to Pytho, we ask the Boeotians for safe passage').⁵⁹ Gomme speculates that even Athenians taking the maritime route to Delphi via the Gulf of Corinth could have been prevented from going further after docking at the Phocian port town of Cirrha.⁶⁰ But the question is complicated by the notice of Pausanias (10.11.6) that the Athenians erected a victory dedication in Delphi connected to the general Phormio's campaign of 429 (on which see Thuc. 2.83-92, 102-03), which implies that there were indeed Athenian pilgrims in Delphi during the Archidamian War (although the monument may have not been installed until 423).⁶¹ And we have evidence for the presence of Athenian sacred ambassadors

⁵⁸ Parke and Wormell 1956, 196; Kagan 1974, 305-06.

⁵⁹ Own trans. For discussion see Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 363; more confident about a *de facto* if not *de jure* exclusion is Zeilhofer 1959, 67-68: 'Darüberhinaus war Athen der Zugang nach Delphoi durch Boiotien auf der „Heiligen Straße“ bisher verschlossen.' Boeotia also rejected the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.17.2), which was still legally in force when *Aves* premiered in 414.

⁶⁰ *HCT* 3, 596.

⁶¹ Parker 1985, 325 n. 98.

or *θεωροί* at another panhellenic sanctuary, that of Isthmia, in 411 (Thuc. 8.10.1), which was controlled by Corinth at a time when Athens and Corinth were certainly at war.⁶²

G. Zeilhofer views the Delphi clause as a significant concession to Athens by the Peloponnesians and specifically by Sparta, with the latter disavowing any interest in ‘Laconizing’ Delphi, choosing instead to maintain it as a truly panhellenic sanctuary even at the expense of Spartan influence.⁶³ However, Hornblower argues that Spartan influence over Delphi was already quite limited, and suggests that the foundation of a Spartan colony at Heraclea in Trachis in 426 (Thuc. 3.92) might have been intended in part to increase Spartan representation on the council of the Delphic Amphictyony.⁶⁴ The implied refusal of Boeotia and Phocis to immediately accept the Truce (at 4.118.2, they need to be ‘persuaded’ by the Spartans) perhaps stemmed from the awareness that they, and not the Spartans, actually had the power to allow or disallow Athenian access to Delphi.

The basis of Thuc. 4.118.4 is the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* as it stood at the time of the truce’s composition; but as the Peace of Nicias would soon show, the ultimate objective was more or less a reversion to the *status quo ante bellum*, that is, to the territorial situation of 431. Specific locales mentioned in the truce include Coryphasium (the Spartan name for Pylos, cf. 4.3.2), as well as Boupheiras and Tomeus which, though not securely identified, were located in Messenia in the general neighbourhood of Pylos.⁶⁵ Cythera, captured by Nicias in 424, was to remain provisionally in Athenian hands; there is no indication that the truce interfered with the four talents’ tribute imposed at Thuc. 4.57.4. Nisaea, the port of Megara on the Saronic Gulf, had also been seized by Athens in 424 during an unsuccessful attempt to take Megara itself (4.69). The Athenians would retain it in 421 in response to the Boeotians’ refusal to relinquish Plataea (5.17.2). Minoa, an island located near Megara, was captured, again by Nicias, in 427 (3.51) and the bridge (γέφυρα) mentioned in the present treaty led from there to the mainland; Minoa may also be the νῆσον, ἣν περ ἔλαβον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι referred to at 4.118.4 (Hornblower), but others see a reference to a different island altogether, perhaps Atalanta (Steup), or Methana (Gomme).⁶⁶ Troezen was captured by Athens in 425 (4.45.2), and 4.118.4 καὶ τὰ ἐν Τροιζῆνι, ὅσα περ νῦν ἔχουσι, καθ’ ἃ ξυνέθεντο πρὸς Ἀθηναίους implies a preexisting treaty between Athens and Troezen, not previously reported by Thucydides.⁶⁷

⁶² Hornblower 1992, 193 writes, ‘This passage proves official Athenian attendance at a sanctuary in hostile territory.’

⁶³ Zeilhofer 1959, 68.

⁶⁴ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 363; cf. Hornblower 1992, 189. Conversely, Falkner 1999 emphasizes Spartan military objectives as the spur to Heraclea’s foundation.

⁶⁵ On Coryphasium/Pylos see *IACP*, p. 557. For attempts to identify Boupheiras and Tomeus see Wilson 1970 and Pritchett 1994, 157-58.

⁶⁶ Classen/Steup *ad loc.*; *HCT* 3, 599-600; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 366-67.

⁶⁷ *HCT* 3, 600.

4.118.5 is a challenging passage. H.T. Wallinga prefers to delete *τάλαντα* altogether and make do with *μέτρα* (the two together being redundant, as they can both be used as units of measurement). In 1964, deeming the Athenian demand ‘not so unreasonable,’ he reckoned the maximum-sized vessel now allowed to the Peloponnesians as, roughly, something on the scale of a thirty-oared *κέρκουρος*.⁶⁸ However, by 1993 he had revised his interpretation and now considered penteconters or similarly-sized boats as the upper limit envisaged by this clause.⁶⁹ Penteconters, while serviceable as freighters, were ‘on no account a warship of anything like the value of the trireme.’⁷⁰ So long as the truce lasted, neither the Spartans nor their more navally adept allies (Corinth especially comes to mind) would be able to harass the Athenians by sea.⁷¹ This is a surprising concession by the Peloponnesians, especially since no reciprocal demands are made on the Athenians, despite their enormous navy (a reported 300 triremes in 431: Thuc. 2.13.8). On the other hand, 4.118.7, which forbids either side to receive deserters (*αὐτομόλους*), seems to have favoured the Spartans, as many helots were then escaping to Athenian-occupied Pylos, although the desertion of free sailors in the Athenian fleet in search of higher wages with the Peloponnesians also appears to have been a problem (1.121.3).⁷²

4.118.8 is the Truce’s arbitration clause. M. Ostwald interprets *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια* here to mean ‘the “traditional ways” short of war in which disputes were normally expected to be settled in the Greek world,’ i.e., arbitration (*δίκαι*).⁷³ Several passages from Thucydides’ authorial narrative imply that other treaties, notably the Thirty Years’ Peace, also contained an arbitration clause (1.78.4, 140.2, 144.2, 145, 7.18.2), but the Truce of Laches, like the Thirty Years’ Peace, proposes neither a specific arbitrator nor specific arbitration procedures.⁷⁴

The Athenian resolution begins at 4.118.11. Curiously, the enactment formula reads *ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ* (‘the People decided’) instead of the expected *ἔδοξεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ* (‘the Boule and People decided’). The simplest explanation is that this is a manuscript error, a position maintained for example by Rhodes.⁷⁵ But the unanimity of the manuscript tradition argues against this, suggesting that the omission stretches back to Thucydides himself. A. Kirchhoff argues that the enactment formula lacks *τῇ βουλῇ* because the Athenian resolution was formulated in the Assembly without reference to the Boule (and not because it was a non-probouleumatic decree).⁷⁶ But this flies in the face of what we know about Athenian legislative

⁶⁸ Wallinga 1964, 12-13.

⁶⁹ Wallinga 1993, 25 n. 33.

⁷⁰ Wallinga 1964, 40.

⁷¹ Corinth is attested sending thirty triremes to Leucimne in 435 (Thuc. 1.27.2), ninety to Sybota in 432 (1.46.1), and forty to Acarnania to restore Evarchus of Astacus, a local tyrant, in 431/30 (2.33.1).

⁷² *HCT* 3, 601; Kagan 1974, 306.

⁷³ Ostwald 1982, 4; cf. Adcock and Mosley 1975, 210; E. Harris and A. Magnetto, *OCD*⁴ s.v. ‘Arbitration, Greek.’

⁷⁴ Ostwald 1982, 4.

⁷⁵ Rhodes 1998, 156, 301.

⁷⁶ Kirchhoff 1895, 14.

procedure, where an item could not even be considered by the Assembly without prior consideration of the Boule.⁷⁷ Hornblower suggests that τῆ βουλῆ was excised from the enactment formula by Thucydides himself, noting his apparent habit of neglecting the Boule where its involvement is to be expected (e.g., 1.139.3, 3.36.5).⁷⁸ In a later article, he speculates that by ignoring the Boule, Thucydides seeks to emphasize the more democratic elements of the Athenian constitution, which he portrays in an unflattering light; accounting for the supposedly more conservative and less easily manipulated Boule would have challenged his desired portrayal of an unruly δῆμος.⁷⁹ However, I am not persuaded by this. In the one case where a treaty survives both in Thucydides and on stone – I am speaking of the Quadruple Alliance of 420 – the differences between the two versions are demonstrably minor.⁸⁰

Pace Kirchhoff, may simply be dealing with a non-probouleumatic decree. Admittedly these are very uncommon for our period: the only earlier example of which I am aware is *IG* 1³ 1 = ML 14, an Athenian decree of ca. 500 BCE relating to Salamis.⁸¹ Subsequently there are no epigraphically-attested instances of a non-probouleumatic decree until *IG* 2² 28 = RO 18, an honorary decree for Clazomenae dating to 387/86.⁸² But this is the best solution that I can think of unless (as is possible) we are prepared to ascribe the omission to a very early manuscript error.

The proposer of the decree is Laches, whom we have already encountered as the proposer of the Halieis treaty. From 427 to 425, he was involved in the Athenian expedition to Sicily (Thuc. 3.86.1), an aggressive campaign, so it is perhaps ironic that we now find him advancing the cause of peace.⁸³ On the other hand, the list of swearers (4.119.2) is less reliable evidence for an individual's political leanings; Gomme writes, 'The strategoi who "signed" this agreement were ordered to do so by the ekklesia, and were so ordered, because, as likely as not, they were the only strategoi present.'⁸⁴ It is a reasonable guess that Nicias, one of the three Athenian oath-takers, really was in favour of the Truce (judging from his support in 421 for the peace treaty which bears his name), but that is all we can say.

⁷⁷ Lambert 2017, 7.

⁷⁸ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc. 2*, 369: 'Th. is very coy about mentioning the *boule* at all. This is part of his general impatience with constitutional procedures and details.' Hornblower 2009, 255-57 lists such examples.

⁷⁹ Hornblower 2009, 260-61.

⁸⁰ On the Quadruple Alliance, Hornblower himself says, 'The few and small discrepancies ... can now be seen to be very small indeed' (*Comm. on Thuc. 3*, 109).

⁸¹ *Comm. ML 14*, pp. 26-27.

⁸² Cf. *comm. RO 18*, p. 78.

⁸³ Gomme (*HCT 3*, 605) cautions that while Laches clearly was in favour of peace in 423, we should not extrapolate that he was pro-peace in all circumstances; he would later partake in the aggressive Mantinea campaign of 418.

⁸⁴ *HCT 3*, 605.

D 2.10

*Athenian alliance with Perdiccas II of Macedon***423 BCE**

ET 1 (= *IG* 1³ 89) is highly fragmentary, indeed literally so, as it consists of no fewer than nine separate fragments (labelled *a-i*), all recovered on the Athenian Acropolis. The order of fragments in the *IG* 1³ edition, which I reproduce below, is *hdefgacbi*. In 1990, R.M. Errington proposed a date in the 440s for the inscription, stressing Athens' strength and energy in the Thraceward region at the time as evidenced by the foundation of a colony at Brea, probably located in the valley of the Strymon, around 445 (*IG* 1³ 46 = OR 142).⁸⁵ It is indeed true that Thucydides, in his narrative of the Pentacontaetia (1.57.2), writes that Perdiccas II, 'formerly an ally and friend' of the Athenians (ξύμμαχος πρότερον καὶ φίλος ὄν), turned hostile, perhaps implying an earlier alliance (though Borza cautions that this does not necessarily presuppose a formal interstate relationship).⁸⁶ But such an early date is incompatible with Tracy, who ascribes **ET 1** to the cutter of *IG* 2² 1386, whose attested career only began in 423/22.⁸⁷

The precise relationship between **ET 1** and **LT 1** (= Thuc. 4.132.1) is unclear, but I argue that both describe the same treat. The just-cited passage of Thucydides is certainly set in summer 423 and it is primarily for this reason that **ET 1** should be assigned to the same year. The context of the Thucydidean passage is Perdiccas' campaign against the Lyncestian dynast Arrhabaeus earlier that year, undertaken in concert with Brasidas (Thuc. 4.124). When, however, the Illyrian mercenaries serving under Perdiccas defected to Arrhabaeus (4.125), the relationship between Perdiccas and Brasidas deteriorated irretrievably (4.128.4-5). Accordingly, Perdiccas had good reason to seek out what Thucydides, in the passage quoted above, calls a *ὁμολογία* with the Athenians, which J.W. Cole identifies with **ET 1**.⁸⁸ E.N. Borza, who also dates the inscription to 423, argues that it offered Perdiccas not only a stable western frontier but also a powerful ally against Brasidas. Furthermore, l. 31 ... καὶ οὐδένα κο]πέας ἐχσάγεν ἐάσο ἐὰμ μὲ Ἄθε[ναί... which appears to guarantee Athens as the sole export market for Macedonian timber, fits well the geopolitical context of 423: after the fall of Amphipolis in 424, Borza suggests, Athens will have sought out Macedon as a new source for timber.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Errington 1990, 15-16, 267.

⁸⁶ Borza 1990, 153; cf. 139 n. 20.

⁸⁷ Tracy 2016, 124.

⁸⁸ Cole 1974, 69; cf. Cole 1977, 29-30; Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 562.

⁸⁹ Borza 1990, 154; cf. Cole 1977, 30.

N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith favour 415, as Perdiccas, having turned on Athenians once again after 423, is known to have reconciled with them at some point between 416 and 414.⁹⁰

Considering all sides of the debate, I maintain 423 as the most probable date of **ET 1**, since both Athens and Perdiccas now stood to gain from an alliance. Brasidas had to be considered a potential threat to Macedonian interests as soon as he and Perdiccas fell out, while the danger he posed to Athenian interests in Chalcidice was plainly evident. An alliance ensured that both Athens and Perdiccas could face Brasidas on a united front and simultaneously foreclose any threat to Perdiccas' realm posed by Athenian campaigning in the northeast.

ET 1: IG 1³89

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens

Lettering: careless Attic

Layout: possibly *stoichedon* 97

[.....⁵⁸.....]ες πέντε [.....³².....]

[.....⁵⁸.....]κες παυέσθο ει[.....²⁷.....]

[.....⁴⁶.....] εἶπε· τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῆι βο[λῆι,²³.....]

[.....⁵⁵.....] δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλον χουμμ[άχον²¹.....]

5 [.....⁵¹.....] ἄναν]εοῦσθαι ἵοταν βόλον[ται ἀμφότεροι¹³.....]

[.....⁵⁴.....]εται πέμπον Ἀθέναζε α[.....²⁵.....]

[.....⁵⁴.....]οι· ἐὰν δὲ μὲ ποιῶσι ταῦ[τα²³.....]

[.....⁵⁴.....]αι ἡοι ἡιππῆς καὶ ἡοι ε[.....²⁵.....]

[.....^{45?}.....] χουμμ[αχία Π]ερδίκκα καὶ τοῖς χ[ουμμάχοις¹⁷.....]

10 [.....⁴⁷.....] καὶ Ἀρ[ραβα]ίοι καὶ τοῖς χουμμ[μάχοις¹⁷.....]

[.....⁴².....] πέντ]ε ἄνδρας ἡ[ε πρ]εσβεία ἐλθ[ῶ]σα α[.....²⁷.....]

⁹⁰ Hammond and Griffith 1979, 136. Thuc. 7.9 has Perdiccas serving with the Athenian general Euetion in a campaign against the now-independent Amphipolis in summer 414, so we may assume that this is the *terminus ante quem* for the reconciliation.

[.....⁴³..... ἀπ]οστελάντων [δὲ ἐπὶ] τὸν α[.....³³.....]
 [.....⁴⁴..... δ]ὲ ἔ~ ναι περὶ αὐ[τῶν³⁸.....]
 [.....⁴⁴.....]έσθο τῷ φσεφίσι[ματι³⁶.....]
15 [.....⁴¹..... ἐάν] δὲ δοκεῖ Περδίκ[και³⁷.....]
 [.....³⁸..... ἀποστ]ῆλαι μὲν Περδίκ[καν³⁸.....]
 [.....⁴²..... ἡ]όστινας ἂν βόλε[ται³⁸.....]
 [.....⁴³.....]αι τὰς χσυνθέκα[ς⁴⁰.....]
 [.....⁴².....]ρο· πρόσοδον δὲ ἔ~ ναι [.....³⁹.....]
20 [.....¹⁷..... πρὸς τὴν βολὴν καὶ τὸν δέμον δέ]κα ἡμερῶν ἐπάναγκε[ς
³⁸.....]
 [.....³⁷..... στρα]τεγὸς χρεματίσαντα[ς³⁸.....]
 [.....³⁹.....]στος· εἰ δὲ τις Ἀθηναῖον [.....³⁹.....]
 [.....³⁷..... δι]πλασίον· ἔ~ ναι δὲ περὶ τῶν [.....³⁹.....]
 [.....²⁹..... προσθῆναι] καὶ ἀφελῆν ἡό τι ἂν ἀμφοτ[έροις δοκεῖ²⁹.....]
25 [.....³²..... ὁμνύε]ν δὲ τὸν ἡόρκον Περδίκκαν κ[αὶ³⁶.....]
 [.....³¹..... Περδίκ]κο καὶ τῶν ἄλλον Μακεδόνο[ν³⁸.....]
 [.....³⁶.....] αὐτοὶ· ὁμνύοντες δέ· δράσο κα[ὶ ἔρῳ³⁵.....]
 [.....³⁰..... καὶ τὸ]ς αὐτὸς φίλος νομιῶ καὶ ἐχθρ[ὸς ἡόσπερ ἂν Ἀθηναῖοι²¹.....]
 [.....²⁷..... πρὸς Ἀθε]ναῖος δικαίος καὶ ἀδόλος κα[ὶ ἀβλαβὸς³².....]
30 [.....³³..... κ]ατὰ τὸ δυνατόν τῷ δέμοι τῷ [Ἀθηναῖον³².....]
 [.....²³..... καὶ οὐδένα κο]πέας ἐχσάγεν ἑάσο ἑὰμ μὲ Ἀθε[ναῖο³⁶.....]
 [.....³⁶.....]ς Ἀθηναῖον ἑὰμ μὲ Ἀθηναῖον . [.....³⁸.....]
 [.....³⁸..... δ]υνατὸν ἡόσοι ἂν ἐθέλοσι [.....³⁸.....]
 [.....⁴².....]ιας πρὸς Ἀθηναῖος, το[ῖ]ς δὲ [.....³⁴.....]
35 [.....³¹..... Περδίκκα]ν καὶ τὸς βασιλέας τὸς [μ]ετὰ Περδ[ί]κκο²⁸.....]
 [.....³⁴..... ἐπὶ τοῖ]ς ἴσοις καὶ τοῖς ὁμ[οί]οις· ὁμνυ[.....³³.....]
 [.....³⁹.....]υῖδο καὶ ἐπαρᾶσθαι [μὲν] τ[ῶ]ι μὲ ἐμ[μένοντι²⁵.....]
 [.....⁴⁰.....]αι Περδίκκαν κ[α]ὶ τὸς παῖδ]ας τὸς Περδίκκο²³.....]

[.....⁴⁰.....]αν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐ[πί βασι]λει[.....³².....]

40 [.....³¹..... οὐ στρατε]υσόμεθα ἐπὶ πόλιν οὐδεμ[ία]ν ἧν Π[ερδίκκας κρατεῖ
.....¹⁷.....]

[.....³⁸..... τ]ὰς δὲ χουνθέκα[ς ἐμ]πεδόσο πρὸς Πε[ρδίκκαν²⁴.....]

[.....³⁰..... ἡὰς χουνέθ]εντο Ἀθηναῖοι ἀδ[όλ]ος ποιῶντι Πε[ρδίκκαι²⁴.....]

[.....⁴⁰.....]ο Περδίκκαν οὔτε [α]ὐτὸν οὔτε τὸς [.....³¹.....]

[.....⁴⁰.....] πρὸς ἡὸς τὸν ἡόρκον {ἡον} ὄ[μο]σα ν οὐ [.....³⁰.....]

45 [.....³⁹..... τ]ὸς αὐτὸς θ<ε>ός. ταῦτα δὲ ἀναγραφά[το ἡο γραμματεὺς ἡο τῆς
βολῆς ...⁶...]

[.....²⁶..... καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα τῶ]ν ὀμοσ<ά>ντων καὶ τῶν πόλε[ον ἡ]ότε[.....³¹.....]

[.....^{c.31}..... προσαναγρ]αφάτο. ἡοι δὲ κολακρέ[ται δόντων τὸ ἀργύριον²⁰.....]

[.....⁴⁶..... ἡο]ι δὲ πρέσβ[εις³⁹.....]

[.....⁴⁶..... ἀγ]γελάντων [ἐς] τὴν [βολὴν³¹.....]

50 [.....²⁴.....]λες ἀφι[κ¹⁶.....]ριος ἡοι [πρ]έσβε[ς³⁴.....]

[.....²².....]ι χουμμαχία[ν²¹.....]ιο κατὰ τά[δε³³.....]

[.....¹⁹..... βό]λονται ἀμφότ[εροι¹⁶..... ἐ]ναντίον τῶι[.....³⁴.....]

[.....²¹.....]ιας σφῶν αὐτ[ῶν⁸..... τὸν εἰπόντα] ἔ τὸν ἐπιφσεφί[σαντα²⁹.....]

[.....²¹.....]εριον ἡένεκ[α¹⁷..... τ]ὰ χρέματα αὐτῷ δε[μύσια ἐ~ναι καὶ τῆς θεῶ τὸ
ἐπιδέκατον ^{vvv}]

55 [ἔδοχσεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι] δέμοι· Αἰαντ[ις ἐπρυτάνευε, γνόμ]ε στρατεγῶν· ἄρχεν τὴν
χουμμαχίαν τὴν πρὸς Περδίκκαν αὐτίκα]

[μάλα· ὑπάρχεν δὲ χρῆσιν ἐμ]πορίων Ἀραβ[αῖοι καὶ τοῖς χουμ]μάχοις ἡέπερ ἂν καὶ Περδ[ίκκαι
.....²⁶.....]

[.....¹⁷..... ἡε βο]λῆ Ἀραβαῖοι [καὶ τοῖς χουμμάχ]οις· ποιέτο δὲ καὶ Ἀραβ[αῖος πρὸς
Περδίκκαν φιλίαν⁹.....]

[.....¹⁶..... καὶ ἡό]ταν φίλος γίγ[νεται Ἀραβαῖ]ος, ποιῆν καὶ Ἀραβαῖοι φιλ[ίαν καὶ
χουμμαχίαν· τὸ δὲ φσέφισμα τόδ]-

[ε τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βολῆς π]ροσγράψαι [πρὸς τὸ πρότερ]ον φσέφισμα *vacat*

60 [.....¹².....]ες Μακεδ[όνο]ν· Περδίκκας [Ἀλεχσάνδρο], Ἀλκέτες Ἀλεχσάνδρο, Ἀρχέλας
Π[ερδίκκο,²³.....]

[...⁶...,] Μενέλαος Ἀλεχσά[νδρ]ο, Ἀγέλαος Ἀ[λκέτο,]υρος Ἀλκέτο, Βυργῖνος Κράστονο[ς
.....²⁹.....]

[...⁶...]ο, Ἄγερρος Φιλίπ[ο], Εὐρύλοχος Βο[...⁶..., Ἀλέ]χσανδρος Πανταπόνο, Νεοπτόλε[μος
.....²⁸.....]

[...⁶...] Ι[.]τιλος, Εὐλανδ[ρ]ος, Ἀντιγένης, Ι[.....¹⁰.....]υκλῆς, Ἄδιμος, Κλέανδρος,
Π[.....³³.....]

[.....¹⁰.....]βο, Λύκαιος, Νομένιος, Κράστο[ν,¹⁰.....], Σταδμέας, Νίκανδρος,
Φυλ[.....³³.....]

65 [.....¹⁰.....]μαχος, Γαιτέας, Καλλίας, Μελα[.....¹¹..... ν]ικος, Κορράτας,
Ἀνδρ[.....³⁶.....]

[.....¹⁰.....], Κορράβον, Δαδ[.]νος, Ἰδάτας, Δ[.....¹⁵.....]ιτας, Κορράτας, [.....³⁸.....]

[...⁷... Με]λέαγρος, Διρβέ[α]ς, Ἄρραβαῖος, Α[.....¹⁴.....]φυττέας, Κατ[.....⁴⁰.....]

[...⁸... Λ]ιμναῖος, Βουκ[.]ς, Αὐτάννιος, [.....¹⁷.....], Καλλίμα[χος³⁸.....]

[...⁷... Δέ]ρδας, βασιλ[εὺς Ἀ]ντίοχος, Δε[.....¹⁶..... βασι]λιεὺς⁴².....]

70 [...⁹...]ος, Ἐρι[...⁹...]λοχος, η[.....⁶⁷.....]

[...⁹...]Σ[.....¹³.....]κος, Ἀ[.....⁷⁰.....]

fr. i incerti loci

----- -γος, Βορδινο[.]

----- Ἄττακῖνος, Ἄνδρο-

----- -σθυνος, Ἔθαρος, Ἄρρ-

75 ----- -νας, Κρατέννας, Θρεσ-

[- - ? Παυσ]ανίας Μαχέτο ^{vvv}

[- - - - Ἄ]γερρος, Βότερες, Λυκε-

----- -ος, Ἀγάθον, Μίσγον ^v

vacat

γνώμεν ἔχσενεγκέτο ἡ βο]λὲ ATL; πρεσβευσάσθο δὲ? ἡ βο]λὲ Davis; προσαγγελάτο δὲ ἡ βὸ]λὲ Wilhelm. 57-58 Περδίκκαν χσυμμαχίαν καθάπερ Ἀ|θηναῖοι κελεύουσιν, καὶ ἡό]ταν ATL. 60 [ἡοῖδε πρέσ]βες David; [ὄμνουον ἄρχο]ντες ATL. 60-61 Ἀρχέλας Π[ερδίκκο, Ἀέροπος Περδίκκο, Ἀλέξανδρος Ἀλκέτο,] Μενέλαος - - Hammond/Griffith.

...

... five ... should stop ... [— proposed: the] other, in other respects as proposed by the council ... but from the other allies ... renew if [both sides] want it ... send to Athens ... if they do not do this ... the horsemen and the ... alliance(?) with Perdiccas and his allies ... and with Arrhabaeus and his allies ... five men; the embassy that has arrived ... should send [to] the ... there shall be, concerning him ... the decree ... [if] Perdiccas thinks it good ... that Perdiccas should send ... whomever he wants ... the treaty ... access *or* income should be ... [before the council and the people] within ten days without fail ... the generals having negotiated. ... If an Athenian ... double. There should be regarding the ... [to add] and take away whatever both sides [think good] ... Perdiccas shall swear the oath and ... Perdiccas and the other Macedonians ... themselves, and they shall swear: 'I will act and [speak] ... [and] have the same friends and enemies [as the Athenians] ... deal fairly [with the] Athenians and without deceit and [without harm] ... to the best of my ability to the people of the [Athenians ... and] I will not let [any] oar-wood be exported, except to an Athenian ... of the Athenians, unless Athenians ... [to the best of my] ability, however many wish ... to the Athenians, the ... [Perdiccas] and the kings with Perdiccas ... on exactly equal terms.' Swear ... and curse him who does not keep it ... Perdiccas and the children [of Perdiccas] ... according to the law before the king ... we will not go to war against any city that Perdiccas [rules] ... I will keep the treaty with Perdiccas ... which the Athenians have made, if Perdiccas acts without deceit ... neither Perdiccas himself nor the ... before whom I have sworn the oath, not ... to the same gods. [The secretary of the council] is to record this ... [and] write down [the names] of those who have sworn and the cities ... shall record besides ... the *kolakretai* shall [give the money] ... the ambassadors ... report [to] the [council] ... the ambassadors ... alliance ... under the following ... both sides want ... opposite the ... of themselves ... [who proposes] or votes ... because of ... his property [is to be] confiscated [and of the goddess the tenth].

[The council and the] people [decided]. Aiantis [was the prytany]; resolution of the generals: that the [alliance with Perdiccas] begin [immediately; that the use of] the trading posts [be permitted] to Arrhabaeus [and his] allies, as well as to Perdiccas ... the council(?) to Arrhabaeus [and his] allies. Arrhabaeus should make [friendship with Perdiccas] ... and if Arrhabaeus becomes a friend, they should also make friendship [and an alliance] with Arrhabaeus; [that the secretary of the council] should add [this decision to the] earlier decision. ...

... of the Macedonians: Perdiccas [son of Alexander], Alcetes son of Alexandros, Archelas son of Perdiccas, ... Menelaus son of Alexander, Agelaus son of Alcetes, —yrus son of Alcetes, Byrginus son of Craston, ... Agerrus son of Philip, Eurylochus son of Bo—, Alexaneder son of Pantaponus,

Neoptolemus, ... —tilus, Eulandrus, Antigeneas, —ycles, Adimus, Cleander, P—, —bus, Lycaeus, Nomenius, Craston, ..., Stadmeas, Nicandrus, Phyl—(?), —machus, Gaeteas, Callias, Mela—, —nicos, Corratas, Andr—, ... Corrabon, Dad[.]nus, Idatas, D—, —itas, Corratas, ... Meleager, Dirbeas, Arrhabaeus, A—, —sytteas, Cat—, ... Limnaeus, Buc[.]s, Autannius, ..., Callimachus, ... Derdas, King Antiochus, De—, King —, ... —us, Eri—, —lochus, Hi—, ..., —cus, A—, ... —nus, Bordino—, ... Attacinus, Andro—, —sthynus, Etharus, Arr—, —nas, Cratennas, Thres—, Pausanias son of Machetas, ... Agerrhus, Botres, Lyce—, —us, Agathon, Misgon.

(own trans., based on the German trans. of Klaus Hallof)

LT 1: Thuc. 4.132.1

περιτειχιζομένης δὲ τῆς Σκιώνης Περδίκκας τοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῖς ἐπικηρυκευσάμενος ὁμολογίαν ποιεῖται πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διὰ τὴν τοῦ Βρασιίδου ἔχθραν περὶ τῆς ἐκ τῆς Λύγκου ἀναχωρήσεως, εὐθὺς τότε ἀρξάμενος πράσσειν.

While the wall was being built round Scione, Perdiccas contacted the Athenian generals and came to an agreement with the Athenians (this was because of his hatred from Brasidas arising out of the retreat from Lyncus, and he had begun negotiations immediately after the retreat).

(trans. Martin Hammond)

Assuming that the present treaty does in fact date to 423, a number of probable clauses can be more securely extracted from the literary sources than from the fragmentary text of the inscription itself. In 422, Cleon requested military support from Perdiccas in the Amphipolis campaign 'in accordance with the alliance' (Thuc. 5.6.2 καὶ πέμψας ὡς Περδίκκαν πρέσβεις, ὅπως παραγένοιτο στρατιᾷ κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν); while, Cole remarks, they are not recorded subsequently fighting at Amphipolis, 'it does not follow, of course, that they were not there.'⁹¹ And ET 1 l. 28, with the familiar formula [καὶ τὸ]ς αὐτὸς φίλος νομιῶ καὶ ἐχθρ[ὸς] ὡςπερ ἂν Ἀθηναῖοι], does in fact denote a military alliance. Earlier, at Thuc. 4.132.2 (and so immediately after the conclusion of the treaty according to Thucydides' chronology), Perdiccas had also persuaded the Thessalians to deny Spartan reinforcements under Ischagoras passage through their territory. Thucydides states that Perdiccas did this at the request of Nicias and does not expressly connect it with the treaty, but I suspect that there was a clause by which Perdiccas pledged to use his influence with the Thessalians to hinder the Spartans and their allies or, failing that, to at least deny them passage through Macedonian territory.

The certain provisions of the inscription begin (ll. 1-13) with Athens undertaking to despatch an embassy to Perdiccas and the other Macedonian oath-takers listed at ll. 60ff. Line 31 [καὶ

⁹¹ Cole 1974, 69.

οὐδένα κο]πέας ἐχσάγεν ἑάσο ἔὰμ μὲ Ἄθε[ναίω], if correctly restored prohibits the sale of Macedonian timber to states other than Athens and thus ensures an Athenian monopoly on its import. Hoffman is acutely cognizant of its significance: ‘This exclusive right to Macedonian wood is undoubtedly the single most important clause of the treaty. Not only was Athens hoping to receive military support from the north Aegean but also to secure sources for crucial raw materials at the same time.’⁹²

Embedded within the inscription is an affirmation of the reconciliation between Perdiccas and Arrhabaeus as brokered by the Athenians (ll. 55-59), although its precise terms are obscure.⁹³ Since Athens was obliged to count the same friends and enemies as Perdiccas, the Athenians may have insisted on this reconciliation as a condition of the alliance, as it spared them from having to assist Perdiccas in an obscure dynastic dispute just as an appreciable part of their ἀρχή was in revolt.

D 2.11

Athenian treaty with the Bottiaei

423/22-421/20 BCE

The Bottiaei were the inhabitants of Bottice, a subregion of Thrace centred on the city of Spartolus (Thuc. 2.79), and were probably of Greek origin.⁹⁴ By the time of the Peloponnesian War, they were members of the Delian League, albeit as individual communities rather than collectively, and several Bottiaean cities appear in the Athenian tribute lists.⁹⁵ In 432 they revolted from Athens at the instigation of Perdiccas II in cooperation with Potidaea and Olynthus, the latter becoming the capital of a Chalcidian federal state (Thuc. 1.57-58).⁹⁶

ET 1 consists of eight fragments all recovered on the Athenian Acropolis except for fr. *h*, which was found in the Agora. As there is no archon-name the date is not immediately obvious; however, Tracy identifies its cutter with the cutter of *IG 2² 1386*, whose attested career spanned from 423/22 to 394/93.⁹⁷ Meritt, noting that the Bottiaean cities Tripolae and Cemacae (ll. 46-67) appear in the tribute quota list of 421/20 (*IG 1³ 285.3 ll. 8, 11*), posits that

⁹² Hoffman 1975, 361; cf. comm. *SdA²* no. 186, p. 113.

⁹³ Cf. Hoffman 1975, 362.

⁹⁴ Flensted-Jensen 1995, 108-11; Flensted-Jensen in *IACP*, p. 811.

⁹⁵ Cemacae and Tripolae in 421/20 (*IG 1³ 285.3 ll. 8, 11*); Aeolitae on several occasions (*IG 1³ 278.6 l. 7; 279.2 l. 84; 77.5 l. 17*).

⁹⁶ Cf. Flensted-Jensen 1995, 126-28.

⁹⁷ Tracy 2016, 124.

year as the *terminus ante quem*.⁹⁸

ET 1: IG 1³ 76

Findspot: fragments *a-g*: Acropolis, Athens; fragment *h*: Agora, Athens

Lettering: developed Attic

Layout: *stoichedon* 42

[----- τὰς τά]-
 χσες ἔν[αι³⁴.....]
 ντες ἠο[ι] ε . [.....²⁷..... διδόντ]-
 ο[ν] δὲ τὰς δί[κας³⁰.....]
 5 [.] . ἐπειδὴν³³.....
 [ἡ]ετέροι πα[.....³²..... ἡ]-
 εκατερον ε[.....³³.....]
 ος· τὸν δὲ ἠόρκον ὁμόσαι ἡκατέρως, Ἀθηναίων μὲν τὲν]
 βολὲν καὶ τ[ὸς στρατηγὸς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχάς, Βοττια]-
 10 ἴον δὲ τὲν βο[λὲν καὶ τὸς στρατηγὸς] κα[ὶ τὸς λοιπὸς ἄρ]-
 χοντας τὸς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ταῖς Βοτ[τι]α[ί]ον· ἠο δὲ ἠόρκ]-
 ος ἔστο Ἀθεν[αί]οι[ς] ἠόδε· ἀμυνῶ τοῖς] Βοττι[αίοις] τοῖς]
 χσυντιθεμέ[νοις] [τὲν χσυμαχίαν, κ]αὶ τὲν χσ[υμαχία]-
 ν πιστῶς καὶ [ἀδ]όλο[ς φυλάχσο Βοττι]αίοις προ[θυμόμε]-
 15 [ν]ος κατὰ τὰ χ[σ]υ[ν]κε[ί]μενα· καὶ οὐ μνε]σικακέσο τῶ[ν παρ]-
 οιομένον ἔ[νε]κα· [Βοττιαῖοι δὲ ὁμν]υόντων κατὰ [τάδε].
 φίλοι ἐσόμε[θα Ἀθηναίοις καὶ χσύμ]μαχοι πιστῶ[ς] κα[ὶ]
 ἀδόλος καὶ τ[ὸς αὐ]τῶ[ς φίλος καὶ ἐχθ]ρὸς νομιῶμε[ν] ἠόσ-

⁹⁸ Meritt 1925, 30, noting at 31 that none of the Bottiaean towns listed in the present treaty (ll. 45-47, 53) are present in the autonomy clause of the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.18.5): 'Assuming, then, that the Bottic alliance was made after the Peace of Nicias, we must also assume that cities party to the alliance were hostile to Athens at the time the Peace of Nicias was ratified. And yet there is no mention of these cities in the document of peace.'

περ ἄν Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ οὐκ ὀφελέσο τὸς ἐχθρὸς τὸς Ἀθεν-
 20 αῖον οὔτε χρ[έμα]σιν ἠ[απλῶς οὔτε δυ]νάμει οὐδεμιᾷ, ο-
 ὔδὲ μνεσικ[ακέσο] τῶν [παροιχομέν]ον ἔνεκα· τὰς δὲ χσυ-
 νθέκας τά[σδε καὶ] τὸν [ἠόρκον κατα]θῆναι Ἀθηναῖος μὲ-
 ν ἐμ πόλε[ι ἀναγρά]φσ[αντας ἐστέλει] λιθίνει καὶ τὰ ὄν-
 [ό]ματα τῶν [πόλεον] τῶν Βοττιαίων τῶν χσυντιθεμένων
 25 τὲν φιλία[ν καὶ τὲν χσυμμαχίαν, κα]ὶ ἐπιγράψαι ἐν τ[ῆ]-
 ι στέλει τῷ ἄρχοντος τὸ ὄνομα ἐφ' ὃ ἐγένοντο αἱ χσ[υ]ν[θ]-
 ῆκαι· Βοττιαῖοι δ' ἐν στέλαις λιθί[ν]αις ἀναγράφ[σαντ]-
 ες καταθέντ[ον ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς κ]ατὰ πόλες, ἐπι[γράφ]-
 αντες ἐν ταῖς στέλαις τῶν ἀρχόν]τον τὰ ὀνόμα[τα τῶν Β]-
 30 οττιαίων ἐφ' ὃν ἐγένοντο ἡαι χσυνθῆ[κ]α[ι]· τὸς δὲ [ῥοκος]
 ἠοίτινες λέ[φ]σονται παρὰ Βοττιαίων ἐλέσθαι τὸν δῆ-
 μον πέντε ἄνδρας αὐτίκα μάλα ἐκ πάντων Ἀθηναίων· τὸ]-
 ς δὲ ὁμέρος ἠ[ὸς ἔχοσι²⁵.....]
 [..] Εὐκράτες εἶπεν· τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῆι βολῆι· τὰ δ]-
 35 ἐ ὀνόματα] κ[.....³³.....]
 ἀποδ.....³⁸.....
 ν ἠοι σ[τρατ]ε[γ]οὶ²⁹.....]
 ἐπειδὰ[ν τὸς ἠόρ]κος²⁶.....]
 ον ἀποδῶ[σι] Βοττιαῖοι²⁴.....]
 40 μὲ δόχσε[ι] ἀποδῶνα[ι²⁶.....]
 ὅτι ἀποκρίνονται α[.....²⁴..... ο]-
 ὔδὲ [γ]νόμας χορὶς κα[.....²⁶.....]
 ον καθὰ παραινῶσιν Β[οττιαῖοι¹⁷.....]
 αἶδε πόλε[ς] ἐσίν· *vacat*
 45 Καλίνδοι[α] *vacat*
 Τριποαί *vacat*

[Κ]εμακαί *vacat*

reliquiae versuum vacat

saltem quinque vacat

in latere dextro stelae, prope v. 21 partis anticae:

vacat

53 *ἡαί*[λειον]

vacat

13 [τὰς ὁμολογίας] Lolling. 33-34 [ὃς ἔχοσι Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποδοῦναι Βοττιαῖοι|ς ν or η[ὃς ἔχοσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀποδοῦναι Βοττιαῖοι|ς] Tod.

... the assessments are ... which ... should offer arbitration ... whenever ... the others ... each of them ... [that both swear] the oath, [of the Athenians the] council and the [generals and the other magistrates, of the] Bottiaei the council [and the generals] and [the other] officials in [the cities of the] Bottiaei. [The oath] for the Athenians is as follows: [‘I will help the] Bottiaei who have concluded [the alliance], and [will keep] the alliance with the Bottiaei faithfully and without deceit, and will be willing to do as agreed; [and I will not] bear a grudge regarding the past.’ [The Bottiaei] are to swear [as follows]: ‘we will be friends [of the Athenians and] allies, loyal and without deceit, and have the same [friends and] enemies as the Athenians, and I will not [help] the enemies of the Athenians, neither with money nor [arms, nor] will I bear a grudge regarding the past.’ This treaty and the [oath] shall be written up by the Athenians on the Acropolis on a stone [stele], and also the names of the [cities of the Bottiaei] that have concluded the treaty of friendship [and alliance]; and add to the stele the [name of the archon under whom] the treaty was concluded. The Bottiaei are to write them up on stone [stelae], erecting them [in the sanctuaries] of their cities, and add to the [stelae] the names of the archons of the Bottiaei under whom the treaties [were concluded]. To administer the [oaths to the Bottiaei, the] people are to [immediate]ly select five men [from among all the Athenians]. The hostages they have ...

Eucrates [proposed: otherwise as requested by the council], but the names ... the generals ... when the oaths ... the Bottiaei give back ... do not decide to give back ... that they answer ... or also draft resolutions without ... as the Bottiaei advise. ... These are the cities: *vacat*
Calindoea *vacat* Tripoeae *vacat* Cemacae *vacat*

Haeolium *vacat*

(own trans., based on the German trans. of Klaus Hallof)

The first seven lines of the inscription are extremely fragmentary, but there is mention of assessments (ll. 1-2 τὰς τὰ] | χσες), presumably of tribute, as well as δι[κας] (l. 4), a probable reference to lawsuits.⁹⁹ The text becomes more legible from l. 8 onwards. There is an oath taken by the Athenians to defend the Bottiaei, to stay true to the alliance, and to forget past wrongs (l. 15 οὐ μνε]σικακέσο). The Bottiaei, for their part, pledge to have the same friends and enemies as the Athenians, not to aid Athens' enemies and, like the Athenians, to forget past wrongs. This is followed by instructions for publishing the decree (with copies to be erected at Athens on the Acropolis and, it seems, in each of the Bottiaean cities) and the selection of Athenian oath-administrators (ll. 30-32, five Athenians chosen by the δῆμος). There is a somewhat cryptic reference to (Bottiaean?) hostages before the text breaks off: ll. 32-33 τὸ] | ς δὲ ὄμερος ἠ[ὸς ἔχοσι C.J. Joyce, following M.N. Tod's restoration (see *apparatus criticus*), reasonably posits that the lost part of l. 33 ensures their return.¹⁰⁰ The Athenian prescript follows, and the treaty concludes with a list of the Bottiaean cities included in the treaty, which does not include Spartolus (Tod believes that Spartolus was in revolt until the Peace of Nicias, where its autonomous but tribute-paying status is confirmed: Thuc. 5.18.4 = **D 2.12 LT 1**).¹⁰¹ The name of the proposer of the Athenian decree, Eucrates, is preserved (l. 34), but the name is far too common for him to be identified.¹⁰²

Joyce writes that the treaty 'was contracted on a theoretical principle of equality, where it lay in the interest of each party to forgive the other for what had been done a decade earlier.'¹⁰³ This is evident in the Bottiaean oath, where loyalty is sworn not to Athens alone but also to the allies of Athens (ll. 17-18 φίλοι ἐσόμε[θα Ἀθηναίοις καὶ χσύμ]μαχοι πιστῶ[ς] κα[ι] | ἀδόλος); I suspect that this reflects the political sensitivity of Bottice and the Athenians' caution not to alienate its newly-recovered allies there.

D 2.12

Peace of Nicias

421 BCE

Hostilities between Athens and Sparta resumed in summer 422 with a northeastern campaign led by Cleon (Thuc. 5.2). This culminated in the battle of Amphipolis, where both Brasidas and

⁹⁹ Meritt 1925, 30; comm. Tod 68, p. 167; Joyce 2008, 509.

¹⁰⁰ Joyce 2008, 509 with n. 7. On the possible identity of the hostages see Panagopoulos 1978, 202-03.

¹⁰¹ Comm. Tod 68, p. 167; Flensted-Jensen 1995, 119-22.

¹⁰² *LGPN* 2 s.v. Εὐκράτης.

¹⁰³ Joyce 2008, 511.

Cleon perished and which was, according to Thucydides (5.16.1), the catalyst which prompted both sides to decide to make peace. D.M. Lewis writes, 'It is hard to believe that any serious war-party survived at Athens or Sparta, and the simultaneous deaths of Cleon and Brasidas were universally treated as symbolic,' as seen for example in Aristophanes' *Pax*, likely composed while peace negotiations were underway and performed less than two weeks before the Peace of Nicias was ratified (ultimately, Aristophanes received second place at the Dionysia of 421).¹⁰⁴ The play centres on an Athenian, Trygaeus, who through fantastical means brings the Peloponnesian War to an end, liberating the goddess Eirene (Peace) from the cave where she is imprisoned; the 'pestles of war,' Cleon and Brasidas, which since 431 had been grinding Greece to powder, are nowhere to be found (Ar. *Pax*. 261-286).¹⁰⁵

The removal of Cleon and Brasidas from the scene allowed for the emergence of another Athenian-Spartan pair who were committed, not to prolonging the war, but to ending it: Nicias, the Athenian statesman and general, and Pleistoanax, the Agiad king of Sparta.¹⁰⁶ Thucydides does not hesitate to speculate on their motives: Nicias, he claims, while eager to avoid defeat on the battlefield loss of face, also genuinely desired to give his fellow Athenians a respite from a decade of war (5.16.1). As for Pleistoanax, his peculiar backstory is used by Thucydides to explain his motives. In 446, towards the end of the First Peloponnesian War, Pleistoanax led a Peloponnesian invasion of Attica but unexpectedly withdrew. Upon his return to Sparta, he was fined and, unable to pay the fine, exiled on the basis of accusations that he had been bribed by Pericles to retreat (cf. Thuc. 1.114.2; 2.21.1), and was not restored to his throne until 427.¹⁰⁷ It cannot have helped his cause that the Pylos disaster occurred not long after his recall. Even in 421 he was still insecure on his throne, as he had domestic opponents claiming that his restoration was illegal on the grounds that he and his brother Aristocles had supposedly bribed the Pythia to endorse his recall. It is therefore likely true, as Thucydides claims (5.16.1-17.1),

¹⁰⁴ Lewis 1992a, 431; Olson 1998, xxxi. The Peace took effect on 25 Elaphebolion in the Attic calendar (Thuc. 5.19.1), and 13 Elaphebolion was probably the last day of the Dionysia: see Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 490.

¹⁰⁵ I paraphrase Adcock 1927, 249: 'The play reflects the growing desire for peace, the realization that fratricidal strife was grinding Greece to powder, and that now there was hope, because the two "pestles of war" had vanished.' Sicking 1998, 83 takes a dimmer view, downplaying Aristophanes' optimism: 'Aristophanes konnte im voraus wissen, daß ein Vertrag in diesem Augenblick den Krieg nicht endgültig beseitigen würde: die Lage ist für eine wirkliche Versöhnung nicht geeignet, die Gegner werden einander nicht in Ruhe lassen bevor der eine den anderen der völligen Vernichtung preisgegeben haben wird.'

¹⁰⁶ On Thucydides' emphasis on the role of individuals in the events surrounding the Peace of Nicias see Hunt 2017, 140; cf. more generally Tsakmakis 2006 and Gribble 2006.

¹⁰⁷ The truth of the accusation of bribery is disputed: Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 1, 186 suggests that Pleistoanax's withdrawal was the result of some kind of preliminary agreement with the Athenians that did not involve bribery. Philippides 1985 argues that Pleistoanax was spooked by the solar eclipse of 2 September 446. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 467 and Gomme at *HCT* 3, 664 both agree that Pleistoanax's recall cannot have occurred earlier than the late summer of 427, as his son Pausanias, still a minor, is attested on the throne in the early summer of that year (Thuc. 3.26.2). But they differ on the question of how long Pleistoanax had been in favour of peace: Gomme believes that Pleistoanax had only recently come to support it, whereas Hornblower interprets 5.17.1 to indicate that Pleistoanax 'had wanted peace for some time.'

that Pleistoanax favoured peace because in peace there was no danger that he would be held responsible for any military failures.

In winter 422/21 the Spartans, frustrated by the sluggish pace of negotiations, forced the issue by threatening to build a fort inside Attica itself, as it would do years later at Decelea (Thuc. 5.17.2; cf. 7.19.1-2). An agreement was soon reached, the basic principle of which was that all sides should return to the *status quo ante bellum*, with the exception that the Boeotians could keep Plataea and the Athenians Nisaea. Ultimately, neither Plataea nor Nisaea were mentioned in the text of the treaty, probably because Athens and Boeotia had already hardened their resolve on the matter. The Spartans subsequently assembled their allies¹⁰⁸ to vote on the Peace; a majority supported it, but key allies including Boeotia, Corinth, Elis, and Megara dissented (5.17.2). The Boeotians in particular objected to the requirement that they cede the Attic border fort of Panactum to Athens (cf. 5.39.2-3); the Megarians' objections, while not explained by Thucydides, surely stemmed from the Athenians' retention of Nisaea; the Corinthians were upset that Athens was allowed to retain Sollium and Anactorium in Acarnania (5.30.2); and R. Seager notes that the Eleans, while they 'suffered no disadvantage from any particular clause of the peace,' objected because 'peace would leave Sparta free to turn her attention to her squabble with Elis over Lepreum.'¹⁰⁹

The level of detail that we see in Thucydides' reproduction of the Peace of Nicias is notable. L. Kozak suggests that the treaty's thoroughness betrays a deep mistrust on both sides, since detailed clauses could less easily be misinterpreted, deliberately or otherwise, than vague and imprecise ones. As she observes, 'The treaty seems to take extreme care to ensure the survival of the fifty years of peace that it was intended to generate.'¹¹⁰ I suspect that the Athenians' unilateral retention of Nisaea on the one hand, and the objections of key Spartan allies on the other, had already raised red flags during the negotiation stage, prompting Sparta and Athens to approach each other with a high level of apprehension.

Insofar as Sparta had tried and failed to destroy Athens' ἀρχή, the Peace of Nicias represented a victory for Athens. However, it is doubtful in light of Pericles' strategy of 431, which envisioned a war of only a few years, that the Athenians expected the war to drag on for a

¹⁰⁸ Gomme (*HCT* 3, 665), following Steup, holds τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ξυμμάχους at 5.17.2 to denote formal members of the Peloponnesian League only – those whom Thucydides so often calls οἱ Πελοπόννησοι – to the exclusion of the northern cities won over by Brasidas and styled 'allies [or friends] of the Lacedaemonians' (Thuc. 5.9.9: Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμάχοις; 4.120.3: Λακεδαιμονίων φίλους). Gomme says of the latter, 'They had only to accept the decisions taken at Sparta, and be handed back to Athens.'

¹⁰⁹ Seager 1976, 250; cf. *HCT* 3, 665; Rhodes 2008, 9. Lepreum was a perioecic community of Elis (Hdt. 4.148.4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23, 25; Paus. 3.8.3 with Roy 1997, 283-85), but was captured and garrisoned by Sparta in 421 (Thuc. 5.31.4, 34.1). On the demolition of Panactum see Kelly 1972.

¹¹⁰ Kozak in Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 256; cf. Lateiner 2012, 176.

decade, with all the loss of wealth and manpower that it entailed – not least owing to the plague, which was a direct result of Pericles' strategy.

LT 1: Thuc. 5.18.1

σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι κατὰ τάδε, καὶ ὤμοσαν κατὰ πόλεις. [2] περὶ μὲν τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν κοινῶν, θύειν καὶ ἰέναι καὶ μαντεύεσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀδεῶς. τὸ δ' ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν νεῶν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Δελφούς αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αὐτοδίκους καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἑαυτῶν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. [3] ἔτη δὲ εἶναι τὰς σπονδὰς πεντήκοντα Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀδόλους καὶ ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. [4] ὄπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονῇ μῆτε Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπ' Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μῆτε Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, μῆτε τέχνη μῆτε μηχανῇ μηδεμιᾶ. ἦν δὲ τι διάφορον ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, δίκαις χρήσθων καὶ ὄρκους, καθ' ὅτι ἂν ξυνθῶνται. [5] ἀποδόντων δὲ Ἀθηναίοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀμφίπολιν. ὅσας δὲ πόλεις παρέδοσαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίοις, ἐξέστω ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούλωνται αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντας· τὰς δὲ πόλεις φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου αὐτονόμους εἶναι. ὄπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν Ἀθηναίους μὴδὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ κακῶ, ἀποδιδόντων τὸν φόρον, ἐπειδὴ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο. εἰσὶ δὲ Ἄργιλος, Στάγιρος, Ἄκανθος, Σκῶλος, Ὀλυνθος, Σπάρτωλος. ξυμμάχους δ' εἶναι μηδετέρων, μῆτε Λακεδαιμονίων μῆτε Ἀθηναίων· ἦν δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πείθωσι τὰς πόλεις, βουλομένας ταύτας ἐξέστω ξυμμάχους ποιεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοις. [6] Μηκυβερναίους δὲ καὶ Σαναίους καὶ Σιγγαίους οἰκεῖν τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν, καθάπερ Ὀλύνθιοι καὶ Ἀκάνθιοι. [7] ἀποδόντων δὲ Ἀθηναίοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Πάνακτον. ἀποδόντων δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι Λακεδαιμονίοις Κορυφάσιον καὶ Κύθηρα καὶ Μέθανα καὶ Πτελεὸν καὶ Ἀταλάντην καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ὅσοι εἰσὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων ἢ ἄλλοθί που ὅσης Ἀθηναῖοι ἄρχουσιν ἐν δημοσίῳ· καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σκιώνῃ πολιορκουμένους Πελοποννησίων ἀφεῖναι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅσοι Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοι ἐν Σκιώνῃ εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσους Βρασιδάς ἐσέπεμψε καὶ εἴ τις τῶν ξυμμάχων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἧς Ἀθηναῖοι ἄρχουσιν ἐν δημοσίῳ. ἀποδόντων δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι οὐστυνας ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων κατὰ ταῦτά. [8] Σκιωναίων δὲ καὶ Τορωναίων καὶ Σερμουλιῶν καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλην πόλιν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, Ἀθηναίους βουλευέσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων ὅτι ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς. [9] ὄρκους δὲ ποιήσασθαι Ἀθηναίους πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κατὰ πόλεις. ὁμνύντων δὲ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὄρκον ἐκάτεροι τὸν μέγιστον ἐπτὰ καὶ δέκα ἐκάστης πόλεως. ὁ δ' ὄρκος ἔστω ὅδε· ἐμμενῶ ταῖς ξυνθήκαις καὶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖσδε δικαίως καὶ ἀδόλως. ἔστω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις κατὰ ταῦτά ὄρκος πρὸς Ἀθηναίους. [10] τὸν δὲ ὄρκον ἀνανεοῦσθαι κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἀμφοτέρους. στήλας δὲ στήσαι Ὀλυμπίασι καὶ Πυθοῖ καὶ Ἴσθμοῖ καὶ Ἀθήνησιν ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι ἐν Ἀμυκλαίῳ. [11] εἰ δὲ τι ἀμνημονοῦσιν ὀποτεροιοῦν καὶ ὅτου πέρι, λόγοις δικαίοις χρωμένους εὐορκον εἶναι ἀμφοτέροις ταύτη μεταθεῖναι ὅπη ἂν δοκῇ ἀμφοτέροις, Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις.

[19.1] ἄρχει δὲ τῶν σπονδῶν <ἐν μὲν Λακεδαίμονι> ἔφορος Πλειστόλας Ἄρτεμισίου μηνὸς τετάρτη φθίνοντος, ἐν δὲ Ἀθήναις ἄρχων Ἀλκαῖος Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος μηνὸς ἕκτη φθίνοντος. ὦμνυον δὲ οἶδε καὶ ἐσπένδοντο. [2] Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν <Πλειστοάναξ, Ἄγις,> Πλειστόλας, Δαμάγητος, Χίονις, Μεταγένης, Ἄκανθος, Δάιθος, Ἰσχαγόρας, Φιλοχαρίδας, Ζευξίδας, Ἄντιππος, Τέλλις, Ἀλκινάδας, Ἐμπεδίας, Μηνᾶς, Λάφιλος. Ἀθηναίων δὲ οἶδε. Λάμπων, Ἰσθμιόνικος, Νικίας, Λάχης, Εὐθύδημος, Προκλῆς, Πυθόδωρος, Ἄγνω, Μυρτίλος, Θρασυκλῆς, Θεαγένης, Ἀριστοκράτης, Ἰώλκιος, Τιμοκράτης, Λέων, Λάμαχος, Δημοσθένης.

<ἐν μὲν Λακεδαίμονι> add. Kirchhoff. <Πλειστοάναξ, Ἄγις> add. Arnold (cf. Thuc. 5.24.1).

A treaty was made by the Athenians and by the Spartans and their allies on the following terms, to which they swore city by city. Concerning the common sanctuaries, any who wish shall be free to sacrifice there and travel there and consult the oracles and visit on a delegation, according to established custom, both by land and by sea, without fear. The sanctuary and temple of Apollo at Delphi and the people of Delphi shall be autonomous and shall have full control of their own taxation and their own courts, as regards both themselves and their territory, according to established custom. The treaty shall be for fifty years between the Athenians and the allies of the Athenians and the Spartans and the allies of the Spartans, and shall be observed both by land and by sea without fraud or violation. Neither side shall be permitted to bring force of arms with harmful intent against the other by any means or contrivance, neither the Spartans and their allies against the Athenians and their allies nor the Athenians and their allies against the Spartans and their allies. Should any dispute arise between them, they shall have resort to judicial process and affidavits, in whatever way is mutually agreed. The Spartans and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians. In those cities which the Spartans have handed over to the Athenians, people shall be free to leave for wherever they wish and to take their property with them. The following cities shall be autonomous on condition of paying the tribute assessed at the time of Aristides, and it shall not be permitted for the Athenians or their allies to bring force of arms to their detriment as long as they pay this tribute, now that the treaty has been made: these cities are Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus. These shall be allies of neither side, neither of the Spartans nor of the Athenians: but if the Athenians so persuade the cities, with their consent the Athenians shall be permitted to make them allies. The people of Micyberna, Sane, and Singus shall have possession of their own cities in the same way as the people of Olynthus and Acanthus. The Spartans and their allies shall restore Panactum to the Athenians. The Athenians shall restore to the Spartans Coryphasium, Cythera, Methana, Pteleum, and Atalante; and shall return all Spartans held in the public prison in Athens or in a public prison anywhere else under Athenian rule; and shall release the Peloponnesians besieged in Scione, all other Spartan allies in Scione, and all those sent in by Brasidas; they shall release also any allies of the Spartans in the public prison in Athens or in a public prison anywhere else under Athenian rule. The Spartans and their allies shall likewise return any of the Athenians and their allies whom they hold. In the case of Scione, Torone, Sermyle, and any other city now held by the Athenians, the Athenians shall decide as they see fit concerning the inhabitants of these and the other cities.

The Athenians shall swear oaths to the Spartans and their allies city by city. Each party shall take the oaths which is most binding in their local observance, and seventeen men shall swear from each city. The form of the oath shall be as follows: 'I shall abide by this agreement and this treaty with all justice and honesty.' The oath sworn by the Spartans and their allies to the Athenians shall be identical. Both sides shall renew the oath annually. Pillars of record shall be set up at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, at Athens on the Acropolis and at Sparta in the Amyclaeum. If either side has failed to include any point on any issue, it shall be consistent with these oaths on both sides to hold proper consultation and make such amendment to this treaty as is agreed by both sides, the Athenians and the Spartans.

The treaty shall take effect from the following date: in Sparta, in the ephorate of Pleistolas, the fourth day before the end of the month Artemisium; in Athens, in the archonship of Alcaeus, the sixth day before the end of the month Elaphebolion. The following swore the oaths and poured the libations to ratify the treaty. Of the Spartans: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daïthus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinadas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. Of the Athenians the following: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theogenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 2: Diod. 12.74.5

μετὰ δὲ τὴν εἰρημένην μάχην ἔδοξαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις συνθέσθαι σπονδὰς πεντηκονταετείς ἐπὶ τοῖσδε· τοὺς μὲν αἰχμαλώτους παρ' ἀμφοτέροις ἀπολυθῆναι, τὰς δὲ πόλεις ἀποδοῦναι τὰς κατὰ πόλεμον ληφθείσας.

After the battle we have described the Athenians decided to make a truce of fifty years with the Lacedaemonians, upon the following terms: the prisoners with both sides were to be released and each side should give back the cities which had been taken in the course of the war.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather)

LT 3: Plut. Nic. 10.1

γενομένων δὲ συνθηκῶν ὅπως τὰ χωρία καὶ τὰς πόλεις, ἃς εἶχον ἀλλήλων, καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἀποδιδῶσι, προτέρων ἀποδιδόντων τῶν κλήρω λαχόντων, ὠνήσατο τὸν κλῆρον ὁ Νικίας κρύφα χρήμασιν, ὥστε προτέρους ἀποδιδόναι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. [2] καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος.

The articles of peace required that the strongholds and cities and prisoners of war which each party had taken from the other should be restored and since that party was to make restoration

first on whom the lot fell, the lot was secretly bought up by Nicias, so that the Lacedaemonians were the first to make restoration. This is the testimony of Theophrastus.

(trans. Bernadotte Perrin)

Unlike the tripartite Truce of Laches, the Thucydidean Peace of Nicias is presented as a single homogenous document.¹¹¹ Thuc. 5.18.1 immediately reveals that this is conceived as a treaty between two parties: the Athenians on the one side and ‘the Spartans and their allies’ on the other. Athens’ allies, whether within the Delian League or outside of it (e.g., Zacynthus, Cephalonia, Corcyra), are unlikely to have taken part in the negotiations and there is no indication that they individually swore to the Peace, although they were still bound to it. On the other hand, Sparta’s allies were invited to swear κατὰ πόλεις, ‘city by city.’¹¹²

The actual provisions of the treaty begin at 5.18.2. The first clause guarantees safe passage for all Greeks to visit the panhellenic sanctuaries (ἱερὰ κοινά) and provides for the autonomy of the sanctuary of Delphi in particular. The Peace of Nicias accordingly goes above and beyond the Truce of Laches, which guaranteed access to Delphi only and said nothing about its autonomy.¹¹³ Specifically, the Peace of Nicias requires both the sanctuary of Delphi and the Delphians themselves (τὸ δ’ ἱερόν καὶ τὸν νεῶν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Δελφούς) to be αὐτόνομοι, αὐτοτελεῖς, and αὐτόδικοι. This is probably a response to earlier attempts to impose external control on Delphi, notably during the Second Sacred War of the early-440s (see my commentary on **D 1.5**).¹¹⁴

5.18.3 sets the time limit of the Peace at 50 years, the longest attested for a peace treaty up to that point, since the previous maximum appears to have been a mere 30 years.¹¹⁵ 5.18.4 begins with a nonaggression clause. The expression ὄπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονῇ and μήτε τέχνη μήτε μηχανῇ μηδεμιᾶ is formulaic: cf. 5.18.5 ὄπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν ... ἐπὶ κακῷ and 5.47.2 (= **D 3.2 LT 1**) ὄπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονῇ μήτε Ἀργείους καὶ Ἡλείους κτλ. As Baltrusch observes, the Peace of Nicias was not the first treaty to use this formula: there was evidently a similar nonaggression clause in the Thirty Years’ Peace (Thuc. 7.18.2 = **D 1.11 LT 7** καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνηθείαις ὄπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν) and in the Pylos ceasefire (4.16.1 = **D 2.6 LT 1** καὶ ὄπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν τῷ Πελοποννησίων στρατῷ).¹¹⁶ The remainder of 5.18.4 contains the arbitration clause. I accept δίκαις over the variant reading δικαίω endorsed by Classen, for, as Gomme notes, δικαίω without the article or λόγῳ (as in λόγοις δικαίοις at

¹¹¹ Giovannini 2007, 259.

¹¹² *HCT* 3, 667; Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 567.

¹¹³ The panhellenic sanctuaries were Delphi, Olympia, Isthmia, and Nemea: Richardson 1992, 223.

¹¹⁴ On the events of the Second Sacred War see also Parke and Wormell 1956, 196-97; Scott 2014, 116-17.

¹¹⁵ Baltrusch 1994, 173.

¹¹⁶ Baltrusch 1994, 173.

Thuc. 5.18.11) is unduly difficult, and δίκαι is the normal term for arbitration in Thucydides, both in his authorial narrative and when quoting documents (cf. 1.140.2; 4.118.8; 7.18.2).¹¹⁷

The return of Amphipolis (5.18.5) was for Athens a matter of the utmost importance and illustrates the treaty's preoccupation with a reversion to the territorial *status quo ante bellum*. Its value was not lost on Thucydides, who remarks on its economic and strategic significance (4.108.1).¹¹⁸ Apart from Amphipolis, the text of the Peace promises to restore other, unnamed cities to the Athenians (ὅσας δὲ πόλεις παρέδωσαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίοις). Hornblower speculates that among these cities were Oesyne/Syme (see Thuc. 4.107.3 on its capture by Brasidas) and a number of cities on the Acte peninsula of Chalcidice including Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoum, and Olophyxus (cf. 4.109).¹¹⁹ The residents of Amphipolis and the other cities handed back to the Athenians are free to leave if they wish and are permitted to take their property with them (τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντας), which both Gomme ('The general purpose of this clause is not only to secure the lives and property of individuals, but to avoid *stasis* in the future') and Kagan ('The idea, no doubt, was to prevent future civil strife which would endanger the peace') regard as a security measure.¹²⁰ Next, six cities in Chalcidice are formally granted autonomy: these are Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. All of them were subject allies of Athens before revolting under varying circumstances. Argilus defected in the course of the Chalcidian campaign of Brasidas (Thuc. 4.103.3-4), as did Stagirus (4.88.2), which Cleon tried unsuccessfully to retake in 422 (5.6.1). Acanthus also sided with Brasidas around this time (4.85-88.1). The secession of Scolus (spelt Stulus in the Athenian tribute lists and elsewhere: cf. *IG* 4² 1.94 lb l. 23; Pliny *NH* 4.37) is, however, otherwise unattested.¹²¹ Olynthus and Spartolus had already seceded in 432 (Olynthus: Thuc. 1.58.2; Spartolus: 2.79.2). Under the Peace of Nicias, these cities, while officially αὐτόνομοι, were to continue paying tribute, albeit now set a fixed rate corresponding to 'the tribute from the time of Aristides' (τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου); the text of the Peace implies that Athens would be justified in attacking them if they failed to pay. Despite the tribute obligation, they are officially neutral, affiliated neither with the Delian League nor the Peloponnesian League (ξυμμαχούς δ' εἶναι μηδετέρων, μήτε Λακεδαιμονίων μήτε Ἀθηναίων), but are permitted to rejoin the former on a voluntary basis. Hornblower denies that this clause really benefited the six cities and argues

¹¹⁷ *HCT* 3, 668; cf. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 574.

¹¹⁸ Meiggs 1982, 357-58 notes Amphipolis' importance as a source for timber needed in shipbuilding, probably harvested from nearby Mount Pangaion and its environs. Kallet-Marx 1993, 175-76 suggests that the gold and silver mines of Pangaion, supplemented by income from Amphipolis' sacred precincts, were a notable source of Athenian wealth. Athens was still trying to recover Amphipolis in 417/16, when an Athenian expedition commanded by Nicias was sent against the city (Thuc. 5.83.4), and it remained a political issue in Athens as late as the reign of Philip II of Macedon.

¹¹⁹ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 475.

¹²⁰ *HCT* 3, 668; Kagan 1974, 342-43.

¹²¹ On the variant spellings and the possible (Homeric) reasons for them, see Lewis 1952, 140, 153.

that it amounted to the reimposition of Athenian hegemony in disguised form. An attack by Olynthus against the Athenian garrison at nearby Meczyberna in winter 421/20 (5.39.1) indicates that the Olynthians at any rate did not accept the Peace. In light of all this, I find myself strongly in agreement with Hornblower and especially N. Luraghi, who argue that the autonomy clause was a Spartan face-saving measure meant to avoid giving the accurate impression that the Spartans had abandoned their Chalcidian allies.¹²²

5.18.6 declares that the inhabitants of Meczyberna, Singus, and Sane (Sane has sometimes been amended to Gale, but this is probably incorrect) may ‘inhabit their cities just like the Olynthians and Acanthians’ (οἰκεῖν τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν, καθάπερ Ὀλύνθιοι καὶ Ἀκάνθιοι).¹²³ Though there is no direct evidence, Gomme believes that Meczyberna and Singus seceded with Olynthus, Spartolus, and Potidaea in 432, their inhabitants evacuated to Macedonian-controlled territory and to Olynthus upon its synoecism (cf. Thuc. 1.58.2); the present clause allows for their resettlement while guaranteeing the independence of Meczyberna and Singus from Olynthus, and that of Sane from Acanthus.¹²⁴ Meczyberna and Singus last appear in the tribute assessment list of 422/21 (*JG* 1³ 77.5 ll. 22-23), but the Athenian garrison attested at Meczyberna not long after the Peace (Thuc. 5.39.1) implies that it was forced to rejoin the Delian League.¹²⁵ Sane appears in the tribute lists as late as 415/14 (*JG* 1³ 290.3 l. 12), so it certainly rejoined the League as a regular member and did not, *pace* the editors of *ATL*, enjoy the special status of the six cities of 5.18.5.¹²⁶

Thuc. 5.18.7 opens with the demand that Panactum be returned to Athens. This border fort near the Boeotian frontier was taken, reportedly by treachery, in 422, not by the Spartans but by the Boeotians (5.3.5).¹²⁷ This fact would cause much grief in the following months, since the Spartans (for whom the fort was militarily irrelevant) could not compel the Boeotians to surrender Panactum in spite of their exhortations (5.35.5, 39.2). The Boeotians only relented after razing the fort altogether (5.39.3), which was a major blow to Spartan-Athenian relations (5.42). Next, the Athenians are instructed to return Coryphasium, Cythera, Methana, Pteleum, and Atalanta to the Spartans (Coryphasium is simply the Spartan name for Pylos: cf. 4.3.2); Cythera, the island off the southern tip of the Peloponnese, as we have seen came under Athenian control in 424 (4.53-57); and Methana in the Argolid fell to Athens in 425 (4.45.2).

¹²² Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 478; Luraghi 2022; cf. Bauslaugh 1991, 139.

¹²³ All three cities were Chalcidian: Flensted-Jensen in *IACP*, 811-13. For Meczyberna see M.H. McAllister, *Princeton Encyclopedia* s.v. ‘Mekyberna,’ 567; for Singus see Zahrnt 1971, 226-29; for Sane see Thuc. 4.109.1-3. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 478-79 defends the reading of Sane against its being ‘with no ms. authority ... violently amended to Gale (Γαλαίους)’ by, e.g., West 1937, 166-73. Gale was a separate settlement in Chalcidice.

¹²⁴ *HCT* 3, 672; cf. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 478-79. Unlike Meczyberna and Singus, Sane never revolted from Athens, though its territory was ravaged by Brasidas in 424 (Thuc. 4.109.5).

¹²⁵ Pritchett 1973, 379. On Singus’ earlier assessments see *ATL* 1, 402f.

¹²⁶ *ATL* 3, 90; cf. 143, 218 n. 119; *HCT* 3, 673.

¹²⁷ Munn 1993, 7 calls Panactum ‘The most important garrison fort on the northwestern frontier’ of Attica.

Pteleum is more difficult to identify, since several places bear this name. Gomme, followed by Hornblower, identify it with the town (modern Φτελιό) on the coast of Achaea Phthiotis in southeastern Thessaly, though Steup proposes an otherwise unknown site in the Argolid near Methana.¹²⁸ Atalanta, a previously uninhabited island off the coast of Opuntian or East Locris, was occupied by Athens in the first year of the war as a base from which to combat piracy around Euboea (2.32; cf. 3.89.3). The question of prisoners is addressed next. For Sparta, recovering them was, a Hornblower puts it, a ‘crucial, almost the main reason for wanting the peace,’ not least because many of the prisoners were Spartiates of high social status (cf. 4.38.5).¹²⁹ Τοὺς ἐν Σκιώνῃ cannot mean the Scionaean themselves, who were effectively under an Athenian death sentence since enthusiastically receiving Brasidas in 423 (Thuc. 4.120.3-121.1, 122.6); rather the reference must be to the Peloponnesian and Chalcidian troops defending the besieged city.¹³⁰ Brasidas had sent 500 Peloponnesian hoplites and 300 Chalcidian peltasts to Scione in 423 under the immediate command of Polydamidas (4.123.4), and these are probably to be identified with τοὺς ... ὄσους Βρασίδας ἐσέπεμψε in the present clause.¹³¹ The Athenians also agree to release Spartan and allied prisoners of war held anywhere within the Athenian ἀρχή, including in Athens itself (the δημόσιον was the city jail of Athens).¹³² In return, the Peloponnesians promise to release all Athenian and allied prisoners on the same terms (κατὰ ταύτά).

Thuc. 5.18.8 gives the Athenians *carte blanche* to do as they please both with the aforementioned Scione and with the cities of Torone and Sermylum. Torone, which was located in Sithonia (one of the promontories of the Chalcidian peninsula), had, like Scione, defected under the influence of Brasidas in 423 (4.110-113).¹³³ But unlike Scione, it was already back in Athenian hands at the time of the Peace (it was recovered by Cleon in 422: 5.3.4). The women and children were enslaved in the usual manner, but the men were transported to Athens as prisoners; they were fortunate to eventually be exchanged with prisoners held by the Olynthians and returned home safely (5.3.4; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.3; Isoc. 12.63). Sermylia probably seceded in 432 (cf. 1.65.2; it is absent from the tribute lists of 432/31 and 430/29), but it is unclear whether the Athenians had retaken it by early 421.¹³⁴ It should also be noted that the present clause extends not only to Scione, Torone, and Sermylum but (theoretically at least) to ‘any other city which they [sc. the Athenians] hold’ (τινα ἄλλην πόλιν ἔχουσιν). So Gomme

¹²⁸ Classen/Steup *ad loc.*; HCT 3, 674; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 480.

¹²⁹ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 480.

¹³⁰ Cf. HCT 3, 675: ‘Athens had already decided what to do to the citizens of Skione, and Sparta was not prepared to interfere.’ The city was already completely blockaded by the end of summer 423 (Thuc. 4.133.4). See 5.32.1 with Bosworth 1993, 37 on its bloody reduction upon its capture by Athens in summer 421.

¹³¹ HCT 3, 674.

¹³² Lewis 1990, 249, 255.

¹³³ Cf. Gehrke 1985, 197-98.

¹³⁴ Zahrnt 1971, 225-26; IACP no. 604, pp. 840-41.

writes, 'Athens is to be left a free hand not only with this group of cities but with the rest of those in her empire. Sparta withdraws completely, for herself and her Peloponnesian and other allies, from the role of liberator of Hellas.'¹³⁵

Thuc. 5.18.9 arranges for 17 Athenians and 17 Spartans to swear oaths to ratify the Peace. Unusually, the oath-takers are listed individually by name (5.19.2). Andrewes and Lewis speculate that the 17 Athenians consist of two men whose function was perhaps religious (Lampon and Isthmionicus¹³⁶), three incumbent generals (Nicias, Laches, and Euthydemus), two former generals (Lamachus and Demosthenes, the last names on the list), and ten men who were members of a board that negotiated the Peace. They suggest that the Spartan list is composed of the two kings (not in the MSS, but supplied on the basis of Thuc. 5.24.1¹³⁷), the five ephors (Pleistolas, one of the Spartan oath-takers, was certainly the eponymous ephor: cf. 5.19.1), and a parallel board of ten negotiators. That there was a ten-man board of Athenian negotiators is known not from Thucydides but Diodorus (12.75.4 Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν διὰ ψηφίσματος ἔδωκαν δέκα ἀνδράσιν ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν βουλευέσθαι περὶ τῶν τῆ πόλει συμφερόντων), and while a parallel Spartan board is not explicitly attested its existence can be plausibly construed from the oath-taker lists preserved in Thucydides.¹³⁸

The oath formula, to be sworn by the Athenians to the Spartans and their allies individually (κατὰ πόλεις) is written out: ἔμμενῶ ταῖς ξυνθήκαις καὶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖσδε δικαίως καὶ ἀδόλως. The precise wording of the Spartans and allied oaths to the Athenians evidently differed, since the treaty text specifies ὁμύντων δὲ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὄρκον ἑκάτεροι τὸν μέγιστον (cf. the Quadruple Alliance at Thuc. 5.47.8), the formulae for which are not preserved in the text of the Peace.¹³⁹ Unusually for an interstate treaties, the oaths are explicitly required to be renewed annually (5.18.10) – a requirement that would soon be repeated at 5.23.4 (= **D 2.13 LT 1**).¹⁴⁰ The publication clause follows next (we are still at Thuc. 5.18.10). Stelae are to be erected at five locations: the panhellenic sanctuaries of Olympia, Pytho (= Delphi), and Isthmia; the Athenian Acropolis; and the sanctuary of Amyclae in Laconia.¹⁴¹ Amyclae, a short distance

¹³⁵ *HCT* 3, 675; cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1969, 387 (,Die wenige Worte klingen harmlos, haben aber große Bedeutung, denn es liegt in ihnen die Anerkennung des attischen Reiches in der Verfassung, wie es damals war'); Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 482.

¹³⁶ Andrewes and Lewis 1957, 180 state, without further specification, 'Lampon's function will be religious,' (there is a known fifth-century Athenian seer or μάντις with the same name: Plut. *Per.* 6.2-3; *IG* 1³ 78 ll. 47, 60), while Isthmionikos, otherwise unattested, was perhaps his colleague.

¹³⁷ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 485.

¹³⁸ Andrewes and Lewis 1957; cf. Oliver 1951; Mosley 1961, 61. I am aware of only one other treaty involving Athens that was sworn by boards of seventeen men: this is *IG* 2² 40, an Athenian-Theban alliance of 378/77.

¹³⁹ Cf. *HCT* 3, 676; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 116; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 258.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. generally Steiner 1994, 67: 'Periodic recitation of the agreement reminds the participants of their pledge.'

¹⁴¹ The sanctuary of Nemea is absent; it seems to have been the least prestigious of the panhellenic sanctuaries and was the only one that did not receive a victory dedication after the Persian Wars: Lewis 1992a, 107; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 483; cf. Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 259.

south of Sparta proper, was home to a sanctuary of Apollo and was the site of an important Spartan festival, the Hyacinthia (cf. Paus. 3.18.6-19).¹⁴² Next, at Thuc. 5.18.11, comes the amendment clause. In the event that either side had forgotten to include anything in the Peace (εἰ δέ τι ἀμνημονοῦσιν ὀποτεροιοῦν καὶ ὄτου πέρι), the Athenians and Spartans (there is no mention here of Sparta's allies, let alone Athens') may alter (μεταθεῖναι) the treaty if both agree. The allies of Sparta later complained (5.29.2) that they were excluded from this clause – a legitimate grievance, as the Peace of Nicias was a multilateral treaty.¹⁴³ 5.19.1 records the date, in both the Spartan and Attic calendars, on which the Peace was ratified: Artemesios 27 in the ephorate of Pleistolas and Elaphebolion 25 in the archonship of Alcaeus. This corresponds to late winter/early spring 421 and fell immediately after the end of the City Dionysia (Thuc. 5.20.1).¹⁴⁴

D 2.13

Alliance between Sparta and Athens

421 BCE

The Spartans' failure to return Amphipolis to Athens as stipulated by the Peace of Nicias is the most significant event that occurred in the short period between the Peace and the present treaty. The decision to retain Amphipolis was taken by Clearidas, the Spartan governor of the city, ostensibly on his own initiative out of sympathy for its Chalcidian inhabitants, and against the express orders of the Spartan government (Thuc. 5.21.1-2).¹⁴⁵ While one may question whether this really was the case or whether Clearidas' actions were tacitly supported by the Spartan authorities, D.W. Bradeen points out that the Amphipolitans continued to resist Athens even after Clearidas reluctantly withdrew the Peloponnesian garrison on the orders of his superiors back in Sparta (5.21.3). In fact, Amphipolis would resist an Athenian-Macedonian-Thracian incursion in 414, long after the Spartans had abandoned the city (Thuc. 7.9), suggesting that Clearidas' assessment of the local mood was correct.¹⁴⁶ Still, Clearidas' failure to cede the city to Athens was a clear breach of both the spirit and letter of the Peace of Nicias.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴² Cartledge 1979, 79-80, 106-08; Cartledge, *Princeton Encyclopedia* s.v. 'Amyklai,' 52-53.

¹⁴³ *HCT* 3, 677-78; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 483.

¹⁴⁴ *HCT* 3, 678; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 484.

¹⁴⁵ Clearidas is reckoned a possible informant of Thucydides by Westlake 1989, 80-81.

¹⁴⁶ Bradeen 1960, 268. Gomme (*HCT* 3, 690) suggests that Amphipolitan hostility towards Athens in 421 was limited to a 'powerful minority' that had been close to Brasidas, but this can hardly explain resistance as late as 414.

¹⁴⁷ Specifically, Amphipolis was a colony (ἀποικία) of Athens (Thuc. 4.102.3; 5.11.1; Diod. 12.68.2; Σ Aeschin. 2.34), although its population was not exclusively Athenian (Thuc. 4.103.3, 106.1; Diod. 12.32.2).

The restoration of Amphipolis was of central importance for the Athenians, and Clearidas' appeal to local sentiment was not likely to arouse much sympathy at Athens.

Another major obstacle to the success of the Peace was the continued refusal of Boeotia, Corinth, Elis, and Megara to accept it (Thuc. 5.22.1). Meanwhile the prisoners taken on Sphacteria remained in Athenian custody despite their release being required by the Peace and despite the fact that the Spartans immediately freed all Athenian and allied prisoners in their custody (5.21.1); this was likely in retaliation for the failure to surrender Amphipolis. Kagan believes that the threat of the Spartan prisoners' execution was still present, if only implicitly, precluding any possibility of Sparta supporting its dissident allies (particularly Megara, Boeotia, and Corinth) should they decide to invade Attica.¹⁴⁸ It was at this point that the Spartans decided to bolster the Peace of Nicias with a treaty of alliance, reasoning that Argos, which refused to renew its thirty-year peace treaty with Sparta because the latter would not cede Cynuria, would be too weak to renew active hostilities without Athenian support (5.22.2).

LT 1: Thuc. 5.23.1

κατὰ τάδε ξύμμαχοι ἔσονται Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πεντήκοντα ἔτη· ἦν τινες ἴωσιν ἐς τὴν γῆν πολέμιοι τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ κακῶς ποιῶσι Λακεδαιμονίους, ὠφελεῖν Ἀθηναίους Λακεδαιμονίους τρόπῳ ὁποῖω ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ἦν δὲ δηλώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Ἀθηναίους καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἀμφοτέρων, καταλύειν δὲ ἅμα ἅμφω τῷ πόλει. ταῦτα δ' εἶναι δικαίως καὶ προθύμως καὶ ἀδόλως. [2] καὶ ἦν τινες ἐς τὴν Ἀθηναίων γῆν ἴωσι πολέμιοι καὶ κακῶς ποιῶσιν Ἀθηναίους, ὠφελεῖν Λακεδαιμονίους Ἀθηναίους τρόπῳ ὅτῳ ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ἦν δὲ δηλώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Ἀθηναίους καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων, καταλύειν δὲ ἅμα ἅμφω τῷ πόλει. ταῦτα δ' εἶναι δικαίως καὶ προθύμως καὶ ἀδόλως. [3] ἦν δὲ ἡ δουλεία ἐπανίστηται, ἐπικουρεῖν Ἀθηναίους Λακεδαιμονίους παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. [4] ὁμοῦνται δὲ ταῦτα οἴπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας σπονδὰς ὤμνουσιν ἐκατέρων. ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν ἰόντας ἐς Ἀθήνας πρὸς τὰ Διούσια, Ἀθηναίους δὲ ἰόντας ἐς Λακεδαίμονα πρὸς τὰ Ὑακίνθια. [5] στήλην δὲ ἐκατέρους στήσαι, τὴν μὲν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι παρ' Ἀπόλλωνι ἐν Ἀμυκλαίῳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐν πόλει παρ' Ἀθηνᾶ. [6] ἦν δὲ τι δοκῆ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Ἀθηναίους προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν περὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας, ὅ τι ἂν δοκῆ, εὖορκον ἀμφοτέροις εἶναι.

[24.1] τὸν δὲ ὄρκον ὤμνουσιν Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν οἶδε· Πλειστοάναξ, Ἄγις, Πλειστόλας, Δαμάγητος, Χίονις, Μεταγένης, Ἄκανθος, Δάιθος, Ἴσχαγόρας, Φιλοχαρίδας, Ζευξίδης, Ἄντιππος, Ἀλκινάδας, Τέλλις, Ἐμπεδίας, Μηνᾶς, Λάφιλος· Ἀθηναίων δὲ Λάμπων, Ἰσθμιόνικος, Λάχης,

¹⁴⁸ Kagan 1981, 25-27. The Athenians' first act after concluding the alliance was to release the prisoners taken at Sphacteria (Thuc. 5.24.2).

Νικίας, Εὐθύδημος, Προκλῆς, Πυθόδωρος, Ἄγων, Μυρτίλος, Θρασυκλῆς, Θεαγένης, Ἀριστοκράτης, Ἰώλκιος, Τιμοκράτης, Λέων, Λάμαχος, Δημοσθένης.

These are the terms on which the Spartans and the Athenians shall be allies for fifty years. If any people enter Spartan territory with hostile intent and do harm to the Spartans, the Athenians shall assist the Spartans with all possible force to the best of their ability: and if such people ravage the territory and then depart, their city shall be declared an enemy of the Spartans and the Athenians and shall suffer retribution at the hands of both, and neither city shall cease hostilities before the other. This cooperation shall be fair, prompt, and honest. And if any people enter Athenian territory with hostile intent and do harm to the Athenians, the Spartans shall assist the Athenians with all possible force to the best of their ability: and if such people ravage the territory and then depart, their city shall be declared an enemy of the Spartans and the Athenians and shall suffer retribution at the hands of both, and neither city shall cease hostilities before the other. This cooperation shall be fair, prompt, and honest. If the slave population revolts, the Athenians shall aid the Spartans with all their strength to the best of their ability. Oaths to this effect shall be taken by the same persons on each side who swore to the other treaty also. The oath shall be renewed annually: for this purpose the Spartans shall go to Athens for the Dionysia and the Athenians shall go to Sparta for the Hyacinthia. Each party shall set up a pillar of record, that in Sparta in the temple of Apollo at Amyclae and that in Athens on the Acropolis in the temple of Athena. If the Spartans and the Athenians decide on any addition to or deletion from this treaty of alliance, it shall be consistent with their oaths to make any such amendment as is agreed by both parties.

The oaths were sworn by the following. Of the Spartans: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippos, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. Of the Athenians: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theogenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 2: Diod. 12.75.4

ὕλόγως δ' ὑπώπτεύθησαν αἱ πόλεις συμφρονεῖν κατὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος διὰ τὸ προσγεγράφαι ταῖς κοιναῖς συνθήκαις· ἐξεῖναι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅπερ ἂν δοκῇ ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι, προσγράψαι ταῖς συνθήκαις καὶ ἀφαιρεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν συνθηκῶν. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν διὰ ψηφίσματος ἔδωκαν δέκα ἀνδράσιν ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν βουλευέσθαι περὶ τῶν τῇ πόλει συμφερόντων· τὸ παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πεποιηκότων φανεράν συνέβη γενέσθαι τῶν δύο πόλεων τὴν πλεονεξίαν.

There was good reason to suspect that Athens and Lacedaemon had common designs against the rest of Greece, since a clause had been added to the compact which the two had made, namely, that the Athenians and Lacedaemonians had the right, according as these states may

deem it best, to add to or subtract from the agreements. Moreover, the Athenians by decree had lodged in ten men the power to take counsel regarding what would be of advantage to the city; and since much the same thing had also been done by the Lacedaemonians, the selfish ambitions of the two states were open for all to see.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather)

Thucydides is the most important source for the present treaty, but Diodorus does add some information not found in Thucydides: that at least some of Sparta's allies suspected that the amendment clause would be used against the other Greek states (exactly how is not explained); and that both Athens and Sparta assigned ten men each to 'take counsel regarding what would be of advantage to the city.' This seems to imply, and Andrewes and Lewis 1957 accept, that the aforementioned ten-man boards negotiated both the Peace of Nicias *and* the alliance.¹⁴⁹

Like the Peace of Nicias, the alliance has a time limit of 50 years, and was to be renewed annually via the exchange of oaths (Thuc. 5.23.1, 4). Kirchhoff believes that the alliance was considered not as a separate treaty but as an addendum to the Peace of Nicias and so was retroactively deemed to have begun at the same moment as the Peace (and would also expire at the same time), and that both treaties were to be renewed simultaneously.¹⁵⁰ Gomme proposes two lacunae at 5.23.4 and restores <ἀρχειν δὲ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν ὅθωπερ καὶ τὰς προτέρας σπονδάς> and ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ <τόν τε ὄρκον τόνδε καὶ τὸν πρότερον>.¹⁵¹ Thucydides himself does not state exactly how much time elapsed between the Peace of Nicias and the alliance, but it cannot have been long (cf. 5.24.2 οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον), and scholars have reckoned an interval of mere days or, at most, weeks.¹⁵²

The alliance, which does not contain any provisions for offensive campaigns, is essentially defensive in nature.¹⁵³ The mirroring clauses ἦν τινες ἴωσιν ἐς τὴν γῆν πολέμιοι τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ... καὶ ἦν τινες ἐς τὴν Ἀθηναίων γῆν ἴωσι πολέμιοι (5.23.1-2) require the alliance to be activated if the territory of one of the parties is attacked, but there is no indication that assistance is obligatory in the event of an offensive campaign. In regard to the oath formula, L. Kozak contrasts ταῦτα δ' εἶναι δικαίως καὶ προθύμως καὶ ἀδόλως, sworn equally by the Athenians and Spartans, with the Peace of Nicias' formula ἐμμενῶ ταῖς ξυθηκαῖς καὶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖσδε δικαίως καὶ ἀδόλως (Thuc. 5.18.9). The addition of προθύμως (which Kozak translates 'with good will,' but which can equally mean 'readily,

¹⁴⁹ Andrewes and Lewis 1957.

¹⁵⁰ Kirchhoff 1895, 83-84.

¹⁵¹ *HCT* 3, 694.

¹⁵² Busolt 1904, 1202 n. 2; *HCT* 3, 695; Kozak in Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 262-63.

¹⁵³ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 498.

zealously, devoted'¹⁵⁴) represents, she believes, an elevated concern that either side might resort to backhanded methods of circumventing its treaty obligations.¹⁵⁵ This may have been especially relevant in light of Clearidas' evasiveness *vis-à-vis* Amphipolis and the Athenians' initial refusal to return the Spartan prisoners.

It is generally agreed that ἡ δουλεία (Thuc. 5.23.3), against whom the Athenians agree to assist Sparta in the event of an uprising, is a reference to the helots.¹⁵⁶ This is the one clause of the truce that is not symmetrical. There is, in fact, no evidence that an uprising of the chattel slaves of Attica was ever a serious possibility in the Classical period, whereas there had in fact been a helot revolt in living memory.¹⁵⁷ Lewis suggests that Spartan apprehension of the helots lay behind the decision to send some 700 helots to serve with Brasidas in Chalcidice and, more nefariously, the supposed extermination of 2000 helots considered especially dangerous (Thuc. 4.80).¹⁵⁸ de Ste. Croix speculates that anti-helot clauses were a regular feature of interstate treaties involving Sparta, though I am sceptical for lack of evidence.¹⁵⁹ As for the undated helot massacre reported by Thucydides, its historicity is doubted by Hornblower, who questions the feasibility of committing such a large-scale atrocity with premodern weapons, and without leaving any trace.¹⁶⁰ Rhodes adds that, while Thucydides apparently believed the story, we do not know how, or how accurately, he was informed of it.¹⁶¹ But Spartan anxiety about the helots is unmistakable, and Thucydides depicts it as a contributing factor to the Spartan decision to make peace in 421, especially as Athenian-occupied Pylos was being used since 425 as a base for helot raids into the Peloponnese (Thuc. 5.14.3).¹⁶²

Thuc. 5.39.3 implies a clause not mentioned in the treaty proper, namely that neither Athens nor Sparta could make war or peace on a third party except by mutual consent (εἰρημένον ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μήτε σπένδεσθαί τω μήτε πολεμεῖν). Hornblower suggests that this is a 'very loose interpretation' of 5.23.1-2, obliging the two sides to assist each other if attacked.¹⁶³ But it is perhaps better to posit that this was an entirely new clause inserted into the alliance at some point between its initial ratification and the events of 5.39, as 5.23.6 specifically allows for the later addition and/or removal of clauses provided both sides agree (cf. Diod. 12.75.4).¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁴ LSJ⁹ s.v. πρόθυμος.

¹⁵⁵ Kozak in Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 262.

¹⁵⁶ Kagan 1981, 26; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 498.

¹⁵⁷ Kirchoff 1895, 82; *HCT* 3, 693; Cartledge 1991, 380; McKeown 2011, 154-55.

¹⁵⁸ Lewis 1977, 27-28.

¹⁵⁹ Ste. Croix 1972, 97.

¹⁶⁰ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 267.

¹⁶¹ Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 554.

¹⁶² Lewis 1977, 27-28. Thuc. 4.41.3 writes that the Spartans tried to conceal their fear of the helots from the Athenians.

¹⁶³ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 92.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. *HCT* 4, 44; Baltrusch 1994, 74 n. 412.

Whereas the Peace of Nicias does not specify when and where the oaths are to be renewed (except to say that they must be renewed annually), the text of the alliance is more specific: the Spartans are to renew their oaths at Athens during the Dionysia, and the Athenians during the festival of the Hyacinthia, probably at Amyclae where the festival took place.¹⁶⁵ The instructions regarding publication are also more specific than for the Peace of Nicias. Whereas the Peace requires that the Athenian stele be erected on the Acropolis and the Spartan stele at Amyclae without further specification, the stelae of the alliance are to be placed more specifically 'by the temple of Athena' (παρ' Ἀθηνᾶ = the Parthenon?) on the Acropolis and 'by the temple of Apollo' (παρ' Ἀπόλλωνι) at Amyclae, respectively. D. Steiner argues that the display of the stelae next to temples with obvious religious significance, what she calls 'divine proximity,' will have enhanced the religious aura associated with them.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ On the Hyacinthia see generally Petterson 1992, 1-41, esp. 11.

¹⁶⁶ Steiner 1994, 66.

Chapter 4

From the uneasy peace to the Athenian surrender (420-404 BCE)

Introduction

The period covered in the present chapter saw the breakdown of the Peace of Nicias and, at Athens, the adoption of a new policy favouring alliance with Argos and hostility towards Sparta. When this did not achieve the desired outcome, Sparta regained its position as master of the Peloponnese. Despite earlier breaches of the Peace of Nicias, open warfare between Athens and Sparta only resumed in 413, following the ill-fated expedition to Sicily, and Athens was soon threatened with the collapse of its ἀρχή. Remarkably, the Athenians were able to stay in the fight until 404 before finally capitulating and accepting a heavily unfavourable treaty with Sparta, ending the Peloponnesian War.

D 3.1

Alliance between Sparta and Boeotia

420 BCE

Boeotia was one of the states that had refused to accept the Peace of Nicias from the start (Thuc. 5.17.2; cf. Ar. *Pax*. 464-466). The Boeotians continued to hold onto the fort at Panactum (cf. Thuc. 5.3) and an unspecified number of Athenian prisoners in violation of the Peace, and in retaliation Athens withheld Pylos from the Spartans (5.39.2). Peace was maintained between Athens and Boeotia thanks only to what Thucydides calls a ten-day truces (5.26.2 ἐκεχειρία δεχήμερον ἦγον; cf. 5.32.5; 6.7.4, 10.3); while first mentioned in the context of the events of winter 421/20, Athens may have begun making such truces with the Boeotians immediately following the Peace of Nicias.¹

At the time of the present treaty, the Boeotians were in a strong diplomatic position *vis-à-vis* Sparta. As R. Seager writes, even pro-peace Spartans 'were so eager to recover Pylos that they

¹ Cf. *HCT* 4, 11; Arnush 1992, 329, 344; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 47-48. At 344 Arnush writes: 'Thucydides' final reference to ten-day armistices supports the notion that such agreements were continually renewed. Nicias, addressing the Athenians in 416/415, warns them that if they depart for Sicily, considerable military threats will remain at home. In other words, among the states who would not accept the Peace of Nicias, some, presumably including Boeotian and the Thracians Chalcidice and perhaps Megara, were still preserving ten-day truces from 421 to 415 that they might abrogate.' The passage in question is Thuc. 6.10.3, which does not specifically mention Boeotia. On Athens' δεχήμεροι σπονδαί with the Thracian Chalcidians see Thuc. 6.7.4.

were ready to run the risk of offending Athens, while those who wanted to renew the war needed Boeotia's friendship.²

LT 1: Thuc. 5.39.2

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα (ἐγίνοντο γὰρ αἰεὶ λόγοι τοῖς τε Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις περὶ ὧν εἶχον ἀλλήλων) ἐλπίζοντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, εἰ Πάνακτον Ἀθηναῖοι παρὰ Βοιωτῶν ἀπολάβοιεν, κομίσασθαι ἂν αὐτοὶ Πύλον, ἦλθον ἐς τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς πρεσβευόμενοι καὶ ἐδέοντο σφίσι Πάνακτόν τε καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων δεσμώτας παραδοῦναι, ἵνα ἀντ' αὐτῶν Πύλον κομίσωνται. [3] οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἀποδώσειν, ἦν μὴ σφίσι ξυμμαχίαν ἰδίαν ποιήσωνται ὥσπερ Ἀθηναίους. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ εἰδότες μὲν ὅτι ἀδικήσουσιν Ἀθηναίους, εἰρημένον ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μῆτε σπένδεσθαί τω μῆτε πολεμεῖν, βουλόμενοι δὲ τὸ Πάνακτον παραλαβεῖν ὡς τὴν Πύλον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ κομιούμενοι, καὶ ἅμα τῶν ξυγγεῖαι σπευδόντων τὰς σπονδὰς προθυμουμένων τὰ ἐς Βοιωτοῦς, ἐποίησαντο τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, τοῦ χειμῶνος τελευτῶντος ἤδη καὶ πρὸς ἔαρ· καὶ τὸ Πάνακτον εὐθὺς καθηρεῖτο.

There continued constant negotiations between Athens and Sparta over the places still held by the other party, and the Spartans hoped that if the Athenians got Panactum back from the Boeotians they themselves could recover Pylos. They now sent a diplomatic mission to Boeotia with the request that Panactum and the Athenian prisoners should be handed over to Sparta, so that they could recover Pylos in an exchange. The Boeotians refused to countenance this transfer unless the Spartans made an independent alliance with them as they had with the Athenians. The Spartans were conscious that they would be putting themselves in the wrong with the Athenians, as there was a specific agreement that neither side should enter into any alliance or any war without the consent of the other, but in view of their desire to take over Panactum as a means of exchange for the recovery of Pylos, together with the advocacy of the Boeotian cause by those intent on the dissolution of the peace treaty, they did make the alliance. This was towards the end of the winter and the approach of spring. The demolition of Panactum began immediately.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 2: Plut. Alc. 14.4

ἐπεὶ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς τε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἐποίησαντο συμμαχίαν καὶ Πάνακτον οὐχ ἔστός, ὥσπερ ἔδει, τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παρέδωκαν, ἀλλὰ καταλύσαντες, ὀργιζομένους λαβὼν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐξετράχυνε.

² Seager 1976, 258-59.

And again, when the Lacedaemonians made an alliance with the Boeotians, and delivered up Panactum to the Athenians not intact, as they were bound to do by the treaty, but dismantled, he [sc. Alcibiades] took advantage of the Athenians' wrath at this to embitter them yet more.

(trans. Bernadotte Perrin, adapted)

At 5.39.3 Thucydides describes the treaty as a *ξυμμαχία ἰδία*. Andrewes interprets this to mean that, although Boeotia was by all indications a regular member of the Peloponnesian League and wished to remain so (cf. 5.31.6, 38.3), the alliance existed outside of the League's structure.³ This meant that the League as a whole would be unaffected if either Sparta or Boeotia were attacked by an outside power such as Athens. I speculate that the mutual defence clause, if there was one (and as a *συμμαχία* it is likely that there was), bound only Sparta and Boeotia to come to the other's assistance and did not require a response from the other states of the Peloponnesian League.

There may have been a specific clause providing for the transfer of Panactum to the Spartans. Needless to say, the Spartans expected the fort to be delivered intact: later, when the Spartan envoys Andromedes, Phaedimus, and Antimenidas arrived at Panactum only to find it razed, they were clearly shocked (Thuc. 5.42.1 Πάνακτον ὑπὸ τῶν Βοιωτῶν αὐτῶν καθηρημένον ἤϊρον: the verb ἤϊρον indicates surprise).⁴ The Spartans cannot have wanted Panactum demolished because this thwarted their own objectives: when the Athenians learned about this, any chance that they would restore Pylos to Sparta immediately vanished.⁵

Hornblower questions why the Boeotians demolished Panactum. His conclusion is that, while shocking, this was a 'purely symbolic' act, and there was no shortage of Athenian stonemasons to quickly rebuild the fort (cf. Thuc. 5.82.6; 6.44.1; Dem. 54.3). Rather, 'the Boiotians were making a point; this border area was sensitive, and a militarized Athenian Panakton was too much of a threat and a symbolic aggressive presence for the Boiotians to bear without protest.'⁶ But it was nothing more than a protest.

D 3.2

³ *HCT* 4, 44; cf. 3, 31: the ancient sources do not explicitly distinguish separate categories of ally within *οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι* ('Peloponnesian League' being a creation of modern scholarship); but what we might call 'regular' League members were those who attended and voted at congresses of the allies, and the Boeotians evidently did so (Thuc. 5.17.2; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19).

⁴ Seager 1976, 259; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 93.

⁵ Sparta would not recover Pylos until 409 (Diod. 13.64.5-7; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.18).

⁶ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 93.

Quadruple Alliance

420 BCE

The events of 421/20 which led to the alliance of Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis – the Quadruple Alliance – are well-documented by Thucydides at 5.27-46. Shortly after the Peace of Nicias was ratified, Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea concluded a separate alliance with Argos, which was neutral throughout the Archidamian War.⁷ But efforts to add Boeotia to the new alliance failed, and Corinth increasingly gravitated towards Sparta. A Spartan embassy went to Athens in 420 in an attempt to salvage the Peace of Nicias and the alliance, but its members were deceived by Alcibiades, who favoured an anti-Spartan and pro-Argive policy, and made to look dishonest before the Assembly. Alcibiades exploited the ensuing outrage to push for Athens to join the existing alliance of Argos, Mantinea, and Elis.

Exceptionally, the text of the Alliance survives in both literary (Thuc. 5.47 = **LT 1**) and epigraphic form (*IG* 1³ 83 = **RO 165** = **ET 1**). The inscription, consisting of two fragments of Pentelic marble that are now joined, was discovered in 1876 near the Theatre of Dionysus, first published by S. Koumanoudis in the same year and subsequently by A. Kirchhoff in 1877.⁸ Although only a relatively small portion of the original stele survives, its stoichedon 77 layout and the consistency of the preserved text with Thucydides' reproduction allowed Kirchhoff to restore it with a very high degree of confidence, and his restorations have been largely accepted by later editors.⁹ There are some discrepancies between the inscription and the literary text, but these have been shown to be minimal thanks to the 15th century Latin translation of Thucydides by Lorenzo Valla, who evidently had access to manuscripts that are no longer extant today.¹⁰ His anticipation of later editors' supplements in Thucydides' own text, themselves based on the evidence from surviving sections of the stone, indicates that Valla's manuscripts were nearer to what Thucydides actually wrote than the manuscripts that survive today. This can be deduced from the surviving or partially surviving sections of the stone, for example ll. 24-25 τῆι σ|[τρατιᾶι], not in the extant manuscripts at Thuc. 5.47.7 but evidently seen by Valla and translated *super exercitum*; and [ἡπάσα]ις ταῖς (l. 25), also absent from the manuscripts but incorporated into the Latin translation as *universis*. This is illustrated in the table below:

⁷ Unlike Corinth and Elis, Mantinea (which was also a Peloponnesian League member: Thuc. 5.29.2; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3) did not reject the Peace of Nicias.

⁸ Koumanoudis 1876, 333-34; Kirchhoff 1877; cf. Herbst 1890.

⁹ Although Koumanoudis was the first to publish the inscription, Kirchhoff was the first to propose restorations. On the history of the inscription since 1876 see Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 109; Levine 2024, 53 with n. 1.

¹⁰ That Valla had access to manuscripts superior to those extant today was first suggested by Poppeo 1825, 72, and is accepted by, Alberti 1972, cxxxi; Ferlauto 1979, 20, 47; Lewis 1980, 277; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 116; but doubted by Jones 1898, iv. Levine 2024, 62-65 evaluates the discrepancies between Thucydides and the inscription and collates the two editions in an appendix at 75-82.

Comparison of Texts of the Quadruple Alliance ¹¹		
IG 1³ 83	Valla	Thuc. 5.47.7
(II. 24-25): ηε δὲ πόλις ηε μεταπεμφσαμέ]νε τ̄ει σ [τρατιᾶι τέν ηεγεμονίαν ἐχέτο]	<i>ipsaque imperium super exercitum teneat</i>	ἡ δὲ πόλις ἡ μεταπεμφσαμένη < τ̄η στρατιᾶ > τήν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχέτω
(II. 25-26): [ἐάν δέ ποι δόχσει ηαπάσαις] ταῖς [πόλεσιν κοινῆι στρατεύεσθαι]	<i>siquidem tamen universis civitatibus videatur communiter in expeditionem eundem</i>	ἦν δέ ποι < ἀπάσαις > ταῖς πόλεσι κοινῆι στρατεύεσθαι

Whether Thucydides directly consulted the stele displayed at Athens is unclear. N.H. Levine reminds us that Thucydides was in exile in 420 and cannot have performed an autopsy on the Athenian stele until after 404.¹² This raises the possibility that the discrepancies between Thucydides' text and the Athenian stele are not the result of inferior manuscripts, but of his having consulted a different stele altogether: we know from the Alliance's publication formula (Thuc. 5.47.11, not preserved in the inscription) that at least four copies were made. L. Canfora alternatively suggests that Thucydides may have inspected an archival copy, or a private copy derived from it and given to him by an informant.¹³ R. Lane Fox raises the interesting possibility, which cannot be discounted, that Thucydides used a stonecutter's working copy of the text.¹⁴ Or he might have seen the bronze stele displayed at Olympia (5.47.11), which was still visible in Pausanias' time (Paus. 5.12.8 = **LT 2**).¹⁵ While we might expect this copy to be written in Elean and not the Attic in which Thucydides renders it, Hornblower suggests that Attic was better-suited to a panhellenic audience than the difficult Elean.¹⁶

ET 1: IG 1³ 83 = OR 165*

Findspot: near Theatre of Dionysus, Athens

Lettering: developed Attic, usually but not always with h

Layout: l. 1 in larger letters; l. 2sq. *stoichedon* 77

¹¹ Table based on passages collected by Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 116, using Valla 1550 for the Latin text.

¹² Levine 2024, 59.

¹³ Canfora 2006, 27; cf. Levine 2024, 59.

¹⁴ Lane Fox 2010, 23.

¹⁵ Clark 1999, esp. 124-26; Lane Fox 2010, 22-23; cf. *HCT* 4, 55.

¹⁶ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 110-11; cf. *HCT* 4, 55; Clark 1999, 123. *Contra* Kirchhoff 1895, 99f.; Levine 2024, 60. There are surviving inscriptions from Olympia written in non-Doric dialects, on which see Buck 1913, 158-59. Although no 5th century inscriptions specifically in Attic are known from Olympia, a large number have been found outside of Attica generally: see Crespo 2006, 97-99.

[Α ρ γ ε ί ο ν. Μ α ν τ ι ν έ ο ν. Έ λ] ε [ί] ο ν.

[σπονδὰς ἐποιέσαντο ἑκατὸν Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτε καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἐλεῖοι] πρὸς ἀλλήλους
h-

[ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν χουμμάχων ἦν ἄρχοσι ἑκάτεροι ἀδόλος καὶ ἀβλαβῆς καὶ] κατὰ γέν
καὶ κα-

[τὰ θάλατταν. ἠόπλα δὲ μὲ ἐχσεῖναι ἐπιφέρεν ἐπὶ πεμονεῖ μετε Ἀργεῖος καὶ Ἐλείος] καὶ
Μαντινέας

5 [καὶ τὸς χουμμάχος ἐπὶ Ἀθηναῖος καὶ τὸς χουμμάχος ἦν ἄρχοσι Ἀθηναῖοι, μετε Ἀθε]ναῖος
καὶ τὸς χ-

[συμμάχος ἦν ἄρχοσι Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ Ἀργεῖος καὶ Ἐλείος καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ τὸς χου]νμάχος,
τέχνει

[μεδὲ μηχανεῖ μεδεμιᾶι ^ν κατὰ τάδε χουμμάχος ἔναι Ἀθηναῖος καὶ Ἀργεῖος καὶ Μα]ντινέας καὶ
Ἐλ-

[εῖος ἑκατὸν ἔτε· ἐὰν πολέμοι ἴοσι ἐπὶ τὲν γέν τὲν Ἀθηναῖον, βοεθῆν Ἀργεῖος καὶ] Μαντινέας
καὶ

[Ἐλείος Ἀθέναζε, καθότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλοσι Ἀθηναῖοι, τρόποι ὅτοι ἂν δύνονται ἰσχυρ]οτάτοι κατὰ
τὸ

10 [δυνατὸν· ἐὰν δὲ δειόσαντες οἴχονται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὲν πόλιν Ἀργεῖος] καὶ
Μαντινεῦσ-

[ιν καὶ Ἐλείος καὶ Ἀθηναῖος, καὶ κακῶς πάσχεν ὑπὸ ἡαπασῶν τῶν πόλεον τούτων· κ]αταλύεν δὲ
μὲ ἐ-

[χσῆναι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς ταύτην τὲν πόλιν μεδεμιᾶι τῶν πόλεον, ἐὰν μὲ ἡαπάσαις] δοκ[ῆ]ι.
βοεθῆν δὲ

[καὶ Ἀθηναῖος ἐς Ἄργος καὶ ἐς Μαντινείαν καὶ ἐς Ἐλιν, ἐὰν πολέμοι ἴοσι ἐπὶ τὲν γῆ]ν τὲν Ἀργεῖον
ἔ

[τὲν Μαντινέον ἔ τὲν Ἐλείον, καθότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλοσι ἡαι πόλες ἡαῦται, τρόποι ἡοποί]οι ἂν
δύνοντα-

15 [ι ἰσχυροτάτοι κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν· ἐὰν δὲ δειόσαντες οἴχονται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην] τὲν
πόλιν Ἀθ-

[εναῖος καὶ Ἀργεῖος καὶ Μαντινεῦσιν καὶ Ἐλείος, καὶ κακῶς πάσχεν ὑπὸ ἡαπασῶν το]ύτων τῶν
π-

[όλεον· καταλύεν δὲ μὲ ἐχσῆναι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς ταύτην τὴν πόλιν μεδεμῖαι τὸν πόλεον], ἐὰν μὲ ἡαπ-

[άσαις δοκεῖ· ἡόπλα δὲ μὲ ἔαν ἔχοντας διέναι ἐπὶ πολέμοι διὰ τῆς γῆς τῆς τε σφετέρως αὐτῶν καὶ τ-

[ὄν χυμμάχον ἡὸν ἄρχοσι ἕκαστοι, μεδὲ κατὰ θάλατταν, ἐὰν μὲ φσεφισαμένον τὸν πόλεον] ἡαπασὸν τ-

20 [ἐν δίοδον ἔναι, Ἀθηναῖον καὶ Ἀργεῖον καὶ Μαντινέον καὶ Ἐλείον νν τοῖς δὲ βοεθῶσιν ἡε] πόλις] ἡε π-

[έμποσα παρεχέτο μέχρι μὲν τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν σῖτον, ἐπειδὴν ἔλθοσι ἐς τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἔπαυ]γέλασ-

[αν βοεθῆν, καὶ ἀπιῶσιν κατὰ τὰ αὐτά. ἐὰν δὲ πλέονα βόλεται χρόνον τῆι στρατιᾷ χρῆσθαι ἡε] πόλις

[ἡε μεταπεμφσαμένε, διδότο σῖτον τῶι μὲν ἡοπλίτει καὶ φσιλῶι καὶ τοχσότει τρεῖς ὀβολ]ός Αἰγιν-

[αῖος τῆς ἡμέρας ἡεκάστες, τῶι δὲ ἡυπεῖ δραχμὲν Αἰγιναῖαν· ἡε δὲ πόλις ἡε μεταπεμφσαμέ]νε τῆι σ-

25 [τρατιᾷ τὴν ἡεγεμονίαν ἔχετο, ἡόταν ἐν τῆι αὐτῆς ἡο πόλεμος ἔι. ἐὰν δὲ ποι δόχσει ἡαπάσα]ις ταῖς

[πόλεσιν κοινῆι στρατεύεσθαι, τὸ ἴσον τῆς ἡεγεμονίας μετῆναι ἡαπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν. ὡμ]όσαι δ-

[ἐ τὰς σπονδὰς Ἀθηναῖος μὲν ἡυπέρ τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὸν χυμμάχον, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἐ]-

[λείον καὶ ἡοι χσύμμαχοι τούτον κατὰ πόλες ὡμνύντον.]

16 πασῶν Thuc. 17 μηδεμῖα τῶν πόλεων not in Thuc. except recs. 18 δοκῆ ταῖς πόλεσιν Thuc. 21 ἐπὴν ἔλθη Thuc., but *intraverint* Valla. 24-25 τῆι σ|[τρατιᾷ absent from Thuc., but *super exercitum* Valla. 25 τὴν ἡεγεμονίαν ἔχετο cf. Thuc.; χρῆσθο ἡεγεμονεύουσα Kirchhoff. ἡαπάσα]ις absent from Thuc., but *universis civitatibus* Valla.

LT 1: Thuc. 5.47.1

σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο ἕκατὸν Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτη καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἠλεῖοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἕκατεροι [οἱ ἕκαστοι], ἀδόλους καὶ ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. [2] ὄπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονῆ μῆτε Ἀργεῖους καὶ Ἠλεῖους καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ Ἀθηναῖους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ὧν ἄρχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, μῆτε Ἀθηναῖους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ὧν ἄρχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ Ἀργεῖους

καὶ Ἡλείου καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, τέχνη μὴδὲ μηχανῆ μὴδεμιᾶ. [3] κατὰ τὰδε ξυμμάχους εἶναι Ἀθηναίους καὶ Ἀργεῖους καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Μαντινέας ἑκατὸν ἔτη· ἦν πολεμιοὶ ἴωσιν ἐς τὴν γῆν τὴν Ἀθηναίων, βοηθεῖν Ἀργεῖους καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Μαντινέας Ἀθήναζε, καθ' ὃ τι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, τρόπον ὁποῖω ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ἦν δὲ δηώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Ἀργείοις καὶ Μαντινεῦσι καὶ Ἡλείοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἀπασῶν τῶν πόλεων τούτων· καταλύειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς ταύτην τὴν πόλιν μὴδεμιᾶ τῶν πόλεων, ἦν μὴ ἀπάσαις δοκῆ. [4] βοηθεῖν δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἐς Ἄργος καὶ ἐς Μαντινείαν καὶ ἐς Ἥλιον, ἦν πολέμιοι ἴωσιν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν Ἡλείων ἢ τὴν Μαντινέων ἢ τὴν Ἀργείων, καθ' ὃ τι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν αἱ πόλεις αὗται, τρόπον ὁποῖω ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ἦν δὲ δηώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις καὶ Μαντινεῦσι καὶ Ἡλείοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἀπασῶν τούτων τῶν πόλεων· καταλύειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς ταύτην τὴν πόλιν μὴδεμιᾶ τῶν πόλεων, ἦν μὴ ἀπάσαις δοκῆ. [5] ὄπλα δὲ μὴ ἔαν ἔχοντας διεῖναι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ διὰ τῆς γῆς τῆς σφετέραις αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἕκαστοι, μὴδὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἦν μὴ ψηφισαμένων τῶν πόλεων ἀπασῶν τὴν δίοδον εἶναι, Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἀργείων καὶ Μαντινέων καὶ Ἡλείων. [6] τοῖς δὲ βοηθοῦσιν ἢ πόλις ἢ πέμπουσα παρεχέτω μέχρι μὲν τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν σῖτον ἐπὶ ἑλθῶσιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἐπαγγείλασαν βοηθεῖν, καὶ ἀπιούσιν κατὰ ταῦτά· ἦν δὲ πλεονα βούλωνται χρόνον τῆ στρατιᾶ χρῆσθαι, ἢ πόλις ἢ μεταπεμψαμένη διδότω σῖτον, τῷ μὲν ὀπλίτῃ καὶ ψιλῷ καὶ τοξότη τρεῖς ὀβολοὺς Αἰγιναίους τῆς ἡμέρας ἑκάστης, τῷ δ' ἵππεϊ δραχμὴν Αἰγιναίαν. [7] ἢ δὲ πόλις ἢ μεταπεμψαμένη τὴν στρατιάν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχέτω, ὅταν ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς ὁ πόλεμος ᾖ. ἦν δὲ ποι δόξη <ἀπάσαις> ταῖς πόλεσι κοινῇ στρατεύεσθαι, τὸ ἴσον τῆς ἡγεμονίας μετεῖναι ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν. [8] ὁμόσαι δὲ τὰς σπονδὰς Ἀθηναίους μὲν ὑπὲρ τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἡλεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τούτων κατὰ πόλεις ὁμνύντων. ὁμνύντων δὲ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὄρκον ἕκαστοι τὸν μέγιστον κατὰ ἱερῶν τελείων. ὁ δὲ ὄρκος ἔστω ὅδε· ἐμμενῶ τῇ ξυμμαχίᾳ κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα δικαίως καὶ ἀβλαβῶς καὶ ἀδόλως, καὶ οὐ παραβήσομαι τέχνη οὐδὲ μηχανῆ οὐδεμιᾶ. [9] ὁμνύντων δὲ Ἀθήνησι μὲν ἢ βουλή καὶ αἱ ἔνδημοι ἀρχαί, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ πρυτάνεις· ἐν Ἄργει δὲ ἢ βουλή καὶ οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ οἱ ἀρτυναί, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα· ἐν δὲ Μαντινείᾳ οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ ἢ βουλή καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρχαί, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ θεωροὶ καὶ οἱ πολέμαρχοι· ἐν δὲ Ἡλιδι οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ οἱ ἐξακόσιοι, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ οἱ θεσμοφύλακες. [10] ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ τοὺς ὄρκους Ἀθηναίους μὲν ἰόντας ἐς Ἥλιον καὶ ἐς Μαντινείαν καὶ ἐς Ἄργος τριάκοντα ἡμέραις πρὸ Ὀλυμπίων, Ἀργεῖους δὲ καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Μαντινέας ἰόντας Ἀθήναζε δέκα ἡμέραις πρὸ Παναθηναίων τῶν μεγάλων. [11] τὰς δὲ ξυνθήκας τὰς περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν καὶ τῶν ὄρκων καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἀναγράψαι ἐν στήλῃ λιθίνῃ Ἀθηναίους μὲν ἐν πόλει, Ἀργεῖους δὲ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τῷ ἱερῷ, Μαντινέας δὲ ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τῷ ἱερῷ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ· καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι στήλην χαλκὴν κοινῇ Ὀλυμπίοις τοῖς νυνί. [12] ἐὰν δὲ τι δοκῆ ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῖς πόλεσι ταύταις προσθεῖναι πρὸς τοῖς ξυγκειμένοις, ὃ τι ἂν δόξη ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀπάσαις κοινῇ βουλευομένας, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι.

* A treaty was made for a hundred years between the Athenians and the Argives, the Mantineans, and the Eleans, binding on both themselves and all subject allies on either side, to be observed without fraud or violation both by land and by sea. Neither side shall be permitted to bring force of arms with harmful intent against the other by any means or contrivance, neither the Argives, Eleans, or Mantineans and their allies against the Athenians and the subject allies of the Athenians nor the Athenians and the subject allies of the Athenians against the Argives, Eleans, or Mantineans and their allies. The Athenians and the Argives, the Mantineans, and the Eleans shall be allies for a hundred years on the following terms. If enemies invade the territory of the Athenians, the Argives and Mantineans and Eleans shall bring such aid to Athens as may be requested by the Athenians, with all possible force to the best of their ability: and if the enemies ravage the territory and then depart, their city shall be declared an enemy of the Argives and Mantineans and Eleans as well as the Athenians and shall suffer retribution at the hands of all these cities, and no one of these cities shall be permitted to cease hostilities against that city without the agreement of all. If enemies invade the territory of the Argives, the Mantineans, or the Eleans, the Athenians shall likewise bring such aid to Argos, Mantinea, or Elis as may be requested by these cities, with all possible force to the best of their ability: and if the enemies ravage the invaded territory and then depart, their city shall be declared an enemy of the Athenians as well as the Argives, the Mantineans, and the Eleans and shall suffer retribution at the hands of all these cities, and no one of these cities shall be permitted to cease hostilities against that city without the agreement of all. The signatory cities of Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis shall not allow the passage of any armed force for purposes of war through their own land or water, or that of their respective subject allies, unless such passage is granted by formal vote of all the signatory cities. A city sending troops to the aid of another shall provision those troops for up to thirty days from their arrival in the city which requested aid, and likewise provide for their return. If the summoning city wishes to make use of the troops for a longer period, it shall pay a rations allowance of three Aeginetan obols a day for each hoplite, light-armed trooper, and archer, and one Aeginetan drachma a day for each cavalryman. The summoning city shall have command of the troops when the war is within its own territory. If all the cities agree on a joint external campaign, the command shall be equally shared between all the cities.

The Athenians shall swear to the treaty on behalf of themselves and their allies: the Argives and the Mantineans and the Eleans and their allies shall swear city by city. The oaths shall be sworn over full-grown victims, and in each case shall be the oath which is most binding in local observance. The form of the oath shall be as follows: 'I shall abide by the alliance on the terms agreed with all justice, fidelity, and honesty, and I shall not violate it by any means or contrivance.' The oaths shall be taken at Athens by the council and the city magistrates, and shall be administered by the prytaneis; at Argos by the council and the Eighty and the Artynae, administered by the Eighty; at Mantinea by the Demiurgi and the council and the other magistrates, administered by the Theori and the Polemarchs; at Elis by the Demiurgi and the

* Trans. of Thuc.'s text only.

ministers of state and the Six Hundred, administered by the Demiurgi and the Thesmophylaces. The oaths shall be renewed as follows: the Athenians shall go for that purpose to Elis and Mantinea and Argos thirty days before the Olympic festival; the Argives and Eleans and Mantineans shall go to Athens ten days before the Great Panathenaea. The articles of agreement concerning the treaty and the oaths and the alliance shall be recorded on stone pillars, to be inscribed and set up by the Athenians on the Acropolis, by the Argives in the sanctuary of Apollo in the agora, and by the Mantineans in the sanctuary of Zeus in the agora: and all parties shall jointly deposit a bronze plaque at Olympia at the coming Olympic festival. If the signatory cities consider it desirable to make any addition to these terms, any such addition as may be jointly agreed by all the cities in consultation shall be binding.

(trans. Martin Hammond)

LT 2: Paus. 5.12.8

στῆλαι δὲ ἄλλαι τε ἐστήκασι καὶ ἡ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ Ἀργείους τε καὶ Μαντινέας ἔχουσα ὄρκον παρὰ Ἡλείων ἕς συμμαχίαν ἐτῶν ἑκατόν.

Tablets too are set up [at Olympia], including one on which is written the oath sworn by the Eleans to the Athenians, the Argives and the Mantineans, that they would be their allies for a hundred years.

(trans. W.H.S. Jones and H.A. Ormerod)

The Quadruple Alliance is a full offensive and defensive alliance. This, Rhodes argues, is clear from the reference to the possibility of a joint external campaign (Thuc. 5.47.7 ἦν δέ ποι δόξῃ ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι κοινῇ στρατεύεσθαι).¹⁷ The alliance is formally time-limited, but at 100 years is, in the words of Polly Low, ‘perhaps to be taken as more or less synonymous with “eternity”’.¹⁸ This may be a nod to longstanding Elean practice: a surviving Archaic alliance between Elis and the Ewaoioi, found on a bronze stele in Olympia, was also made for 100 years (*IvO* 9 = *SdA*² no. 110 l. 2).

It is not immediately clear whether the Quadruple Alliance is bilateral or multilateral. Do Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, remain separate entities for the purposes of the treaty or are they legally treated as a single unit? The MSS of Thucydides have ἐκάτεροι (‘each of two’) at 5.47.1, and the inscription, though restored at the relevant point, must have contained that word also, since ἕκαστοι (‘each of several’) is not possible under the 77-letter *stoichedon* layout. Nevertheless,

¹⁷ Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 573. *Contra* Welwei 2011, 307, who calls it a *Defensivbündnis* without further elaboration. Kagan 1981, 74 expresses uncertainty on the matter.

¹⁸ Low 2017, 111.

Kirchhoff emended ἑκάτεροι in the manuscripts of Thucydides to ἕκαστοι on the assumption that Argos, Mantinea, and Elis do in fact remain legally separate.¹⁹ This seems unnecessary: other aspects of the treaty, such as city-by-city swearing and the requirement that all four states agree to any subsequent changes, clearly indicate that there are four, not two, partners, in the treaty. The heading at ET 1 l. 1, [Ἀργείων. Μαντινέων. Ἐλ]ε[ί]ων, not in Thucydides, reinforces their distinct identities.

The expression καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἑκάτεροι [or ἕκαστοι] ('the allies over whom each of them rule'; we are still at Thuc. 5.47.1) implies that the four contracting parties have subordinate allies who are bound by its provisions but do not actively participate in the treaty's creation.²⁰ This comes as no surprise with respect to the Athenians, who customarily swore treaties, such as the Peace of Nicias, not only on their own behalf but on behalf of their subject allies also (cf. 5.47.8 ὁμόσαι δὲ τὰς σπονδὰς Ἀθηναίους μὲν ὑπὲρ τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων). The dependencies of Argos, Elis, and Mantinea are less well-attested. T.H. Nielsen suggests that Mantinea had subject allies in the region of Maenalia in Arcadia, possibly including the settlements Pallantium, Eutaea, Asea, Dipaea, and Helisson (cf. Thuc. 5.29.1, 33, 67.2, 81.1; RO 14 = SEG 37.340).²¹ Meanwhile, K.W. Welwei identifies Kleonai and Orneai in the Argolid as dependents of Argos.²² The Eleans, by 420, controlled a number of perioecic territories including Akoreia, Lasion, Letrinoi, Marganeis, Amphidolia, and the entire region of Triphylia.²³

5.47.5 requires a unanimous vote of the Alliance's members to allow the passage of an external armed force through any part of their territory, or through the territory of their (subject) allies, whether by land or sea. This is exceptional because the freedom of troops from third parties to cross neutral territory was usually taken for granted, and we must wait until Hellenistic times for a similar prohibitory clause to reappear (Polyb. 21.32.3).²⁴ Regarding 5.47.6, Andrewes writes, 'The thirty days begin from the arrival of the troops at the city which has summoned them. The city of origin must provision them for the journey as well as for the thirty days; and it must provide for the return journey too.'²⁵ 5.47.7 specifies that, in the event of a defensive campaign which takes place on the territory of one of the parties or (one presumes) in the territory of any of their subject allies, the summoning party is to be given overall command. Arrangements of this sort are attested elsewhere, primarily in the 4th century (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.3;

¹⁹ Kirchhoff 1895, 87 n. 1. The emendation is endorsed by Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 113, *contra* Baltrusch 1994, 76.

²⁰ Welwei 1996; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 113.

²¹ Nielsen 2002, 369-72.

²² Welwei 1996, 90 with n. 13, noting that Kleonai and Orneai are attested fighting alongside Argos in the battle of Mantinea (Thuc. 5.67.2, 72.4, 74.3).

²³ Roy in *IACP*, p. 489; cf. Roy 1997 and 1999.

²⁴ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 115.

²⁵ *HCT* 4, 56.

IG 2² 112 = RO 41 ll. 34-35). But if the four allies decide to jointly undertake an offensive campaign, they are to share the command equally among themselves.

The clause found at Thuc. 5.47.8 requires the Argives, Mantineans, Eleians to swear ‘city by city’ (κατὰ πόλεις); under Gomme’s interpretation, this simply means that Argos, Mantinea, and Elis swear independently of one another, not that their respective dependents swear for themselves. Their position *vis-à-vis* their subject allies therefore does not differ from that of Athens.²⁶ Representatives from each of the four states are instructed to swear the ἐπιχώριος ὄρκος, that is, ‘Each city is to swear by the god(s) whom it locally regards as providing the most weighty sanction’ according to Andrewes.²⁷ However, the actual oath-formula is the same for each side: ἐμμενῶ τῆ ξυμμαχίᾳ κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα δικαίως καὶ ἀβλαβῶς καὶ ἀδόλως, καὶ οὐ παραβήσομαι τέχνη οὐδὲ μηχανῆ οὐδεμιᾶ.

At 5.47.9, the oath-takers and oath-administrators for each side are listed. The Athenian oath-takers include the Boule and, unusually, the ἔνδημοι ἀρχαί or ‘home magistrates’ in Hornblower’s translation. The latter are numbered at 700 by [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.3, a 4th century work, but if the figure was identical in 420 then there must be 1200 Athenian oath-takers in total.²⁸ This is certainly a large number but not unprecedentedly so: note the enormous contingents on both sides of the Chalcis treaty, as discussed by Lambert, potentially amounting to 6500 oath-takers on each side, which highlights the gravity of that agreement.²⁹

The present passage is our main evidence for the Eighty of Argos, which was currently democratic (Thuc. 5.29.1, 31.6). This was apparently a second council distinct from the Argive Boule; and this passage is our *only* evidence for the ἀρτυῖναι.³⁰ Mantinea was also democratic in 420 (5.29.1), and its Boule consisted of perhaps 300 members (cf. RO 14 l. 24, 4th century); the δαμιουργός was the eponymous magistrate (*ibid.*, l. 20).³¹ The Mantinean θεωροί and polemarchs are attested nowhere else, but cf. the θεωροί of nearby Tegea known from Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.7). J. Roy suggests that Elis had been democratic perhaps since the synoecism of the Elean communities in 471 (Diod. 11.54.1; Strab. 8.3.2).³² The δημιουργοί, as at

²⁶ HCT 4, 57.

²⁷ HCT 4, 57; cf. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 116.

²⁸ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 117. For discussion of the ἔνδημοι ἀρχαί see Hansen 1980 and Chambers 1990, 254-55.

²⁹ Lambert 2017, 23-24: ‘On the Athenian side the oath is to be sworn by the Council of 500 and the jurors [of whom there were 6000 according to [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.3]. ... In Chalcis the oath is to be sworn by all adult males, again a large body (perhaps ca. 6500).’

³⁰ See further Piérart 2000, 305-06; IACP no. 347, p. 604. On the Eighty cf. SEG 33.286 (late-4th century): they seem to have been divided into four groups of 20. Argos also had a board of five generals (Thuc. 5.59.5), but because they are not specifically mentioned here Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 117-18 suggests that they were possibly *ex officio* members of either the Boule or the Eighty.

³¹ IACP no. 281, p. 519.

³² IACP no. 251, p. 497.

Mantineia, were the eponymous officials, epigraphically attested at *IVO* 17, 39 and *SEG* 15.241.³³ And οἱ τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες, a vague expression, is perhaps a reference to Elean financial officials called the μαστροί (cf. *IVO* 2) or to the τελεστά (*IVO* 9).³⁴

The renewal clause (5.47.10) requires the oaths to be renewed by the Athenians 30 days before the Olympic games, and by the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans at Athens ten days before the Great Panathenaea. The text indicates, and Gomme affirms, that ‘Athenian delegates must go to the three cities in turn,’ certainly no easy task under ancient conditions.³⁵ Because the Great Panathenaea was held in the third year of each Olympiad (and the Olympic games were of course held only once every four years, like the Great Panathenaea), Hornblower calculates that the oaths were to be renewed every two years, with the aim that the renewal ceremonies would take place simultaneously at Olympia and Athens on Hecatombaeon 11.³⁶

The final clause of the Alliance (5.47.12) allows for amendments through the addition (προσθεῖναι) but not, as the text stands, through the deletion of clauses – contrast the Spartan-Athenian alliance at 5.24.6 (προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν). But naturally this is only possible if all sides agree.

D 3.3

Spartan treaty proposal to Argos

418/17 BCE

Sparta’s convincing battlefield victory at Mantinea in summer 418 shattered the threat posed by the Quadruple Alliance and ended any chance for the time being that Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnese could be effectively challenged.³⁷ Sparta’s first act after the battle was to advance on the Arcadian city of Tegea, from where the Spartans could threaten Argos (Thuc. 5.76.1). The ascendant pro-Spartan faction in Argos exploited the situation to advocate a peace treaty and alliance with Sparta, after which they planned to overthrow the democracy (5.76.2).³⁸ The Spartan assembly drew up a proposal (ξυμβατήριος λόγος) and had Lichas, an

³³ On the magistrates of Elis see Sherk 1990, 233-34; Minon 2007, 493f., 511.

³⁴ Minon 2007, 496; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 118.

³⁵ *HCT* 4, 61.

³⁶ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 118-19 with Busolt 1904, 1227 n. 2. *Contra HCT* 4, 61, arguing for renewal every four years.

³⁷ According to Thuc. 5.74.3, Argos and its allies Orneai and Kleonai lost 700 men in the battle.

³⁸ Cf. Seager 1976, 268: ‘Political dissension in Argos hastened the collapse of the [Quadruple] alliance. The pro-Spartan element wanted peace and alliance with Sparta as a preliminary to the overthrow of the democracy, and despite the efforts of Alcibiades their arguments for peace prevailed with the apparently unsuspecting Argive assembly.’

Argive proxenus, deliver it to the Argive authorities (5.76.3).³⁹ This is the document reproduced by Thucydides at 5.77 (= **LT 1**), retaining the original Laconian dialect.⁴⁰

LT 1: Thuc. 5.77.1

καττάδε δοκεῖ τᾶ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμβαλέσθαι ποττώς Ἀργείως. ἀποδιδόντας τῶς παῖδας τοῖς Ὀρχομενίοις καὶ τῶς ἄνδρας τοῖς Μαιναλίοις, καὶ τῶς ἄνδρας τῶς ἐν Μαντινεῖᾳ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀποδιδόντας. [2] καὶ ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρω ἐκβῶντας καὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀναιροῦντας. αἱ δέ κα μὴ εἴκωντι τοῖ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρω, πολεμῖως εἶμεν τοῖς Ἀργείοις καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμάχοις καὶ τοῖς τῶν Ἀργείων ξυμμάχοις. [3] καὶ αἱ τινὰ τοῖ Λακεδαιμόνιοι παῖδα ἔχοντι, ἀποδόμεν ταῖς πόλειςσι πάσαις. [4] περὶ δὲ τῷ σιῶ σώματος, αἱ μὲν λῆν, τοῖς Ἐπιδαυρίοις ὄρκον δόμεν, αἱ δέ, αὐτῶς ὁμόσαι. [5] τὰς δὲ πόλιας τὰς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμως εἶμεν πάσας κατὰ πάτρια. [6] αἱ δέ κα τῶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννήσῳ τις ἐπὶ τὰν Πελοπόννασον γᾶν ἴη ἐπὶ κακῶ, ἀλεξέμεναι ἀμόθι βουλευσαμένως, ὅπα κα δικαιοτάτα δοκῆ τοῖς Πελοποννασίοις. [7] ὅσοι δ' ἐκτὸς Πελοποννήσῳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοί ἐντι, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐσσίονται ἐν τῷπερ καὶ τοῖ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τοῖ τῶν Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐσσίονται ἐν τῷπερ καὶ τοῖ Ἀργεῖοι, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες. [8] ἐπιδείξαντας δὲ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ξυμβαλέσθαι, αἱ κα αὐτοῖς δοκῆ. αἱ δέ τι δοκῆ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, οἴκαδ' ἀπιάλλην.

It is determined by the assembly of the Spartans to make agreement with the Argives on the following terms. They shall return to the Orchomenians the children taken hostage, and the men to the Maenaliens. They shall also return to the Spartans the men now held in Mantinea. They shall depart from Epidaurus and demolish the walls they built. If the Athenians will not withdraw from Epidaurus, they shall be enemies of the Argives and the Spartans and of the allies of the Spartans and the allies of the Argives. If the Spartans hold any children as hostages, they shall return them to each city from which they come. Concerning the sacrifice due to the god, the Argives at their discretion shall either require an oath of the Epidaurians or else take an oath themselves. The cities in the Peloponnese, both small and large, shall all be independent according to established custom. If anyone from outside the Peloponnese enters Peloponnesian territory with harmful intent, the two parties shall in consultation with each other organize the defence in whatever way they decide most equitable to the Peloponnesians. The allies of the Spartans outside the Peloponnese shall have the same standing as the Spartans, and the allies of the Argives outside the Peloponnese shall have the same standing as the Argives, and they shall retain their present territory. The Spartans shall publish these terms to their allies and conclude

³⁹ Introduced here by Thuc. as πρόξενος ὦν Ἀργείων Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσίλου; but this is neither his first appearance in Thuc. (cf. 5.22.2, 50.4) nor his last (8.39.2). On his numerous international connections see Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 132.

⁴⁰ Dialect: Colvin 1999, 65 with Buck 1955, 161; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 196.

the agreement if they too are content: if the allies have any comments, they should relay these comments to Sparta.

We learn from Thuc. 5.77.1 that the proposal is based on a resolution of the Spartan assembly (καπτάδε δοκεῖ τῷ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων κτλ.). Andrewes remarks that this is the only document, Spartan or otherwise, in which the word ἐκκλησία is used to refer to this body (but cf. Thuc. 6.88.10 for ἐκκλησία used narratively). This, according to Andrewes, ‘creates a strong presumption that it was called, as here, *ekklesia*’ by the Spartans themselves.⁴¹

5.77.2 refers to the ongoing Argive-Athenian war against Epidaurus. The conflict began in 419/18 over a dispute regarding sacrifices owed by the Epidaurians to Apollo Pythaeus, whose temple – placed by Hornblower at Asine in the Argolid – was under Argive administration (Thuc. 5.52.1; cf. 5.77.4; Paus. 2.36.5).⁴² The Argives raided Epidaurian territory (5.54.3-55.4), but the installation of a Spartan garrison prevented them from taking the city itself. Following the battle of Mantinea, the Athenians intervened and constructed a blockading wall around Epidaurus (5.56).⁴³ The Spartan proposal exerts pressure on the Athenians by threatening joint Spartan-Argive action if they do not withdraw from Epidaurus.⁴⁴

At 5.77.5, Sparta insists on the autonomy (αὐτονομία) of all Peloponnesian cities. There are clear parallels between 5.77.5 and the rescript of the Spartan-brokered King’s Peace of 387/86: τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31 = **D 4.8 LT 1**); but in the later case the autonomy principle was extended beyond the Peloponnese to the rest of Greece with limited exceptions.⁴⁵ The present clause seems to have been directed first and foremost against Argos; apart from Kleonai and Orneai, Argive dependencies included possibly Nauplia⁴⁶ and, as perioecic settlements, Lyrkeia and perhaps Tiryns.⁴⁷ Was Argos expected to give them up? I believe that this is implicit in the text.

5.77.6 proposes that Sparta and Argos cooperate militarily in the event that an extra-Peloponnesian power invades the Peloponnese. The inferred target is of course Athens, which at this time was not a merely putative aggressor but actually had ‘boots on the ground,’ so to speak, in the territory of Epidaurus at that very moment.⁴⁸ Though this clause strictly binds Sparta and Argos only (cf. 5.79.3), the attitude of the other Peloponnesian powers it to be taken

⁴¹ HCT 4, 134; cf. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 197.

⁴² Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 140. The Argives were encouraged by Athens for strategic reasons (Thuc. 5.53).

⁴³ Cf. IACP no. 348, p. 607.

⁴⁴ Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 578.

⁴⁵ Cf. Tuplin 1993, 98 n. 33.

⁴⁶ Hansen 1997, 36-37; Hansen 2000, 196 n. 49.

⁴⁷ Piérart 1997, 334-36; cf. IACP no. 347, pp. 602-03.

⁴⁸ HCT 4, 138; Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 578.

into consideration (ὄρα κα δικαιότατα δοκῆ τοῖς Πελοποννασίοις) in the event that a joint campaign is undertaken.

5.77.8 acknowledges that the allies of Sparta may want to make comments or suggestions regarding the proposal before the treaty is finalized.⁴⁹ Andrewes, noting the lack of evidence for a Peloponnesian League conference presently in session, suggests that Sparta either *intended* to summon one or (his preferred solution) merely distributed copies of the proposal among the allies. He writes, ‘A conference would then be necessary only if radical amendments or total rejection were widely supported,’ and there is no evidence that this was the case.⁵⁰ Nor were Sparta’s allies formally party to the agreement: the prescript of the definitive treaty (Thuc. 5.79.1 = **D 3.4 LT 1**) reads καττάδε ἔδοξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν εἶμεν πεντήκοντα ἔτη: here the allies are conspicuously absent.

D 3.4

Peace of Lichas

418/17 BCE

The name given to the present treaty is my own coinage, reflecting Lichas’ role in the diplomacy of 418/17. The Argives accepted the Spartan proposal and the Spartan army pointedly retreated from Tegea (Thuc. 5.78). The text of the Peace of Lichas, like **D 3.3 LT 1**, is recorded by Thucydides *verbatim* and in Laconian dialect. Though its date can already be easily guessed from its position in Thucydides’ narrative and its close association with **D 3.3**, there is also the evidence of Diodorus (12.80.2 = **LT 2**), who places it in the archon-year of Antiphon (418/17).

LT 1: Thuc. 5.79.1

καττάδε ἔδοξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν εἶμεν πεντήκοντα ἔτη, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις δίκας διδόντας κατὰ πάτρια· ταὶ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλιες ταὶ ἐν Πελοποννάσῳ κοινανεόντων τᾶν σπονδᾶν καὶ τᾶς ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλιες, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες, κατὰ πάτρια δίκας διδόντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας. [2] ὅσοι δὲ ἔξω Πελοποννάσῳ Λακεδαιμονίοις ξύμμαχοί ἐντι, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐσσοῦνται τοῖσπερ καὶ τοὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· καὶ τοὶ τῶν Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐσσοῦνται τῷπερ καὶ τοὶ Ἀργεῖοι, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες. [3] αἱ δὲ ποι στρατείας δέη κοινᾶς, βουλευέσθαι Λακεδαιμονίως καὶ Ἀργείως ὄρα κα δικαιότατα κρίναντας τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. [4] αἱ δὲ τινι τᾶν πολιῶν ἢ ἀμφίλογα, ἢ τὰν ἐντὸς ἢ τᾶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσῳ, αἶτε

⁴⁹ But see Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 578: ‘It is not clear whether the allies had time to respond between the agreement of 5.77 and the alliance of 5.79.’

⁵⁰ *HCT* 4, 140.

περὶ ὄρων αἴτε περὶ ἄλλου τινός, διακριθῆμεν. αἱ δὲ τις τῶν ξυμμάχων πόλις πόλι ἐρίζοι, ἐς πόλιν ἐλθεῖν, ἂν τινα ἴσαν ἀμφοῖν ταῖς πολίεσσι δοκεῖοι. τῶς δὲ ἕτας κατὰ πάτρια δικάζεσθαι.

It has been determined by the Spartans and the Argives that there should be a treaty and alliance between them for fifty years on the following terms: both parties shall deal on fair and equal terms according to established custom. The other cities in the Peloponnese shall be participants in this treaty and alliance as independent cities each in its own right and retaining its own territory, dealing on fair and equal terms according to established custom. The allies of the Spartans outside the Peloponnese shall have the same standing as the Spartans, and the allies of the Argives shall have the same standing as the Argives, and they shall retain their present territory. If there is need for any combined military expedition the Spartans and the Argives shall decide the most equitable contribution for the allies and consult together on the conduct of the war. If any of the cities within or outside of the Peloponnese has a dispute, whether about boundaries or any other matter, it shall be resolved in this way: a quarrel between any two allied cities shall be referred to a third city deemed fair and acceptable by both cities. Private citizens shall pursue their legal rights according to established custom.

LT 2: Diod. 12.80.2

ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι διαπρεσβευσάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰρήνην ἐποιήσαντο καὶ συμμαχίαν συνέθεντο.

During this year [418/17] the Argives and Lacedaemonians, after negotiations with each other, concluded a peace and formed an alliance.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather)

It is evident both from Thucydides and Diodorus that this treaty consists of both a peace-agreement and a military alliance, σπονδαί (or in Diodorus' case εἰρήνη) καὶ ξυμμαχία, its time limit set at 50 years (cf. the authorial narrative of Thuc. 5.80.1: αἱ μὲν σπονδαί καὶ ἡ ξυμμαχία αὕτη ἐγγεγνήτο). While Athens is not explicitly mentioned, in contrast to **D 3.3**, there can be no doubt that a key Spartan objective was to force the Athenians from the Peloponnese, and in particular Epidaurus. At Thuc. 5.80.1, Sparta and Argos resolve not to receive any Athenian herald until the Athenians agree to quit the peninsula, and at 80.3 an Argive embassy demands specifically that they disestablish the garrison in Epidaurus, which the Athenians (grudgingly, one imagines) agreed to do.⁵¹

The prescript κατὰδε ἔδοξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν κτλ. shows that this is a bilateral treaty of Sparta and Argos; however, the other cities in the Peloponnese are

⁵¹ Cf. Seager 1976, 268-69.

said to 'have a share in' (κοινανεόντων) the treaty. This seems to be a way of saying that they are affected by some of its provisions without being formal parties to it; indeed, in the same section we are informed that they are to be αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλιες, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες. The word αὐτοπόλιες is a hapax (but cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.14 αὐτοπολιῖται) and literally means 'city by itself'; it is treated by Hornblower as synonymous with αὐτόνομος.⁵² M. Ostwald argues that this clause expresses Sparta and Argos' expectation that Mantinea give up its Arcadian dependencies (cf. Thuc. 5.33.2) and that Elis abandon its claim to Lepreum, under Spartan occupation since 421 (5.31.4).⁵³

5.79.3 raises the possibility of a joint expedition (στρατείας ... κοιῶς) by Argos and Sparta. Seager assumes that 'the Peloponnesian League would still presumably meet to ratify any declaration of war made by them,' although Argos under the present treaty does not appear to have become a League member; therefore, I propose that it is a συμμαχία ἰδία like the Spartan-Boeotian alliance of 420 (Thuc. 5.39.3), although not explicitly referred to as such.⁵⁴ This clause also implies that, if Argos and Sparta do undertake a joint expedition, they are to do so as equals. This is a remarkable concession by Sparta to Argos, which was obviously in a weakened position after the battle of Mantinea. R. Seager suggests that this 'is explicable only if she [sc. Sparta] knew of the impending oligarchic revolution at Argos and was relying on Argos remaining in the hands of a puppet government dependent on Sparta for survival and so unwilling or unable to oppose Sparta's wishes in any major matter of policy.'⁵⁵ Actually at Thuc. 5.81.2 we learn that Spartan troops actively assisted in overthrowing the Argive democracy, replacing it with a pro-Spartan oligarchy (one wonders what Lichas' role was in all this).

5.79.4 describes arbitration procedures to be followed in the event of a dispute between two cities. Hornblower suggests that Sparta and Argos here envision *compulsory* arbitration, though the treaty text fails to explain how this is to be enforced.⁵⁶ Andrewes posits that it may envision arbitration not only between states, but also between private individuals from different cities in which one would have to use the other city's law-courts.⁵⁷

Thucydides in the authorial narrative of 5.80.1 writes that the Argos and Sparta 'settled the question of gains made from each other in the war and any other issues' (καὶ ὅποσα ἀλλήλων

⁵² Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 202.

⁵³ Ostwald 1982, 5; cf. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 201-02; Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 578.

⁵⁴ Seager 1976, 268; cf. *HCT* 4, 141.

⁵⁵ Seager 1976, 268; cf. *HCT* 4, 142.

⁵⁶ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 203; cf. Andrewes at *HCT* 4, 144: 'There had been recent examples of war between allies of Sparta, within the Peloponnese Tegea and Mantinea (Thuc. 4.134), outside it Phokis and Lokris (5.32.2).' On Greek interstate arbitration see generally Bétant 1862; Sonne 1888; Bérard 1894; Raeder 1912; Tod 1913; and for a concise overview see Edward Harris and Anna Magnetto, *OCD*⁴ s.v. 'arbitration, Greek,' esp. subsection 'Interstate Arbitration in the Ancient Greek World.'

⁵⁷ *HCT* 4, 144.

πολέμῳ ἢ εἴ τι ἄλλο εἶχον, διελύσαντο). It is unclear what if any territory was returned by either side, but Rhodes raises the reasonably likely possibility that there was an exchange of prisoners.⁵⁸

D 3.5

Athenian alliance with Egesta

418/17 BCE

The scholarship on Athens' alliance with Egesta is prodigious, and I will provide only a brief overview of it here. Because of the poor condition⁵⁹ of the stone, only the last two letters of the archon-name at **ET 1** l. 3, ON, are clearly legible, and no fewer than eleven Athenian archons between 478 and 404 have such names.⁶⁰ Because of the three-barred *sigma*, scholars prior to the mid-20th century generally assigned the present treaty an early date, the most popular candidate being 454/53 (archonship of Ariston) because Diodorus (11.86.2) refers to a war involving Egesta that year.⁶¹ A.E. Raubitschek prefers 458/57 (archonship of Habron) because this was a period when Athens was actively expanding its ἀρχή.⁶² Today, however, the much later date 418/17 (archonship of Antiphon) is now widely accepted. This was first proposed by Mattingly in 1970, disputing the then-current orthodoxy that the three-barred *sigma* was extinct by this time.⁶³ Mattingly's theory regarding the name of the archon at l. 3 was subsequently corroborated by M. Chambers, R.F. Gallucci, and P. Spanos, who used advanced modern technology to reveal the once-illegible letters before ON.⁶⁴ As a result of their efforts, the identification of Antiphon is now mostly secure.

If the date of the *inscription* is now confidently known, its *nature* in some respects remains uncertain, specifically on the question of whether it is an original alliance or a later renewal. N. Papazarkadas maintains that it is a renewal and posits that both the present treaty and the related Athenian treaty with Halicyae (**D 3.8**) were first made in 427/26 in the context of Athens' first Sicilian expedition.⁶⁵ Consider Thucydides' account (6.6.2) of Egesta's appeal to Athens in 416/15, when Egesta was at loggerheads with neighbouring Silenus: ὥστε τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ Λάχητος καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πολέμου Λεοντίνων οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι ξυμμαχίαν ἀναμιμνήσκοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐδέοντο σφίσι ναῦς πέμψαντας ἐπαμῦναι. Hornblower's

⁵⁸ Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 579.

⁵⁹ Fragment *c*, corresponding to OR 166 §i, is extremely fragmentary and not included here, but see Matthaïou 2011, 67-70 for proposed restorations.

⁶⁰ Comm. OR 166, p. 394.

⁶¹ E.g., Köhler 1867, 17; comm. ML 37, p. 81.

⁶² Raubitschek 1944, 10-14.

⁶³ Mattingly 1970; cf. Tracy 2016, 219.

⁶⁴ Chambers, Gallucci, and Spanos 1990. See also *apparatus criticus*.

⁶⁵ Papazarkadas 2009, 75-76.

translation of this passage reads, ‘The Egestaians reminded the Athenians of the alliance which the latter had made with the Leontinoi under Laches in the former war, and asked them to send ships to help them.’⁶⁶ The ‘former war’ (τοῦ προτέρου πολέμου) is the Athenian campaign in Sicily of the mid-420s, initially led by Laches (Thuc. 3.86). Some scholars argue that the ξυμμαχία in question must be the Athenian alliance with Leontini and not an Athenian-Egestan alliance of ca. 427.⁶⁷ But as we have seen, the Leontini alliance was likely first contracted in the 440s and certainly reaffirmed in 433/32 during the archonship of Apseudes, years before the expedition of Laches.

It remains disturbing in any case that Thucydides fails to mention the alliance with Egesta under 418/17, and (in the words of Chambers *et al.*), ‘inconceivable that the Egestans would arrive in Athens, seeking military assistance when facing virtual extinction, and not point to an alliance only recently concluded in support of their request.’⁶⁸ But Rhodes argues that the omission is more readily explainable if the surviving inscription is in fact a renewal of an alliance originally contracted ca. 427 (in which case τοῦ προτέρου πολέμου Λεοντίνων would mean ‘the previous war over Leontini’).⁶⁹ This is supported by Lorenzo Valla’s Latin translation of Thuc. 6.6.2: *Itaque Egestani repetita memoria societatis sibi cum Lachete initae, et superioris belli Leontinorum, obsecrabat Athenienses ut se missa classe tutarentur.*⁷⁰

If we choose to date the alliance itself to ca. 427, but the surviving inscription to the occasion of its renewal in 418/17 – and I have just presented good evidence for doing so – then we need not be troubled by the arguments of M. Chambers who, assuming an initial treaty of 418/17, proposes that it was either fresh in the memory of the Athenians of 416/15 and that they did not need to be reminded of it (not in itself an unreasonable argument) or that the exiled Thucydides was simply ignorant of it.⁷¹ But why was the alliance reaffirmed in 418/17? J.D. Smart suggests that the Egestans may have wanted assurances that the Athenians would support them in a war against Silenus, which may have already been on the horizon.⁷² Also, Antiphon’s archonship fell in a Great Panathenaic year which, Papazarkadas notes, was an ideal occasion for the renewal of the oaths between Athens and Egesta.⁷³

⁶⁶ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 303-04.

⁶⁷ *HCT* 4, 221; Chambers *et al.* 1990, 48-55; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 304-05.

⁶⁸ Chambers, Gallucci, and Spanos 1990, 53.

⁶⁹ Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 585.

⁷⁰ Valla in Chambers 2008 *ad loc.*

⁷¹ Chambers 2003, 188-94. But if Thucydides was ignorant of the treaty, how did he know so much about the Egestan embassy to Athens?

⁷² Smart 1972, 136; cf. comm. OR 166, p. 397.

⁷³ Papazarkadas 2009, 83 n. 56; cf. Thuc. 5.47.10, stipulating renewal of the oaths of the Quadruple Alliance (**D 3.2**) at Athens ten days before the Great Panathenaia (ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ τοὺς ὄρκους ... Ἀργείους δὲ καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Μαντινέας ἰόντας Ἀθήναζε δέκα ἡμέραις πρὸ Παναθηναίων τῶν μεγάλων).

ET 1: IG 1³ 11 = OR 166*

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens

Lettering: developed Attic, but with tailed *rho* and three-barred *sigma*Layout: l. 1 in larger letters; ll. 2sq. *stoichedon* 48[...^{c.9}... ἡόρ]κ[ο]. Ἀ[θ]ῆνα[ίον κα]ὶ Ἐγεσταί[ον].[ἔδοχσεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τ]ῶι [δέμοι. ...⁶...ίς] ἐπρυτάνευε· [...][- - - ἐγραμμάτευε· - - -]Ο[..⁵..]Ι[..⁵.. Ἀν]τιφῶν ἐ~ρχε. Ἀρ[..⁵..]Λ[.][- - εἶπε· - - -]ΙΟ[...N[..⁸... δ]ῶν[α]ι αὐτὸ[ῖς..]5 [.....²⁰.....]ΟΣΑ[.....¹⁶.....]Δ[..⁵..][.....²¹.....]Σ[.Ι[.....¹².....]αι τὸς δι[..⁵..][.....¹⁹.....]ΕΡ[.....]Θ[.....]Ν[.]α [h]ιερά [h]όσομπ[ε]ρ ε[.][.....¹⁸..... τ]ῶν ἡό[ρκ]ον ὁ[μνύ]να[ι. ἡόπ]ος δ' ἂν ὁμό[σοσ]-

[ιν ἡάπαντες, ἡοι στρατ]εγοὶ ἐπιμελεθέν[τον ...]αγγ[ε]λτο[...]

10 [.....¹⁸.....] τ]ῶν ἡόρκοτῶν ἡόπ[ος ..⁵..] Ἐγ[εσταί]ο .][.....¹¹..... τὸ δὲ φσέ]φισμα τότε καὶ τὸν [ἡόρ]κ[ο]ν ἀνα[γρ]ά[φ]σα]-

[ι ἐστέλει λιθίνει ἐμ π]όλει τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βολῆς· [ἡοι δὲ π]-

[ολεταὶ ἀπομισθοσάντ]ον· ἡο[ι] δὲ κολακρέται δό[ν]το[ν τὸ ἀργύρ]-

[ιον. καλέσαι δὲ καὶ ἐπ]ι χσένια τὲν πρεσβείαν τῶν Ἐγ[εσταίων]

15 [ἐς πρυτανεῖον ἐς τὸν] νομιζόμενον χρόνον. ὕ Εὐφεμ[ος εἶπε· τὰ]

[μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῆι β]ολῆι· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐπειδὰν π[ρέσβ]ες Ἐγ]-

[εσταίων ἀφικνῶνται ἡο κ]ῆρυχς προσαγ[έτο¹⁴.....][.....²³.....] τὸς π[.....²¹.....]*lacuna*[πρέσβ]ες Ἐγεσταί[ον³².....]20 [...⁷...]ικίνο Ἀπ[-----³⁴-----]*vacat*

1 χουμμαχίας ἡρόκο[ς] or ἡρόκο[ι] Osborne; συμμαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἐγεσταίων /G 1²; [χουμμαχία καὶ ἡρόκο[ς]] Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἐγεσταίων /G 1³; [φιλία καὶ χουμμαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἐγεσταίων] Woodhead 1948; [χουμμαχία καὶ ἡρόκο[ς]] Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἐγεσταίων Bradeen and McGregor. 2 Ἀντιοχίς or Ἐρεχθεὶς or Κεκροπίς Osborne and Rhodes. 3 ἐπιεστάτε Bradeen and McGregor. Ἀντιφῶν Matthaίου 2011; Ἀρίστον /G 1²; ἡάβρον Raubitschek; Ἀντιφῶν Mattingly; Ἀντιφῶν Matthaίου and Korres. 4 εἶπεν· περὶ Ἐγεσταίων τὸν [ἡόρ]κον εὐθύς Bradeen and McGregor; εἶπεν· περὶ μὲν Ἐγεσταίων τὸν [ἡόρ]κον /G 1³. 5 χούμμαχοι ἐσόμεθα ἀδό[λος] αἰεὶ Ἐγεσταίους· Chambers, Gallucci, and Spanos. 5-7 [hoítines | éxsoorkósi áfikómēnoi éś'Égestan helésthā]i τὸν δ[ἔ]μμον δέ | κα ἄνδρας αὐτίκα μάλα. περὶ δὲ τ[ο] R. von Scala. 8-11 ἡόπος δ' ἄν ὁμό[σοσ] | ιν ἡάπαντες ἡοι στρατ[ε]γοὶ ἐπιμελεθέν[τον]. κατ[ά]γγελο[ν] δὲ | πρέσβυν πέμψαι μετὰ τῶν ἡορκοτῶν ἡόπο[ς] ἄν ἡυπ' Ἐγ[ε]σταίων | τάδε ὁμυθεῖ Chambers, Gallucci, and Spanos. 10-11 ἡόπος ἄν τὸς] Ἐγ[ε]σταίους | ἐχσορκόσοσι Bradeen and McGregor; ἡόπος εὐθύς] Ἐγ[ε]σταίους | ἐχσορκόσοσι (?) Matthaίου 2011.

... oath[s? of the Athenians] and Egestans.

[The council and] the [people decided. —] was the prytany. [— was secretary. — was chairman?]. [An]tiphon was archon (418/17). Ar— [proposed]: ... give to them ... victims as many ... swear the oath. [So that all shall swear let the] generals take care ... the men administering the oath so [that they shall administer the oath to the Egestans?] ... This decree and the oath the secretary of the council shall inscribe [on a stone stele on the] Acropolis: [let the *poletai* make the contract]; and let the *kolakretai* pay [the money. Also to invite] the Egestans' embassy to hospitality [in the Prytaneum at the] customary time.

[Euphemus⁷⁴ proposed: in other respects in accordance with the] council, but in future when [envoys come from Egesta?] let the herald bring them forward ...

lacuna

[Envoys] of the Egestans ... son of — icinus, Ap— ...

(trans. Stephen Lambert and P.J. Rhodes, adapted)

The Egesta treaty is clearly an alliance, even if χουμμαχία is not visible on what survives of the stele (but see the *apparatus criticus*). The prytany at the time was held by ...⁶...ίς, therefore it must be Antiochis, Erechtheis, or Cecropis. **ET 1 ll. 4-7** are extremely fragmentary and any proposed restorations must be treated with great caution. Interesting, Chambers, Gallucci, and Spanos restore l. 5 to make this a perpetual alliance, χούμμαχοι ἐσόμεθα ἀδό[λος] αἰεὶ

⁷⁴ The name Euphemus, partially restored as the proposer at l. 15, is too common to be confidently identified (cf. *LGPV* 2 s.v. Εὐφήμος). Interestingly, however, a Euphemus features in the 'Camarina debate' at Thuc. 6.75.4: Smart 1972, 135 n. 55 speculatively identifies him with the proposer of the present treaty.

Ἐγεσταίοις.⁷⁵ Compare how the Athenian alliances with Rhegium and Leontini, while also perpetual, were nonetheless reaffirmed at a later time.

The inscription becomes more intelligible from l. 8 onward. At ll. 8-10, the Athenian(?) generals are tasked with ensuring that the oath is sworn by the Egestans, although it is unclear whether the Egestan oath-takers consist of the envoys in Athens only, or whether the generals are to travel to Egesta and administer the oath to a broader section of the citizen population.⁷⁶ The [π|ολεταῖ] of ll. 12-13 were Athenian officials responsible for the sale or lease of state property, including metics who lapsed into slavery for failure to pay the μετοίκιον (a tax on metics).⁷⁷ If the restoration is correct, their task is to negotiate a contract with the stonecutter(s) responsible for the inscription. The κωλακρέται (l. 13) were state treasurers, here responsible for disbursing the necessary funds for inscribing the treaty.⁷⁸

It is unknown whether the alliance was a purely defensive or a full offensive/defensive one. At Thuc. 6.6.2, Thucydides writes that the Selinuntines and their Syracusan allies ‘drove them [sc. the Egestans] to war by land and sea’ (κατεῖργον αὐτοὺς τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν), which seems to imply that Egesta was attacked first. But the circumstances under which the alliance was first contracted in ca. 427 remain obscure.

D 3.6

30-year truce between Sparta and Mantinea

418/17 BCE

The defeat of the Quadruple Alliance at Mantinea and the subsequent Spartan-Argive *rapprochement* left the Mantineans little choice but to come to terms with the ascendant Spartans. Thucydides’ account (5.81 = **LT 1**) places the present treaty in winter 418/17, and with its time limit of 30 years, reported not by Thucydides but by Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.2.2 = **LT 2**), it will have expired in 388/87. In fact, Sparta did not attack Mantinea until 386, forcing it to submit to a dioecism.⁷⁹ The delay presumably stems from the fact that the Corinthian War was still ongoing in 388/87, and Sparta could not spare the resources to campaign against Mantinea immediately.

⁷⁵ Chambers, Gallucci, and Spanos 1990, 46. For their restoration and translation of the overall inscription see 45-46.

⁷⁶ Chambers, Gallucci, and Spanos 1990, 47 argue for restoring κατ]άγγελτο[v at l. 9, so that ‘An envoy will be named and sent off to Egesta along with the Athenians who are to swear the treaty there.’

⁷⁷ [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 47.2-4 with D.M. MacDowell, *OCD*⁴ s.v. ‘pōlētai.’

⁷⁸ On the κωλακρέται see generally *ATL* 3, 359-66 and Rhodes 1972, 102.

⁷⁹ *HCT* 4, 148, but cf. Andrewes’ note with Diod. 15.5.3, placing the attack in 385, which would give the present treaty a *terminus post quem* of 415. It is admittedly not entirely certain that Thucydides and Xenophon are in fact

LT 1: Thuc. 5.81.1

μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων ἀπόστασιν ἐκ τῆς ξυμμαχίας καὶ οἱ Μαντινῆς, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀντέχοντες, ἔπειτ' οὐ δυνάμενοι ἄνευ τῶν Ἀργείων, ξυνέβησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφεῖσαν τῶν πόλεων.

After the Argive defection from the original alliance the Mantineans held out at first, but then, powerless without the Argives, they too agreed a truce with Sparta and abandoned any claim to control cities.

LT 2: Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.2

ἐλέγοντο δὲ καὶ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐξεληλυθέναι τοῖς Μαντινεῦσι τούτῳ τῷ ἔτει αἱ μετὰ τὴν ἐν Μαντινείᾳ μάχην τριακονταετείς γενόμεναι.

It was also common talk that the thirty years' truce, concluded after the battle of Mantinea, had expired this year, so far as the Mantineans were concerned.

(trans. Carleton L. Brownson)

LT 3: Diod. 12.80.2

διόπερ οἱ Μαντινεῖς ἀποβαλόντες τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀργείων βοήθειαν ἠναγκάσθησαν ὑποταγῆναι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις.

Consequently the Mantineians, now that they had lost the help of the Argives, were compelled to subject themselves to the Lacedaemonians.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather)

The Argive abandonment of the Quadruple Alliance (Thuc. 5.81.1 τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων ἀπόστασιν ἐκ τῆς ξυμμαχίας) was sealed, of course, when Argos assented to the Peace of Lichas. It is unclear whether or not Elis also formally made peace with Sparta around this time, and while J. Roy believes that they did, he adds that since they did not participate in the battle of Mantinea, they 'could not be dictated to as a defeated enemy, as was Mantinea.'⁸⁰

describing the same treaty, but I am less inclined than Andrewes (*HCT* 4, 148) and Hornblower (*Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 207) to entertain doubts on this matter.

⁸⁰ Roy 2022, 122; cf. Roy 2009, 71-74.

Andrewes believes that the present treaty between Sparta and Mantinea was entirely separate from the Peace of Lichas, despite the specification in that agreement that Peloponnesian states other than Sparta and Argos may 'have a share' in it (Thuc. 5.79.1 = **D 3.4 LT 1** ταὶ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλεις ταὶ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ κοινανεόντων τᾶν σπονδᾶν καὶ τᾶς ξυμμαχίας). He also supposes that Mantinea rejoined the Peloponnesian League; it is true that Mantinea, unlike Argos, was a member of the League before the Quadruple Alliance (Thuc. 5.29.2; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3), but the thirty-year time limit attested by Xenophon is difficult to square with readmission into the League (Andrewes himself expresses uneasiness on this point).⁸¹ What is certain is that Mantinea was forced to relinquish control of 'the cities' (Thuc. 5.81.1 τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφεῖσαν τῶν πόλεων). Thucydides does not provide details, but cf. 5.29.1, where we are informed that the Mantineans had 'forcibly subjected a part of Arcadia' (μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον) during the Archidamian War. J. Roy identifies the area of Mantinean conquest as Parrhasia, roughly corresponding to southwestern Arcadia, though the Mantineans had already been driven out of it by the Spartans in summer 421 (5.33).⁸² However, Arcadian allies (οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀρκάδων), not individually identified, are recorded by Thucydides as having fought alongside the Mantineans in the battle of Mantinea (5.67.2), implying that at least a residual Mantinean ἀρχή continued to exist.⁸³ The present treaty confirms the abandonment of Mantinean claims to sovereignty over these allies, and perhaps over Parrhasia also, if this had not already been confirmed *de jure*.

D 3.7

Athenian alliance with Argos

416 BCE

In early 417, the Argive democracy was overthrown by the Spartans in concert with the oligarchic party at Argos and replaced with a pro-Spartan oligarchy (Thuc. 5.81.2). However, that summer the Argive δῆμος took advantage of the Spartans' momentary distraction (they were celebrating the Gymnopaedia) and overthrew the oligarchs (5.82.2). A Spartan force was despatched against Argos but advanced no further than Tegea (82.3-4); the Argives were nonetheless alarmed began to construct long walls between the city and the sea with the assistance of Athenian craftsmen (82.5-6).⁸⁴ In winter 417/16 the Spartans finally advanced on

⁸¹ *HCT* 4, 148.

⁸² Roy 2022, 106-07, 124; cf. Nielsen 1996, 135; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 65. On Parrhasia see generally Roy 2013 and 2022, 108-11.

⁸³ Roy 2022, 111 identifies them as 'the northern Mainalians and doubtless also the Eutresians.' For the locations of northern Maenalia ('between Mantinea and Parrhasia') and Eutresia ('in the northern and northeastern areas of the Megalopolis basin') see *ibid.*, 107-08.

⁸⁴ The Athenian assistance was probably unofficial (cf. *HCT* 4, 152), and note that other, unspecified Peloponnesian cities were involved in building the walls (Thuc. 5.82.6).

Argos under the command of Agis to stop construction of the walls (5.83.1). The walls were razed but the city itself was not attacked and the expedition was subsequently abandoned (83.2).⁸⁵

The present treaty can be dated to spring 416 based on the archon-date (ET 1 l. 3 Εὐφemos ἔρχε) and the prytany (l. 2 Αἴαν[τίς]). This leaves a gap, not easily explained, of several months between the counterrevolution at Argos and the treaty.⁸⁶ In summer 416 Alcibiades went to Argos with 20 ships and detained 300 suspected Spartan sympathizers who were then dispersed throughout the Athenian ἀρχή (Thuc. 5.84.1; cf. 6.61.3). That expedition, the goal of which, according to H. Heftner, was to ensure that Argos did not slide back into oligarchic rule, must have been a consequence of the treaty.⁸⁷

ET 1: IG 1³ 86 = Agora 16.19*

Findspot: fragments *a-d*: Acropolis, Athens; fragment *g*: Agora, Athens

Lettering: developed Attic

Layout: ll. 1-2 in larger letters; l. 3sqq. *stoichedon* 76

[. .]όδορος Πολυχάρως Ἀ[μφιτροπέθεν(?) ἔγραμμάτευεν]·
 [ἔδοχσεν τῆι] βολῆι καὶ τῶι δέμοι· Αἴαν[τίς ἐπρυτάνευε, . .]όδορος ἔγραμμάτευε],
 [.....¹⁰..... ἐπεσ]τάτε, Εὐφemos ἔρχε· ΧΣΥ[.....³⁹..... Ἀθena]-
 [ίους καὶ Ἀργείους πε]ντέκοντα ἔτε· περὶ [μὲν τῶν hierōn³².....]
 5 [.....¹⁸..... Ἀθ]εναίος καὶ Ἀργ[είος¹⁷.....]ι περ[ι¹⁸.....]
 [.....²³.....]ν ἐὰν ἐσβά[λλουσιν ἐς τὲν γέν τὲν Ἀργ]εῖον ἐπὶ πο[λέμοι ἔ] Λακεδαιμόν]-
 [ιοι ἔ] ἄλλος τις, βοεθῆν Ἀργείους Ἀθena[ίους hoπόσοις ἂν ἐπαγγέ]λλουσιν· τούτον [δὲ¹².....]
 [.....⁴⁶..... πρ]ὸς τὸς ἐπιστρατεύ[οντας⁸.....]
 [.....⁴⁸.....] μέχρι heχσaκοσίον [.....¹².....]

⁸⁵ Plut. *Alc.* 15.4-5 makes Alcibiades instrumental in persuading the Argives to build the walls, which is plausible in light of his earlier involvement in Argive affairs (cf. Thuc. 5.76.3). But this tradition is not in Thucydides, and Plutarch's testimony is doubted by Hornblower (*Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 213). However, Gomme (*HCT* 4, 151) entertains that it might be true. Alcibiades is also attested as general for 417/16 by Diod. 12.81.2.

⁸⁶ Cf. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 211. Aiantis was tribe IX in the official order of Attic tribes. For Euphemus as eponymous archon for 417/16 see Diod. 12.81.1.

⁸⁷ Heftner 2011, 71.

10 [.....⁴⁷.....]ς· χρέμασι δὲ ἥπος ἄν [Ἀργεῖοι χρῶντ]-

[αι ἠικανοῖς ἐχσελ]ἔν ἐκ τ]ῶ φόρο μ[ἐ ἔλαττον ἔ¹².....] τάλαντα ἐς τὸν πόλε[μον κατ' ἐνιαυτὸ]-

[ν ἡέκαστον· ἐάν δὲ] ἐρένευ βόλον[ται ποῒσθαι Λακεδαιμόνιοι] Ἀργεῖοις καὶ Ἀθε[ναί]οις καὶ τοῖς ἄ]-

[μφοτέρων συμμάχ]οις, Ἀργεῖο[ι] Λ[ακεδαιμονίος ἐς τὲν βολὲν κα]ὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν [Ἀθε]ναί[ον] Ἀθῆναζε]

[ἐφιέντων· ἐάν δὲ] ἐσβάλλουσιν [ἐς τὲν γέν τὲν Ἀθηναίων ἔ Λακε]δαιμόνιοι ἔ ἄλλος τις ἐ[πὶ πολέμοι β]-

15 [οεθόντων Ἀργεῖο]ι Ἀθηναίο[ις αὐτίκα καθάπερ ἄν Ἀθηναῖοι] ἐπαγγέλλουσιν μ[έ]χρι δι[μένο καὶ στρ]-

[ατιόταις μὲ ὄλεζο]ν δισχιλ[ίον· τοῖς δὲ χρέμασι τοῖς ὑπάρ]χοσι χρῆσθαι ἐπὶ [τ]ὸς ἐπ[.....¹¹.....]

[.....¹⁵..... το]ῦτο [.....²⁶.....] δέονται πρὸς τού[το]ις [.....¹².....]

[.....⁴⁹.....]αι αὐτοῖς τέ[ν]δε τ[έν(?)¹¹.....]

[.....⁴⁷..... ἐ]χσῆν[αι ἔ τὸ]ν [π]όλεμ[ον¹¹.....]

20 [.....⁴⁵..... τὸ]ν πρὸς Λακε[δαίμ]ον[ίος¹¹.....]

[.....⁴⁷.....] Ἀθηναίος κα[.....²⁰.....]

[.....⁴⁶.....]ις μεδὲ ἐκεχ[ερῖαν¹⁵.....]

[.....⁴²..... ἡόρκ]ον τὸν πάτρι[ον¹⁸.....]

[.....⁴⁷.....]ν ἐς Παναθ[έναια¹⁶.....]

25 [.....⁴⁵..... βο]εθῆν Ἀ[θηναίος¹⁷.....]

[.....⁴³..... Ἀθε]ναίων β[οεθῆν¹⁹.....]

[.....⁴⁶.....]ντας [.....²⁶.....]

lacuna

3-4 χσυ[μμαχίαν καὶ χσυνθέκας ἀδόλος καὶ ἀβλαβῶς ἐ~ναι Ἀθηνα]ίους /G 1³; Χσύ[μμαχος(?) εἶπε· χσυμαχίαν ἐ~ναι ἄδολον καὶ ἀβλαβῆ Ἀθηνα]ίους Wilhelm. 11 τετταράκοντα] τάλαντα /G 1³; πέντε καὶ δέκα] τάλαντα Woodhead. 14-15 ἔ ἄλλο[ι, βοεθῆν Ἀργ]εῖος παντὶ σθένε]ι Hiller. 14-16 [β]οεθόντων Ἀργεῖο]ι Ἀθηναίο[ις αὐτίκα καθάπερ ἄν Ἀθηναῖοι] ἐπαγγέλλουσιν μ[έ]χρι δι[μένο καὶ στρ]ατιόταις μὲ ὄλεζο]ν δισχιλ[ίον· τοῖς δὲ χρέμασι τοῖς ὑπάρ]χοσι χρῆσθαι Meritt.

—odoros son of Polychares [of Amphitrope(?) was the secretary]. [The] council and the people [decided]. Aiantis [was the prytany; —odoros was the secretary; —] was the chairman; Euphemus was the archon: [that there be an alliance and treaty without deceit or hurt between the?] Athenians and Argives for fifty years. Regarding [the sanctuaries] ... for the Athenians and Argives ... regarding ... [if the Lacedaemonians or anyone else] invade [the territory of] the Argives with hostile intent, [that the] Athenians [assist the Argives, as many as] they request; and this one ... against those taking up arms ... up to six hundred ... so that [the Argives have sufficient means, that you extract] from the tribute [no fewer than —] talents for war [annually. But if the Lacedaemonians] want to [conclude] peace with the Argives and Athenians and their [respective] allies, the Argives [are to refer] the Lacedaemonians [to Athens to the council] and people of the Athenians. [But if] the Lacedaemonians or anyone else invades [the territory of the Athenians with hostile intent, the Argives are to assist] the Athenians without delay, [as many as the Athenians] request, up to two months' duration [and with no fewer than] two thousand [soldiers]; that they use the available [funds] for the ... this ... require in addition to this ... this to them (?) ... war shall be allowed ... against the Lacedaemonians ... Athenians ... neither truce ... the ancestral oath ... to the Panathenaea ... the Athenians (?) shall help ... helping (?) the Athenians ...

(own trans., based on the German trans. of Klaus Hallof)

The present treaty amounts to a renewal of the alliance contracted by Argos and Athens in 420, though now without the participation of Mantinea and Elis, and $\chi\sigma\upsilon[\mu\mu\alpha\chi\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu]$ has been restored at **ET 1** l. 3 by Meritt, though the correct restoration may actually be $\chi\sigma\acute{\upsilon}[\mu\mu\alpha\chi\omicron\varsigma]$, identified by Wilhelm as the proposer of the treaty (see *apparatus criticus*).

It seems clear to me that the treaty constitutes as $\sigma\upsilon\mu\mu\alpha\chi\acute{\iota}\alpha$, even if we cannot be certain that the word appeared in the inscription (but see l. 13 [$\sigma\upsilon\mu\mu\acute{\alpha}\chi\omicron\iota\varsigma$]). We know, for example, that Argos assisted the Athenian in the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.29.3, 43; 7.57.9); that is plausibly a consequence of this treaty.

If correctly restored, l. 4 $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ [$\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ τῶν ἱερῶν³².....] opens a clause about sanctuaries, although we cannot say more than this. Lines 6-7, again dependent upon restoration, envision a specifically but not exclusively Spartan incursion into Argive territory ([$\tilde{\epsilon}$ Λακεδαιμόνιοι $\tilde{\epsilon}$ ἄλλος τις]), which is unusual among alliance treaties, which normally do not specify a particular enemy to be defended against. The heavily restored ll. 10-12, according to Meritt, relate to the financing of a speculative joint Argive-Athenian campaign, with the money to be derived from the tribute of the Delian League.⁸⁸ The minimum amount (l. 11) was either at 40 (suppl. Meritt) or 15 (suppl. Woodhead) talents. The editors of *ATL* consider 40 talents a

⁸⁸ Meritt 1945, 126.

somewhat unreasonably high figure, whereas 15 better corresponds with what ‘was obviously to be considered as a routine expense (ἐκ τῷ φόρῳ) and not as anything significant enough to be borrowed from the treasurers of Athena.’⁸⁹ At ll. 12-14, the Spartans, if they wish to make peace with Argos, must also consult Athens; this is a *de facto* prohibition on a separate peace. Lines 14-16 detail the terms on which Argos must assist Athens if Athens is attacked, whether by Sparta or another state. The mutual defence provisions are symmetrical in theory, but in practice Argos was in more immediate danger of attack by an outside power (namely Sparta) than Athens.

Note also that the time limit is now 50 years (l. 4) in contrast to the more ambitious 100 years of the Quadruple Alliance. It is unclear why this reduction was agreed to, but perhaps both sides were discouraged by how quickly the Quadruple Alliance, despite its lofty ambitions, had fallen apart.

D 3.8

Athenian alliance with Halicyae

416/15 BCE

Halicyae was a Sicilian city mentioned by Thucydides at 7.32.1: in this passage, set in summer 413, i.e., during the Sicilian expedition, the Halicyaeans are described as ξύμμαχοι of Athens, providing at least a *terminus ante quem* for the present treaty, which is inscribed on the same stone as the treaty with Egesta (D 3.5) of 418/17.⁹⁰ However, I argue that both the Halicyae treaty and the inscription that records it belong instead to 416/15. There are, first of all, epigraphic indications that this is the correct date. The first two lines contain the enactment formula, and while it is so fragmentary that no archon-date can be securely identified, T. Wick sees in ET 1 l. 23 Ἀρ[...^{c.7}... the name of Arimnestus, archon of 416/15.⁹¹ The Egesta and Halicyae treaties, though inscribed on the same stele, are in different hands and so clearly were not cut at the same moment.⁹² And because the Halicyae inscription occupies the lower portion of the stele, it stands to reason that it was that last to be inscribed. I suggest that the Halicyaeans, perhaps threatened like Egesta by Silenus and Syracuse, accompanied the Egestans to Athens in winter 416/15 when the latter, as we know from Thucydides (6.6), appealed for Athenian intervention in Sicily.

⁸⁹ ATL 3, 357 n. 45.

⁹⁰ But evidently employing two different cutters, since both the lettering and line-length differ markedly from the Egesta treaty.

⁹¹ Wick 1975, 190 n. 32; cf. Smart 1972, 133; Wick 1981, 121 n. 19.

⁹² Cf. Tracy 2016, 219.

ET 1: IG 1³ 12 = OR 166 (cont.)*

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens

Lettering: developed Attic

Layout: possibly *stoichedon* 54*Line numbering continued from D 3.5 ET 1*22 [ἔδοχσε]ν τῆι βολῆι [καὶ τοῖι δέμοι·^{c.9}.... ἐπρυτάνευε·^{c.9}....][.· ἐγραμ]μάτευε· Ἄρ[...^{c.7}... ἐπεστάτε·^{c.11}..... εἶπε· Ἀθηναίους] Ἄρ[ίμνεστος (416/15) ἔρχε

[καὶ ἡαλι]κυαίοις Ἐλ[ύμοις (?) φιλίαν καὶ χουμμαχίαν εἶναι κατὰ τὰ χου]-

25 [γκείμεν]α τὰ πρὸς Ἀθ[εναίος ἡὰ Ἐγεσταίοις ἐστίν· ταῦτα δὲ τὸν γραμ]-

[ματέα τῆς β]ολῆς ἀναγ[ράφσαι ἐμ πόλει ἐν τῆι αὐτῆι στέλει ἐν ἡῖι ἀναγ]-

[ἐγραπται κα]ὶ περὶ Ἐ[γεσταίων τὰ ἐφσεφισμένα τοῖι δέμοι. *vacat?*]*vacat?*22-24 Ἄρ[— ἐπεστάτε· — ἔρχε· — εἶπε· τὸν ὄρ|κον ἡαλι]κυαίοις Mattingly. 23 Ἄρ[...^{c.7}... ἐπεστάτε· IG 1³. 23-24 [εἶπε· δὲ]ναὶ ἡαλι]κυαίοις Ἐλ[ύμοις τὸν ὄρκον ...] Mattingly.

The council and the people decided. [— was the prytany. —] was secretary. Arimnestus (416/15) [was archon. — proposed]: ... the Elymian (?) Halicyaeans ... with the Athenians ... [the secretary] of the council shall inscribe ... about the E[gestans] ...

vacat?

(trans. Stephen Lambert and P.J. Rhodes, adapted)

No specific treaty clauses are preserved, but if **ET 1** ll. 24-25 [φιλίαν καὶ χουμμαχίαν εἶναι κατὰ τὰ χου|γκείμεν]α τὰ πρὸς Ἀθ[εναίος ἡὰ Ἐγεσταίοις ἐστίν] are correctly restored, its terms will have been identical to those of the Egesta treaty.

Athenian treaty with Mytilene

ca. 412 BCE

The (in)famous rebellion of Lesbos in 428 was suppressed in 427. Although Mytilene, the leading Lesbian city, was spared the worst reprisals contemplated by the Athenians, 1000 Mytilenian oligarchs were executed all the same, the city's walls torn down, and its fleet confiscated (**D 2.3 LT 1** = Thuc. 3.50.1).⁹³ The land was later divided into 3000 κλήροι, 300 of which were reserved for the gods, with the Athenian cleruchs chosen by lot and paid two minas each annually (3.50.2). C. Fornara assumes that these are identical with the cleruchs mentioned in the present treaty (**ET 1 ll. 17, 25**), and I see no grounds for disagreement.⁹⁴

Scholars in the 20th century overwhelmingly dated the present treaty to the 420s. M.N. Tod, without argument, assigns it to 427/26.⁹⁵ Gomme, Meritt, and Bradeen-McGregor each favour 425, whereas Brunt advocates for a marginally later date of 425/24.⁹⁶ The basis of both Gomme and Brunt's arguments is that, had the Athenian cleruchy still existed in the 410s, Thucydides ought to have mentioned the cleruchs in his catalogue of the Athenian allies participating in the Sicilian expedition (7.57-58) or during military operations in and around Mytilene in 412 (8.23.1), which he does not. However, more recently C.W. Fornara and V. Saldutti have challenged the previous orthodoxy on a number of grounds.

The gift of autonomy taken together with the giving back of the land unquestionably reflects a change of mood among the Athenians which is inexplicable so soon as a year or two after the quelling of the rebellion, and certainly seems to require some act by the Mytilenians to which the conferral of autonomy was a response. No such condition is met in the mid-twenties. In a word the orthodox date is psychologically implausible.⁹⁷

As late as 421, Athens did not hesitate to massacre and enslave the people of rebellious Scione. Mytilene itself in 427 only escaped a similar fate by the narrowest of margins. V. Saldutti rightly emphasizes that this is 'difficilmente conciliabile con la scelta, nello stesso arco di tempo, di un trattamento particolarmente clemente con chi quel sentimento aveva fatto nascere,' and that, consequently, the present treaty must be dated later. Specifically, Saldutti proposes a *terminus post quem* of 421 (Peace of Nicias) and a *terminus ante quem* of 412, when Mytilene revolted again (Thuc. 8.22.2).⁹⁸

⁹³ The figure of 1000 is defended by Gomme (*HCT 2*, 325-26) and Hornblower (*Comm. on Thuc. 1*, 440). Doubt on this point stems from the reading of ms. Λ, τριάκοντα, over χιλίων of ms. A, but Gomme is reluctant to accept the former. See further Fornara 2010, 129 n. 1.

⁹⁴ Fornara 2010, 130.

⁹⁵ Comm. Tod 63, p. 135.

⁹⁶ *HCT 2*, 329-31; Gomme 1953; Meritt 1954, 364ff.; Brunt 1966, 82-84; Bradeen and McGregor 1973, 121f.

⁹⁷ Fornara 2010, 132.

⁹⁸ Saldutti 2016, 255-57.

Thucydides (5.84.1) attests the presence of two Lesbian ships at the siege of Melos in 416, but this does not necessarily imply Mytilenean autonomy. We are not told whether these were specifically *Mytilenean* ships, and T.J. Quinn suggests that they were actually Methymnian (it will be recalled that Methymna was the only Lesbian city that did not revolt in 428).⁹⁹ Hornblower argues further that these were probably not warships at all, but troop-carrying vessels (cf. Thuc. 6.43), incapable of challenging the Athenians at sea.¹⁰⁰ We are therefore not required to accept that Mytilene was autonomous by 416. All things considered, it is best to date the present treaty to 412 or soon afterwards. It was in the period after the Sicilian expedition that Athens, severely weakened and facing allied rebellions throughout the Aegean, began to offer generous concessions to its allies, such as by granting autonomy to Samos in 412 (Thuc. 8.21) and to Selymbria later (see **D 3.14**). Mytilene was easily recovered in 412 (Thuc. 8.23.2, 100.3) and remained faithful to Athens until its capture by Lysander in 405 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.5). The lenient terms of the present treaty plausibly explain this.¹⁰¹

ET 1: IG 1³ 66

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens (south slope)

Lettering: developed Attic

Layout: ll. 1-2 in larger letters; l. 3sqq. *stoichedon* 38

[...⁶... ἐ γ ρ α μ μ ά τ] ε υ ε ·

[θ ε ο] ί ·

[ἔδοχσεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι δέμοι· Ἀκαμα]ντίς ἐπρ-

[υτάνευε, ...⁹... ἐγραμμάτευε, Σμίκυ]θος ἐπε-

5 [στάτει, ...⁸... εἶπε· ἐπειδὲ καλῶς πειθαρχεῖ

[Μυτιλναίον ἡο δῆμος καὶ φίλος ἐστὶ καθάπερ ἐ]-

[ν τῶι πρόσθεν χρόνοι Ἀθηναίων τῆι βολῆι κα]ὶ τῶ-

⁹⁹ Quinn 1981, 37.

¹⁰⁰ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 228.

¹⁰¹ Fornara 2010, 140, points out that the inscription mentions Athenian generals and soldiers (**ET 1** l. 19 [στ]ρατεγῶν [καὶ] τῶν στρατιοτῶν). This fits the context of 412, when the Athenian generals Leon and Diomedon are attested campaigning in Mytilenean waters against the Chian fleet (Thuc. 8.23.2). He argues that Athens, in the years immediately following the Lesbian revolt of 428, was too busy on other fronts to maintain a military presence on Lesbos.

[ι δέμοι, κέρυκα ἀποπέμφσαι εὐθύς ἐπειδ]ὰν δόσχ-
 [ει ταῦτα ἡὸς ἀπαγγελε]ῖ τ[οῖς Μυτιλεν]αίοις ἡότ-
 10 [ι καλὸς διάκειται ἡο δ]ῆμος ἡο Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἀπο-
 [δίδοσιν αὐτοῖς τὲν γῆ]ν καὶ αὐτο[νό]μος δοκ[εῖ] ἔ~ν-
 [αι αὐτὸς οἰκῶντας πάντα] τ[ὰ] σφ[έτερα] αὐτῶ[ν πλὲν]
 [ἔ] παραδό[ν]τας [σφῶν τὰ κα]τ' ἔ[πειρον χορία ἡάπερ π]-
 [αραδῶν]αι Ἀθεν[αῖο]ι κελεύουσ[ιν καὶ ἀπὸ χσυμβολ]-
 15 [ῶν δί]κας διδόν[τα]ς πρὸς Ἀθεν[αίος καὶ δεχομένο]-
 [ς κα]τὰ τὰς χσυ[μβο]λὰς ἡαὶ ἔ~σαν [πρὸ τῶ· καὶ λογίζε]-
 [σθ]αι τοῖς κλε[ρό]χοις ἡόσα ἐπο[λέθε] τισὶ ἐκ τῶν κ]-
 [λέ]ρον πρὶν ἀ[πο]δοθῆναι αὐτοῖς [ζετέσαντας τῶν]
 [στ]ρατεγῶν [καὶ] τῶν στρατιοτῶν [καὶ τῶν ἄλλον Ἀθ]-
 20 [εν]αίον τὸς ἔχοντας καὶ ἀναγράφ[σαι ταῦτα τὸν γ]-
 [ρα]μματέα τῆς βολῆς ἐστέλει λιθ[ίνει καὶ καταθ]-
 ἔναι ἐμ πόλει τέλεσι τοῖς σ[φετέροις αὐτῶν· ταῦ]-
 τα μὲν ἀναγράφσαι καὶ κ[αλέσαι τὲμ πρεσβείαν τ]-
 ῶν Μυτιλεναίων ἐπὶ χ[σένια ἐς τὸ πρυτανεῖον ἐς]
 25 αὔριον· τοῖς δὲ κλ[ερόχοις δοδόναι μετὰ τὲν τῆς]
 γῆς ἀνταπόδο[σιν τὰ οἰκόπεδα τῶν ἀπογεγενημέ]-
 [νο]ν. ^v ἔδο[χσεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι δέμοι·⁸....]

4 [Μνάσιππος ἐγραμμάτευε] Mattingly. 6-7 [Μυτιλεναίων ἡο δῆμος καὶ φίλος καὶ πιστός ἐστ]ι κατὰ τὰς χσυνθέκας] ATL. 11-12 αὐτο[νό]μος δοκ[εῖ] ἔ~ν | [αι αὐτὸς δὲ φυλάττοντας] τ[ὰ] σφ[έτερα] αὐτῶ[ν] Saldutti. 25-27 τοῖς δὲ κλ[ερόχοις δοδόναι μετὰ τὲν τῆς] | γῆς ἀνταπόδο[σιν ἐφόδια ὅπος ἂν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀπίο]σι]ν Fornara; τοῖς δὲ κλ[ερόχοις πράττεν τὰς ἀντι τῆς] | γῆς ἀνταποδό[σες τὰς ἐκεῖ ἀρχὰς καὶ τὸμ φρόραρ]χο]ν ATL.

[—] was the secretary. Gods. [The council and people decided]. Akamantis was the prytany; [— was the secretary; Smicy] thus was the chairman; [— proposed. Since the Mytilenian people

obey well and are friendly just as in the past towards the council] and people [of the Athenians, let a herald be sent as soon as this] is decided [to proclaim to the] Mytilenians that the Athenian people [are well-disposed] and returns the land [to them] and decides that they should be autonomous [and inhabit all] their own land, [except that they hand over the lands of theirs on the mainland which] the Athenians command them [to hand over; and that on the basis of the agreements], they give and receive *dikai* with respect to the Athenians in accordance with the agreements that have already been made; and that an account be made by the cleruchs of everything that was sold [to others from the] *kleroi* before the restoration, [after they have located] the current owners from among the generals [and] the soldiers [and the other] Athenians; and that the secretary of the council record [this] on a stone stele [and] erect it on the Acropolis at [their own] cost. Let this be recorded and invite Mytilenian [embassy] to hospitality [in the Prytaneum] tomorrow, and let the cleruchs, [after the] restoration of the land, [be given plots of land in exchange for what they have ceded]. [The council and people] decided. ...

...

(own trans., based on the German trans. of Klaus Hallof)

This is one of several 5th-century Athenian inscriptions to include the θεοί-heading (ET 1 l. 2). There is no reference to the eponymous archon, included only sporadically in the final decades of the century, and the name of the proposer is not preserved. The secretary may have been Mnasippos, restored by Mattingly at l. 4, although I treat this hypothesis with caution.¹⁰² At l. 11, the Mytileneans are declared αὐτόνομοι. Although the nature of their αὐτονομία is not entirely clear, Quinn believes that they gained the right to choose their own constitution (πολιτεία).¹⁰³ However, the surviving inscription contains no reference to constitutional matters. On the other hand, l. 12 [οἰκῶντας πάντα] τ[ὰ] σφ[έτερα] αὐτῶ[ν] together with l. 26 γῆς ἀνταπόδο[σιν] secures the restoration of land formerly assigned to the Athenian cleruchs.¹⁰⁴ Since even the Athenians recognized that forcing a cleruchy on an allied state deprived it of its autonomy, the abolition of the cleruchy must be considered fundamental to the restoration of Mytilene's autonomous status. Beyond this, the treaty restores the judicial arrangements (συμβολαί) that were previously in place (l. 16), presumably before the revolt of 428 according to Fornara.¹⁰⁵ The Mytileneans themselves were required to cover the cost of the

¹⁰² Even if the name were secure, he almost certainly cannot be the [.]γράφος recorded as secretary at *IG* 1³ 10 l. 3 (Athenian regulations for Phaselis), dated by the editors of *IG* 1³ to between 469 and 450 BCE. *LGPN* 2 s.v. Μνάσιππος does not record any Athenian named Mnassippos active in the late-5th century.

¹⁰³ Quinn 1971, 409 with n. 26. There is no solid evidence for the subsequent nature of Mytilene's government, but Quinn (*ibid.*) thinks it likelier than not that it became an oligarchy.

¹⁰⁴ Fornara 2010, 130-31.

¹⁰⁵ Fornara 2010, 130; cf. Meiggs 1972, 230-31.

Athenian inscription, to be displayed on the Acropolis (l. 22, partially restored). There must have been provision made for a Mytilenean copy, as it was standard procedure for Athenian treaties with individual allies to have copies erected both at Athens and in the relevant allied city; however, this clause is not preserved. At ll. 23-25, the Mytilenean ambassadors are invited to hospitality (ξενία) in the Athenian Prytaneum.

While this is clearly a conciliatory document, it is not totally one-sided in favour of the Mytileneans. As M.N. Tod observes, the rights of the former cleruchs to compensation is assured at ll. 17 and 25-27, while l. 14 Ἀθεν[αῖο]ι κελεύουσ[ιν] reaffirms that Mytilene remains in some sense subordinate to Athens.¹⁰⁶

D 3.10

Athenian treaty with the Clazomenians at Daphnus

ca. 412 BCE

Clazomenae was an island city in Ionia and a member of the Delian League, from which it defected in summer 412, upon which the Clazomenians moved to a site on the mainland called Polichna (Thuc. 8.14.3).¹⁰⁷ Athens captured Polichna in the same summer and the majority of the population subsequently returned to the island, but a minority retreated to Daphnus (8.23.6), not precisely located but presumably on the mainland not far from Clazomenae.¹⁰⁸ In winter 412/11 the Spartans under Astyochus tried unsuccessfully to conquer Clazomenae and remove the remaining population to Daphnus (Thuc. 8.31.2-3; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.11).

While the Athenian capture of Polichna and the resettlement of Clazomenae proper in 412 provides the most plausible context for the present treaty, there are other possibilities. There was an attack on Clazomenae by an unidentified group of exiles in late 407 or early 406¹⁰⁹, against which Alcibiades, the proposer of the inscribed Athenian decree (ET 1 l. 3, below), is known to have intervened (Diod. 13.71.1). But then he should not appear as the decree's proposer because he is not attested in Athens again after his departure for rebellious Andros earlier in 407 (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.21).

I suggest the following chronology: when Daphnus was settled in 412, an initial agreement was made on the spot with the Athenian generals in the area, possibly but not necessarily including

¹⁰⁶ Comm. Tod 63, p. 136.

¹⁰⁷ *IACP* p. 1061 (Polichna); no. 847, pp. 1076-77 (Clazomenae).

¹⁰⁸ Smarczyk 1986, 13; Hornblower, *Comm. On Thuc.* 3, 814; cf. Plin. *HN* 5.117 with Cook 1953/54, 157.

¹⁰⁹ For the date see Gehrke 1985, 78.

Alcibiades. When Alcibiades returned to Athens in 407, he got the Assembly to formally approve the treaty, perhaps on the same day as the Selymbria decree.

ET 1: IG 1³ 119 = OR 186*

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens (north slope)

Lettering: Ionic

Layout: *stoichedon* 34

ἔδοξεν τῆι βολῆ[ι καὶ τῶ]ι δῆμ[ωι. ...⁶...ις ἐ]-
 πρυτάνευε· Κράτη[ς] ἔγραμμ[άτευε· Ἐπιγέν]-
 ης ἐπεστάτε. Ἀλκιβιάδης εἶπ[ε· τὰς ξυνθήκα]-
 ς ἄς ξυνέθεντο οἱ στρατηγοὶ [τοῖς οἰκίσασ]-
 5 ι Δαφνῶντα, εἶναι αὐτοῖς κατὰ [τὰ ξυγκείμε]-
 να, ἐπειδὴ ἄνδρες ἐγένοντο ἀγ[αθοί. καὶ ἀνα]-
 γράψαι τὸν γραμμα[τέα τῆς βολῆς ἐν στήλῃι]
 λιθίνῃ ἐν [πόλει τὰς τε ξυνθήκας καὶ τὸ ψή]-
 [φισμα τόδε²⁵.....]

1 Ἄντιοχίς or Ἐρεχθεῖς or Κεκροπίς.

The council and the people decided. [Erechtheis or Kekropis or Antiochis] was the prytany. Crates was secretary. [Epigen]es was chairman. Alcibiades proposed: that the agreement which the generals made [with those living at] Daphnus shall apply to them in accordance with [what has been laid down], since they have been good men; and the secretary [of the council shall inscribe on a] stone [stele] on the [Acropolis the agreement and this decree] ...

...

(trans. P.J. Rhodes, adapted)

Towards the end of the fifth century, it had become increasingly common to include the archon-name in the prescripts of Athenian decrees, so its omission both here and in the Selymbria treaty is unusual. In contrast to the Selymbria treaty, the text of the initial agreement made in 412 is not recorded, meaning that we are not in a position to identify individual clauses. In the inscription, the initial agreement is referred to as ‘the agreement which the [Athenian] generals made with those living at Daphnus’ (ET 1 ll. 3-5 [τὰς ξυυθήκα] | ζ ἄς ξυυέθεντο οἱ στρατεγοὶ [τοῖς οἰκίσασσ] | ι Δαφνῶντα – note the partial restoration). Alcibiades’ role in the initial agreement can only be speculated because he is not attested by name in the events of Thuc. 8.23.6, although he was certainly in Ionia at the time.

Gehrke suggests that the treaty’s objective was to resolve στάσις between the majority at Clazomenae, which was probably pro-Athenian and democratic, or at least was quickly reconciled with Athens, and the faction that fled to Daphnus, which was likely oligarchic and pro-Spartan.¹¹⁰ I speculate that the present treaty allowed the Daphnus faction to live there in peace, perhaps because this was seen by the Athenian generals as the surest way of avoiding further conflict. But this was clearly unsuccessful if the exiles who attacked Clazomenae in 407/06 are identical with the men at Daphnus of ll. 4-5.

D 3.11

First Peloponnesian-Persian treaty

412 BCE

In winter 413/12, the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus urged the Peloponnesian fleet to engage against Athens on the Aegean east coast with the promise of Persian subsidies. To this end they dispatched delegations to Sparta led by ethnic Greeks, probably intending to soften the Spartans’ inhibitions against ‘medizing’ or collaboration with Persia (Thuc. 8.5.4-6.1).¹¹¹ It was decided to send 40 Peloponnesian warships to Ionia (8.6.4), while a further 100 were already under construction (8.3.2), joining the revolting Chians and their reported fleet of 60 triremes.¹¹² D.M. Lewis ascribes this decision to the influence of Alcibiades, who had famously defected to Sparta in 415, through his relationship with the ephor Endius (8.6.3; cf.

¹¹⁰ Gehrke 1985, 78. Why the men at Daphnus are considered ‘good men’ (l. 6 ἐπειδὴ ἄνδρες ἐγένοντο ἀγ[αθοί]) is unclear.

¹¹¹ Cf. Lewis 1977, 88-89; Hyland 2018, 51.

¹¹² On this figure see HCT 5, 27-32; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 798-99; Hyland 2018, 51-52.

5.44.3).¹¹³ This was ratified at a meeting in Corinth, likely a Peloponnesian League congress (8.8.2 ξυνελθόντες ἐς Κόρινθον οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐβουλευόντο).¹¹⁴

Despite the Peloponnesians' agreement to assist Tissaphernes, there was initially no treaty to govern their relationship. The figure credited with negotiating the present treaty is an obscure Spartan named Chalcideus (Thuc. 8.17.4), but he may have been little more than a puppet of Alcibiades, with whom Chalcideus is attested campaigning at 8.17.1-3. Tissaphernes' immediate objective was to suppress the revolt in Caria of Amorges, the former satrap of Lydia, which broke out in 413 (8.5.5). Amorges' revolt, on the face of it, was of no concern to the Peloponnesians, so Tissaphernes must have made his support contingent on their agreement to help put it down. The treaty, which Thucydides classifies as a ξυμμαχία both in his authorial narrative (8.17.4) and in the text of the treaty (8.18.1 = **LT 1**), immediately followed the defection of Miletus from the Delian League (8.17.1-4; cf. 8.25,2, 61.2, 79.4).¹¹⁵

LT 1: Thuc. 8.18.1

ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς βασιλέα καὶ Τισσαφέρην Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι. ὀπόσῃν χώραν καὶ πόλεις βασιλεὺς ἔχει καὶ οἱ πατέρες οἱ βασιλέως εἶχον, βασιλέως ἔστω· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν πόλεων ὀπόσα Ἀθηναίοις ἐφοῖτα χρήματα ἢ ἄλλο τι, κωλυόντων κοινῆ βασιλεὺς καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὅπως μήτε χρήματα λαμβάνωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι μήτε ἄλλο μηδέν. [2] καὶ τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους κοινῆ πολεμούντων βασιλεὺς καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι· καὶ κατάλυσιν τοῦ πολέμου πρὸς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐξέστω ποιεῖσθαι, ἢν μὴ ἀμφοτέροις δοκῆ, βασιλεῖ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμαχοῖς. [3] ἦν δέ τινες ἀφιστῶνται ἀπὸ βασιλέως, πολέμιοι ὄντων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμαχοῖς· καὶ ἦν τινες ἀφιστῶνται ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμαχῶν, πολέμιοι ὄντων βασιλεῖ κατὰ ταῦτά.

The Spartans and their allies made an alliance with the King and Tissaphernes on these terms: all the territory and all the cities which are in the King's possession, or were in the possession of the King's forefathers, shall belong to the King; and whatever revenues or other goods once accrued to the Athenians from these cities, the King and the Spartans and their allies shall jointly ensure that the Athenians receive neither monies nor any other goods. The King and the Spartans and their allies shall jointly pursue the war against the Athenians: and termination of the war shall only be allowed if agreed by both parties, by the King and by the Spartans and their allies. If any revolt from the King, they shall also be the enemies of the Spartans and their

¹¹³ Lewis 1977, 89 with n. 33. On Alcibiades' relationship with Endius see Kebric 1976.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Lewis 1977, 89 n. 34: 'This interesting meeting ... bears every appearance of being a meeting of the Peloponnesian League.'

¹¹⁵ Miletus was an important source of troops for Athens, with more than 2000 hoplites reported in 424 (Thuc. 4.54.1); for Milesian participation in Athenian campaigns cf. Thuc. 4.42; 7.57.4.

allies: and if any revolt from the Spartans and their allies, they shall be the King's enemies likewise.

Thucydides' chronology places the treaty in summer 412.¹¹⁶ Its brief heading (8.18.1 = **LT 1**) establishes that this is a treaty between, on one side, the Great King Darius II and (= represented by?) Tissaphernes and, on the other, the Spartans and their allies (Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι), by which we are presumably to understand the Peloponnesian League; however, according to E. Lévy Sparta's new allies in Ionia, especially Miletus and Chios with its powerful fleet, may be implied among οἱ ξύμμαχοι.¹¹⁷

Staying at 8.18.1, the clause ὅπῳσιν χώραν καὶ πόλεις βασιλεὺς ἔχει καὶ οἱ πατέρες οἱ βασιλέως εἶχον, βασιλέως ἔστω is of particular interest: later, at 8.43.3, the Spartan envoy Lichas will complain bitterly that this concedes, if only theoretically¹¹⁸, vast swathes of Greek territory to the Achaemenids, even including parts of the mainland such as Thessaly, Locris, and Boeotia, which was briefly controlled by Darius' ancestor Xerxes in 480/79.¹¹⁹ Hornblower wonders whether this clause required the annulment of preexisting Peloponnesian agreements with states located within the area of claimed Persian control – he cites the recent Spartan alliance with Erythrae (8.6.4) as an example – but concludes that this was probably overlooked, itself an indictment of Chalcideus' hasty and sloppy diplomacy.¹²⁰ Kagan suggests that the 'monstrous concessions' of this clause were so embarrassing to the Peloponnesians that the treaty was actually kept secret from the general public.¹²¹ Sparta began the Peloponnesian War with the promise of liberating Greece from Athens (Thuc. 2.8.4), and Rhodes is certainly correct that the concessions of this clause, even if purely theoretical, are difficult to reconcile with that.¹²²

According to L. Kallet, the expressions χρήματα ἢ ἄλλο τι and χρήματα ... μήτε ἄλλο μηδέν establish a clear distinction between financial revenues (χρήματα) and other goods and supplies.¹²³ But rather than promising benefits in a positive sense to either the Peloponnesians or the Persians, the emphasis of this clause is on inconveniencing the Athenians by denying

¹¹⁶ According to Busolt 1904, 1422 n. 3, the treaty was made in late summer.

¹¹⁷ Lévy 1983b, 226.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Lévy 1983b, 230: 'En fait il est impensable que les Perses songent à rétablir leur domination sur l'ensemble de ces régions et même leur iconographie ne les range pas parmi les régions qui sont censées dépendre du Roi.' See also Lewis 1977, 99 n. 69.

¹¹⁹ Lévy 1983b, 230; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 802.

¹²⁰ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 802; cf. Lewis 1977, 90; Debord 1999, 205 n. 21.

¹²¹ Kagan 1987, 48 with n. 82; cf. Hatzfeld 1940, 222 n. 4; Connor 1984, 219. *Contra* Hyland 2018, 55; cf. Heitsch 2007, 38-39.

¹²² Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 617; cf. Lévy 1983b, 230: 'Même sans effets pratiques, cette reconnaissance des prétentions du Roi ne peut que scandaliser les Grecs.'

¹²³ Kallet 2001, 251.

them access to χρήματα ἢ ἄλλο τι. If successfully implemented, this might prove instrumental in crippling Athens' financial power.¹²⁴ But given Tissaphernes' reported motive in calling in the Peloponnesians in the first place, namely, to redirect the tribute of Delian League members into Persian coffers (Thuc. 8.5.4-5), clearly Darius and Tissaphernes intended that Persia, rather than the Peloponnesians, would be the chief beneficiaries.¹²⁵

5.18.3 contains the antirebel clause. While nominally reciprocal, its one-sidedness in practice has not escaped the attention of commentators.¹²⁶ Tissaphernes was of course confronted at that very moment with the revolt of Amorges, whereas there is no evidence for defection among Sparta's allies or, indeed, among the subject allies of other members of the Peloponnesian League. E. Lévy, followed by Hyland, argue that the antirebel clause bound Sparta, at least in theory, to intervene on Persia's behalf not only against Amorges, but even against the Asiatic Greeks in the event that they resisted the Persian control asserted at 8.18.1.¹²⁷

It has been claimed that both this treaty and the subsequent one (**D 3.12**) were never anything more than drafts and were never ratified. The simplicity of the prescript, which lacks the date of ratification and lists of oath-takers, is often cited as evidence for this.¹²⁸ This is surely incorrect: even the third treaty (**D 3.13**), while containing a more elaborate prescript, lacks an oath formula and publication clause, as Lévy notes, yet no study of which I am aware questions the validity of that agreement.¹²⁹ And the antirebel clause of the first treaty was certainly fulfilled, which can be inferred from the attested presence of Peloponnesian troops at Iasus when Amorges was captured (8.28). Why would Sparta and its allies abide by the terms of a treaty if it never had any legal force?¹³⁰

No reference is made to Tissaphernes' earlier promise (Thuc. 8.5.5) to pay for the maintenance of the Peloponnesian fleet.¹³¹ However, it has been argued that this was unnecessary because Peloponnesian ships had not yet reached Ionia in significant numbers.¹³² The question of Persian subsidies would be addressed in the second and third treaties.

¹²⁴ Lewis 1977, 91.

¹²⁵ Kallet 2001, 250-51.

¹²⁶ Lewis 1977, 91; *HCT* 5, 41-42, emphasizing that the clause does not appear in the later treaties made after the capture of Amorges (Thuc. 8.28); Lévy 1983b, 232; Kagan 1987, 48; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 802; Hyland 2018, 56.

¹²⁷ Lévy 1983b, 232 with n. 100; Hyland 2018, 56.

¹²⁸ Westlake 1979, 36; *HCT* 5, 40; Cartledge 1987, 188 (first treaty only); Cawkwell 2005, 149; Heitsch 2007, 57 n. 54. *Contra* Keen 1998, 99.

¹²⁹ Lévy 1983b, 225.

¹³⁰ Cf. Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 616-17.

¹³¹ Cf. Kallet 2001, 251.

¹³² Kirchhoff 1895, 132-33; *HCT* 5, 40; Heitsch 2007, 39; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 801; Hyland 2018, 55.

D 3.12
Second Peloponnesian-Persian treaty
412 BCE

Despite the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet after the conclusion of the first Peloponnesian-Persian treaty (**D 3.11**), the Athenians could not be dislodged from their new base at Samos. According to Hyland, it must have become clear towards the end of 412 that the war in the Aegean would last longer than first anticipated.¹³³ Meanwhile, soon after the capture of Amorges (Thuc. 8.36), Tissaphernes halved the daily wage of the sailors in the Peloponnesian fleet to three obols from the previous Attic drachma, but then backtracked in response to the objections of the Syracusan general Hermocrates, now active in Ionia (Thuc. 8.29.1-2).¹³⁴ Since wages are not mentioned in the first treaty, the original one-drachma wage must have been fixed by a further unrecorded settlement at some point between the first and second treaties.

The influx of booty taken from Iasus during the capture of Amorges temporarily stabilized the Peloponnesians' financial situation, but this would not last forever. Kallet suggests that the lack of specific financial arrangements in the first treaty was a particular point of concern.¹³⁵ Indeed, Thucydides states that the earlier treaty was now recognized as 'defective' (8.36.2 ἐνδεεῖς) by the Peloponnesians. Accordingly, a Spartan named Therimenes was assigned to negotiate a new agreement with Tissaphernes.¹³⁶

LT 1: Thuc. 8.37.1

ξυνθῆκαι Λακεδαιμονίων και τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς βασιλέα Δαρεῖον και τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς βασιλέως και Τισσαφέρνην, σπονδὰς εἶναι και φιλιαν κατὰ τάδε. [2] ὀπόση χώρα και πόλεις βασιλέως εἰσὶ Δαρείου ἢ τοῦ πατρὸς ἦσαν ἢ τῶν προγόνων, ἐπὶ ταύτας μὴ ἰέναι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ μηδὲ κακῶ μηδενὶ μήτε Λακεδαιμονίους μήτε τοὺς ξυμμάχους τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων, μηδὲ φόρους πράσσεσθαι ἐκ τῶν πόλεων τούτων μήτε Λακεδαιμονίους μήτε τοὺς ξυμμάχους τοὺς

¹³³ Hyland 2018, 60.

¹³⁴ The text of Thuc. 8.29.2 is corrupt and scholars have struggled to quantify the new rate offered by Tissaphernes: see Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 836-38.

¹³⁵ Kallet 2001, 256.

¹³⁶ Chalcideus was no longer in the picture: his death in battle against Athens is recorded at Thuc. 8.24.1. No less an authority than Wilamowitz 1908, 598 disputes the historicity of Therimenes' role in the second treaty, proposing that it was actually concluded by the Spartan navarch Astyochus, who shifted responsibility for its shortcomings onto the deceased Therimenes (for his presumed death by shipwreck see 8.38.1). But Thucydides at any rate believed that it was the work of Therimenes (cf. 5.36.2), and Lévy 1983b, 223 n. 22 doubts that he could have been so easily deceived, given his access to the treaty texts. Furthermore, Westlake 1968, 296 n. 2 believes that Astyochus arrived in Ionia only after the treaty was concluded.

Λακεδαιμονίων· μηδὲ Δαρεῖον βασιλέα μηδὲ ὧν βασιλεὺς ἄρχει ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲ τοὺς
 ξυμμάχους ἰέναι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ μηδὲ κακῶ μηδενί. [3] ἦν δέ τι δέωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἢ οἱ
 ξύμμαχοι βασιλέως ἢ βασιλεὺς Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅτι ἂν πείθωσιν ἀλλήλους,
 τοῦτο ποιοῦσι καλῶς ἔχειν. [4] τὸν δὲ πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κοινῇ
 ἀμφοτέρους πολεμεῖν· ἦν δὲ κατάλυσιν ποιῶνται, κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρους ποιεῖσθαι. ὁπόση δ' ἂν
 στρατιὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ τῇ βασιλέως ἢ μεταπεμψαμένου βασιλέως, τὴν δαπάνην βασιλέα
 παρέχειν. [5] ἦν δέ τις τῶν πόλεων ὁπόσαι ξυνέθεντο βασιλεῖ ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλέως ἴη χώραν, τοὺς
 ἄλλους κωλύειν καὶ ἀμύνειν βασιλεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· καὶ ἦν τις τῶν ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ ἢ
 ὅσης βασιλεὺς ἄρχει ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἴη ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων, βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω καὶ
 ἀμυνέτω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

An agreement between the Spartans and their allies and King Darius and the King's sons and
 Tissaphernes. There shall be a treaty and friendship between the parties on these terms:
 whatever territory and cities belong to King Darius, or belonged to his father or forefathers,
 neither the Spartans nor the allies of the Spartans shall go against these for the purpose of war
 or any other detriment, and neither the Spartans nor the allies of the Spartans shall exact
 tribute from these cities: nor shall King Darius or the subjects of the King go against the Spartans
 or their allies for the purpose of war or any other detriment. If the Spartans or their allies make
 any request of the King, or the King of the Spartans or their allies, whatever action they take by
 mutual agreement shall be valid. Both parties shall jointly pursue the war against the Athenians
 and their allies: and if they terminate the war, both parties shall do so jointly. Whatever troops
 are in the King's territory, at the summons of the King, shall be maintained at the King's
 expense. If any of the cities which are party to this agreement with the King go against the
 King's territory, the others shall intervene and assist the King to the full extent of their power:
 and if any in the King's territory, or in any territory over which the King has dominion, go against
 the territory of the Spartans or their allies, the King shall intervene and give assistance to the full
 extent of his power.

According to Andrewes, Thuc. 8.37.1 (= **LT 1**) constitutes a formal heading, albeit not as
 elaborate as the heading of the third treaty (8.58.1).¹³⁷ G. Cawkwell, on the other hand, takes
 the present treaty to be an unratified draft like the first.¹³⁸ But Lichas' fury over the broad
 concessions of the first and second treaties (8.43.3) is more readily comprehensible if they
 actually went into effect. Notably, the heading refers not only to Darius and Tissaphernes, but
 also to Darius' sons – these were Cyrus and Arsaces, the latter being the future Artaxerxes II.
 Their inclusion is perhaps intended to ensure that the treaty remained active even after Darius'
 death, but then it is strange that the third treaty reverts to naming Darius alone (8.58.1).¹³⁹

¹³⁷ *HCT* 5, 79.

¹³⁸ Cawkwell 2005, 149f.

¹³⁹ *HCT* 5, 79; Lévy 1983b, 227 with n. 60; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 855.

8.37.2 ὀπόση χώρα ... κακῶ μηδενὶ implicitly reiterates Darius' claim to the territory held by his predecessors, which was explicit in the first treaty, but here it is couched in negative terms: Darius does not actively *claim* extensive Greek territories, but rather prohibits the Peloponnesians from going against them. Thus, the most embarrassing Spartan concession in the earlier treaty is smoothed over, but the adjustment is chiefly a cosmetic one, still requiring the Spartans and their allies to recognize Darius' rights over the Greeks of Asia Minor.¹⁴⁰ This is followed by a clause (μηδὲ φόρους πράσσεισθαι κτλ.) which prohibits the Peloponnesians from collecting tribute from both actual and claimed Persian territory. This is not only a forthright statement of Persian power, but also limits the Peloponnesians' ability to fund the war effort independently and ensures their financial dependency on Tissaphernes. It has also been suggested that this clause was intended to ensure that Persia, not Sparta, replaced Athens as the master of Ionia.¹⁴¹ E. Heitsch goes so far as to suggest that the treaty was intended by Tissaphernes to outright discourage Peloponnesian forces from operating in the Aegean.¹⁴² Hyland disputes this, arguing that Peloponnesian troops and ships was necessary to confront and defeat Athens – an outcome that was obviously in Persia's interest as well as Sparta's.¹⁴³ Both are partially correct: Darius and his western satraps naturally stood to gain from the decline or even disappearance of Athenian power, but they will have been keen to ensure that the resulting power vacuum was filled by Persia, not Sparta or its allies. Furthermore, the promised arrival of the royal fleet (cf. 8.58.7) would hypothetically reduce the overall need for Peloponnesian ships.¹⁴⁴

8.37.3 offers a vague and superficially reciprocal promise of material assistance. According to Hyland, this implicitly includes wages; he argues that the clause was added at the insistence of the Peloponnesians, who feared a total cessation of wages by Tissaphernes – not an unreasonable concern in light of the earlier wage reduction (8.29.1-2).¹⁴⁵ M. Goldstein hypothesizes that an unrecorded dispute over tribute arose at some point between the first and second treaties, and that the present clause is a response to Peloponnesian complaints on this matter. Therefore, the Peloponnesians are guaranteed Persian subsidies while Darius and Tissaphernes ensure that the tribute formerly collected by Athens would now fall to them.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁰ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 855.

¹⁴¹ Busolt 1904, 1444-45; Hatzfeld 1940, 230-31; Goldstein 1974, 163; Lewis 1977, 93; Lévy 1983b, 233; Kagan 1987, 81; Hawthorn 2014, 209; Hyland 2018, 63. Rutishauser 2012, 143-44, pointing to the experience of Spartan imperialism under Lysander, argues that any attempt to replicate Athens' tribute system would have been impaired in any case by Sparta's economic backwardness, notably its lack of a viable currency standard.

¹⁴² Heitsch 2007, 61.

¹⁴³ Hyland 2018, 63.

¹⁴⁴ Kallet 2001, 266-67.

¹⁴⁵ Hyland 2018, 62.

¹⁴⁶ Goldstein 1974, 163. Cf. Kallet 2001, 258: 'To have exacted tribute would, admittedly, be at odds with their [sc. the Peloponnesians'] role as liberators, but the very fact of its mention raises the possibility and, fitting as it does into Thucydides' larger narrative, it confirms that the Spartans will be completely reliant on Persian subsidies.'

This is stated more explicitly at 8.37.4 ὁπόση δ' ἂν ... βασιλέα παρέχειν. However, the amount of aid to be given to the Peloponnesians is not quantified, and they are only eligible if they have been expressly summoned by the king.¹⁴⁷

8.37.5 contains a reciprocal antirebel clause. But with Amorges now removed from the scene, its target is uncertain. E. Heitsch suggests that the allusion is not to any active rebellion, but to the possibility of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, now claimed by Persia, revolting in the future.¹⁴⁸ However, the word ξυνέθεντο may imply a party with which the King 'made an agreement,' which complicates matters if this is indeed how the passage is to be translated. As Hornblower argues, it is 'difficult to imagine a Persian King at this relatively advanced date stooping to diplomacy with individual Greek coastal cities.'¹⁴⁹ The most recent attested example of such diplomacy was Cyrus the Great's renewal, in the sixth century, of the ὄρκιον made earlier between Miletus and Croesus of Lydia (Hdt. 1.141.4). Andrewes posits that the 'agreement' in question may actually be the present treaty itself, although he admits that its clear bilaterality, distinguishing between the Spartans and their allies on the one side and the Achaemenid monarchy on the other, is difficult to reconcile with this interpretation.¹⁵⁰

D 3.13

Third Peloponnesian-Persian treaty

411 BCE

Soon after arriving in Ionia, Lichas sharply criticized the first two treaties as unduly favourable to Persia and invited Tissaphernes to conclude 'another, better treaty' (Thuc. 8.43.4 ἑτέρας οὖν ἐκέλευε βελτίους σπένδεσθαι), an offer the satrap declined. Subsequently the Peloponnesians attempted to fund their campaign without Persian subsidies (8.44.1), but their hopes proved badly misplaced. A venture to Rhodes yielded 32 talents of revenue (8.44.4), but Lewis calculates that this was enough to fund the 94 ships of the Peloponnesian fleet for only 20 days or so.¹⁵¹ Meanwhile Alcibiades had fallen out of favour at Sparta and Astyochus received orders

¹⁴⁷ Cf. *HCT* 5, 80, 101; Kallet 2001, 266 n. 119; Munson 2012, 263; Hyland 2018, 63. Kallet 2001, 258 concludes that this treaty, while slightly improving over the first one, still leaves many questions surrounding the financing of the Peloponnesian forces unanswered.

¹⁴⁸ Heitsch 2007, 62-63.

¹⁴⁹ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 857. Hornblower's trans. of Thuc. 8.37.5 (= **D 3.12 LT 1**), 'if any of the cities who *have made agreements with the King* attack the King's territory' (emphasis mine), clearly understands the verb συντίθημι here to mean 'make an agreement.' But this is not the only possibility: LSJ⁹ s.v. συντίθημι B I do indeed include 'agree on, conclude' (e.g., a treaty) among its meanings in the middle voice, but also 'observe, give heed to,' which need not imply a treaty but, in the context of the present passage, could simply mean 'any of the cities which given heed to the King.'

¹⁵⁰ *HCT* 5, 81.

¹⁵¹ Lewis 1977, 103.

to have him executed, but Alcibiades quickly absconded and went over to Tissaphernes, becoming his trusted advisor (8.45.1). In this capacity he encouraged the satrap to follow a policy that would weaken both Athens and Sparta. For example, under Alcibiades' influence, Tissaphernes halved the wages of the Peloponnesian sailors from one Attic drachma to three obols daily (equivalent to the contemporary Athenian naval wage), which was paid at irregular intervals (8.45.2-46.2).¹⁵² Nevertheless, Thucydides writes (8.57.1-2) that Tissaphernes was ultimately compelled to negotiate a new treaty with the Peloponnesians because their financial difficulties threatened to lead both to Athenian victory and raiding by the desperate Peloponnesian crews along the Ionian coast.¹⁵³ Accordingly, he initiated discussions with the Peloponnesians at Caunus in Caria, drafting a new treaty before retiring to the Maeander plain, where he was joined by a Peloponnesian delegation to formally ratify the treaty in spring 411.¹⁵⁴

LT 1: Thuc. 8.58.1

τρίτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει Δαρείου βασιλεύοντος, ἐφορεύοντος δὲ Ἀλεξιπίδα ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι, ξυρθῆκαι ἐγένοντο ἐν Μαιάνδρου πεδίῳ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς Τισσαφέρην καὶ Ἰεραμένη καὶ τοὺς Φαρνάκου παῖδας περὶ τῶν βασιλέως πραγμάτων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων. [2] χώραν τὴν βασιλέως, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστί, βασιλέως εἶναι· καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται. [3] Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μὴ ἰέναι ἐπὶ χώραν τὴν βασιλέως ἐπὶ κακῷ μηδενί, μηδὲ βασιλέα ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων χώραν μηδὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ κακῷ μηδενί. [4] ἦν δὲ τις Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ κακῷ ἴη ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλέως χώραν, Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κωλύειν· καὶ ἦν τις ἐκ τῆς βασιλέως ἴη ἐπὶ κακῷ ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ἢ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω. [5] τροφὴν δὲ ταῖς ναυσὶ ταῖς νῦν παρούσαις Τισσαφέρην παρέχειν κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα μέχρι ἂν αἱ νῆες αἰ βασιλέως ἔλθωσιν· [6] Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ἐπὴν αἰ βασιλέως νῆες ἀφίκωνται, τὰς ἑαυτῶν ναῦς, ἦν βούλωνται, τρέφειν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι. ἦν δὲ παρὰ Τισσαφέρνους λαμβάνειν ἐθέλωσι τὴν τροφήν, Τισσαφέρην παρέχειν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τελευτῶντος τοῦ πολέμου τὰ χρήματα Τισσαφέρνει ἀποδοῦναι ὅποσα ἂν λάβωσιν. [7] ἐπὴν δὲ αἰ βασιλέως νῆες ἀφίκωνται, αἶ τε Λακεδαιμονίων νῆες καὶ αἰ τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αἰ βασιλέως κοινῇ τὸν πόλεμον πολεμούντων καθ' ὅτι ἂν Τισσαφέρνει δοκῆ καὶ

¹⁵² Andrewes (*HCT* 5, 97) argues on the basis of Plut. *Alc.* 35.3 and Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.4 that sailors in the Athenian fleet were paid one Attic drachma daily until 413 and three obols thereafter, which Hornblower (*Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 888) attributes to Athenian financial difficulties following the Sicilian expedition. See also Pritchett 1974, 24.

¹⁵³ Tissaphernes' supposed foresight is discussed by Westlake 1985, 46; Aidonis 1996, 95-96; Hyland 2007, 10. Might this be a clue to Thucydides' use of Alcibiades as an informant?

¹⁵⁴ For Caunus as the site of negotiations, and the Maeander plain as the site of the treaty's ratification, cf. Thuc. 8.57.1, 58.1 with Westlake 1979, 23; Lévy 1983b, 225; Cawkwell 2005, 148; Νύνιτ 2014a, 49-53; Hyland 2018, 192 n. 128.

Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμαχοῖς. ἦν δὲ καταλύειν βούλωνται πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐν ὁμοίῳ καταλύεσθαι.

In the thirteenth year of the reign of King Darius, and in the ephorate of Alexippidas at Sparta, an agreement was made in the plain of the Maeander between, on the one hand, the Spartans and their allies, and, on the other, Tissaphernes and Hieramenes and the sons of Pharnaces, concerning the respective interests of the King and of the Spartans and their allies. All the King's territory which lies in Asia shall remain the King's: and the King shall determine as he pleases in respect of his own territory. The Spartans and their allies shall not go against the King's territory for any detriment, neither shall the King go against the territory of the Spartans or their allies for any detriment. If any of the Spartans and their allies go against the King's territory for detriment, the Spartans and their allies shall intervene to prevent it: and if any of those in the King's dominion go against the Spartans or their allies for detriment, the King shall intervene to prevent it. Maintenance for the ships now present shall be provided by Tissaphernes according to the agreement, until such time as the King's ships arrive. When the King's ships have come, the Spartans and their allies may, if they choose, take responsibility on themselves for the maintenance of their own ships: if they wish to continue to receive maintenance from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall provide it, but at the end of the war the Spartans and their allies shall pay back to Tissaphernes whatever money they have received. When the King's ships have come, the ships of the Spartans and their allies and the King's ships shall jointly pursue the war in whatever way is decided by Tissaphernes and the Spartans and their allies. And if they wish to agree a settlement with the Athenians to end the war, the terms of that settlement shall be the same for both parties.

Like the first and second treaties, the Greek side consists of the Spartans and their allies collectively. Hieramenes is an obscure figure, but a Hieramenes is attested alongside Tissaphernes on the Lycian-language 'Xanthos stele' (TL 44c l. 12); he may have been Darius' brother-in-law or son-in-law, if he is the same man who appears at Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.8-9.¹⁵⁵ P. Debord has alternatively suggested that he was a sub-governor under Tissaphernes.¹⁵⁶ The phrasing 'sons of Pharnaces' (τοὺς Φαρνάκου παῖδας) is sometimes assumed to be a roundabout reference to Pharnabazus,¹⁵⁷ but others propose that Pharnabazus himself deputized his half-brother Bagaeus to represent him at the ratification ceremony.¹⁵⁸ Pharnabazus' participation, whether direct or indirect, may have sprung from Darius' desire to assert Persian control over the coastal cities of Hellespontine Phrygia (Pharnabazus' satrapy) as

¹⁵⁵ Son-in-law: Klinkott 2005, 372. Brother-in-law: Lewis 1977, 104; Hyland 2018, 72. See further Meyer 1901, 572. For Alexippidas as ephor in 412/11 cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.10.

¹⁵⁶ Debord 1999, 214.

¹⁵⁷ Lewis 1977, 104; Klinkott 2005, 372.

¹⁵⁸ Kirchhoff 1895, 140; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1908, 597.

well as Ionia.¹⁵⁹ Calculated according to the Babylonian lunar calendar, Darius' thirteenth year began on 29 March 411, supposedly giving the present treaty a secure *terminus post quem*.¹⁶⁰ However, in contrast to earlier commentators, E. Bickerman suggests that the treaty is dated not according to the Babylonian lunar calendar, but according to the regnal year of the Persian court at Susa; and Darius' thirteenth regnal year began in late January or early February 411.¹⁶¹ Dating the treaty earlier rather than later fits better with the chronology of Thucydides, who places it within winter 412/11 (cf. 8.60.1, 3).

The territorial clause (Thuc. 8.58.2) drops all references to the land of Darius' ancestors and limits Persian territorial claims explicitly to Asia, i.e., mainland Asia Minor. It seems that either Lichas' protests were effective or, more likely, that Darius and Tissaphernes were never serious about enforcing Persian territorial claims beyond Asia Minor. In the view of Hyland and M. Amit, this implicitly confirms the independence of Chios and Rhodes, whose support in the war against Athens was crucial and whom the Persians could not afford to alienate.¹⁶² However, the theoretical possibility of future Persian expansion is not explicitly repudiated.¹⁶³ Unlike the first two treaties, which mention both the *χώρα* and *πόλεις* of the King, the present treaty refers to *χώρα* only (8.52.2-3); this may or not be important, as the distinction between *χώρα* and *πόλεις* is securely attested in Asia Minor only from the time of Alexander the Great.¹⁶⁴ There is a possibility that the omission of *πόλεις* in the present treaty reflects the Peloponnesians' reluctance to acknowledge Darius' claims on the Greek cities of Asia Minor, but the overall phrasing of the treaty, together with a later passage of Thucydides (8.84.5: Miletus described by Lichas as belonging to the King), indicates that the Spartans were required to and in fact did accept royal authority over Greeks and non-Greeks alike in Asia Minor.¹⁶⁵ This is supported further by 8.58.2 καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται within the present treaty, interpreted by some as a veiled admission of Darius' right to collect tribute within his realm.¹⁶⁶

8.58.5-6 contains the most detailed finance-related clauses among any of the three treaties. It is unclear what the 'agreement' (κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα) alluded to is, though according to Kallet this implies that a fixed rate of pay had been set by Darius and was to be distributed by Tissaphernes. However, that rate is not quantified in any surviving source.¹⁶⁷ 8.58.5 ταῖς νῦν

¹⁵⁹ Petit 1981, 56-57; Hyland 2018, 73.

¹⁶⁰ *HCT* 5, 138, whose source is Parker and Dubberstein 1956, 33; cf. Lévy 1983b, 225.

¹⁶¹ Bickerman 1981, 19-23.

¹⁶² Amit 1975, 62; Hyland 2018, 73.

¹⁶³ *HCT* 5, 140; Lévy 1983b, 230; Heitsch 2007, 93; Hyland 2018, 73.

¹⁶⁴ The evidence for this distinction is RO 86 B = Tod 185, an edict by Alexander to the Ionian city of Priene from 334. Ste. Croix 1972, 313-14 argues for the distinction's relevance in 411.

¹⁶⁵ Lewis 1977, 105; *HCT* 5, 141; Lévy 1983b, 231-32; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 929; Hyland 2018, 73.

¹⁶⁶ Lévy 1983b, 234; Debord 1999, 213; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 928; Hyland 2018, 73-74.

¹⁶⁷ Kallet 2001, 266.

παρούσα restricts Persian subsidies to Peloponnesian ships that are already in Ionia and excludes ships that have not yet arrived.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, any Persian financial assistance given after the arrival of the royal fleet would be a loan and not a grant.¹⁶⁹ The two fleets, after linking up, were to act in concert, and a separate peace with Athens is prohibited. The last point is of interest because the eventual Spartan settlement with Athens in 404 contains no hint of Persian involvement. The Persian naval contribution to Sparta's victory was in fact minimal: royal ships sailed at the battle of Cyzicus in 410 (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.11-18: a Peloponnesian defeat, as it happened), but there was no Persian participation in the battles of Notium and Arginusae in 406 or at Aegospotami in 405.¹⁷⁰

D 3.14

Athenian treaty with Selymbria

ca. 408 BCE

Selymbria on the Propontis was a member of the Delian League but was in revolt by 410 at the latest (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.21).¹⁷¹ Στάσις soon erupted between pro- and anti-Athenian factions in the city and it was recaptured in 408 by Alcibiades, who compelled the Selymbrians to pay an indemnity and receive an Athenian garrison (Plut. *Alc.* 30.2-5; Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.10; Diod. 13.66.4); the present treaty also implies that the Selymbrians gave hostages.¹⁷²

It is to this context that §I, the treaty proper, almost certainly belongs. §II is the Athenian decree of ratification, proposed by Alcibiades after his return to Athens in 407 (on which cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.12; Diod. 13.68; Plut. *Alc.* 32), furnishing a likely date for §II, while his final exile from Athens after the battle of Notium in 406 is surely a definite *terminus ante quem*. This is one of at least two, and potentially several, decrees proposed by Alcibiades after his return.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ Cf. *HCT* 5, 141-42.

¹⁶⁹ Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 623. The royal fleet, ironically, did not come (Thuc. 8.87). Lewis 1977, 133 suggests that it may have been redirected to deal with a revolt in Egypt.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. Lewis 1977, 133: 'I admit that the trouble in Egypt seems to have been over by early summer 410 and that no evidence at present exists to show why the fleet was not available in 408/7 and not used for the rest of the war, but some may yet appear.'

¹⁷¹ For the evidence of the tribute lists, on which Selymbria appears from 454/53 to 418/17, see *IACP* no. 679, p. 922.

¹⁷² Cf. Gehrke 1985, 145-46.

¹⁷³ Other examples are *IG* 1³ 119 = OR 186 l. 3 (treaty with the Clazomenians at Daphnus, below) and the extremely fragmentary *IG* 1³ 120 (cf. ll. 4-5 Ἀλκι[β|ιάδης εἶπε]). Meritt 1936, 249 proposes restoring Alcibiades as the proposer of *IG* 1³ 117, an Athenian honorary decree for Archelaus of Macedon (407/06), at l. 4: the name is entirely lost but must have contained ten letters. Osborne and Rhodes (comm. OR 188, p. 535) dispute this on the basis that Alcibiades had no attested dealings with Macedon.

ET 1: IG 1³ 118 = OR 185*

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens (south slope)

Lettering: Attic, but frequently lapsing into Ionic

Layout: inconsistent *stoichedon* 36

§I

[.....³¹.....]εροσα[.....³⁰.....]αι Ἀθεν-[.....³⁰.....]εχσαγο[.....³¹.....]νκ[.]ιε5 [.....³⁴.....]σε[.....²³.....]ελλ[.] Ἀθεν-[.....²²..... κ]ατάλογον κατ[.][.....²¹..... ὁ]μέρος δὲ ἡὸς ἔχο[σ]-

[ιν Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποδοῖναι, τὸ δὲ] λοιπὸν μὲ λαμβάν-

10 [εν. καταστέσασθαι δὲ Σελυμ]βριανὸς τὲμ πολι-

[τεῖαν αὐτόνομος τρόποι ἡ]ότοι ἂν ἐπίστοντ-

[αι¹⁷..... ὄφ]ελε τὸ κοινὸν τὸ Ση-

[λυμβριανὸν ἔἰδιοτὸν τι]ς Σελ<υ>μβριανὸν τοι

[.....¹⁸.....] εἶ το [χ]ρέματα ἐδεδέμε-

15 [υτο ἔἰ τις τῶι κοινῶι] ὄφελεν ἔἰ τις ἐτίμοτ-

[ο.....²⁰.....] φεύγοσι Σελυμβριανὸν[.....¹⁵.....]ος πολεμῖος δὲ καὶ φιλῖος[.....¹⁴.....] ἄ δὲ ἀπόλετο ἐν τῶι πολέμοι

[χρέματα Ἀθηναί]ον ἔ τῶν συμμάχον ἔ εἶ τι ὄφελ-

20 [όμενον ἔ παρακ]αταθέκεν ἔχοντός το ἔπραχσα-

[ν οἱ ἄρχοντες,] μὴ ἔ~ναι πρᾶχσιν πλήγ γῆς καὶ οἰ-

[κίας. ὅσα δὲ ἄλλα χσυμβόλαια πρὸ τῷ ἔν τοῖς ἰ-
 [διόταις πρ]ὸς τὸς ἰδιότας ἔ ἰδιώτει πρὸς τὸ κ-
 [οινὸν ἔ κο]ινῶι πρὸς ἰδιότεν ν ἔ ἔάν το ἄλλο γίγ-
 25 [νεται, δια]λύεμ π[ρ]ὸς ἀλλέλος· ὃ τι δ' ἂν ἀμφισβη-
 [τῶσι, δίκας] ἔ~ναι ἀπὸ χσυμβόλον. τὰς δὲ χσυνθέκ-
 [ας ἀναγράφ]σαντας ἐ[ς] στέλεν θῆναι ἐς τὸ ἱερὸ-
 [ν το...⁷...]ς. ὤμοσαν Ἀθηναίων οἱ στρατηγοὶ
 [καὶ οἱ τριέραρχ]οι καὶ οἱ ἠοπλίται καὶ εἴ τι-
 30 [ς ἄλλος Ἀθηναίων] παρῆν καὶ Σελυμβ[ρ]ιανοὶ π-
 [ά]ντε[ς. ν

§II

Ἀλ]κιβ[ιάδης] εἶπε· καθὰ χσυνέθεντο Σε-
 [λυμ]βρια[ν]οὶ πρὸς Ἀθ]εναίος, κατὰ ταῦτα ποιῆν,
 καὶ καταθῆναι ἐν [πόλ]ει ἀναγράψαντας τὸστ-
 [ρατε<γ>ὸς [τ]ὰς συνθέ[κ]ας μετὰ τὸ γραμματέος τ-
 35 [ἔς] βολῆς [[.....¹⁸.....]] ἐν στέλει λιθί-
 [ν]ει τέλει τοῖς αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ φσέφισμα τόδε.
 [Ἀπο]λλόδορον δὲ τὸν Ἐμπέδο ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ἀφῆν-
 [α]ι αὐτὸν τῆς ὁμερέας, καὶ [ἐ]χσαλεῖφσαι τὰ ὀνόμα-
 [τα] τῶν ὁμέ[ρ]ον τῶν Σελυμβ[ρ]ιανῶν καὶ τῶν ἐγγυε-
 40 [τῶν α]ὐτῶν [α]ὔριον τὸν γραμ[ματ]έα τῆς βολῆς [ὄπο
 [ἔσι ἀν]αγεγ[ρ]αμμένοι ἐναντίον τῶν πρυτάνε-
 [ων.]ὀμ[α]χον δὲ τὸν Σελυμβ[ρ]ιανὸν ἀναγρά-
 [φσαι ἐν τ]ῆι [αὐ]τῆι στέλει πρόχσε[νον Ἀθ]εναίων·
 [ἔ~ναι δὲ καὶ] Ἀπολλοδόροι τέμ προ[χσε]νίαν κα-
 45 [θάπερ τῶι] πατρὶ αὐτῷ. τὸς δὲ πρέσβ[εις καὶ] Ἀπολ-
 [λόδορον κ]αλέσαι ἐς πρυτανεῖον ἐπ[ὶ χσέν]ια ἐ-

[ς αὔριον.] *vacat*

13-14 τοῖς φεύγουσι· με̄ δὲ κύρια ἔ] εἶ Cataldi. 16-18 [κάθοδον δ' ἔ̄ναι τοῖς] φεύγουσι Σελυμβριανῶν | [ἐγομένοις τὸς αὐτ]ὸς πολεμῖος δὲ καὶ φίλιος | [τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει Wilhelm *apud IG 1²*; φίλιος | [τὸς αὐτὸς νομίσαι.] Cataldi. 28 Ἀπόλλωνος (?). 35 τ | [ἔς βολῆς καὶ τὸν Σελυμβριανῶν] Wilhelm; [[καὶ τὸ φσέφισμα τόδε]] Meritt. 44-46 underlined letters = fr. c, now lost.

§I

... Athen— ... export ... Athen— ... catalogue ... the Athenians shall give back the hostages whom they have, and in future shall not take any. The Selymbrians shall be [autonomous] and [shall establish] their constitution in whatever way they know. ... is owed by the community of the Selymbrians [or by any individual among] the Selymbrians to ... if anybody's property has been confiscated, or if anybody is in debt [to the community], or if anybody has been deprived of rights ... exiles of the Selymbrians ... enemies and friends ... With regard to any property of the Athenians or the allies which has been lost in the war, or anything that may be owed or was deposited, and which [the officials] exacted from the one who had it, there shall be no exaction except for land and house. Whatever other causes of dispute there were heretofore, of individuals against individuals or an individual against the community or the community against an individual, or if there are any others, they shall settle them between one another; for what they cannot agree over, the lawsuits shall follow the conventions. The agreement shall be inscribed on a stele and placed in the sanctuary of —. There swore of the Athenians the generals and the trierarchs and the hoplites and any other Athenian who was present; and all the Selymbrians.

§II

Alcibiades proposed: the agreement made by the Selymbrians with the Athenians shall be acted on; and the generals shall inscribe the agreement and set it down on the Acropolis together with the secretary of the council [*words deleted*], on a stone stele at their own expense, and this decree; and to praise Apollodorus son of Empedus and release him from his position as hostage; and the names of the Selymbrian hostages and their guarantors shall be deleted tomorrow by the secretary of the council wherever they have been written up, in the presence of the prytany; and to inscribe —machus the Selymbrian on the same stele as a *proxenos* of the Athenians; and Apollodorus also shall have the position of *proxenos* as his father did; and to invite the envoys and Apollodorus to the Prytaneum for hospitality tomorrow.

(trans. Stephen Lambert and P.J. Rhodes, adapted)

Little sense can be made of the inscription until **ET 1** l. 8. It is possible that the extremely fragmentary ll. 1-7 originally mentioned the indemnity and Athenian garrison, which are known from literary sources. Lines 8-10 concern the Selymbrian hostages, ensuring their return from Athenian captivity. Lines 10-12, as restored, secure Selymbria's autonomy, allowing the Selymbrians to choose their own form of government (πολιτεία), while ll. 12-14 may affirm the cancellation of Selymbrian debts to Athens. Lines 14-18 restore the civil rights of Selymbrians who have been disenfranchised or exiled.¹⁷⁴ Lines 18-22 confirm that Athenians and citizens of allied cities will not pursue claims on lost property in Selymbria, except for 'land and house' (ll. 21-22: γῆς καὶ οἰ[κίας], i.e., non-moveable property; ll. 22-26 specify that χουμβόλαια (l. 22: 'causes of dispute'¹⁷⁵) should be settled privately if possible; otherwise, lawsuits may be initiated.¹⁷⁶ Lines 26-28 provide for the publication of the Selymbrian copy of the treaty, which is to be set up in a local sanctuary, the identity of which is not preserved, but speculatively restored as a sanctuary of Apollo by Kirchhoff (see *apparatus criticus*). The final part of §I, ll. 28-31, informs us that the treaty was sworn on the spot by an unspecified number of Athenian generals, trierachs, hoplites, and other Athenians there present, and by 'all' Selymbrians, by which we are surely to understand citizen males of military age as in the Chalcis treaty.

§II imposes the costs of inscribing the Athenian copy of the treaty on the Athenian generals (ll. 33-36). This is highly unusual, although the generals may have been involved in the publication of *IG* 1³ 127 = OR 191, an Athenian honorary decree for the Samians from 405/04, at ll. 38-39 (restored). The names of the Selymbrian hostages, which have evidently been recorded elsewhere, are to be physically erased: Osborne and Rhodes suggest that the verb [ἐ]χσαλεῖψαι (l. 38) implies that the list of hostages was written in charcoal on a whitewashed board.¹⁷⁷ A Selymbrian whose name ends in —machus is awarded Athenian proxeny, as is Apollodorus, whose father was also a proxenus (ll. 44-45). Apollodorus and a group of Selymbrian envoys, who are presumably in Athens to swear to the treaty, are invited to hospitality (ξενία) in the Prytaneum on the day following its ratification (ll. 45-47).

This is a conciliatory document, sensitive to the need to maintain Selymbria's loyalty.¹⁷⁸ The assurance of Selymbria's autonomy, if correctly restored (l. 11), is in keeping with Athens' (necessarily) light-handed approach towards the allies in the last decade of the Peloponnesian War and as such is comparable with **D 3.9** and **D 3.10**. But as J. Ma and L. Lazar remind us, we

¹⁷⁴ Cf. comm. ML 87, p. 269.

¹⁷⁵ This is the trans. of χουμβόλαια preferred by OR and ML against de Ste. Croix 1961, 102 'contracts.'

¹⁷⁶ The expression used at l. 26 is [δίκας] ... ἀπὸ χουμβόλων, defined as 'lawsuits regulated by a convention between states' (comm. OR 185, pp. 521-22).

¹⁷⁷ Comm. OR 185, p. 523. LSJ⁹ s.v. ἐξαλείψω glosses 'plaster or wash over.' For the annulment of records by their physical destruction, cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 47.5-48.1. For the hostages mentioned in this treaty, see Panagopoulos 1978, 37-39.

¹⁷⁸ Cf. Smarczyk 1986, 5-10.

must be careful not to mistake this for a total renunciation of Athenian claims over its allies within the ἀρχή.¹⁷⁹

D 3.15

Athenian treaty with Carthage

406/05 BCE

The present treaty is not Athens' first attested engagement with far-off Carthage. An Athenian ship went there in 415/14 seeking assistance in Sicily, which was not forthcoming (Thuc. 6.88.6); a similar appeal by Egesta was also rebuffed (Diod. 12.82.7). But the Carthaginians did intervene in Sicily in 410/09 in support of Egesta against Silenus (Diod. 13.44, 54-59).¹⁸⁰

The Athenian inscription (**ET 1**) recording the present treaty, which consists of two fragments separated by a lacuna, is poorly preserved. Mattingly's radical restoration of ll. 1-4 (see *apparatus criticus*) yields the name of the archon Callias, whom he identifies with Callias Angelides (406/05), but it is not clear from the surviving text that the inscription even contained an archon-date; and to accomplish this Mattingly is forced to extend the probable stoichedon 36 layout by three stoichoi.¹⁸¹ A.S. Henry retorts that l. 4 as restored by Mattingly sits awkwardly with the following text.¹⁸²

However, while the archon's name was perhaps omitted from the inscription, historical context nonetheless supports a date of 406/05. The names of the Carthaginian generals Himilco (ll. 14-15), and Hannibal (l. 19) are partially preserved. We know from Diodorus that Hannibal and Himilco campaigned in Sicily from early 406 (i.e., in the archonship of Callias Angelides: 13.80.1-2) until Hannibal's death later in the same archon-year (86.3). If the present treaty is connected with that campaign, which is likely in light of l. 9 Σικελ[ίαν], then 406/05 is both a *terminus post* and *ante quem*. Note also that the Boule secretary (l. 2) and possibly the chairman (ll. 2-3) are identified by both given name and demotic: the earliest securely-dated inscription in which this occurs is *IG 1³ 126*, a proxeny decree from 405/04.¹⁸³

ET 1: *IG 1³ 123* = OR 189*

¹⁷⁹ Ma 2009, 128; Lazar 2024, 52.

¹⁸⁰ Notably, the Athenian decision of 415 to campaign in Sicily was based on Egesta's conflict with Silenus (Thuc. 5.5).

¹⁸¹ Mattingly 1974.

¹⁸² Henry 1979, 30.

¹⁸³ Meritt 1940, 249; Henry 1977, 11-12; comm. OR 189, p. 538; cf. comm. ML 92, p. 281.

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens (bastion of the Temple of Athena Nike)

Lettering: developed Attic

Layout: probably *stoichedon* 36

[ἔδοχσεν τῆι βο]λῆι κ[αὶ τῶι δέμοι. ...^{c. 6}... ἐπρυ]-

[τάνευε· ...^{c. 6}...]ς Ἀφιδ[ναῖος ἐγραμμάτευε· ...]

[.....¹².....]ς ἐπεσ[τάτε. - - - εἶπε· - - -]

[.....¹¹.....]κανκα[.....¹⁹.....]

5 [.....¹².....]ονοτα[.....¹⁹.....]

[.....¹¹..... ἀ]ναγρά[φσαι δὲ Καρχεδονίος εὐ]-

[εργέτας Ἀθηνα]ίον τὸν [γραμματέα τῆς βολῆς ἐ]-

[μ πόλει ἐστέλ]ει λιθίν[ει.¹⁶.....]

[.....¹¹.....] ἐς Σικελ[ίαν πέμψαι πρὸς στρα]-

10 [τεγὸς Ἀννίβα]ν Γέσκον[ος καὶ Ἰμίλκωνα Ἄννον]-

[ος ...⁹...]ς αὐτὸς [.....²⁰.....]

[.....¹³...]τα[.....²¹.....]

lacuna

[.....^{c. 35}..... π]-

[ρὸς στρατηγὸς Ἀννίβας Γέσκονος καὶ Ἰμίλκο-

15 [να Ἄννονος, ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸς κέρυκα]ς τὸς

[Ἀθέναζε ἀφιγμένος ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄνδρες ἀγ]αθοὶ

[περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων. καλέσαι δὲ] καὶ ἐ-

[πὶ χσένια ἐς τὸ πρυτανεῖον ἐς αὔριον. ^{vv}] *vacat*

[.....²⁹..... Ἄνν]ίβας

20 [.....³⁴.....]υτ

1-4 [ἔδοχσεν τῆι βο]λῆι κ[αὶ τῶι δέμοι ...^{c.9}... ἐπρυ|τάνευε, ...^{c.6}...]ς Ἀφιδ[ναῖος ἐγραμμάτευε... |.....¹².....]ς ἐπεσ[τάτε, Καλλίας [406/05] ἔ~ρχε, εἶ|πε· ἐπειδὲ ἀφῆ]καν Κα[ρχεδόνιοι κέρυκας? ----] Mattingly. 3-6 κέρυ|χσι μὲν ὃς ἀφῆ]καν Κα[ρχεδόνιοι πρόσοδον ἔ~ν|αι πρὸς τὸν δῆμ]ον ὄτα[μπερ πρῶτον ἐκκλεσία κ|υρία γένεται Meritt. 6 Καρχεδονίος Meritt; τὸς ἡέκοντας Luria. 8-9 κέρυκας δὲ Ἀθηναίον|ν αὐτίκα μάλα Meritt. 11 αἰτέσοντα]ς αὐτὸς φ[ιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν Meritt. After *lacuna* [— εἶπε· τὰ μ|ὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῆι βολῆι· πέμφσαι δὲ κέρυκα|ς ὃς ἂν ἡέλονται οἱ πρυτάνες μετὰ τῆς βολῆς π|ρὸς στρατηγὸς Meritt. 19-20 [Καρχεδονίον οἶδε ὄμνυον τὸν ὄρκον· Ἄνν]ίβας | [Γέσκοκος, Ἡμίλκον Ἄννονος,¹².....]υτ Meritt.

The council and the people decided. — was in prytany. — of Aphidna was secretary. — of — was chairman. — proposed: ... [the secretary of the council] shall inscribe [the Carthaginians as benefactors?] of the Athenians [on the Acropolis on a] stone stele; ... to Sicily ... [to the generals Hannibal] son of Gescon [and Himilco son of Annon] ... them ...

lacuna

... [the generals Hannibal son of Gescon and?] Himilco [son of Annon and to praise?] ... who [have come to Athens, because they are?] good [men with regard to the Athenian people]; and [to invite them?] to [hospitality in the Prytaneum tomorrow?]. *End of line uninscribed*

... Hannibal ...

...

Meritt, followed by Meiggs and Lewis, reasonably interpret the present treaty as an alliance, emphasizing that Athens desperately needed allies by 406.¹⁸⁴ It is also in keeping with Athens' earlier attempts to secure an alliance with Carthage. The individual clauses of the alliance are not preserved; probably they were inscribed in the lacuna between ll. 12 and 13 or below l. 20. More can be said about procedure. Envoys come from Carthage to swear to the treaty at Athens (ll. 15-16), but Meritt is surely wrong to restore Hannibal and Himilco as oath-takers at ll. 19-20; they cannot have been expected to interrupt the campaign in Sicily to travel to Athens for this purpose. But it does appear that Athenian envoys did travel to Sicily to swear before Hannibal and Himilco personally (ll. 10-11).¹⁸⁵

Thucydides (7.87) reports that the survivors of the Sicilian expedition of 415-13, which he counts at 7000 in total, were held in quarries under inhumane conditions for 70 days, during

¹⁸⁴ Meritt 1940, 252; comm. ML 92, p. 281. The absence of technical terminology such as *χουμμαχία* or *φιλία* is not decisive in such a fragmentary inscription.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. comm. ML 92, p. 281.

which many died. After this period, the survivors – excluding Athenians, Sicels, and Italiots – were sold into slavery. Thucydides does not say what happened to the remaining Athenians, but D.H. Kelly suggests that many were ransomed instead of being killed outright or sold into slavery.¹⁸⁶ Indeed, an Athenian honorary decree of 405/04 (*IG* 1³ 125) praises a certain Epicrdes of Cyrene for helping Athenian prisoners captured in Sicily (cf. *Dem.* 20.41-42). Plutarch (*Per.* 29) claims that while most of the Athenian captives died in the quarries, some were kidnapped and sold into slavery but subsequently manumitted in many cases. Anyway, all this evidence suggests that there likely were some Athenians still in Sicily as late as 406/05, and this may have been relevant to the present treaty.

Carthage's own motives for entering into alliance with Athens are harder to guess. Athens in 406/05 was clearly not in a position to campaign in Sicily in support of Carthage, but perhaps the Carthaginians believed that such a prospect was at least possible in the medium- to- long term. For this reason, I think it is a real possibility that the alliance had a long time-limit or was even perpetual, but the surviving inscription contains no details regarding duration.

D 3.16

Surrender of Athens

404 BCE

The decisive victory of Lysander and the Peloponnesian fleet at Aegospotami in 405 resulted in the virtual obliteration of the Athenian fleet and, with it, Athens' last hope of winning the Peloponnesian War (*Xen. Hell.* 2.1.7-32; *Diod.* 13.105-06; *Plut. Lys.* 9.6-13.2). Lysander went on to Piraeus and blockaded Athens, intent on starving the city out and forcing its surrender (*Xen. Hell.* 2.2.1-23; *Diod.* 13.107; *Plut. Lys.* 13-14). Meanwhile the Corinthians, Thebans, and other Spartan allies insisted that Athens be destroyed and its population enslaved (*Xen. Hell.* 2.2.19; *Plut. Lys.* 15.2; *Paus.* 10.9.9). However, this was unacceptable to Sparta since, as Kagan explains, it would have effectively made Attica an extension of Boeotia and offered Thebes a dangerously large power vacuum to fill.¹⁸⁷ Under the pretext of Athens' services to Greece during the Persian Wars, the Spartans decided to spare Athens from obliteration (*Xen. Hell.* 2.2.20 = **LT 1**). Nonetheless, the cost of defeat was high and, as the testimonia show, the settlement imposed on the Athenians was at least temporarily crippling.

¹⁸⁶ Kelly 1970.

¹⁸⁷ Kagan 1987, 410.

LT 1: Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20

Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ οὐκ ἔφασαν πόλιν Ἑλληνίδα ἀνδραποδιεῖν μέγα ἀγαθὸν εἰργασμένην ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις γενομένοις τῇ Ἑλλάδι, ἀλλ' ἐποιοῦντο εἰρήνην ἐφ' ᾗ τὰ τε μακρὰ τείχη καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ καθελόντας καὶ τὰς ναῦς πλὴν δώδεκα παραδόντας καὶ τοὺς φυγάδας καθέντας τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν καὶ φίλον νομίζοντας Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔπεσθαι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ὅποιοι ἂν ἡγῶνται.

The Lacedaemonians, however, said that they would not enslave a Greek city which had done great service amid the greatest perils that had befallen Greece, and they offered to make peace on these conditions: that the Athenians should destroy the long walls and the walls of Piraeus, surrender all their ships except twelve, allow their exiles to return, count the same people friends and enemies as the Lacedaemonians did, and follow the Lacedaemonians both by land and by sea wherever they should lead the way.

(trans. Carleton L. Brownson)

LT 2: [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 34.3

τῆς εἰρήνης γενομένης αὐτοῖς ἐφ' ᾗ τε πολιτεύσονται τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν.

The peace having been concluded on terms of their carrying on the government according to the ancestral constitution ...

(trans. H. Rackham)

LT 3: Diod. 13.107.4

ἐπιτείνοντος δὲ τοῦ δεινοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν, ἢ μὲν πόλις ἔγεμε νεκρῶν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ διαπρεσβευσάμενοι πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους συνέθεντο τὴν εἰρήνην, ὥστε τὰ μακρὰ σκέλη καὶ τὰ τείχη τοῦ Πειραιέως περιελεῖν, καὶ μακρὰς ναῦς μὴ πλεῖον ἔχειν δέκα, τῶν δὲ πόλεων πασῶν ἐκχωρῆσαι καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις ἡγεμόσι χρῆσθαι.

Since the suffering increased day by day, the city was filled with dead, and the survivors sent ambassadors and concluded peace with the Lacedaemonians on the terms that they should tear down the two long walls and those of the Piraeus, keep no more than ten ships of war, withdraw from all the cities, and recognize the hegemony of the Lacedaemonians.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather)

LT 4: Diod. 14.3.2

κατὰ δὲ τούτους τοὺς χρόνους Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν καταπεπονημένοι ἐποίησαντο συνθήκας πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καθ' ὅς ἔδει τὰ τείχη τῆς πόλεως καθελεῖν καὶ τῇ πατρίῳ πολιτεία χρῆσθαι. καὶ τὰ μὲν τείχη περιεῖλον, περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πρὸς ἀλλήλους διεφέροντο.

At this time the Athenians, completely reduced by exhaustion, made a treaty with the Lacedaemonians whereby they were bound to demolish the walls of their city and to employ the polity of their fathers. They demolished the walls, but were unable to agree among themselves regarding the form of government.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather)

LT 5: Plut. *Lys.* 14.4

καίτοι Λακεδαιμονίων ἐστὶν ἀκοῦσαι λεγόντων ὡς Λύσανδρος μὲν ἔγραψε τοῖς ἐφόροις τάδε· ἀλώκναι ταὶ Ἀθῆναι, Λυσάνδρω δ' ἀντέγραψαν οἱ ἔφοροι· ἀρκεῖ τό γε ἐάλωκναι. ἀλλ' εὐπρεπείας χάριν οὗτος ὁ λόγος πέπλασται. τὸ δ' ἀληθινὸν δόγμα τῶν ἐφόρων οὕτως εἶχε· τάδε τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἔγνω· καββαλόντες τὸν Πειραιᾶ καὶ τὰ μακρὰ σκέλη, καὶ ἐκβάντες ἐκ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων τὰν αὐτῶν γᾶν ἔχοντες, ταῦτά κα δρῶντες τὰν εἰρήναν ἔχοιτε, αἰ χρήδοιτε, καὶ τοὺς φυγάδας ἀνέντες. περὶ τᾶν ναῶν τῷ πλήθει, ὁκοῖόν τί κα τηνεὶ δοκέη, ταῦτα ποιέετε. [5] ταύτην δὲ προσεδέξαντο τὴν σκυτάλην οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Θηραμένους τοῦ Ἄγνωνος συμβουλευσάντος.

It is true one hears it said by Lacedaemonians that Lysander wrote to the ephors thus: 'Athens is taken'; and that the ephors wrote back to Lysander: "'Taken'" was enough'; but this story was invented for its neatness' sake. The actual decree of the ephors ran thus: 'This is what the Lacedaemonian authorities have decided: tear down the Piraeus and the long walls; quit all the cities and keep to your own land; if you do these things, and restore your exiles, you shall have peace, if you want it.' This edict was accepted by the Athenians, on the advice of Theramenes the son of Hagnon.

(trans. Bernadotte Perrin)

P. Krentz dates Athens' acceptance of the peace terms to March 404.¹⁸⁸ Plutarch's testimony (esp. 14.4 = **LT 5**) is, in my view, the most important single testimonium for the Athenian surrender, as he claims to reproduce the actual decree of the Spartan ephors (τὸ δ' ἀληθινὸν δόγμα τῶν ἐφόρων), which is preserved in the original Doric (cf. Thuc. 5.77, 79). Plutarch reports three key clauses:

1. Dismantling of the Long Walls and the walls of Piraeus (καββαλόντες τὸν Πειραιᾶ καὶ τὰ μακρὰ σκέλη).

¹⁸⁸ Krentz 1982, 43.

2. Relinquishment of Athenian control over the cities of the ἀρχή (καὶ ἐκβάντες ἐκ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων τὰν αὐτῶν γᾶν ἔχοντες).
3. Restoration of exiles (καὶ τοὺς φυγάδας ἀνέντες).

The ephoral decree, of course, is not the peace treaty, whose contents are known only from scattered literary references. Xenophon and Diodorus, while not claiming to reproduce an original document, include a number of additional clauses that are not in Plutarch's decree. In *Xen. Hell.* 2.2.20, the Athenians are forced into alliance with Sparta as a subordinate junior partner: according to S. Bolmarcich, their promise to have the same friends and enemies as the Spartans and follow where they might lead 'implies total control over an ally's foreign policy and military resources.'¹⁸⁹ Indeed, Diodorus claims that Athens explicitly acknowledged Spartan hegemony (13.107.4 = **LT 3** Λακεδαιμονίοις ἡγεμόσι χρῆσθαι). They were also required to surrender the majority of the fleet and were restricted to ten (Diod. 13.107.4) or twelve (*Xen. Hell.* 2.2.20) warships. Kagan suggests that this was not part of the settlement proper, but that the ephors allowed Lysander, as the Spartan commander on the spot, to decide for himself how many ships the Athenians could keep; this is implied in the text of the ephoral decree itself (Plut. *Lys.* 14.4 περὶ τᾶν ναῶν τῷ πλήθει, ὁκοῖόν τί κα τῆνεί δοκέη, ταῦτα ποιέετε).¹⁹⁰ An additional clause, specifically stripping the Athenians of their cleruchies at Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, is reported by pseudo-Andocides in the spurious *De Pace* (Andoc. 3.12).¹⁹¹ Kagan rightly doubts this on the basis that no source other than Andocides (whose speech he nevertheless accepts as authentic) mentions it.¹⁹² Additionally, it is already clear from the decree of the ephors that Athens must abandon all territories outside Attica, presumably including cleruchies; a separate clause regarding Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros would have been redundant.¹⁹³

Diodorus (14.3.2 = **LT 4**) and [Aristotle] (*Ath. Pol.* 34.3 = **LT 2**) add that the Athenians were instructed to revert to their 'ancestral constitution' (πάτριος πολιτεία). In Plutarch (*Lys.* 15.1) the matter is not addressed until Lysander's entry into Athens. W.J. McCoy notes that the very meaning of the slogan πάτριος πολιτεία was notoriously subjective, and Athenians of widely varying political stripes could freely interpret it to suit their political sympathies. Radical democrats might associate it with the πάτριοι νόμοι ('ancestral laws') invoked by Thrasybulus and the Athenian fleet on Samos in 411 in defence of the full democracy, that is, the democracy as it

¹⁸⁹ Bolmarcich 2008, 65.

¹⁹⁰ Kagan 1987, 410. The discrepancy in the sources regarding the number of ships may have originated in a textual corruption in the manuscripts of Diodorus.

¹⁹¹ Against the authenticity of Andocides' *De Pace* see my commentary on **D 4.8**.

¹⁹² Kagan 1987, 410 n. 133.

¹⁹³ In 387/86, Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros were specifically excluded from the autonomy clause of the King's Peace, which allowed Athens to retain them (*Xen. Hell.* 5.1.31).

existed since the mid-5th century reforms attributed to Ephialtes (Thuc. 8.76.6).¹⁹⁴ For moderates it might evoke the more limited democracy of Cleisthenes or the still older constitution of Solon, while oligarchs probably envisioned the πάτριος πολιτεία as eschewing democracy altogether.¹⁹⁵ The ‘correct’ interpretation would soon be imposed by Lysander who, McCoy argues, wanted to see Athens ruled by a narrow oligarchy of his own choosing, as he did elsewhere through his establishment of decarchies.¹⁹⁶ He was willing to tolerate a limited democracy under the guise of the πάτριος πολιτεία, which may have been suggested to him by Theramenes, but purely as a temporary solution: the impending return of exiles to Athens, many if not most of them oligarchs by inclination, would soon provide Lysander with a firm power base with which to reform Athens along highly oligarchic lines.¹⁹⁷

It is probable that tribute, or a financial obligation of some kind, was imposed on Athens under the present treaty. When, after the fall of the Thirty in 403, the ascendant democrats led by Thrasybulus and the surviving oligarchs who had fled to Eleusis were reconciled, the treaty made between them, which is recorded in the Aristotelean *Athēnaiōn Politeia*, required the men at Eleusis to ‘contribute from their revenues like the other Athenians to the fund for the common defence,’ ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 39.2 = **D 4.1 LT 3** συντελεῖν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προσιόντων εἰς τὸ συμμαχικὸν καθάπερ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἀθηναίους, trans. H. Rackham). M. Chambers and P.J. Rhodes, in their commentaries on the *Ath. Pol.*, agree that συντελεῖν ... εἰς τὸ συμμαχικὸν expresses a financial obligation, and καθάπερ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἀθηναίους implies that the Athenians have already been paying this.¹⁹⁸ I argue that this alludes to a clause of the present treaty. Notably, [Aristotle] does not use the word φόρος: perhaps the Spartans also avoided doing so in order to escape allegations of imperialism.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁴ On this passage cf. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 981: ‘This is the only hint, in Th.’s account of the events of 411, of the important contemporary notion of the “ancestral constitution,” the πάτριος πολιτεία.’ For a revisionist view of Ephialtes’ role in the democratic reforms with which he is associated, see Zaccarini 2018.

¹⁹⁵ For example, at [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 29.3 (discussing the oligarchic revolution of 411), an Athenian named Clitophon speaks positively of the constitution of Solon, albeit by emphasizing its similarities to the later constitution of Cleisthenes.

¹⁹⁶ The Thirty, who came to power ca. September 404 through Lysander’s intervention, might be thought of as a kind of expanded decarchy. This interpretation is of course open to debate; as Krentz 1982, 144 opines, ‘If the Athenian oligarchs were trying to imitate the Spartan system, they saw themselves as something other than a decarchy.’ At 40 n. 29 he argues, referring to Diod. 14.13.1, that Lysander ‘may not have established decarchies exclusively’ in the Aegean. For the establishment of the Thirty see [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 34.3; Plut. *Lys.* 15; *Lys.* 12.71-76; Diod. 14.3.5-7. On the date see Krentz 1982, 48.

¹⁹⁷ McCoy 1975, 139-41; cf. Kagan 1987, 411; Bolmarcich 2008, 77; Joyce 2022, 217 with n. 21.

¹⁹⁸ Chambers 1990, 316; Rhodes 2017, 327; cf. LSJ⁹ s.v. συμμαχικός. Elsewhere, e.g., Thuc. 5.6.2, this word means simply ‘treaty of alliance.’

¹⁹⁹ Compare how the Athenians explicitly eschew imposing φόρος in the decree of 378/77 inviting other states to join the Second Athenian Confederacy (*IG* 2² 43 = *RO* 22 I. 23). Allied financial contributions were described as συντάξεις, not φόρος (*FGrH* 115 Theopompus F 98).

D 3.17

Surrender of Samos to Lysander

404 BCE

Samos, an autonomous ally of Athens since 412 (cf. Thuc. 8.21), resisted Lysander's attempts to conquer the island even after the surrender of Athens itself, but it too ultimately succumbed. Xenophon places the capitulation of Samos in the early part of the 'anarchic' year of 404/03 (*Hell.* 2.3.1), so this must have occurred before the end of 404 and more likely before the onset of winter.²⁰⁰

LT 1: Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.6

οἱ δὲ Σάμιοι πολιορκούμενοι ὑπὸ Λυσάνδρου πάντη, ἐπεὶ οὐ βουλομένων αὐτῶν τὸ πρῶτον ὁμολογεῖν προσβάλλειν ἤδη ἔμελλεν ὁ Λύσανδρος, ὠμολόγησαν ἔν ἱμάτιον ἔχων ἕκαστος ἀπιέναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, τὰ δ' ἄλλα παραδοῦναι· καὶ οὕτως ἐξῆλθον. [7] Λύσανδρος δὲ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις πολίταις παραδοὺς τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα πάντα καὶ δέκα ἄρχοντας καταστήσας φρουρεῖν ἀφῆκε τὸ τῶν συμμάχων ναυτικὸν κατὰ πόλεις.

Meanwhile the Samians were being besieged by Lysander on every side, and when, seeing that at first they refused to come to terms, he was on the point of making an attack upon them, they came to an agreement with him that every free person should depart from the city with but one cloak and that all else should be surrendered; and on these terms they withdrew. And Lysander gave over the city and everything therein to the former citizens, and appointed ten rulers to guard it; then he dismissed the naval contingents of the allies to their several cities.

(trans. Carleton L. Brownson)

Xenophon describes the return of the 'former citizens' (ἀρχαῖοι πολῖται) of Samos at Lysander's invitation: these are likely the 400 upper-class Samians that were expropriated and banished from Samos after a popular uprising in 412 (Thuc. 8.21).²⁰¹ He also claims that the entire free population of Samos was expelled, and this is not inconceivable: an Athenian inscription of 403/02 thanks Ephesus and Notium for admitting Samian refugees (Tod 97 II. 8-9 ἐπαινοῦσι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι Ἐφεσίους καὶ Νοτ[ιᾶς | ὅτι προθύμως ἐδέξαντο] Σαμίων τοὺς ἔξω ὄντας). No fewer than 14 Samians resident in Attica have been identified from the late-5th to mid-4th centuries BCE,

²⁰⁰ Pythodorus should have been eponymous archon for 404/03, but Xenophon writes that he was retroactively denied this appellation because he was elected under an oligarchy (*Hell.* 2.3.1 Πυθοδώρου δ' ἐν Ἀθήναις ἄρχοντος, ὃν Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ἤρθεθι, οὐκ ὀνομάζουσιν, ἀλλ' ἀναρχίαν τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν καλοῦσιν).

²⁰¹ Thucydides refers to this faction as οἱ δύνατοι ('the powerful men'). As Hornblower (*Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 808) stresses, they were not necessarily oligarchs.

and there may have been many more who took up Athenian citizenship and Attic demotics and are not usually identifiable as Samians in inscriptions.²⁰² Also, numerous Greek cities are known to have suffered expulsions in the 5th century such as Eretria in 490 (Hdt. 6.101), Hestiaea in 446/45 (Thuc. 1.114), and Plataea (2.6; cf. 3.67) and Aegina (2.27) during the Peloponnesian War. Nevertheless, G. Shipley emphasizes the practical difficulties of expelling an island's entire population or even its citizen population, and reckons that Lysander's efforts were limited to rounding up those living in the densely-settled southeastern corner of Samos, including the main settlement. Also, the establishment of a decarchy by Lysander (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.7 = **LT 1** δέκα ἄρχοντες) speaks against expulsion: according to Shipley, 'It is inconsistent with the introduction of a new, *reliable* population. Lysander imposed a narrow oligarchy because the population needed keeping under tight control. ... There was no mass expulsion, merely a lopping-off of the highest ears of corn.'²⁰³ I propose that Lysander's priority was to expel the leaders of, or those who were otherwise prominent in, the Samian democratic revolution of 412 and the resistance to Lysander himself in 404. He could, I believe, afford to overlook those whose involvement was marginal or nonexistent.

²⁰² Shipley 1987, 132, 303. As a reward for their loyalty to Athens, the Samians were offered Athenian citizenship *en masse* by a decree of 405/04 (*IG* 1³ 127 = OR 191).

²⁰³ Shipley 1987, 132-33 with n. 23. Diod. 14.3.5 adds that Lysander appointed a Spartiate named Thorax as harmost of Samos. Shipley 1987, 131 states that this implies the establishment of a garrison. For Lysander's general policies in the Aegean see Gomez-Castro 2018.

Chapter 5

The post-Peloponnesian War period and the Corinthian War (403-387/86 BCE)

Introduction

This chapter charts Athens' gradual recovery after the nadir of 404 and Sparta's attempt to reinforce and maintain the highly favourable geopolitical role which it had obtained as a result of its victory over Athens. Dissatisfaction with Sparta's postwar conduct led, in 395, to the so-called Corinthian War, in which a Persian-backed coalition led by Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos came to blows with the Spartans. The war culminated in the King's Peace, also known as the Peace of Antalcidas, which was the first of several fourth-century κοινή εἰρήνη treaties.

D 4.1

Treaty between Athenian democrats and oligarchs

403 BCE

The decision of the Thirty in late 404 or early 403 to restrict the Athenian citizen body to 3000 men (the 'Three Thousand') was the spur to the resistance that ultimately brought the regime down; it was, according to C.J. Joyce, 'the point at which the community began to fall apart.'¹ The exiled democrats led by Thrasybulus occupied the border fort of Phyle (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.2; Plut. *Mor.* 345d; Nep. 2.1) before proceeding to Piraeus, where they defeated the Thirty in a battle in which Critias was killed (*Hell.* 2.4.11-19; Diod. 14.32.6-33.1; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 38.1; Nep. 7.2.5-7). But the oligarchy was not immediately abolished; rather, the Thirty were replaced by board of ten (a literal decarchy) and its surviving members retired to Eleusis (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.23-24; cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 35.1; Nep. 3.1).² A Spartan force led by Pausanias confronted Thrasybulus' men and, although militarily victorious, Pausanias secretly opened negotiations with the democrats despite Lysander's opposition (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.35-38). This resulted in the present treaty, its ratification overseen by a Spartan commission composed of ten (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.38 = **LT 2**) or fifteen ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 38.4 = **LT 3**) men. It ought to be counted as an interstate treaty because, while made between two groups of Athenians, it established Eleusis as sovereign political community separate from Athens, albeit one with some peculiar features, as we shall see.

¹ Joyce 2022, 62.

² The sources disagree on the precise manner of the Ten's selection: see Joyce 2022, 64 n. 115.

There is some controversy regarding the date. The Aristotelean *Athēnaiōn Politeia* states (39.1) that the democracy was restored in the archonship of Euclides (403/02) but then later claims (41.1) that Thrasybulus established the ‘current constitution’ (τὴν νῦν οὖσαν πολιτείαν) in the archonship of Pythodorus (404/03). Plutarch is more specific (*Mor.* 349f), placing the return of the democratic exiles on 12 Boedromion – and he must be referring to the year 403 – or approximately September, therefore in Euclides’ archonship.³ This is often assumed to correspond to the date on which the ratifying oaths were sworn.⁴ The most plausible solution, maintained by a number of scholars, is that Pythodorus retained the archonship for several additional months, possibly due to the chaotic situation at Athens, and that Euclides was retroactively recognized as archon for the whole of 403/02.⁵ This allows for the date of 12 Boedromion for the ratification of the treaty to stand.

The *Athēnaiōn Politeia* is by far our most important source for the present treaty, although it is unclear whether it presents a verbatim reproduction of an official document or is only a paraphrase, albeit an unusually detailed one. Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.4.38) also briefly discusses the treaty, but does not add any information not found in *Ath. Pol.* Andocides (1.90) quotes the oaths associated with the treaty, for which he is our only source, although this is only a partial quotation according to T.C. Loening, who notes that it begins with καί.⁶ Joyce identifies a total of twenty individual clauses based on all surviving testimonia, of which eighteen are known principally from *Ath. Pol.*⁷

LT 1: Andoc. 1.90

φέρει δὴ τοίνυν, οἱ ὄρκοι ὑμῖν πῶς ἔχουσιν; ὁ μὲν κοινὸς τῇ πόλει ἀπάση, ὃν ὁμωμόκατε πάντες μετὰ τὰς διαλλαγὰς, καὶ οὐ μνησικακήσω τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδενὶ πλὴν τῶν τριάκοντα <καὶ τῶν δέκα>* καὶ τῶν ἔνδεκα· οὐδὲ τούτων ὅς ἂν ἐθέλῃ εὐθύνας διδόναι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἧς ἤρξεν. ὅπου τοίνυν αὐτοῖς τοῖς τριάκοντα ὤμνυτε μὴ μνησικακήσειν, τοῖς μεγίστων κακῶν αἰτίοις, εἰ διδοῖεν εὐθύνας, ἧ̃ που σχολῆ τῶν γε ἄλλων πολιτῶν τινι ἡξιούτε μνησικακεῖν. ἡ δὲ βουλή αὖ ἢ ἀεὶ βουλευούσα τί ὄμνυσι;

*<καὶ τῶν δέκα> add. de Valois, cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 39.6.

³ 12 Boedromion 404 is impossible because at that time Athens was still in the early days of the rule of the Thirty: Loening 1987, 22.

⁴ Chambers 1990, 317; Joyce 2022, 72. But Plut. *Mor.* 349f reports merely that ‘the men from Phyle returned’ (οἱ ἀπὸ Φυλῆς κατήλθον) on this date.

⁵ Kaibel 1893, 200-02; Raubitschek 1941, 286; Hereward 1952, 112-13; Loening 1987, 22.

⁶ Loening 1987, 55 n. 97.

⁷ Joyce 2022, 76-77. Her clauses 19 (‘items confiscated under the Thirty and not sold off may be recovered’) and 20 (‘items sold off to a third party may not be recovered’) are known only from Lysias’ fragmentary speech *Against Hippotheres* (*P.Oxy.* XIII 1606 ll. 34-48).

And now, what of your oaths? First, the oath in which the whole city joined, the oath which you swore one and all after the reconciliation: 'and I will harbour no grievance against any citizen, save only the Thirty, the Ten, and the Eleven: and even of them against none who shall consent to render account of his office.' After swearing to forgive even the Thirty, whom you had to thank for sufferings untold, provided that they rendered account of themselves, you can have been in very little hurry to harbour grievances against the ordinary citizen. Again, what is the oath sworn by the Council when it takes office?

(trans. K.J. Maidment)

LT 2: Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.38

ἀκούσαντες δὲ πάντων αὐτῶν οἱ ἔφοροι καὶ οἱ ἔκκλητοι, ἐξέπεμψαν πεντεκαίδεκα ἄνδρας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας, καὶ ἐπέταξαν σὺν Πausανία διαλλάξαι ὅπη δύναιντο κάλλιστα. οἱ δὲ διήλλαξαν ἐφ' ὧτε εἰρήνην μὲν ἔχειν ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀπιέναι δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστον πλὴν τῶν τριάκοντα καὶ τῶν ἕνδεκα καὶ τῶν ἐν Πειραιεῖ ἀρξάντων δέκα. εἰ δὲ τινες φοβοῖντο τῶν ἐξ ἄστεως, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς Ἐλευσίνα κατοικεῖν.

When the ephors and the members of the Lacedaemonian assembly had heard all the ambassadors, they dispatched fifteen men to Athens and commissioned them, in conjunction with Pausanias, to effect a reconciliation in the best way they could. And they effected a reconciliation on these terms, that the two parties should be at peace with one another and that every man should depart to his home except the members of the Thirty, and of the Eleven, and of the Ten who had ruled in Piraeus. They also decided that if any of the men in the city were afraid, they should settle at Eleusis.

(trans. Carleton L. Brownson)

LT 3: [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 39.1

Ἐγένοντο δ' αἱ διαλύσεις ἐπ' Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας τάσδε. τοὺς βουλομένους Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἐν ἄστει μεινάντων ἐξοικεῖν ἔχειν Ἐλευσίνα ἐπιτίμους ὄντας καὶ κυρίους καὶ αὐτοκράτορας ἑαυτῶν καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν καρπούμενους. [2] τὸ δ' ἱερὸν εἶναι κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δὲ Κήρυκας καὶ Εὐμολπίδας κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. μὴ ἐξεῖναι δὲ μήτε τοῖς Ἐλευσίνιοθεν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ μήτε τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως Ἐλευσίναδ' εἰσιέναι πλὴν μυστηρίοις ἐκατέρους. συντελεῖν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προσιόντων εἰς τὸ συμμαχικὸν καθάπερ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἀθηναίους. [3] ἐὰν δὲ τινες τῶν ἀπιόντων οἰκίαν λαμβάνωσιν Ἐλευσίνι, συμπεῖθειν τὸν κεκτημένον· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ συμβαίνωσιν ἀλλήλοις τιμητὰς ἐλέσθαι τρεῖς ἑκάτερον, καὶ ἦντιν' ἂν οὗτοι τάξωσι τιμὴν λαμβάνειν. Ἐλευσινίων δὲ συνοικεῖν οὐς ἂν οὗτοι βούλωνται. [4] τὴν δ' ἀπογραφὴν εἶναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐξοικεῖν, τοῖς μὲν ἐπιδημοῦσιν ἀφ' ἧς ἂν ὁμόσωσιν τοὺς ὄρκους δέκα ἡμερῶν, τὴν δ' ἐξοίκησιν εἴκοσι, τοῖς δ' ἀποδημοῦσιν ἐπειδὰν ἐπιδημήσωσιν κατὰ ταυτά. [5] μὴ ἐξεῖναι δὲ ἄρχειν μηδεμίαν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ ἄστει τὸν Ἐλευσίνι κατοικοῦντα πρὶν ἀπογράψηται πάλιν ἐν τῷ ἄστει κατοικεῖν. τὰς δὲ δίκας

τοῦ φόνου εἶναι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, εἴ τίς τινα αὐτοχειρίᾳ ἀπέκτεινεν ἢ ἔτρωσεν. [6] τῶν δὲ παρεληλυθότων μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα μνησικακεῖν ἐξεῖναι πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς τριάκοντα καὶ τοὺς δέκα καὶ τοὺς ἑνδεκα καὶ τοὺς τοῦ Πειραιέως ἄρξαντας, μηδὲ πρὸς τούτους, ἔαν διδῶσιν εὐθύνας. εὐθύνας δὲ δοῦναι τοὺς μὲν ἐν Πειραιεῖ ἄρξαντας ἐν τοῖς ἐν Πειραιεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἐν τοῖς τὰ τιμήματα παρεχομένοις. εἴθ' οὕτως ἐξοικεῖν τοὺς μὴ ἐθέλοντας. τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἃ ἐδανείσαντο εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἑκατέρους ἀποδοῦναι χωρὶς.

The reconciliation took place in the archonship of Eucleides on the following terms: that those of the Athenians who have remained in the city that desire to emigrate do have Eleusis, retaining their full rights, and having sovereignty and self-government, and enjoying their own revenues. And that the temple be the common property of both sections, and be under the superintendence of the Heralds and the Eumolpidae according to the ancestral practice. But that it be not lawful for those at Eleusis to go into the city, nor for those in the city to go to Eleusis, except in either case at a celebration of the Mysteries. And that they contribute from their revenues like the other Athenians to the fund for the common defence. And that any of those who go away that take a house at Eleusis be helped to obtain the consent of the owner; and if they cannot come to terms with one another, each party to choose three valuers, and to accept whatever price these valuers assess. And that of the people of Eleusis those whom the settlers may be willing to allow do dwell in the place with them. And that the registration of those that wish to migrate be, for those who are in the country, within ten days of the date of their swearing the oaths of peace, and their migration within twenty days, and for those abroad similarly from the date when they return. And that it be not permitted for anyone residing at Eleusis to hold any of the offices in the city until he removes himself from the roll in order to reside again in the city. And that trials for homicide be in accordance with the ancestral ordinances, if a man has killed or wounded another with his own hand. And that there be a universal amnesty for past events, covering everybody except the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven, and those that have been governors of Peiraeus, and that these also be covered by the amnesty if they render account. And that those who had been governors in Peiraeus render account before the courts held in Peiraeus, but those in the city before a court of persons that can produce ratable property; or that those who will not render account on these terms do migrate. And that each party separately repay their loans contracted for the war.

(trans. H. Rackham)

It is generally agreed that the survivors among the Thirty and their supporters at Eleusis retained Athenian citizenship, albeit subject to certain restrictions. They were not allowed to physically enter the city of Athens and were barred from public office and service in the lawcourts there so long as they remained attached to the community of Eleusis.⁸ Nevertheless, they were declared to be ἐπιτίμους, κυρίου καὶ αὐτοκράτορας ἑαυτῶν, and τὰ αὐτῶν καρπουμένους (*Ath. Pol.* 39.1). According to Rhodes, ἐπιτίμους means that they retained

⁸ Stahl 1891, 484; Cloché 1915, 258-59; Rhodes 1981, 467; Joyce 2022, 80.

‘possession of their rights as Athenian citizens,’ while κυρίου καὶ αὐτοκράτορας ἑαυτῶν means ‘with full power and authority over themselves, so that the authorities in Athens cannot legislate for the internal affairs of the community at Eleusis or impose taxes on it’; and lastly, τὰ αὐτῶν καρπουμένους indicates that they were ‘entitled to draw the revenues from their own property.’⁹ Joyce and T.C. Loening agree that this included the right to hold land and other non-moveable property within Attica, even if it was located outside of Eleusis (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.20-22).¹⁰

For the purposes of the Eleusinian Mysteries, the political separation of Athens and Eleusis was to be ignored.¹¹ Specifically, the normal prohibition against Athenians visiting Eleusis and vice-versa was lifted during the celebration of the Mysteries, parts of which took place in Athens and others in Eleusis.¹² Even one of Thrasybulus’ supporters, Cleocritus, was a herald of the Mysteries (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.20); presumably he had to travel back and forth between Athens and Eleusis in fulfilling his religious duties.¹³

The stipulation that Eleusis ‘contribute to the [Spartan] war-fund just like the other Athenians’ ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 39.2 συντελεῖν ... εἰς τὸ συμμαχικὸν καθάπερ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἀθηναίους) suggests that the Athenian and Eleusinian contributions were to be assessed separately.¹⁴ Under 39.3 ἐὰν δέ τινες τῶν ἀπιόντων οἰκίαν λαμβάνωσιν κτλ., inhabitants of Eleusis who were living there before the arrival of the oligarchs and who had not already been expropriated by them could, if they refused to sell their homes voluntarily, be compelled to do so at a price decided upon by the board of evaluators (τιμηταί), which was not appealable.¹⁵ Upon migrating to Eleusis, the oligarchs massacred over 100 Eleusinians and expropriated their homes (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.8-10; Diod. 14.32.5-6; Lys. 12.52; 13.44-46). This clause thus clearly benefited the oligarchs at the expense of the pre-existing Eleusinian population.¹⁶

Commentators have frequently interpreted *Ath. Pol.* 39.5 τὰς δὲ δίκας ... εἴ τις τινα αὐτοχειρία ἀπέκτεινεν ἢ ἔτρωσεν to indicate that only persons who had committed homicide ‘by their own hand’ (αὐτοχειρία) were eligible for prosecution, whereas those who were indirectly responsible for the death of another, such as by making an unlawful denunciation leading to execution, were immune.¹⁷ This is rejected by Joyce, who notes that there is no evidence in the body of Athenian

⁹ Rhodes 1981, 464; cf. Loening 1987, 30-31.

¹⁰ Loening 1987, 35; Joyce 2022, 77. *Contra* Cloché 1915, 251-53; Carawan 2013, 72. For comparison, an Athenian decree of the mid-4th century allows émigrés to return to Athens (*IG* 2² 111 = RO 39 II. 65-66).

¹¹ Cloché 1915, 253-55; Rhodes 1981, 465.

¹² Chambers 1990, 316; Rhodes 2017, 327.

¹³ Kühn 1967, 39-40; Lehmann 1972, 223 n. 57; Rhodes 1981, 465; Joyce 2022, 78.

¹⁴ Joyce 2022, 79. *Contra* Rhodes 1981, 466.

¹⁵ Loening 1987, 36; cf. Chambers 1990, 317; Rubinstein 2018, 138.

¹⁶ Cloché 1915, 256-58; Rhodes 1981, 466.

¹⁷ Cloché 1915, 259-61; Bonner 1924, 175-76; Rhodes 1981, 468; Loening 1987, 39-40; Todd 2007, 639 with n. 55; Carawan 2013, 271-72; cf. Gray 2013, 385-401. The point about denouncers is made largely moot by the near-

homicide law that there was ever a distinction between direct and indirect homicide.¹⁸ The question is complicated by the textual corruption of the relevant passage, which reads, in the papyri, τὰς δὲ δίκας τοῦ φόνου εἶναι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, αυτοχिरαεκτισιοτρωσασ. T. Thalheim amends this to εἴ τις τινα αὐτοχειρία ἐκτείσαιτο τρώσας ('if anyone should kill somebody after having wounded him by his own hand'), whereas the *editio princeps* of F.G. Kenyon has εἴ τις τινα αὐτοχειρία ἀπέκτεινεν ἢ ἔτρωσεν ('if anyone kills or wounds anyone by his own hand').¹⁹ Joyce proposes that the intention of this clause was to render *private* suits stemming from alleged crimes committed during the period of the oligarchy (that is, before 12 Boedromion 403) inadmissible, even for crimes as serious as homicide, whether committed directly or indirectly.²⁰ Joyce and E. Harris argue that the exclusion of former members of the various oligarchic committees from the amnesty (39.6) implies that their crimes were considered a public matter and thus still liable to prosecution. Homicides committed *in the future* were certainly not covered by the amnesty and were to be prosecuted according to the traditional legal procedure (κατὰ τὰ πάτρια).²¹ Finally, R.J. Bonner emphasizes that even an amnesty could not erase the pollution (μίασμα) associated with homicide.²²

The amnesty proper is declared at *Ath. Pol.* 39.6 with the words μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα μνησικακεῖν (cf. Andoc. 1.90 = **LT 1** καὶ οὐ μνησικακήσω τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδενὶ, recording the oath). Rhodes notes that μὴ μνησικακεῖν is the standard formula operative formula of amnesties attested elsewhere (e.g., Thuc. 4.74.2; *IG* 1³ 76 ll. 15-16; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.43).²³ However, as I have hinted above, the amnesty of 403 was not universal: the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven, and the 'governors of the Piraeus' (τοὺς τριάκοντα καὶ τοὺς δέκα καὶ τοὺς ἕνδεκα καὶ τοὺς τοῦ Πειραιέως ἄρξαντας) were not automatically amnestied but had to first submit to εὐθυναί. The Eleven was a board appointed by the Thirty (*Ath. Pol.* 35.1) whose duties included administering the death penalty, most infamously against Theramenes (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.55-56); the governors of the Piraeus were ten men whose jurisdiction was limited to the port; and 'the Ten' were those who, as noted, replaced the Thirty after Critias' death and who governed in Athens itself.²⁴ Some scholars, supposing that the Ten were milder than the Thirty, reject the testimony of the *Ath. Pol.* that they were included from the amnesty.²⁵ There is no reference to the Ten in the manuscripts of Andocides at 1.90, which must be supplied with reference to *Ath.*

universal amnesty represented by the μὴ μνησικακεῖν clause ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 39.6; Andoc. 1.90), from which only certain individuals and not certain crimes (or manner of committing said crimes) are excluded.

¹⁸ Joyce 2022, 81; cf. Harris 2015b.

¹⁹ Thalheim's reading is endorsed by Gray 2013, 399-400.

²⁰ Joyce 2022, 82.

²¹ Harris 2015a, 46; Joyce 2022, 81.

²² Bonner 1924. On μίασμα see generally Parker 1983.

²³ Rhodes 1981, 468.

²⁴ Rhodes 1981, 469; Loening 1987, 41-42.

²⁵ Delmeyda 1930, 45; Maidment 1941, 408.

Pol. 39.6 (see *apparatus criticus*), nor are they mentioned at *Xen. Hell.* 2.4.38.²⁶ But at least one former member of the Ten, Rhinon, is known to have submitted to εὐθυναί (*Ath. Pol.* 38.4), implying that he was not covered by the amnesty.²⁷ Regarding the Ten's supposed mildness, political persecutions did in fact continue under their rule, and at least one wealthy Athenian named Demaretus is known to have been executed on their orders (*Ath. Pol.* 38.2).²⁸ Choosing to submit to εὐθυναί was a potentially risky endeavour, since those who failed to clear their names were presumably punished.²⁹ It is entirely possible that the clause was intended to discourage the non-amnestied oligarchs from returning to Athens.³⁰

D 4.2

Spartan treaty with Elis

ca. 400 BCE

By the late-5th century, Elis, which had long controlled the sanctuary of Olympia and the administration of the Olympic Games, had become a regional power of some importance. Key to this was its expansion into Triphylia, the area between the rivers Alpheios and Neda centred around the perioecic town of Lepreum.³¹

Elis was one of the Peloponnesian League members that refused to accept the Peace of Nicias (*Thuc.* 5.17.2); its defiance indicates a willingness and ability to chart an independent foreign policy. Later in 421, a financial dispute between Elis and Lepreon resulted in a Spartan attempt to impose arbitration (*Thuc.* 5.31.3). The Eleans submitted at first but then withdrew because they did not expect a fair hearing. Sparta subsequently declared Lepreum autonomous and garrisoned it to protect it from the Eleans. In response, Elis allied with Argos (*Thuc.* 5.33.3-5), later expanding into the Quadruple Alliance.³² Also in 420, Elis at least temporarily banned the

²⁶ But cf. the note *ad loc.* in the *apparatus criticus* of the *OCT* edition of the *Hellenica*: ‘post τριάκοντα fort. excidit καὶ τῶν δέκα.’

²⁷ MacDowell 1962, 130-31; Joyce 2022, 84. For Rhinon as a member of the Ten cf. *Lys.* 12.55 and *Isoc.* 18.6.

²⁸ Cf. Joyce 2022, 64. One former member of the Thirty who appears to have submitted to εὐθυναί was Eratosthenes, accused of orchestrating the execution of Polemarchus, brother of the orator Lysias (*Lys.* 12.53-58). The proceedings depicted therein are identified as εὐθυναί by MacDowell 1963, 98-99 and Joyce 2022, 147. Eratosthenes' fate is unknown.

²⁹ Loening 1987, 47; cf. Rhodes 1981, 469-70: ‘A member who joined the community at Eleusis would, however, be protected by the fact that he was not obliged to leave Eleusis and face an Athenian court.’

³⁰ For internal political reconciliation in the Greek world see generally Dössel 2003. For an Athenian perspective see Edwards 2017.

³¹ Capree 2007/08, 487ff., 491. On Triphylia see generally *IACP*, pp. 540-41 with Tuplin 1993, 184.

³² On the events of 421 see Roy 2022, 113.

Spartans from participating in the Olympic games and from visiting the sanctuary of Olympia (Thuc. 5.50.2, 4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21-22; Paus. 3.8.3).³³

Elis must have retaken Lepreum by the end of the Peloponnesian War, although its recapture is not explicitly attested.³⁴ Tensions with Sparta erupted again after 404 when Sparta delivered an ultimatum demanding that Elis make the perioecic communities which it controlled, including Lepreum, autonomous.³⁵ The Eleans refused to do this unless the Spartans made their own perioeci autonomous and Sparta subsequently invaded Elis (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23; Paus. 3.8.3). The war probably ended around summer 400, since Diodorus (14.34.1 = **LT 2**) places the present treaty towards the end of the Athenian archon-year 401/00. The Spartan king Agis, who died ca. 399, was still alive when the war began, but this is useful only for dating the beginning of the war, not its end.³⁶

LT 1: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30

καὶ τὸ μὲν λοιπὸν θέρος καὶ τὸν ἐπιόντα χειμῶνα ὑπὸ τοῦ Λυσίππου καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἐφέρετο καὶ ἤγετο ἢ τῶν Ἡλείων χώρα. τοῦ δ' ἐπιόντος θέρους πέμψας Θρασυδαῖος εἰς Λακεδαιμόνα συνεχώρησε Φέας* τε τὸ τεῖχος περιελεῖν καὶ Κυλλήνης** καὶ τὰς Τριφυλίδας πόλεις ἀφεῖναι Φρίζαν καὶ Ἐπιτάλιον καὶ Λετρίνους καὶ Ἀμφιδόλους καὶ Μαργανέας, πρὸς δὲ ταύταις καὶ Ἀκρωρείους καὶ Λασιῶνα τὸν ὑπ' Ἀρκάδων ἀντιλεγόμενον. Ἡπειον μέντοι τὴν μεταξὺ πόλιν Ἡραΐας καὶ Μακίστου ἠξίουσι οἱ Ἡλεῖοι ἔχειν· πρίασθαι γὰρ ἔφασαν τὴν χώραν ἅπασαν παρὰ τῶν τότε ἔχόντων τὴν πόλιν τριάκοντα ταλάντων, καὶ τὸ ἀργύριον δεδωκέναι. [31] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι γνόντες μηδὲν δικαιότερον εἶναι βίᾳ πριαμένους ἢ βίᾳ ἀφελομένους παρὰ τῶν ἡπτόνων λαμβάνειν, ἀφίεναι καὶ ταύτην ἠνάγκασαν· τοῦ μέντοι προεστάναι τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου ἱεροῦ, καίπερ οὐκ ἀρχαίου Ἡλείοις ὄντος, οὐκ ἀπήλασαν αὐτούς, νομίζοντες τοὺς ἀντιποιομένους χωρίτας εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἰκανοὺς προεστάναι. τούτων δὲ συγχωρηθέντων εἰρήνη τε γίνεσθαι καὶ συμμαχία Ἡλείων πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ οὕτω μὲν δὴ ὁ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἡλείων πόλεμος ἔληξε.

*Φέας Dindorf; σφέας codd. **Κυλλήνης O. Müller; κυλλήνην codd.

During the rest of the summer and the ensuing winter the country of the Eleans was plundered by Lysippus and the men with him. But in the course of the following summer Thrasydaeus sent to Lacedaemon and agreed to tear down the walls of Phea and Cyllene, to leave the Triphylian towns of Phrixa and Epitalium independent, likewise the Letrinians, Amphidolians, and Marganians, and besides these the Acrorians and the town of Lasion, which was claimed by the

³³ It is unclear whether the ban was quickly lifted or remained in effect until the end of the Elean War. Against the 'current orthodoxy,' Hornblower 2000 argues that the ban was short-lived. For a summary of earlier scholarship see Hornblower 2000, 213-14.

³⁴ Cf. *IACP* no. 306, p. 544.

³⁵ On relations between Elis and the perioeci see Roy 1997, 291-98.

³⁶ For a discussion of dates see Funke 1980, 32 n. 16; Tuplin 1993, 201-05.

Arcadians. The Eleans, however, claimed the right to hold Epeum, the town between Heraea and Macistus; for they said that they had bought the whole territory for thirty talents from the people to whom the town at that time belonged, and had paid the money. But the Lacedaemonians, deciding that it was no more just to get property from the weaker by a forced purchase than by a forcible seizure, compelled them to leave this town also independent; they did not, however, dispossess them of the presidency of the shrine of Olympian Zeus, even though it did not belong to the Eleans in ancient times, for they thought that the rival claimants were country people and not competent to hold the presidency. When these things had been agreed upon, a peace and an alliance were concluded between the Eleans and the Lacedaemonians. And so the war between the Lacedaemonians and the Eleans ended.

(trans. Carleton L. Brownson)

LT 2: Diod. 14.34.1

Ἡλεῖοι δὲ φοβηθέντες τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὑπεροχὴν, κατέλυσαν τὸν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πόλεμον, ἐφ' ᾧ τὰς τριήρεις δοῦναι Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τὰς περιουκίους πόλεις αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι.

The Eleans, because they stood in fear of the superior strength of the Lacedaemonians, brought the war with them to an end, agreeing that they would surrender their triremes to the Lacedaemonians and let the neighbouring cities go free.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather)

LT 3: Paus. 3.8.5

τρίτῳ δὲ ἔτει τοῦ πολέμου Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν καὶ Ἄγισ παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς ἐς τὴν Ἡλείαν καὶ τότε ἐσβαλοῦντες; οἱ δὲ Ἡλεῖοι καὶ Θρασυδαῖος (κεκακωμένοι γὰρ ἐς τὸ ἔσχατον ἦσαν) συγχωροῦσι μήτε τῶν περιούκων ἔτι ἄρχειν καὶ τοῦ ἄστεως κατερεῖψαι τὸ τεῖχος, Λακεδαιμονίους τε ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ καὶ θύειν τῷ θεῷ καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐξεῖναι σφισιν ἀγωνίζεσθαι.

In the third year of the war the Lacedaemonians under Agis again prepared to invade the territory of Elis. So Thrasydaeus and the Eleans, reduced to dire extremities, agreed to forgo their supremacy over their neighbors, to dismantle the fortifications of their city, and to allow the Lacedaemonians to sacrifice to the god and to compete in the games at Olympia.

(trans. W.H.S. Jones and H.A. Ormerod)

In the view of J. Capreedy, both the outbreak of the Elean War itself and the terms of the peace treaty that ended it reflect the Spartans' growing apprehension of so-called 'regional hegemonies' in the Peloponnese, represented in the case of Elis by its control of perioecic

territory.³⁷ Not that this was entirely new: Sparta's first order of business after the Mantinea campaign of 418 was to neutralize Argos and Mantinea with the Peace of Lichas and the 30-year Spartan-Mantinean treaty respectively. But unlike the Mantinea campaign, the Elean War was provoked by Sparta: C.D. Hamilton suggests that it 'appears as the deliberate policy of a group in Sparta that had been seeking to chastise Elis for past offences,' a group which Hamilton believed was led by Agis.³⁸

An examination of the accounts of Xenophon, Diodorus, and Pausanias (**LT 1-3**) reveals four clauses that certainly or probably appeared in the treaty:

1. The perioecic communities of Phrixa, Epitalion, Letrinoi, Amphidolia, Marganeis, Acroreia, Lasion, and Epeon were to be autonomous.
2. Elis was to surrender part or all of its war-fleet to Sparta.
3. The walls of Phea and Cyllene, and possibly of the town of Elis itself, were to be demolished (see **Addendum: Cyllene and Phea, below**).
4. Elis was to retain administration of the sanctuary of Olympia and the Olympic games.

J. Roy in *IACP* divides the region of Elis prior to ca. 400 into two categories: 1) the Elean state proper, located entirely north of the river Alpheios, which included Phea and Cyllene; and 2) perioecic territory controlled indirectly by Elis.³⁹ Of the conceded settlements/territories mentioned at Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30, Letrinoi, Amphidolia, Marganeis, and Lasion were located in the region of Elis proper as defined by *IACP* but were not directly incorporated into the Elean state, while Phrixa, Epitalion, and Epeon were in Triphylia.⁴⁰ Acroreia was not a single settlement, but a subregion within Elis consisting of four πόλεις: Alion, Eupagion, Opous, and Thraistos.⁴¹ Strangely, Lepreum is not mentioned in any of the testimonia for the present treaty, but Roy assumes that it must have been relinquished by Elis.⁴² The territorial losses suffered by Elis may have resulted in its area of control being reduced to κοίλη or 'Hollow' Elis, which contained the town of Elis proper and its environs and which was not perioecic.⁴³ The perioecic settlements of Triphylia subsequently formed a new federal state, also called Triphylia (epigraphically attested

³⁷ Capreeedy 2007/08, 486.

³⁸ Hamilton 1979, 109-10.

³⁹ *IACP*, pp. 489, 495: apart from the town of Elis proper, the Elean state likely included several settlements in Pisatis (Harpina, Heracleia, Salmone) as well as Alasyaion, Cyllene, and Pylos; cf. Roy 1997, 302-04. For Pisatis see Giangiulio 2009.

⁴⁰ See the *IACP* entries on the following: Amphidolia (no. 247 p. 494); Lasion (no. 256 p. 499); Letrinoi (no. 258 pp. 499-500); Marganeis (no. 259 p. 500); Epeon (no. 304 pp. 542-43); Epitalion (no. 305 p. 543); Phrixa (no. 309 p. 545).

⁴¹ Siewert 1987/88. See further the *IACP* entries for Alion (no. 246 pp. 493-94); Eupagion (no. 252 pp. 498-99); Opous (no. 261 p. 500); Thraistos (no. 264 p. 502).

⁴² Roy 1997, 292. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.25 records a revolt of the Lepreans, who went over to Agis, in the course of the Elean War.

⁴³ Roy 1997, 300ff.

at *SEG* 35.389; 40.392).⁴⁴ The provision about the Elean triremes is ignored by Xenophon and Pausanias but briefly touched upon by Diodorus, who gives the impression, but does not explicitly state, that the Eleans were forced to relinquish the entire war-fleet.⁴⁵ Capreedy, drawing on the work of W.T. Loomis, speculates that the Elean ships were seized by Sparta as an indemnity for the costs incurred while fighting the Peloponnesian War.⁴⁶

Diodorus and Pausanias (**LT 2-3**) both imply that the initiative for peace came from the Eleans.⁴⁷ Xenophon (**LT 1**) describes the treaty as εἰρήνη τε ... καὶ συμμαχία, peace and alliance, but the nature of the συμμαχία that he refers to is unclear: was the Elean state simply re-absorbed into the Peloponnesian League, or did the present treaty create a separate Spartan-Elean alliance similar to that created between Argos and Sparta under the Peace of Lichas? Elis is attested as an ally of Sparta in 394 (*Xen. Hell.* 4.2.16), 382 (*Diod.* 15.31.2), and 374 (*Xen. Hell.* 6.2.3), but these accounts do not describe the nature of their alliance. The question must remain open.

Addendum: Cyllene and Phea

The text of *Xen. Hell.* 3.2.30 = **LT 1** presents certain difficulties. The manuscripts contain the pronoun σφέας where L. Dindorf supplies Φέας. The word σφέας is difficult to accept, as it is not found elsewhere in the *Hellenica*, and such a reading would imply that the city wall of Elis was demolished *as a result of* the present treaty, apparently contradicting Xenophon's earlier statement (*Hell.* 3.2.27) that Elis already lacked a wall, although P. Krentz thinks it at least possible that the Eleans could have erected hastily constructed fortifications between the events of 3.2.27 and 3.2.30.⁴⁸ Dindorf's amendment is the most sensible solution: it is the wall of Phea, not the wall of the town of Elis, that is to be torn down. The text implies the same fate for Cyllene if we accept O. Müller's emendation of the manuscripts' accusative κυλλήνην to the genitive Κυλλήνης.⁴⁹

It is unknown whether Phea and Cyllene were perioecic. If not, they were probably not formally conceded by the Eleans; but even if they remained under Elean control, if they were now unwallled they were much easier for the Spartans to access.⁵⁰ C. Falkner goes so far as to suggest that the Spartans launched the Elean War chiefly for this reason, emphasizing that Spartan control of the Elean coast had several advantages: the Corinthians, first of all, could

⁴⁴ See further Siewert 1987, 275-77; Ruggeri 2009, 49-50, 58-59.

⁴⁵ Hamilton 1979, 110 argues that Diodorus' account ultimately derives from the *Hell. Oxy.* via Ephorus.

⁴⁶ Capreedy 2007/08, 501 n. 85; cf. Loomis 1992, arguing generally that the Peloponnesian League was more dependent on contributions of troops and ships than on cash contributions.

⁴⁷ Cf. Roy 2009, 82.

⁴⁸ Krentz 1995, 175; cf. Roy 2009, 82 with n. 38.

⁴⁹ Roy 2009, 84.

⁵⁰ Roy 1997, 303; Capreedy 2007/08, 501 n. 86, 502 n. 89.

now be denied access to Sicily and Southern Italy while Sparta could reach the west more easily. Though the ancient sources do not confirm this, Falkner reckons that the Spartans looked to this region as a source of mercenaries and timber, both vital resources for an emerging maritime power.⁵¹

D 4.3

Athenian alliance with Boeotia

395 BCE

The present treaty is attested both epigraphically and in the literary sources. The inscription (ET 1) consists of two fragments, of which fr. *a* (ll. 0-1) is extremely fragmentary but has been known to scholars for much longer than fr. *b*, which contains the vast majority of the surviving inscription (fr. *b* was discovered in 1936, built into the wall of a modern house near the ruins of the Eleusinion).⁵²

Sparta partnered up with the Persians in 412, as we have seen. But Agesilaus II, who succeeded Agis as the Eurypontid king of Sparta in ca. 400, launched a 'Panhellenic' campaign against Persia in 396 with the support of Lysander; its ostensible aim was to guarantee the autonomy of the Greek cities in Asia Minor, but according to Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.4.2-5), Lysander's true objective was to reestablish the Aegean decarchies which had been abolished by the ephors.⁵³ In response, Artaxerxes despatched a Rhodian envoy named Timocrates with a reported 50 talents' worth of gold to bribe Boeotia, Athens, Corinth, and Argos into launching a war against Sparta on the Greek mainland.⁵⁴ The Boeotians were the first to accept the offer, and encouraged their Locrian allies to seize some disputed territory controlled by Phocis, a Spartan ally.⁵⁵ Phocis retaliated by invading Locris, and the Boeotians in turn invaded Phocis. The Spartans then invaded Boeotia in early 395 (*Xen. Hell.* 3.5.1-7; *Hell. Oxy.* 19ff. Chambers). This prompted Thebes, the dominant city of the Boeotian federation, to send envoys to Athens to seek an alliance. The Athenians accepted, which Xenophon ascribes to the influence of Thrasybulus (*Xen. Hell.* 3.5.7-16).

⁵¹ Falkner 1996, 23.

⁵² Woodhead, comm. *Agora* 16 no. 34, p. 46. The *editio princeps* of fr. *b* is Schweigert 1939, 1-3.

⁵³ On Lysander's decarchies see generally Cartledge 1987, 90-91, noting that only two decarchies are specifically attested in the ancient sources: Samos (*Xen. Hell.* 2.3.7) and Thasos (*Nep. Lys.* 3.1), although the Ten at Athens are likened to a decarchy by Parke 1930, 52. The date of the decarchies' abolition is unclear, but the most likely candidates are 403/02 or 397: see Andrewes 1971, 206-16, endorsing the earlier date.

⁵⁴ Lendon 1989, 311 with n. 56; Buck 1998, 95. On the date of Timocrates' mission see Seager 1967, 95 n. 2; Cook 1981, 122-27, 556-70.

⁵⁵ It is unclear whether these were the eastern, Opuntian Locrians (*Xen. Hell.* 3.5.3) or the western, Ozolian Locrians (*Hell. Oxy.* 21.1 Chambers; Paus. 3.9.9).

The testimony of Lysias (see below) implies that the alliance was concluded before the battle of Haliartus, in which Lysander was killed, although Athens' role in the battle was peripheral (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1-7; Diod. 14.81.1-3; Plut. *Lys.* 29.1; Paus. 3.5.4-5).⁵⁶ Although no archon-date survives in the inscription, it is best to assign a date of early 395, in the archonship of Phormion (Diod. 14.54.1).

ET 1: IG 2² 14 = RO 6*

Findspot: fragment *a*: Acropolis, Athens; fragment *b*: near Eleusinion, Athens

Lettering: Attic-Ionic (ε sometimes used for ει and ο for ου)

Layout: *stoichedon* 30

[..]οι [- - - - -]

vacat

[συμ]μαχία Βοιω[τῶν καὶ Ἀ]θηναί[ων ἐς τὸ]-

[ν ἀεὶ] χρόνον. *vacat*

[ἐάν τ]ις ἴηι ἐπ[ὶ πολέμωι ἐπ Ἀθηναίος ἦ]

5 [κατὰ] γῆν ἢ κατ[ὰ θάλαττ]αν, βοηθῆν Βοι[ω]-

[τὸς π]αντὶ σθέ[νει καθ]ότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλ-

[ωσιν] Ἀθηναῖ[οι κατὰ τὸ] δυνατόν· καὶ ἐ[ά]-

[ν τις ἴ]ηι ἐπὶ [Βοιωτὸς ἐ]πὶ πολέμωι ἢ [κα]-

[τὰ γῆν ἢ] κατὰ [θάλατταν], βοηθῆν Ἀθηνα[ί]-

10 [ος παντὶ σθένει καθότι] ἂν ἐπαγγέλλ[ω]-

[σι Βοιωτοὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνα]τόν. ἐὰν δέ τ[ι δ]-

[οκῆι ἢ προσθεῖ]ναι ἢ ἀφελεῖ[ν Ἀθην[αί]ο]-

[ις καὶ Βοιωτοῖς κοινῆι βουλευομένο]-

[ις (?) - - - - -]

⁵⁶ Salmon 1984, 348-49; Liddel 2020, 134.

1 [θε]οί Koehler, *IG* 2¹ 16; doubted by Woodhead.

Alliance of the Boeotians and Athenians [for all] time. [If] anybody goes [against the Athenians for war either] by land or by sea, the Boeotians shall help with all their strength as the Athenians call on them, [as far as] possible; and if [anybody] goes against [the Boeotians] for war either [by land or] by [sea] the Athenians shall help [with all their strength as the Boeotians] call on them, [as far as] possible. If it is [decided to add or subtract anything] by the Athenians [and Boeotians deliberating jointly?]

...

(trans. Stephen Lambert and P.J. Rhodes, adapted)

...

LT 1: Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.16

τῶν δ' Ἀθηναίων πάμπολλοι μὲν συνηγόρευον, πάντες δ' ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς. Θρασύβουλος δὲ ἀποκρινάμενος τὸ ψήφισμα καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείκνυτο, ὅτι ἀτειχίστου τοῦ Πειραιῶς ὄντος ὅμως παρακινδυνεύοιεν χάριτα αὐτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι μείζονα ἢ ἔλαβον.

But as for the Athenians, very many spoke in support of him [sc. Thrasylbulus] and they voted unanimously to aid the Thebans. And Thrasylbulus, after giving the ambassadors the decree for an answer, pointed out also that, although Piraeus was without walls, they would nevertheless brave the danger of repaying to the Thebans a greater favour than they had received.

(trans. Carleton L. Brownson)

LT 2: Lys. 16.13

πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ὅτε τὴν συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσασθε πρὸς {τοῦς} Βοιωτοὺς καὶ εἰς Ἀλίαρτον ἔδει βοηθεῖν, ὑπὸ Ὀρθοβούλου κατειλεγμένος ἵππεύειν.

First of all, when you made your alliance with the Boeotians, and we had to go to the relief of Haliartus, I had been enrolled by Orthobulus for service in the cavalry.

(trans. W.R.M. Lamb)

LT 3: *FGrH* 328 Philochorus F 148 (= Σ Aristophanes *Eccl.* 193)

περὶ δὲ τοῦ συμμαχικοῦ Φιλόχορος ἱστορεῖ ὅτι πρὸ δύο ἐτῶν ἐγένετο συμμαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν.

Regarding the alliance, Philochorus narrates that an alliance between the Athenians and Boeotians came into being two years earlier.⁵⁷

(own trans.)

U. Koehler argues that **ET 1** l. 1 [...]οι corresponds to the final two letters of a θεοί-heading, which he accordingly restores as [θε]οί.⁵⁸ However, the letters are not spread across the full width of the stele as we would expect, and A.G. Woodhead thinks it likelier that [...]οι belongs to the last line of a separate text written on the same stone.⁵⁹ More recently, Matthaïou has suggested that ll. 0-1 are the remains of the treaty's prescript.⁶⁰ Since this is largely if not completely lost, we do not know who proposed the alliance, but P. Liddel proposes Thrasybulus.⁶¹ However, although Thrasybulus was undeniably vocal in his endorsement of the Boeotian alliance (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.16 = **LT 1**), it does not necessarily follow that he was the actual proposer of the decree.⁶²

Unsurprisingly, the Athenian-Boeotian alliance is defined as a συμμαχία both in the inscription (l. 2) and in literary testimonia (Lys. 16.13 = **LT 2**). It is a perpetual alliance as indicated by **ET 1** ll. 2-3 [ἐς τὸ | ν ἄεϊ] χρόνον, and ll. 4-11 outline the mutual obligations of both sides. Lines 11-14, if correctly restored, allow for amendments to be made to the treaty if both sides agree. The alliance is with the *Boeotians* (l. 2, restored at ll. 8, 11, 13), still a federal state in 395, and not with the Thebans alone. This is of key significance: since Lysander was already in Boeotia, though not in Thebes itself, when the alliance was made (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.6), the Athenians became belligerents automatically.⁶³

D 4.4

Athenian alliance with Locris

⁵⁷ Ar. *Eccl.* 193 refers vaguely to 'the alliance' (τὸ συμμαχικὸν αὐ̃ τοῦθ', ὅτ' ἐσκοπούμεθα). As Jones 2016 *ad FGh* 328 F 148 remarks, the uncertainty of the play's date makes it difficult to determine which alliance is being referred to; it may be the Boeotian-Athenian alliance of 395 as Philochorus implies, but another candidate is the broader 'Alliance of Corinth' (see below) between Athens, Argos, Corinth, and Boeotia, also dating to 395 (Diod. 14.81.1-3, 7 and Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.7-16 with Sommerstein 1998, 154-55).

⁵⁸ Köhler 1871, 1.

⁵⁹ Woodhead, comm. *Agora* 16 no. 34, p. 47.

⁶⁰ Matthaïou 2012, 14.

⁶¹ Liddel 2020, 134-35. *Contra* Develin 1989, 208.

⁶² Pace Van Wijk 2021, 3, it is not evident from Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.16-17 that, as Van Wijk writes, 'Thrasybulus then proposed a decree in response [sc. to the Theban embassy].'

⁶³ Krentz 1995, 200; *IACP* no. 221, p. 454; Hornblower 2011, 230; cf. comm. Tod 101, p. 14.

ca. 395 BCE

In contrast with the Boeotian alliance, Athens' alliance with Locris is known exclusively from an inscription (**ET 1**). It is unclear whether the Locrians concerned are the Ozolian (western) or Opuntian (eastern) Locrians. Both fought against Sparta in the Corinthian War (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.15 Λοκροὶ ἀμφοτέρω, but commentators note suggestively that only Opuntian Locris shared a border with Athens' ally Boeotia.⁶⁴ It is best to remain neutral on this point.

Historical context and the similarity of both script and formulae suggest that the Boeotian and Locrian alliances are, as M.N. Tod writes, 'almost, if not absolutely, contemporaneous.'⁶⁵ Also suggestive is the fact that the stele of the Locrian alliance was discovered on the north slope of the Acropolis, close to the Eleusinion where fr. *b* of the Boeotian alliance (**D 4.3 ET 1**) was found. This raises the intriguing possibility that both stelae were erected side by side. However, there is no hint of Locrian participation in Xenophon's detailed account of the Theban embassy to Athens (*Hell.* 3.5.7-16). Neither inscription contains a surviving prescript that would allow us to date them, but in the Boeotian case our ignorance is at least alleviated by the literary evidence. The same cannot be said for the Locrians.

ET 1: IG 2²15

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens (north slope)

Lettering: Ionic

Layout: *stoichedon*, uncertain line length

[-----]οσο[...⁸....]

[----- καθάπερ] τοῖς [Κορινθίοι]-

[ς¹⁵..... συμμαχία Ἀθη]ναίων καὶ Λ[οκρῶν ἐς]

[τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον· ἐάν τις ἴη ἐπ' Ἀθ]ηναίος ἐπὶ πολέμ[ωι ἢ κ]-

5 [ατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν, βοηθ]ῆεν Λοκρὸς παντὶ σθέν[ει κ]-

[αθότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσι Ἀθηνα]ῖοι κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. [καὶ ἐ]-

[άν τις ἴη ἐπὶ Λοκρὸς ἐπὶ πολέ]μωι ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ [θάλα]-

⁶⁴ Comm. Tod 102, p. 16; comm. RO 6, p. 41. The literary sources are contradictory: Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.3 depicts the Boeotians supporting the Opuntians, but *Hell. Oxy.* 21.2 Chambers and Paus. 3.9.9 state that it was the Ozolians.

⁶⁵ Comm. Tod 102, pp. 15-16.

[ατταν, βοηθῆν Ἀθηναίος παντί] σθένει καθότι ἂν ἐ[παγγ]-
 [έλλωσι Λοκροὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν]· ὅτι δ' ἂν ἄλλο δοκῆι Ἀ[θη]-
 10 [ναίοις καὶ Λοκροῖς συμβουλευομέ]νο[ις, τοῦτο κύριο[ν ε]-
 [ῖναι].

[Just as for] the [Corinthians] [Alliance] of the Athenians and Locrians [for all time. If anyone goes against] the Athenians for war [either by land or by sea], the Locrians shall assist them with all their strength, [in whatever way is requested by] the Athenians, to the best of their ability. [And if anyone goes against the Locrians for] war either by land or by [sea, the Athenians shall assist them with all] their strength, in whatever way is requested [by the Locrians, to the best of their ability]. And whatever else is resolved by the Athenians [and the Locrians] deliberating together, this [shall be] valid.

(own trans.)

Although [συμμαχία] at **ET 1** l. 3 is restored, we are clearly dealing with a military alliance, with formulae typical of alliances especially at ll. 4-6 and 8-9, only partially restored. Probably the alliance was perpetual: [τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον] at l. 4, although restored, aligns with **D 4.3 ET 1** ll. 2-3 [ἐς τὸ |ν ἀεὶ] χρόνον of the Boeotian alliance. Lines 9-11 of the present treaty seem to allow for later amendments to the alliance, dependent as usual on mutual agreement (συμβουλευομέ]νο[ις]).

D 4.5

Establishment of the Alliance of Corinth

395 BCE

The 'Alliance of Corinth' presently under consideration must not be confused with the League of Corinth established by Philip II in 338/37. It refers to the anti-Spartan coalition created during the Corinthian War, which had a common council (συνέδριον) at Corinth which was responsible for military planning and for recruiting new allies (Diod. 14.82 = **LT 1**).⁶⁶ The establishment of the συνέδριον is the first event which Diodorus reports for the archon-year 395/94 (archonship of Diophantus), on account of which C.D. Hamilton dates its creation to August or September 395.⁶⁷ This, by the way, may be relevant to the date of the Athenian-Locrian alliance (**D 4.4**):

⁶⁶ Cf. Accame 1951, 53; comm. *SdA* 2² no. 225, p. 172.

⁶⁷ Hamilton 1979, 211 with Diod. 14.81.3, 86.6; cf. Accame 1951, 53.

since Diodorus does not mention the Locrians at 14.82, this may imply that the Athenian-Locrian alliance did not yet exist. But it is equally possible that Diodorus simply forgot to mention the Locrians, or that they did not sit on the συνέδριον.

LT 1: Diod. 14.82.1

τούτων δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν παρειληφόντων Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Κορίνθιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, συμμαχίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐποιήσαντο. [2] ... καὶ πρῶτον μὲν συνέδριον κοινὸν ἐν τῇ Κορίνθῳ συστησάμενοι τοὺς βουλευσομένους ἔπεμπον καὶ κοινῶς διώκουν τὰ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρέσβεις εἰς τὰς πόλεις ἀποστέλλοντες πολλοὺς συμμάχους ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπέστησαν. [3] εὐθὺ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἢ τε Εὐβοία ἅπασα προσέθετο καὶ Λευκάδιοι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ἀκαρνανέες τε καὶ Ἀμβρακιῶται καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς οἱ πρὸς τῇ Θράκῃ. ... [7] ... μετὰ δὲ ταῦθ' ὁ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀφηγούμενος Ἰσμηνίας τοὺς μὲν Ἀργεῖους ἐν τῇ πόλει κατέλιπε φυλακῆς ἕνεκα, αὐτὸς δὲ πείσας ἀποστῆναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων Αἰνιᾶνας καὶ Ἀθαμᾶνας ἤθροισε παρά τε τούτων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων στρατιώτας.

After these men had assumed their magistracies the Boeotians and Athenians, together with the Corinthians and the Argives, concluded an alliance with each other. ... First of all, they set up a common Council in Corinth to which they sent representatives to form plans, and worked out in common the arrangements for the war. Then they dispatched ambassadors to the cities and caused many allies of the Lacedaemonians to withdraw from them; for at once all of Euboea and the Leucadians joined them, as well as the Acarnanians, Ambraciots, and the Chalcidians of Thrace. ... After this Ismenias, the leader of the Boeotians, left the Argives in the city to serve as its garrison and himself persuaded the Aenianians and the Athamanians to revolt from the Lacedaemonians and gathered soldiers from among them and their allies.

(trans. C.H. Oldfather)

J.B. Salmon reads Diod. 14.82.1 = **LT 1** συμμαχίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐποιήσαντο to imply that Athens, Boeotia, Corinth, and Argos each first concluded bilateral alliances with each of the others and only afterwards established the common συνέδριον.⁶⁸ It is certainly true that Athens and Boeotia, at least, had a pre-existing bilateral alliance, and even in the absence of documentary evidence for the other purported alliances Salmon's hypothesis is at least possible. But Diodorus uses the singular συμμαχίαν where he could have used the plural συμμαχίας, which suggests to me that he is referring to a single treaty, i.e., the Alliance of Corinth.

⁶⁸ Salmon 1984, 349; cf. Accame 1951, 55.

Other aspects of the Alliance of Corinth are more obscure. No formal charter is attested either epigraphically or by the literary sources, although the Alliance's organized structure seems to presuppose one. We also do not know whether the Alliance was intended as a purely temporary measure or was envisioned as a more permanent body. It must, in any case, have been abolished by the Spartan-dominated King's Peace (**D 4.8**) in 387/86.

Salmon characterizes the Alliance as primarily defensive rather than offensive in nature, with the aim of defending its members against Spartan aggression.⁶⁹ It was anti-imperialistic insofar as all members shared the common goal of opposing Spartan hegemony over Greece, though Hamilton stresses there is no evidence that its individual members renounced their own hegemonic ambitions.⁷⁰ The Alliance of Corinth recalls in certain respects the early years of the Delian League with its common congresses (ξύνοδοι) at Delos (Thuc. 1.96.2). Furthermore, when in 378/77 the Athenians partially revived the Delian League in the form of the Second Athenian Confederacy, they also established a συνέδριον of the allies, now based in Athens (Diod. 15.28.4; cf. *IG* 2² 43 = RO 22). The Alliance of Corinth was conceivably a source of inspiration.

The Alliance was expandable beyond the original membership of Boeotia, Athens, Corinth, and Argos. Apart from the communities recorded by Diodorus, they were likely joined by the Malians – who were at any rate contributing troops by the time of the battle of Nemea in 394 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.17) – while Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.4.1), Lysias (12.17), and Plato (*Tht.* 142c) also allude to the membership of Megara.⁷¹ But within the Peloponnese, most of the less important states remained loyal to Sparta or at least maintained neutrality (Diod. 14.82.4; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.13).⁷²

D 4.6

Athenian alliance with Eretria

394/93 BCE

The present treaty, an alliance between Athens and the Euboean city of Eretria, is known from an inscription (**ET 1**) consisting of two non-contiguous marble fragments separated by a lacuna, first identified as part of the same inscription by A. Wilhelm.⁷³ The assignment of the inscription's date based on the archon-year depends on the restoration of **ET 1** fragment *a*. ll. 5-

⁶⁹ Salmon 1984, 350.

⁷⁰ Hamilton 1978, 212-13.

⁷¹ Accame 1951, 61-62; Salmon 1984, 349 with n. 30; cf. Zahrnt 1971, 81.

⁷² Cf. Funke 1980, 71 n. 2.

⁷³ Comm. Tod 103, p. 16.

6, restored by the editors of *IG 2²* as Εὐβολίδη[ς ἦρχεν¹²..... | ἐπεστ]άτε· Γναθίο[ς εἶπε]. If this restoration is correct, the treaty must date to the archonship of Eubulides (394/93). However, P. Krentz identifies Eubulides not as the archon, but as the ἐπιστάτης. Krentz notes that *a. l. 3* [ἔ]δοξεν τῆι βολῆι is not followed by the expected καὶ τῶι δήμωι and argues that this is indicative of a decree passed during a period of oligarchic rule, and consequently assigns the treaty to 403/02. Whereas the editors of *IG 2²* supply [ς ἦρχεν¹².....] in the 18-letter gap following Εὐβολίδη, Krentz suggests that this space contained Eubulides' patronymic and demotic, so that *a. ll. 5-6*, taken together, would read Εὐβολίδη[ς] (patronymic, demotic) | ἐπεστ]άτε, Γναθίο[ς εἶπε ...].⁷⁴ This is admittedly epigraphically possible, but his argument that the absence of δῆμος in the prescript implies oligarchy is undermined by an honorary decree for Dionysius of Syracuse, definitively dated to 394/93 and which, for whatever reason, also reads ἔδοξεν τῆι βουλῆι, excluding τῶι δήμωι (Tod 108 l. 5).⁷⁵

A date of 403/02 can therefore largely be ruled out, but uncertainty remains over whether we should assign the treaty to 394/93 (archonship of Eubulides) or to 395/94 (archonship of Diophantus). Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.2.17) reports that at least 3000 men 'from all Euboea' (ἐξ Εὐβοίας ἀπάσης) fought in the battle of Nemea in summer 394, although the Eretrians are not specifically mentioned. If the Eretrians were among them, then we must consider the battle, which Diodorus places near the end of the archonship of Diophantus (14.83.2; cf. 82.1), to be a *terminus ante quem* for the present treaty.⁷⁶ Tod considers July 394 the best fit, both epigraphically and historically, for the alliance, followed closely by the battle of Nemea.⁷⁷ I second his view.

ET 1: *IG 2² 16*

Findspot: Acropolis, Athens

Lettering: Ionic

Layout: fragment *a ll. 1-2* in larger letters; fragment *a l. 3sqq.* mostly *stoichedon 32*

⁷⁴ Krentz 1979, 399.

⁷⁵ As pointed out by Knoepfler 1980, 462 n. 2. Krentz himself (1979, 399 n. 3) acknowledges the Dionysius inscription. See also Accame 1941, 235.

⁷⁶ Knoepfler 1980, 462 n. 2 places the battle of Nemea in early July 394, within the archonship of Diophantus, and the subsequent battle of Coronea in mid-August, by which point we are in the archonship of Eubulides. That some Athenian campaigning in the Corinthiad continued into the archon-year 394/93 is clear from *IG 2² 6217* = Tod 105, the epitaph of the Athenian cavalryman Dexileos, which reads in full: Δεξιλεως Λυσανίου Θορίκιος | ἐγένετο ἐπὶ Τεισάνδρου ἄρχοντος, | ἀπέθανε ἐπ' Εὐβουλίδου | ἐν Κορίνθωι τῶν πέντε ἰππέων. This need not imply, as Krentz 1979, 398-99 tentatively suggests, that Diodorus has incorrectly dated the battle of Nemea.

⁷⁷ Comm. Tod 103, p. 18.

fragment *a*

Ἐρετριέων [συμμαχία]
καὶ Ἀθηνα[ίων].
[ἔ]δοξεν τῆι βολῆι· [Ἀκαμαντὶς ἐπρυτάνευ]-
[εν], Χελωνίων Θεογ[.....¹²..... ἐγγραμμ]-
5 [άτε]υεν, Εὐβολίδη[ς ἦρχεν¹².....]
[έπεστ]άτε· Γναθίο[ς εἶπε· συμμαχος ἔναι Ἐ]-
[ρετριάς καὶ Ἀ]θην[αίος -----]

*lacuna*fragment *b*

[- - - - - κατὰ] τὸ [δ]υνατό[ν· ὅτι δ' ἂν δο]-
[κῆι ἄμεινον ἔναι τ]οῖν πολέοιν κοινῆ[ι βο]-
[λευομέναιν, τοῦτ]ο κύριον εἶ[ναι· [ὁ]μόσα[ι]
[δὲ Ἀθηναίων μὲν] τοὺς στρατηγο[ύς καὶ τῆ]-
5 [ν βολὴν καὶ τοὺς ἰ]ππέας, Ἐρετριέων δὲ τ[ούς]
[στρατηγούς καὶ] τὴν βολὴν καὶ το[ύς ἰπ]π[έ]-
[ας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας] ἀρχάς· ὑπάρχεν δ[ὲ ...]σ[.]
[.....¹³.....]ν· ὀμνύναι δὲ τ[ὸ]ν [ν]όμιμ[ο]-
[ν ὄρκον ἐκατέρο]υς τὸν παρὰ σφίσιν αὐτ[ο]-
10 [ῖς· ἐλέσθαι δὲ πρ]έσβες αὐτίκα μάλ[α] τῆ[ν β]-
[ουλὴν δέκα ἄνδρ]ας, πέντε μὲν ἐκ τῆς βο[ουλ]-
[ῆς, πέντε δὲ ἐξ ἰδι]ωτῶν, οἵτινες ἀπο[λήψο]-
[νται τοὺς ὄρκους πα]ρὰ Ἐρετ[ρ]ιέω[ν - - - -]

a 3 Ἀκαμαντὶς Wilhelm. *a* 3-6 [ἔ]δοξεν τῆι βολῆι [Ἀκαμαντὶς *or* Πανδιονὶς ἐπρυτάνευ | εν], Χελωνίων Θεογ[.....¹².....] [ἐγγραμμ|άτε]υεν, Εὐβολίδη[ς] [.....¹⁷..... | έπεστ]άτε, Γναθίο[ς εἶπε - - -] Krentz *a* 4 ΘΕΟΓ Koehler; ΘΕΟΠ Lolling. *b* 7-8 ὑπάρχεν δ[ὲ τὰς] σ[π|ονδὰς ἔτη ἐκατό]ν *or* ὑπάρχεν δ[ὲ τὴν]

σ[υμ|μαχίαν ἀείδιο]ν Knoepfler; ὑπάρχεν δὲ [τὰς] σ[π|ονδὰς] Matthaίου; ὑπάρχεν δ[ὲ τὴν] σ[υ|μμαχίαν] ἐς ἀίδιον Krentz.

[Alliance] of the Eretrians and Athenians. The council decided; [Akamantis was the prytany]; Chelonion son of Theog— was the secretary; Eubolides (394/93) [was archon; —] was chairman; Gnathius [proposed. The Eretrians and] Athenians [shall be allies] ...

lacuna

[... according to] their power. [And whatever is determined to be better] by the two cities [deliberating in common], this shall be valid. [Of the Athenians], the generals [and the council and the horsemen] shall swear; and of the Eretrians, [the generals and] the council and the horsemen [and the other] magistrates. And it shall begin Each side shall swear [the oath that is] customary among themselves. The [council] shall immediately [select] as envoys [ten] men, five from the council and [five] private citizens who shall receive [the oaths] from the Eretrians ...

(own trans.)

The formulaic language of the present treaty is highly suggestive of an alliance even if *a ll.* 1-2 [συμμάχος ἔναι Ἐ|ρετριᾶς καὶ Ἀ]θην[αίος] is almost entirely restored. Since there is no evidence that Athens and Eretria were in conflict immediately prior to 394, the attempt of Knoepfler and Matthaίου to restore [τὰς] σ[π|ονδὰς] to *b ll.* 7-8 should be rejected; Krentz's restoration [τὴν] σ[υ|μμαχίαν] is more plausible (see *apparatus criticus*).

The duration of the alliance is not preserved, but Tod argues that εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, in keeping with the alliances with Boeotia (certainly) and Locris (possibly), appeared in the lacuna.⁷⁸ Krentz agrees regarding the absence of a time limit, but restores the relevant formula to *b ll.* 7-8: ὑπάρχεν δ[ὲ τὴν] σ[υμ|μαχίαν] ἐς ἀίδιον.⁷⁹ However, this exceeds the 32-letter *stoichedon* by one letter, as does ὑπάρχεν δ[ὲ τὰς] σ[π|ονδὰς] ἔτη ἑκατόν (suggested as a possibility by Knoepfler). But Knoepfler also canvasses the possibility of reading ἀείδιο]ν in place of ἐς ἀίδιον, and because this respects the *stoichedon* it is to be preferred.⁸⁰

The Athenian oath-takers consist of the generals, the members of the Boule, and the cavalrymen (*b ll.* 3-5, [τὴν βολὴν] restored). Their Eretrian counterparts, as well as 'the other magistrates' ([τὰς ἄλλας] ἀρχάς), comprise the Eretrian oath-takers (*b ll.* 5-7, [στρατηγούς]

⁷⁸ Comm. Tod 103, p. 17.

⁷⁹ Krentz 1979, 400.

⁸⁰ Knoepfler 1980, 464 with n. 10, 466-67, 469.

restored).⁸¹ The Athenian oath-administrators consist of a total of ten men, five of whom are members of the Boule and five ἰδιωταί, that is, private citizens (*b ll.* 10-13).

D 4.7

Athenian alliance with Evagoras of Salamis

ca. 390 BCE

Evagoras I had been ruler of the Cypriot city of Salamis since ca. 411, albeit initially as a subordinate of the Persian king. He nevertheless cultivated strong connections with Athens and was even made an Athenian citizen, as recorded by an Athenian decree of ca. 410 (*IG* 1³ 113; cf. *Isoc.* 9.54; [Dem.] 12.10).⁸² Following the battle of Aegospotami, Evagoras offered asylum to the Athenian general Conon (*Xen. Hell.* 2.1.29; *Diod.* 13.106.6). Evagoras supplied the Persian fleet which, under the command of Conon and Pharnabazus, broke Sparta's naval power at Cnidus in 394 (*Isoc.* 9.56; cf. *Lys.* 19.28; *Xen. Hell.* 4.3.10). The grateful Athenians erected statues of both Conon and Evagoras in the Agora (*Isoc.* 9.56-57; *Paus.* 1.3.2), and a surviving honorary decree for Evagoras (*IG* 2² 20 = RO 11) also belongs to this period.⁸³

G. Cawkwell and P.J. Stylianos argue that the present treaty likely dates to the summer of 390.⁸⁴ By this time, Evagoras' attempts to expand his domains led the Cypriot cities of Soli, Amathus, and Citium to complain to Artaxerxes II, bringing Evagoras and the Artaxerxes into open conflict (*Diod.* 14.98.2). Evagoras was supported by the Carian satrap Hecatomnus (*Diod.* 15.2.3; cf. *Isoc.* 4.162) and, as the testimonia below reveal, by Athens. C. Tuplin makes the best case for assigning the present treaty, which is known only from literary sources, to ca. 390: 'We can therefore be quite certain that that war had started by 390/89, and reasonably certain that its inception was fairly recent, since it is likely that Evagoras' request for Athenian assistance was motivated precisely by Artaxerxes' decision to respond to appeals from Amathus, Soli and Citium by going to war with him.'⁸⁵

LT 1: *Xen. Hell.* 4.8.24

⁸¹ *Strab.* 10.1.10 claims to have seen a stele in the sanctuary of Artemis Amarysia in Eretria on which a population of 600 Eretrian ἰππῆς was recorded. He does not attempt to date the stele.

⁸² For the date of the inscription see Lambert 2020, 65 with n. 207.

⁸³ See further Funke 1983.

⁸⁴ Cawkwell 1976, 274; Stylianos 1988, 469.

⁸⁵ Tuplin 1983, 178. Evagoras was eventually assassinated in 374/73 (*Diod.* 15.47.8; cf. *Arist. Pol.* 1311b; *FGrH* 115 Theopompus F 103.12).

ὁ δὲ Τελευτίας ἔπλει εἰς τὴν Ῥόδον, ἤδη ἔχων ναῦς ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι· πλέων δὲ περιτυγχάνει Φιλοκράτει τῷ Ἐφιάλτου πλέοντι μετὰ δέκα τριήρων Ἀθήνηθεν εἰς Κύπρον ἐπὶ συμμαχίᾳ τῆ Εὐαγόρου, καὶ λαμβάνει πάσας, ὑπεναντιώτατα δὴ ταῦτα ἀμφότεροι ἑαυτοῖς πράττοντες· οἳ τε γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι φίλῳ χρώμενοι βασιλεῖ συμμαχίαν ἔπεμπον Εὐαγόρᾳ τῷ πολεμοῦντι πρὸς βασιλέα, ὃ τε Τελευτίας Λακεδαιμονίων πολεμούντων βασιλεῖ τοὺς πλέοντας ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκείνου πολέμῳ διέφθειρεν.

Then Teleutias continued his voyage to Rhodes, having now twenty-seven ships; and while sailing thither he fell in with Philocrates, the son of Ephialtes, sailing with ten triremes from Athens to Cyprus for the purpose of aiding Evagoras, and captured all ten. Both parties were acting in this affair in a manner absolutely opposed to their own interests; for the Athenians, although they had the King for a friend, were sending aid to Evagoras who was making war upon the King, and Teleutias, although the Lacedaemonians were at war with the King, was destroying people who were sailing to make war upon him.

(trans. Carleton L. Brownson)

LT 2: Lys. 19.21

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐπειδὴ οἱ πρέσβεις ἦκον ἐκ Κύπρου ἐπὶ τὴν βοήθειαν, ... ὑμεῖς δὲ <δέκα>* τριήρεις αὐτοῖς ἔδοτε καὶ τᾶλλα ἐψηφίσασθε, ἀργυρίου δ' εἰς τὸν ἀπόστολον ἠπόρου.

* δέκα add. Westermann, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.24.

Next, when the envoys had arrived from Cyprus to procure our assistance ... you had granted them ten warships, and had voted all the material, but they were in need of money for the dispatch of the fleet.

(trans. W.R.M. Lamb)

Scholars dispute whether or not Athens' support for Evagoras was the result of a formal treaty. Tuplin, for example, argues that Xenophon's characterization of the agreement as a συμμαχία (LT 1) does not necessarily indicate a formal alliance.⁸⁶ On the other hand, P. Liddel believes that even the relatively small amount of support given to Evagoras presupposes a formal treaty ratified by an Athenian ψήφισμα, and this is further implied by Lysias' use of the verb ἐψηφίσασθε (LT 2).⁸⁷

Cawkwell raises the possibility that the ten ships attested by Xenophon and restored to the text of Lysias are identical with the ten (or twelve) ships that the Athenians were allowed to retain

⁸⁶ Tuplin 1983, 172 n. 11.

⁸⁷ Liddel 2020, 172-73.

under the terms of their surrender to Sparta in 404.⁸⁸ This is rightly contested by Liddel, noting that the Athenians had already cast off the Spartan yoke in 395 and are not likely to have waited long before constructing new triremes.⁸⁹

A second Athenian intervention in support of Evagoras' occurred in 387 when an Athenian force commanded by Chabrias sailed to – and this time reached – Cyprus (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.10). The present treaty probably remained valid after Philocrates' abortive expedition, and Chabrias' voyage was carried out in accordance with its terms.

D 4.8

King's Peace (Peace of Antalcidas)

387/86 BCE

In the context of the Corinthian War, the possibility of a peace treaty is first known to have been discussed at Sardis in spring 392, as reported by Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.8.12-16).⁹⁰ Upon discovering that the Athenians were using Persian money to rebuild their walls and fleet, the Spartan envoy Antalcidas went to Tiribazus, satrap of Lydia, offering that Sparta would recognize Persian rule over the Greek cities of Asia Minor and that the Greek cities elsewhere should be autonomous.⁹¹ However, Antalcidas was thwarted when representatives from Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos protested (*Hell.* 4.8.13). A blanket autonomy clause would have forced the Athenians to concede the cleruchies of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros; the Thebans to dissolve Boeotian federation; and the Argives to end their union with Corinth (4.8.15).⁹²

A subsequent round of negotiations supposedly took place at Sparta. This is known not from Xenophon but from the speech *De Pace*, attributed to Andocides. This was purported to have taken place in 391, since the author states that the Corinthian War, which began in 395, had already been going on for four years ([Andoc.] 3.20).⁹³ The authenticity of *De Pace* is accepted by several scholars, but strongly and convincingly rejected by E. Harris, who dismisses it as a rhetorical exercise dating to the Hellenistic or Roman periods.⁹⁴ First of all, as Harris argues,

⁸⁸ Cawkwell 1976, 275 n. 20.

⁸⁹ Liddel 2020, 176.

⁹⁰ For the date see Ryder 1965, 27 with Appendix XII.

⁹¹ Cf. Hampl 1938, 85ff.; Heuß 1938, 161; Ryder 1965, 28; Quass 1991; Urban 1991.

⁹² Pl. *Menex.* 245b-c perhaps too optimistically ascribes the Athenians' objections to their reluctance to abandon the Asiatic Greeks to Persia.

⁹³ Cf. Harris 2021, 38.

⁹⁴ Authenticity accepted by Hamilton 1979, 234-37, Devoto 1986, Edwards 1995, 107-08, and Moroo 2023. *Contra* Harris 2000 and 2021.

references to historical events (παραδείγματα) in preserved speeches before the Athenian Assembly – which is what *De Pace* purports to be – are typically brief and succinct, but the speaker in *De Pace* engages in extended excurses which are more typical of lawcourt speeches.⁹⁵ Secondly, and more importantly, *De Pace* is riddled with historical inaccuracies. If speakers in the Assembly wished to maintain their credibility, they could not afford to misrepresent recent events, and were held to a much higher standard of factual accuracy than in lawcourt speeches.⁹⁶ For example, the speaker implies that Athens had neither ships nor walls in 391 ([Andoc.] 3.36). But Athenian warships are attested at the battle of Cnidus in 394 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.10-12; cf. Diod. 14.83.4-7), and as for the walls, both literary (*FGrH* 328 Philochorus F 40a-b; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9-10; Diod. 14.85.3; Dem. 20.68, 72-74) and epigraphic sources (*SEG* 19.145; *IG* 2² 1660) confirm that their reconstruction was already underway in ca. 395/94.⁹⁷ P.J. Rhodes acknowledges this evidence, but interprets Andocides to mean that Athens was offered Sparta's permission to *keep* its newly-reconstructed walls and ships.⁹⁸ According to Harris, however, the clear but inaccurate implication of [Andoc.] 3.36-37 is that Athens still lacked walls and ships *in 391*, indicating that 'this passage must have been written long after 391 by someone who knew very little about the historical circumstances of the period.'⁹⁹ Additionally, the speechwriter's chronology of Athenian foreign affairs in the late-5th century is confused: he places Athens' decision to support the rebel satrap Amorges *before* the Sicilian expedition (3.29, 31); but we know from Thucydides that the Sicilian expedition began in 415, while the Athenians did not declare their support for Amorges until late summer 412 (Thuc. 6.6-8; 8.28.2-4).¹⁰⁰ Lastly, the speech implies ([Andoc.] 3.26-27, 32, 41) that the union of Corinth and Argos had not yet occurred by 391, but this contradicts both Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.4.6; cf. 4.5.1, 4.8.15) and Diodorus (14.92.1), who place it in 393 or 392.¹⁰¹

We can therefore safely discount the historicity of the Spartan peace conference of 391 and return to the more securely attested events leading up to the King's Peace. As early as 392, the Athenians resumed collection of the εικοστή, a five percent tax on allied trade first levied in 413 as a temporary substitute for φόρος (Diod. 14.94.2; *IG* 2² 28 = RO 18 l. 7-8; cf. Thuc. 7.28.4).¹⁰² Thrasybulus' campaign in the Aegean was marked by a number of incidents recalling 5th century Athenian imperialism, such as the imposition of democracy on Byzantium (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.27) and

⁹⁵ Harris 2021, 27-28.

⁹⁶ Harris 2021, 19.

⁹⁷ Harris 2021, 30; cf. Theodoraki 2020, 27-28.

⁹⁸ Rhodes 2016, 185.

⁹⁹ Harris 2021, 31.

¹⁰⁰ Harris 2021, 32; cf. Westlake 1989, 108.

¹⁰¹ Harris 2021, 45 n. 54; see further Griffith 1950 and Kagan 1962.

¹⁰² Cf. Ryder 1965, 34. Diod. 14.94.2, set in summer 392, writes that '[Thrasybulus] sailed to Ionia and collected funds from the allies' (οὗτος δὲ πλεύσας εἰς Ἰωνίαν καὶ χρήματα λαβὼν παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων). This is specifically identified as the 'εικοστή from the time of Thrasybulus' (τὴν ἐπὶ | Θρασυβούλο εἰκοστήν) at *IG* 2² 28 ll. 7-8, securely dated to 387/86 (cf. the archon-date at l. 1). On this inscription see further comm. RO 18, pp. 78-79.

the plundering of cities such as Aspendus that resisted Athenian influence (4.8.30; Thrasybulus was killed in a skirmish there). As we have seen, Athens also lent its support to Evagoras of Salamis in his revolt against Artaxerxes (Diod. 14.98; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.24; 5.1.10).

‘The Spartans had apparently continued their diplomatic pressure on the Persians,’ writes T.T.B. Ryder, and in 387/86, the diplomatically active Antalcidas persuaded Artaxerxes to dictate a peace to the Greeks with the added threat that, if they did not accept it, he would switch his allegiance to the Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.25).¹⁰³ With the support of Tiribazus, a Spartan fleet under Antalcidas’ command quickly secured control of the Hellespont, which blocked Athens’ crucial grain route via the Black Sea (5.1.28). This immediately sparked fears that Athens would be starved out and besieged as after Aegospotami; the Argives meanwhile faced an imminent Spartan invasion of the Argolid (5.1.29). Aware of the new appetite for peace among Sparta’s enemies, Tiribazus summoned their envoys to Sardis to hear the peace terms proposed by Artaxerxes (5.1.30).¹⁰⁴ These terms, which were accepted, and the events that immediately followed are detailed in the testimonia below.

LT 1: Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31

Ἄρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομενὰς καὶ Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι πλὴν Λήμνου καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου· ταύτας δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, τούτοις ἐγὼ πολεμήσω μετὰ τῶν ταῦτα βουλομένων καὶ πεζῇ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν.

King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties does not accept this peace, upon them I will make war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money.

(trans. Carleton L. Brownson)

LT 2: Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.35

¹⁰³ Ryder 1965, 34-35.

¹⁰⁴ Badian 1991, 36 speculates that Antalcidas was heavily involved in composing the treaty, which was formally a royal *Diktat*. The Peace did in fact heavily favour Sparta’s interests, some of which (e.g., the independence of the Boeotian cities from Thebes and the political separation of Argos and Corinth) were of little concern even to the Achaemenid empire’s western satraps, still less to Artaxerxes himself.

ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐπράχθη καὶ ὤμωμόκεσαν αἱ πόλεις ἐμμενεῖν ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἣν κατέπεμψε βασιλεὺς, ἐκ τούτου διελύθη μὲν τὰ πεζικά, διελύθη δὲ καὶ τὰ ναυτικά στρατεύματα. Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν δὴ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις οὕτω μετὰ τὸν ὕστερον πόλεμον τῆς καθαιρέσεως τῶν Ἀθήνησι τειχῶν αὕτη πρώτη εἰρήνη ἐγένετο. [36] ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἀντιρρόπως τοῖς ἐναντίοις πράττοντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης. προστάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττοντες, προσέλαβον μὲν σύμμαχον Κόρινθον, αὐτονόμους δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων τὰς Βοιωτίδας πόλεις ἐποίησαν, οὐπὲρ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν, ἔπαυσαν δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖους Κόρινθον σφετεριζομένους, φρουρὰν φήναντες ἐπ' αὐτούς, εἰ μὴ ἐξίοιεν ἐκ Κορίνθου.

When these things had been accomplished and the states had sworn that they would abide by the treaty which the King had proposed, thereupon the armies were disbanded and the naval armaments were likewise disbanded. Thus it was that this peace was established between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians and their allies, the first since the outbreak of the war which followed the destruction of the walls of Athens. Now while in the war the Lacedaemonians were no more than holding their own with their antagonists, yet as a result of the so-called Peace of Antalcidas they gained a far more distinguished position. For by having become champions of the treaty proposed by the King and by establishing the independence of the cities they gained an additional ally in Corinth, made the Boeotian cities independent of the Thebans, a thing which they had long desired, and also put a stop to the doings of the Argives in appropriating Corinth as their own, by threatening to call out the ban against them if they did not depart from Corinth.

(trans. Carleton L. Brownson)

LT 3: Polyb. 1.6.1

ἔτος μὲν οὖν ἐνειστήκει μετὰ μὲν τὴν ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς ναυμαχίαν ἐννεακαίδέκατον, πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχης ἐκκαίδέκατον, [2] ἐν ᾧ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν τὴν ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου λεγομένην εἰρήνην πρὸς βασιλέα τῶν Περσῶν ἐκύρωσαν.

It was in the nineteenth year after the sea-fight at Aegospotami, and the sixteenth before the battle at Leuctra; the year in which the Lacedaemonians made what it is called the Peace of Antalcidas with the King of Persia.

(trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh)

LT 4: Diod. 14.110.3

διαλεχθέντος δ' αὐτοῦ περὶ ᾧ ἦν ἀπεσταλμένος ἐνδεχομένως, ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔφησεν ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰρήνην· τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ὑπὸ βασιλέα τετάχθαι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους Ἑλληνας ἅπαντας αὐτονόμους εἶναι· τοῖς δὲ ἀπειθοῦσι καὶ μὴ προσδεχομένοις τὰς συνθήκας διὰ τῶν εὐδοκούντων πολεμήσειν.

Antalcidas discussed as well as he could the circumstances of his mission and the King agreed to make peace on the following terms: 'The Greek cities of Asia are subject to the King, but all the other Greeks shall be independent; and upon those who refuse compliance and do not accept these terms I shall make war through the aid of those who consent to them.'

(trans. C.H. Oldfather)

LT 5: Plut. Ages. 23.1

ἐπεὶ δὲ Κόνων καὶ Φαρνάβαζος τῷ βασιλέως ναυτικῷ θαλαττοκρατοῦντες ἐπόρθουν τὰ παράλια τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἐτειχίσθη δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Φαρναβάζου χρήματα δόντος, ἔδοξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς βασιλέα· καὶ πέμπουσιν Ἀνταλκίδαν πρὸς Τιρίβαζον, αἰσχίστα καὶ παρανομώτατα τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας Ἕλληνας, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐπολέμησεν Ἀγησίλαος, βασιλεῖ παραδιδόντες.

When Conon and Pharnabazus with the Great King's fleet were masters of the sea and were ravaging the coasts of Laconia, and after the walls of Athens had been rebuilt with the money which Pharnabazus furnished, the Lacedaemonians decided to make peace with the king of Persia. To that end, they sent Antalcidas to Tiribazus, and in the most shameful and lawless fashion handed over to the King the Greeks resident in Asia, in whose behalf Agesilaus had waged war.

(trans. Bernadotte Perrin)

LT 6: Plut. Artax. 21.5

ὁ δὲ Ἀνταλκίδας Σπαρτιάτης ἦν, Λέοντος υἱός, καὶ σπουδάσας βασιλεῖ διεπράξατο τὰς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις Ἑλληνίδας ἀπάσας καὶ νήσους, ὅσαι προσκυροῦσιν Ἀσίᾳ, παρεῖναι Λακεδαιμονίους αὐτῷ κεκτῆσθαι φόρων ὑποτελεῖς.

Now Antalcidas was a Spartan, son of Leon, and acting in the interests of the king he induced the Lacedaemonians to surrender to the king all the Greek cities of Asia, and all the islands adjacent to Asia, to possess them on payment of tribute.

(trans. Bernadotte Perrin)

Only one of the above testimonia can be reasonably considered an 'official' source, and this is the rescript of the Peace as preserved by Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.31 = **LT 1**). This passage, E. Badian suggests, is 'no doubt based on the original Aramaic, and quite possibly the official translation of it (since Xenophon must have known the document).'¹⁰⁵ K. Schmidt goes so far as to argue

¹⁰⁵ Badian 1991, 41.

that the rescript *was* the peace treaty, the brevity of which would have been useful to Sparta because this allowed for a wider permissible range of interpretations.¹⁰⁶ In the Greek treaty-making tradition, even a short peace treaty must provide details regarding such matters as the exchange of oaths and (if applicable) the publication of the text. But, given how little we know of Persian diplomatic practice, we must not automatically assume that a longer, fuller version of the King's Peace did indeed exist.

Cyprus, Clazomenae, and the Greek cities of mainland Asia Minor were explicitly excluded from the general autonomy guarantee. Cyprus had belonged continuously to the Achaemenid realm throughout the 5th and early-4th centuries and was part of the Fifth Satrapy, with local rule exercised by a collection of vassal kings such as Evagoras (Hdt. 3.91.1; Diod. 16.42.4).¹⁰⁷ The cities of the Ionian dodecapolis including Clazomenae were not, on the other hand, controlled by Persia immediately prior to the Corinthian War. Clazomenae is mentioned separately in the prescript because, as an island πόλις, it was not considered to belong to 'Asia.'¹⁰⁸ Hornblower suggests that Athenian interference in Clazomenae near the end of the Corinthian War, epigraphically attested by an Athenian decree of 387/86 (*JG* 2² 27 = RO 18), sufficiently alarmed Artaxerxes that he thought it prudent to insist on Persian control.¹⁰⁹ Clazomenae was also strategically important, as S. Rudzicka emphasizes, and was a site for mustering naval forces (Diod. 15.2.2).¹¹⁰ In addition to Clazomenae, all of the mainland cities of the Ionian dodecapolis (cf. Hdt. 1.142) fell to Persia. These were Miletus, Myus, Priene, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teos, Phocaea, and Erythrae. As a result, only the island-based Samos and Chios retained their autonomy.¹¹¹ It is a matter of debate whether Artaxerxes took the mainland territories (περαΐαι) even of Samos and Chios.¹¹²

Agésilas' insistence that the Thebans allow the Boeotian cities to swear the Peace individually (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.33) spelled the end of the Boeotian federation, although it would be re-established in 378 (*Hell.* 5.4.63; 6.1.1; Isoc. 14.9; Diod. 15.28.1).¹¹³ R. Seager suggests that, with Thebes temporarily deprived of its dominance over Boeotia, Plataea (destroyed in 426: Thuc. 3.68.3) was returned to the Plataeans immediately (cf. Paus. 9.1.4) and not in 382 when the

¹⁰⁶ Schmidt 1999, 85.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Maier at *IACP* pp. 1223-25.

¹⁰⁸ For the geography of Clazomenae see Paus. 7.3.9; Strab. 14.1.36.

¹⁰⁹ Hornblower 2011, 232.

¹¹⁰ Rudzicka 1983.

¹¹¹ Cf. Rubinstein at *IACP* p. 1058.

¹¹² Hornblower 1982, 128, demonstrates that non-Ionian Tenedos (in the Troad) and Rhodes lacked περαΐαι in the mid-4th century and ascribes this to the King's Peace; cf. Seager 1994a, 118. For the possibility that at least some island πόλεις retained their περαΐαι after 387/86, see Debord 1999, 264-72. Only Cos is certainly known *not* to have possessed a περαΐα at the time of the King's Peace: Robert 1951, 11 n. 1; Sherwin-White 1978, 31-32.

¹¹³ Cf. Buckler 1980, 15-45; Hansen at *IACP*, p. 432.

Spartans seized the Theban Cadmea (Isoc. 14, hypoth.).¹¹⁴ V. Martin suggests that the autonomy clause was accompanied by the statement that the Greeks should ‘possess their own territory’ (ἔχοντες τὴν ἑαυτῶν). However, Martin’s argument is largely based on the testimony of the Roman historian Justin (6.6.1 *civitatibus libertatem suaque omnia restituit*), who is far too late and weak a source to justify arguments of this nature.¹¹⁵

Nevertheless, as Ryder observes, the expression ἔχοντες τὴν ἑαυτῶν does appear in much more reliable sources in connection with earlier agreements, notably the Oath of Plataea (Thuc. 2.71.2) and the Peace of Lichas (5.79.1 = **D 3.4 LT 1**). Isocrates (8.16) also uses this phrase in connection with a later treaty, which Ryder identifies as the Common Peace of 375 (on which see also Diod. 15.38; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1).¹¹⁶ In the same passage, Isocrates claims that this later treaty required foreign garrisons to be dismantled. Whether there was an identical or similar clause in the King’s Peace is uncertain but at least possible. Xenophon reports that Agesilaus forced the Argives to withdraw their garrison from Corinth under threat of war and connects this with the King’s Peace (*Hell.* 5.1.34-35). Admittedly there may have been a specific clause applying to the Argive garrison only, but it is also possible to interpret Agesilaus’ demand to be a logical consequence of the autonomy clause, against which the presence of foreign garrisons was considered a violation.¹¹⁷

In earlier scholarship it was fashionable to insert a clause limiting the size of the Athenian fleet, but this is now considered unlikely.¹¹⁸ A clause of the Theban-dictated Common Peace treaty of 367 requiring ‘that the Athenians ground their ships’ (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.36 καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς) provoked such outrage that the Athenian ambassador Timagoras was sentenced to death by the Assembly for having agreed to it (7.1.38). But there is not a whiff of evidence that the Athenian fleet was reduced under the King’s Peace, and much circumstantial evidence against it, since Athens needed a fleet to protect its coasts and shipping lanes from pirates and hostile states and to ensure effective lines of communication with Imbros, Scyros, and Lemnos, which were now guaranteed Athenian cleruchies. And as M. Clark stresses, Athens could hardly have made a credible alliance with Chios in 384/83 (*IG* 2² 34 = RO 20) without the naval power to back it up.¹¹⁹ When the Athenians were forced to give up most of their ships in 404, they were facing

¹¹⁴ Seager 1994b, 156.

¹¹⁵ Martin 1944, 26.

¹¹⁶ Ryder 1965, 122.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Jehne 1994, 39-40; Seager 1994a, 118; Buckler 2003, 171. *Contra* Ryder 1965, 122.

¹¹⁸ That the King’s Peace imposed limitations on the Athenian fleet was argued by Judeich 1927, 189; Cawkwell 1973, 51-54; Cawkwell 1981, 74-76; Kallet-Marx 1985, 146 n. 84; Schmitz 1988, 244. This was challenged by Sinclair 1978, 31-34 and Clark 1990, 56-65.

¹¹⁹ Clark 1990, 60.

imminent starvation and the physical destruction of their city, but they would never have agreed to such punitive terms in 387/86.¹²⁰

Xenophon records the return of Corinthian exiles to their native city in 387/86 (*Hell.* 5.1.34-35) but does not explicitly associate this with the King's Peace. However, in Xenophon's *Agésilas*, the eponymous king is depicted as opposing the Peace until both Corinth and Thebes agreed to allow the return of pro-Spartan exiles (*Xen. Ages.* 2.21). It was on the basis of such evidence that Cawkwell in 1973 entertained the possibility of an exiles clause.¹²¹ By 1981, however, he had come to reject his earlier view because none of the later attested Common Peace treaties contain such a clause.¹²² Even if Xenophon at *Hell.* 5.1.34-35 does not explicitly associate the return of the Corinthian exiles in 387/86 with the King's Peace, the date alone hardly allows for a different context, and this is bolstered by the information which Xenophon gives us in the *Agésilas*.

Badian argues that the Corinthian War was, from Persia's perspective, a bilateral conflict between Sparta and its allies on one side and the anti-Spartan powers, including Persia, on the other, rather than a multilateral war in which each state was counted as an individual belligerent. Therefore, he argues, the King's Peace was also bilateral in nature.¹²³ In the rescript at *Xen. Hell.* 5.1.31 (**LT 1**), Artaxerxes threatens war on 'whichever of the two' sides that does not accept the Peace (ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται). As the lexicographers note, ὁπότερος indicates duality, and Xenophon's commentator G.E. Underhill likewise interprets the ὁπότεροι of the prescript to indicate two, and no more than two, parties.¹²⁴

But some aspects of the Peace, such as the autonomy guarantee, necessarily affected a very large number of cities. And many cities swore individually, notably the πόλεις of Boeotia (*Hell.* 5.1.32), not because they were major powers in their own right but because this confirmed the breakup of the Boeotian confederation as Agesilaus demanded. Corinth must also have sworn for itself so as to terminate the union with Argos (cf. 5.1.34), as probably did the individual member-states of the Peloponnesian League (cf. *Thuc.* 4.119.2; 5.18.9), which would have allowed Sparta to keep up the pretense that it respected its allies' autonomy.¹²⁵ The Spartan siege of Mantinea in 385 resulted in the forcible breakup of Mantinea into its constituent villages (*διοικισμός*: *Xen. Hell.* 5.2.7; *Isoc.* 8.100; *FGrH* 70 Ephorus F 79; *Polyb.* 4.27.6; cf. *Diod.* 15.2.2; *Isoc.* 4.126).¹²⁶ It is tempting to connect this with the autonomy clause of the King's Peace, against which the Spartans may have opportunistically claimed that the existence of a

¹²⁰ Cf. Cawkwell 1981, 76.

¹²¹ Cawkwell 1973, 59 n. 1.

¹²² Cawkwell 1981, 83; cf. Jehne 1994, 39.

¹²³ Badian 1991, 37; cf. Lewis 1977, 147 with n. 79.

¹²⁴ LSJ⁹ s.v. ὁπότερος; Underhill 1900, 175; cf. Badian 1991, 37 n. 25.

¹²⁵ Cf. Badian 1991, 40.

¹²⁶ The original synoecism of Mantinea is not datable: Hodkinson and Hodkinson 1981, 257-61. The *διοικισμός* was reversed in 370, after Sparta's defeat at Leuctra (*Xen. Hell.* 6.5.3-5).

unified Mantinean state was a violation, but Xenophon's record of Spartan grievances against Mantinea (*Hell.* 5.2.1-2) makes no mention of the King's Peace.¹²⁷ Other states, such as Phocis and Locris, have not been heard from since 394 (*Xen. Hell.* 4.3.21ff.) and may have dropped out of the war before 387/86, in which case they probably did not swear.¹²⁸ The 'duality' of the Peace suggested by Badian and Underhill more probably reflects the Persian perspective, by which Greece was treated as one large bloc, rather than the messy reality of the politically fragmented Greek world.

Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.36 = **LT 2**) claims that the Spartans became προστάται, roughly 'guarantors' or 'defenders,' of the King's Peace. This is accepted by Cawkwell, noting that it was to the Spartans, not the Persians, that the Acanthians appealed in 382 against the encroachments of the Chalcidian federation.¹²⁹ Conversely, Isocrates claims that the role of guarantor – he uses the phrase φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης – fell to the Persians (4.175; cf. 4.121). And Isocrates, unlike Xenophon, invites his audience to view the inscribed text of the Peace for themselves (4.120), where one could presumably confirm this. Lewis, who disagrees with Cawkwell's conclusions, argues that the 'periphrastic way in which the King in 367 indicated his switch to the Thebans' (*Plut. Pel.* 30.7) also speaks against Spartan 'presidency.'¹³⁰ Nevertheless, if the task of enforcing the Peace did not fall to Sparta *de jure*, it certainly did so *de facto*. As Seager stresses, 'It was simply that the favour of Persia and her own military strength made Sparta able to interpret the terms of the peace to her own advantage and to enforce her will on the other Greek states.'¹³¹ In practice, Artaxerxes seems to have had little interest in enforcing the Peace beyond what was necessary to maintain his grip on mainland Asia Minor, Clazomenae, and Cyprus. Sparta faced little difficulty in interpreting the Peace, and especially its autonomy clause, to its own advantage, preserving the Peloponnesian League and its own hegemonical position within it while abolishing both the Boeotian federation – albeit only temporarily – as well as the union of Corinth and Argos.¹³²

¹²⁷ Funke 2004 argues that the *διοικισμος* of Mantinea was in fact a *violation* of at least the spirit of the King's Peace, and that Sparta's actions can be understood as a response to a treaty of συμπολιτεία (probably early-4th century but not precisely dated) between Mantinea and Helisson (*SEG* 37.340).

¹²⁸ Badian 1991, 39 with n. 29; Jehne 1994, 26 n. 91.

¹²⁹ Cawkwell 1973, 53.

¹³⁰ Lewis 1977, 147 n. 80.

¹³¹ Seager 1994a, 118-19.

¹³² Cf. Salmon 1984, 368-69; Badian 1991, 40.

Chapter 6

Undated treaties

Introduction

This chapter examines one treaty – the Spartan treaty with the Erxadieis – for which I have been unable to determine a reasonably precise date. Nevertheless, as shall be seen, there is enough evidence to place this treaty within the period with which this dissertation is concerned, and its inclusion is further justified by the fact that it is the only known inscribed Spartan treaty of the Classical period.

D 5.1

Spartan treaty with the Erxadieis

The present treaty, recovered on the acropolis of Sparta, represents one of very few surviving Spartan inscriptions of the Classical period. It contains the only attested mention of a mysterious people called the Erxadieis who, based on internal evidence (**ET 1** l. 1, below) seem to have been a subgroup of Aetolians. Even their name is not entirely certain, since the first *epsilon* in l. 17 [Ε]ρξαδιέων is restored.

The lettering, described in the OR edition simply as ‘careless Spartan lettering of the fifth century,’ is not much help with the date.¹ We must instead try to date it on historical grounds. Osborne and Rhodes suggest that the exiles (l. 14 φεύγον[τας]) are the Messenians settled at Naupactus by the Athenians, who arrived in ca. 455 (Thuc. 1.103.1-3 with 108.5; cf. Diod. 11.84.6-7) and were expelled by the Spartans around 400 (Diod. 14.34.2-5; Paus. 4.26.2, cf. 10.38.10).² S. Bolmarcich notes astutely that the Aetolians do not appear in Thucydides’ list of non-Peloponnesian Spartan allies in 431 (2.9.2) and posits this as a *terminus post quem* for the present treaty.³ However, both Gomme and Hornblower stress that Thucydides’ list may be incomplete or inaccurate.⁴ L.H. Jeffrey makes the case for 426 when, as we learn from Thucydides (3.100), the Aetolians despatched embassies to both Corinth and Sparta seeking help against Naupactus and the Athenian force under Demosthenes, to which the Spartans at least responded positively.⁵ Cartledge proffers either 426, for the same reason as Jeffrey, or

¹ Comm. OR 128, p. 156; cf. Jeffrey 1961, 187 (unaware of the present treaty).

² Comm. OR 128, p. 161.

³ Bolmarcich 2008, 72 n. 36.

⁴ *HCT* 2, 10-13; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 1, 248-49.

⁵ Jeffrey 1988, 181.

425/24, when he thinks the Spartans will have sought new allies after their defeat at Pylos.⁶ M. Sordi connects the treaty with the aftermath of the Elean War of ca. 402-400, a conflict in which at least some Aetolians fought on the side of Elis (Diod. 14.17.9-10).⁷ Lastly, D.H. Kelly proposes that the treaty belongs to 388, when Agesilaus marched at the head of a Spartan army through Aetolia; Xenophon stresses (*Hell.* 4.6.14) that the Aetolians, not further specified, allowed him to pass through.⁸ Ultimately, Rhodes is right to emphasize the difficulty of establishing a reasonably precise date.⁹ The various arguments are good but mutually contradictory and one should not feel bound by any one of them. But let us now move onto the text of the inscription itself.

ET 1: OR 128

Findspot: Acropolis, Sparta

Lettering: careless 5th-century Spartan

Layout: non-stoichedon

[συνθῆκ]αι Αἰτολοῖς. κ[αττάδε]
 [?φιλία]ν καὶ ἡιράναν Ι[- - ποτ']
 [Αἰτο]λὸς καὶ συνμαχ[ίαν ?άιδιον]
 [- - -]ανμονος μαν[- - ηεπο]-
 5 [μ]ένος ἡόπυι κα Λα[κεδαιμόνι]-
 [ο]ι ἡαγίονται καὶ κα[τὰ γᾶν]
 καὶ καθάλαθαν, τὸ[ν αὐτὸν]
 φίλον καὶ τὸνν αὐτ[ὸν ἐχθρόν]
 ἔχοντες ἡὸν περ [καὶ Λακε]-
 10 δαιμόνιοι. μεδὲ κ[ατάλυθιν]
 ποιῆθαι ἄνευ Λα[κεδαιμονίον]

⁶ Cartledge 1976, 92; cf. Cartledge 1978.

⁷ Sordi 1991.

⁸ Kelly 1978 (non vidi), endorsed by Yates 2005, 66 n. 4.

⁹ Rhodes 2011, 12.

μεδενί, ἀνχιέν[τας τὸν πόλεμονκωεστιον]
 ἐπὶ ταύτὸν πόθ' ὄν [περ Λακεδαι]-
 μονίος. φεύγον[τας δὲ μὲ δεκέθο]-
 15 ἡαν κεκοινανεκ[ότας κωεστιονἀδικε]-
 μάτον. ἀέ δέ τίς κα [ἐπὶ τὰν τῶν]
 [Ἐ]ρξαδιέον χόραν [στρατεύει]
 ἐπὶ πολέμοι, ἐπι[κορῆν Λακεδαιμο]-
 νίος παντὶ σθένει[ι ?κὰ τὸ δύνατον·]
 20 αὶ δέ τίς κα ἐπὶ τὰ[ν τῶν Λακεδαιμο]-
 νίον χόραν στρα[τεύει ἐπὶ πολέ]-
 μοι, ἐπικορῆν Ἐ[ρξαδιῆς παντι]
 [σθένει κὰ τὸ δύνατον? - - - -]

2 [σπονδὰς] G.T. Griffith *op. Kelly*. 4 ?πλ]ᾶν μόνος Μαν[τινῆς? Gschnitzer. 10 κ[ατάλυτιν] cf. Thuc.
 3.18.2, 37.6; *IG* 1³ 83 ll. 11, 17; *IG* 1³ 105 l. 35. 12 μεδενίαν χιέν[τας πρέσβες] Peek; μεδενί, ἀνχιέν[τας
 πολεμῆν?] Gschnitzer; μεδενί, ἀνχιέμε[ν δὲ μαχομένους] Luppe. 17 Ἐρξαδιέον Peek; [.]ρξαδιέον Píkoulas
 and Matthaίου. 19 καττὸ δύνατον Peek.

Alliance with the Aetolians. On the following terms [friendship?] and peace [shall be?] made
 with the Aetolians, and alliance [for all time? ...]; following where the Spartans lead both by
 [land] and by sea, having the [same] friends and the same [enemies] as the Spartans. Neither
 shall they make [a settlement] with anyone without the Spartans, but giving up [the war?]
 against the same enemy (?) as the Spartans. They shall not receive exiles who have taken part in
 [wrongdoing?]. If anyone [marches against the] territory of the Erxadieis for war, the Spartans
 shall support with all their strength [as far as possible?]; and if anyone marches against the
 territory [of the] Spartans for war, the [Eraxadieis shall support with all their strength as far as
 possible?]

...

(trans. R. Osborne and P.J. Rhodes, adapted)

The most common view is that the ‘Aetolians’ mentioned in the inscription (ET 1 ll. 1, 3) are to be identified with the Aetolians of northwestern Greece.¹⁰ But there exists a fragment of Androtion (*FGrH* 324 F 63) which refers to a perioecic city in Laconia called Aetolia.¹¹ Gschnitzer’s restoration at l. 4 [πλ]ᾶν μόνος Μαν[τινῆς?] would make the treaty somehow relevant to Mantinea, but given what we know of Spartan interactions with Aetolia in the 5th and 4th centuries, A. Giovannini is misguided in insisting on a Peloponnesian, rather than Aetolian, context.¹²

The alliance formula of ll. 4-10 is particularly interesting. The promise of the Erxadieis to follow the Spartans by both land and sea wherever they may lead, having the same friends and enemies, is virtually identical to the oath sworn by the Athenians in 404, as reported by Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.2.20), and is attested in various 4th-century contexts involving Sparta (*Xen. Hell.* 4.6.2; 5.3.26; 6.3.7).¹³ Not only does this bind the Erxadieis to accompany the Spartans on military expeditions, according to Giovannini, but also prohibits them from concluding a separate peace treaty; in turn, the Spartans vow to protect the Erxadieis if they are attacked.¹⁴ Cartledge posits that the purpose of the exiles clause of ll. 14-16 was to ensure that the Erxadieis did not harbour any exiled Messenians in their community – note that this presupposes a *terminus ante quem* of ca. 400.¹⁵ Although the inscription does not include instructions for the inscription and display of the stele, the fact that it was recovered on the Spartan acropolis (the only Classical-era inscribed stele to have been found there) strongly suggests that it was also displayed there.

¹⁰ Peek 1974, 5; Shipley 1997, 265 with n. 181; Rhodes 2011, 11.

¹¹ Cf. Gschnitzer 1978, 24; Effenterre and Ruzé 1994, no. 55.

¹² Giovannini 2007, 252.

¹³ Cf. de Ste. Croix 1972, 108; Yates 2005, 65-66; Bolmarcich 2008, esp. 69.

¹⁴ Giovannini 2007, 252.

¹⁵ Cartledge 1978, 190. *Contra* Bolmarcich 2008, 72 n. 37.

Chapter 7

Classification of treaties

Introduction

The diplomatic landscape of the ancient Greeks was characterized by a sophisticated lexicon for international agreements, described by Bederman as ‘unrivaled by ancient Near Eastern practice, and probably superior even to Roman understanding.’¹ Within this complex system, the terminology used by the Greeks to describe treaties was rarely static; rather, it functioned as a nuanced set of descriptors that indicated the duration, intent, and power dynamics of a given agreement. By examining the distinct categories of ancient instruments, one can discern how the Greeks utilized precise language to navigate the transitions between war, peace, and empire. This chapter will analyze the classification of these treaties in both literary and epigraphic testimonia to reveal the underlying legal and political structures of the Greek world.

Clauses of a treaty: συνθήκη/αι

The noun συνθήκη, for which the gloss of *A Greek-English Lexicon* reads ‘*article of a compact or treaty*,’ is derived from the verb συντίθεμαι, of which the middle/passive form συντίθημι can mean ‘*agree on, conclude*,’ which lends itself well to contexts of treaty-making; but the plural form συνθήκαι (‘*articles of agreement, and hence, covenant, treaty, between individuals or states*’) is more common in the treaty testimonia.² The evidence of the testimonia bolsters P. Karavites’ argument that συνθήκη/συνθήκαι ‘covered a wide spectrum of agreements, and it could easily be applied to a wide variety of purposes replacing terms like ὁμολογία, εἰρήνη, συμμαχία, σπονδαί, σύμβασις, etc.’³ In oath formulae, συνθήκαι refers to the agreement as a whole even when used in apposition with another technical term such as σπονδαί as at Thuc. 5.18.9 = **D 2.12 LT 1**, where καὶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς may serve simply to refine the imprecise ταῖς ξυνθήκαις. In publication clauses, συνθήκαι seems at times to encompass the *terms* of the treaty but not the oaths, since the ὄρκοι are expressed separately from the συνθήκαι in at least two publication clauses (*IG* 1³ 76 = **D 2.11 ET 1** ll. 21-23; Thuc. 5.47.11 = **D 3.2 LT 1**).

¹ Bederman 2001, 154-55.

² LSJ⁹ s.vv. συνθήκη; συντίθημι; cf. Kußmaul 1969, 16; Giovannini 2007, 230. The testimony of Ammon. *Diff.* 446 Nickau is practically worthless. At Athens, contracts between private individuals were often called συνθήκαι, but their precise differences compared to συγγραφαί in the context of Athenian private law are difficult to identify: see further Kußmaul 1969, 14-37.

³ Karavites 1982, 32.

Armistices and peace treaties: σπονδαί and εἰρήνη

Σπονδαί is the plural form of the noun σπονδή ('libation'), which itself derives from the verb σπένδω, 'to pour a libation' or 'make a drink-offering,' a ritual well-known to the Greeks since Homeric times (Hom. *Il.* 9.177, *Od.* 3.45). The middle/passive-voice form of the verb, σπένδομαι, means 'pour libations with one another,' and its more usual meaning 'make a treaty, make peace' stems from the fact that the pouring of libations, usually of wine, was a central aspect of Greek treaty-making (Hdt. 3.144; Ar. *Ach.* 199, *Av.* 1534; Thuc. 4.99).⁴ In Homer, libations or σπονδαί in the literal sense are offered by private individuals acting on their own behalf, rather than on behalf of a state, and are used to guarantee divine protection ahead of a potentially perilous undertaking.⁵ Examples from the *Iliad* include Achilles' libation of wine for the safe return of Patroclus (Hom. *Il.* 16.225ff.) and later, Priam's offering, at his wife Hecabe's urging, for his own safe return from his meeting with Achilles (*Il.* 24.283ff.).⁶

5th century and later sources use σπονδαί to describe agreements occurring within a wide range of contexts, such as capitulations, short-term ceasefires allowing for the recovery of one's dead after a battle, a preliminary truce prior to negotiations for a longer-term peace treaty, and the peace treaty itself.⁷ Thucydides qualifies as σπονδαί numerous agreements of very short duration which were concluded, for example, to give the Spartan general Menedaeus enough time to recover the dead and evacuate the camp (3.109.1), or to allow the Athenians to withdraw safely from Torone (4.114.2: this σπονδαί-agreement, approved by Brasidas, lasted for two days).⁸ Nor is the term limited to historical writers: dramatists such as Euripides and Aristophanes sometimes used σπονδαί to mean 'truce' or occasionally 'reconciliation' (cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 97; Ar. *Eq.* 1389).⁹ Even long-term treaties such as the Peace of Nicias were as much σπονδαί in legal terms as these ephemeral ceasefires because they, too, were time-limited, even if the expressed duration was as great as 50 years: the difference was of extent and not of kind.¹⁰

Multiple treaties are referred to explicitly as σπονδαί in epigraphic sources and literary sources based directly on the original texts. The word is securely attested in the Truce of Laches (Thuc. 4.118.10, 14 = **D 2.9 LT 1**); the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.18.1, 3, 5, 9, 19.1 = **D 2.12 LT 1**); the

⁴ LSJ⁹ s.v. σπένδω, with further examples; cf. Adcock and Mosley 1975, 122, 229; Baltrusch 1994, 103.

⁵ Baltrusch 1994, 99.

⁶ Cf. Karavites 1984, 61: 'If (I emphasize the if) Homer is occasionally reflecting some of the pre-Dorian customs, then the use of *spondai* to seal agreements appeared very early in Greek history, sometime in the misty Mycenaean period.'

⁷ Karavites 1982, 30; Karavites 1984, 69-70; Baltrusch 1994, 193.

⁸ Karavites 1984, 67-68; Herrmann 1990, 23-25; Arnush 1992, 333-34; Baltrusch 1994, 125.

⁹ Karavites 1984, 61-63.

¹⁰ Baltrusch 1994, 103.

Quadruple Alliance (Thuc. 5.47.1, 8, 11 = **D 3.2 LT 1**; cf. **ET 1**); the Peace of Lichas (twice at 5.79.1 = **D 3.4 LT 1**); and the second Peloponnesian-Persian treaty (Thuc. 8.37.1 = **D 3.12 LT 1**). Furthermore, it appears restored in the Halieis treaty (Lambert 2018a, 7-8 = **D 2.8 ET 1** l. 5) and the Spartan-Erxadieis treaty (OR 128 = **D 5.1 ET 1** l. 2 suppl. Griffith). Still more numerous are treaties described as σπονδαί within authorial passages in literary sources: these include the Truce of Cimon (Thuc. 1.112.1; Diod. 11.86.1 = **D 1.7 LT 1, 3**); the Peace of Callias (*FGrH* 104 Aristodemus F 13.2 = **D 1.9 LT 7**); the Athenian-Boeotian peace treaty (Thuc. 1.113.3 = **D 1.10 LT 1**); the Thirty Years' Peace (Thuc. 1.35.1, 40.2, 67.4, 115.1; Diod. 12.7 = **D 1.11 LT 1-4, 8**); the Pylos ceasefire (Thuc. 4.16 = **D 2.6 LT 1**); the Truce of Laches (Diod. 12.72.5 = **D 2.9 LT 2**); the Peace of Nicias (Diod. 12.74.5 = **D 2.12 LT 2**); and the 30-year truce between Sparta and Mantinea (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.2 = **D 3.6 LT 2**).

Adcock and Mosley argue that σπονδαί 'could be used properly of all agreements, of whatever nature and duration, and took its meaning from the context in which it was used.'¹¹ This is not strictly true: as F. Hampl demonstrates, Thucydides at least, even in his authorial narrative, is careful not to confuse σπονδαί and συμμαχία and often places the two terms in apposition (e.g., 5.46.5 Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐποιήσαντο σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τήνδε; 5.76.2 ἐβούλοντο δὲ πρῶτον σπονδὰς ποιήσαντες πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους αὖθις ὕστερον καὶ ξυμμαχίαν).¹² This distinction is no mere Thucydidean invention but is respected in the texts of the treaties as well, e.g., at Thuc. 5.48.1 = **D 3.2 LT 1** (cf. **ET 1**) αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ καὶ ἡ ξυμμαχία οὕτως ἐγένοντο; and 5.79.1 = **D 3.4 LT 1** καττάδε ἔδοξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἤμεν πεντήκοντα ἔτη; cf. 8.37.1 = **D 3.12 LT 1** σπονδὰς εἶναι καὶ φιλίαν κατὰ τάδε. A σπονδαί-agreement thus terminated hostilities but did not itself create an alliance. The vast majority of treaties with which the word σπονδαί is associated were created to end or at least interrupt an ongoing conflict. The Quadruple Alliance is ostensibly an exception to the general rule, but an examination of its historical background reveals that, in fact, Elis had refused to follow Sparta in accepting the Peace of Nicias in 421 (Thuc. 5.17.2) and so, it seems, was technically still at war with Athens. We may compare how, in 480, the Greek states considered it necessary to put aside existing conflicts, such as that between Athens and Aegina, through the exchange of πίστεις ('pledges of faith'¹³) before uniting in alliance to counter Xerxes' invasion (Hdt. 7.145.1).¹⁴ Similarly, in the second Peloponnesian-Persian treaty, the two sides pledged 'truce and friendship' (Thuc. 8.37.1 = **D 3.12 LT 1** σπονδὰς εἶναι καὶ φιλίαν κατὰ τάδε).¹⁵ M. Amit posits that this is either a hendiadys in which φιλία qualifies

¹¹ Adcock and Mosley 1975, 200.

¹² Hampl 1936, 156-57.

¹³ LSJ⁹ s.v. πίστις.

¹⁴ Cf. Baltrusch 1994, 92, 123; Scheibelreiter 2013, 20.

¹⁵ The word used here is φιλία rather than ξυμμαχία (contrast the first of the three treaties: Thuc. 8.18.1 = **D 3.11 LT 1** ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς βασιλέα καὶ Τισσαφέρνην κτλ.), though the clause specifying joint conduct of the war (8.37.4 = **D 3.12 LT 1**) confirms that this is still an alliance treaty: see Lewis 1977, 93. In the third

σπονδαί, or that it is ‘the conjunction of two different parts in a treaty,’ that is, a conflict-ending agreement (σπονδαί) coupled with a more positive affirmation of friendship (φιλία).¹⁶ What conflict was there to end? Amit notes that while direct Spartan involvement in the struggle against Persia ended after the expeditions of Pausanias to Byzantium and of Leotychidas to Thessaly in 477 and 476 respectively, the war was not terminated on a *de jure* basis – there had been no Spartan equivalent to the Peace of Callias. Thus, Sparta and Persia were still technically at war with each other up until 412.¹⁷ D.M. Lewis suggests that this was overlooked when the first treaty was being negotiated, but suddenly recalled in time for the second: ‘It is possible that someone has woken up to the fact that Sparta and Persia have been at war with each other for seventy years.’¹⁸

Let us turn our attention now to εἰρήνη (lit. ‘peace’). For the Greeks, εἰρήνη was no mere political abstraction, but was frequently personified as a goddess. She notably appears as a non-speaking character in the eponymous comedy of Aristophanes, where she is offered sacrifice (ll. 1017-19); and she is described as Εἰρήνην, κουροτρόφον θεάν (‘Peace, the child-nursing goddess’) in Euripides’ *Bacchae* (ll. 419-20). An active cult and altar of Εἰρήνη are attested at Athens from 375 BCE (Isoc. 15.109-10; *FGrH* 328 Philochorus F 151; Nep. *Tim.* 2.2) and continuing until at least the 330s (*IG* 2² 1496 ll. 95, 127-28).¹⁹ The word εἰρήνη appears within treaty texts already in the 5th century, for example in the Truce of Laches (Thuc. 4.118.14 = **D 2.9 LT 1**), the surrender of Athens to Sparta (Plut. *Lys.* 14 = **D 3.16 LT 5**), the King’s Peace (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31 = **D 4.8 LT 1**), and the Spartan treaty with the Erxadieis (OR 128 = **D 5.1 ET 1 l. 2**).²⁰ However, the scholarly consensus holds that εἰρήνη only came to replace σπονδαί in the sense of ‘peace treaty’ at the time of the King’s Peace.²¹ This is because while the word εἰρήνη does sometimes appear in 5th century sources, both literary and epigraphic, it almost always refers to a *state* of peace rather than a specific *peace treaty*.²² *IG* 1³ 58 l. 30 ἐάν τε ἐρένε[ν βόλονται ποῦσθαι], a fragmentary Athenian decree regarding Eleusis (not, however, an

treaty, by contrast, the only technical term to appear is ξυνθήκαι (Thuc. 8.58.1 = **D 3.13 LT 1** ξυνθήκαι ἐγένοντο ἐν Μαιάνδρου πεδίῳ).

¹⁶ Amit 1974, 59.

¹⁷ Amit 1974, 58.

¹⁸ Lewis 1977, 93.

¹⁹ Parker 1996, 229-30.

²⁰ Wandering briefly beyond the chronological scope of the present study, εἰρήνη also appears as a *terminus technicus* in *IG* 2² 34 = RO 20 (Athenian alliance with Chios from 384/83) at l. 9 (mostly restored) and more securely at ll. 18 and 22, referring in each case not to the treaty at hand but to the King’s Peace: cf. comm. RO 20, pp. 86-87.

²¹ Proponents of this view include Graetzel 1886; Keil 1916; Vernant 1968, 9ff.; Baltrusch 1994, 92-93. For further bibliography see Giovannini 2007, 141-42.

²² Cf. Keil 1916, 5; Ryder 1965, xv; Giovannini 2007, 226; Couvenhes 2016, 15 n. 10. There are some exceptions, but these occur within authorial comments (e.g., Thuc. 3.54.3 describing the Thirty Years’ Peace as ἡ εἰρήνη) or in comedy (Aristophanes refers to numerous fictional εἰρήνη-treaties in his works: *Acharn.* 1051-67; *Pax* 1079). See further Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 245 n. 7.

interstate treaty), dated by Mattingly to 425 or slightly later, is a good example.²³ Here the conditional particle *ἐάν* indicates that *ἐρένε[ν]* is not a specific treaty, but a hypothetical future period of peace – and let us remember, if Mattingly’s date is correct then Athens will have been embroiled in the Archidamian War, although the inscription is admittedly fragmentary and we know very little of its context for certain. Likewise, *IG 1³ 127*, an Athenian honorary decree for the Samians dating to 405/04, similarly uses *εἰρήνη* within conditional clauses, e.g., l. 14 *καθάπερ αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὴν εἰρήνη γένηται*, and l. 21 *περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐὰν γίνηται*. Among interstate treaties, the Athenian treaty with Halieis (**D 2.8 ET 1**), with ll. 18-19 restored [*ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐρένε γένηται ? τ]έν σφετέραν αὐτῶ | [ν φυλάτ]τ[εν χαλιᾶς* by S. Lambert and *ἐρένες δὲ γενομένους τ]έν σφετέραν αὐτῶ | [ν φυλάτ]τ[εν χαλιᾶς* by the editors of *IG 1³*, promises the dismantling of the Athenian garrison in Halieis at the end of the Archidamian War. Finally, the Athenian alliance with Argos, as restored, employs a conditional clause to envision a possible future peace treaty between the Spartans on one side and the Athenians/Argives on the others: *Agora 16.19 = D 3.7 ET 1* l. 12 [*ἐάν* δὲ] *ἐρένε βόλον[ται ποῦσθαι Λακεδαιμόνιοι] Ἀργεῖοις καὶ Ἀθε[ναί]ο[ις]*. The distinction between *εἰρήνη* as ‘state of peace’ and *ἡ εἰρήνη* as ‘treaty of peace’ becomes still more apparent when we consider the rescript of the King’s Peace, *ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, τούτοις ἐγὼ πολεμήσω* κτλ. (*Xen. Hell.* 5.1.31 = **D 4.8 LT 1**), where the demonstrative pronoun accompanies *εἰρήνη*. The correct translation can only be ‘whoever does not accept *this peace treaty* ...’ because ‘whoever does not accept *this state of peace*’ is clearly nonsensical in the present context.

V. Alonso argues that one of the key distinctions between *σπονδαί*- and *εἰρήνη*-treaties is that, whereas the former are temporally limited, the latter are not, or at least not explicitly.²⁴ The King’s Peace, as Alonso observes, does not have a time limit – certainly there is no mention of one in the ample surviving testimonia, nor in any of the testimonia for subsequent 4th century κοινὴ εἰρήνη treaties.²⁵ Similarly, the surrender of Athens, like all surrender treaties, was temporally unlimited by its very nature, although owing to a change in circumstances it was effectively a dead letter within a decade. And the treaty between Sparta and the Erxadieis, which was certainly one of *εἰρήνη* (*OR 128 = D 5.1 ET 1* l. 2) was, if l. 3 [*ᾠίδιον*] has been correctly restored, an explicitly perpetual covenant.

Treaties of alliance: συμμαχία, ἐπιμαχία, φιλία

The word *συμμαχία*, which refers to a military alliance, appears widely in both literary and epigraphic sources. It is used for alliance treaties as early as the Archaic period, as an inscribed

²³ Mattingly 1966, 73; cf. Santi Amantini 1985, 54.

²⁴ Alonso 2007, 221.

²⁵ Ryder 1965, 1-2, 5.

treaty of ca. 500 BCE between Elis and the Ewaoioi (*IvO* 9 = *SdA*² no. 110 l. 1) demonstrates.²⁶ Among inscriptions and verbatim literary copies of treaties, the word *συμμαχία* is securely attested in the Athenian treaty concerning the Delphic Amphictyony (OR 116 = **D 1.5 ET 1** l. 5); the Athenian alliances with Rhegium (OR 149A = **D 1.14 ET 1** l. 1) and Leontini (OR 149B = **ET 2** ll. 2-3, 16-17); the Athenian alliance with Perdiccas II (*IG* 1³ 89 = **D 2.10 ET 1** l. 51); the Bottiaei treaty (*IG* 1³ 76 = **D 2.11 ET 1** ll. 13-14); the Spartan-Athenian alliance of 421 (Thuc. 5.23.6 = **D 2.13 LT 1**); the Quadruple Alliance (Thuc. 5.47.8, 11 = **D 3.2 LT 1**); the Peace of Lichas (Thuc. 5.79.1 = **D 3.4 LT 1**); the first Peloponnesian-Persian treaty (Thuc. 8.18.1 = **D 3.11 LT 1**); the Athenian alliance with Boeotia (RO 6 = **D 4.3 ET 1** l. 2); and the Spartan treaty with the Erxadieis (OR 128 = **D 5.1 ET 1** l. 3). 5th century *συμμαχία*-treaties were usually bilateral, although multilateral alliances were possible, of which the Quadruple Alliance is a prime example.²⁷ ML 17, contracted for 100 years, demonstrates that temporally-limited alliances existed well before the chronological range of the present study, and certain Classical-era *συμμαχία*-treaties – compare again the Quadruple Alliance – at least formally retained a time limit, while others, such as the Athenian alliances with Rhegium and Leontini, were explicitly perpetual. Unsurprisingly, given their military implications (note the *μαχη*- root), most *συμμαχία*-treaties were initiated or renewed in a context of active or at least anticipated conflict.²⁸

In contrast to a *συμμαχία*, an *ἐπιμαχία* is a purely defensive alliance and as such is sometimes contrasted with *συμμαχία*, most famously by Thucydides (1.44.1 = **D 1.16 LT 1**), who narrates Athens' decision to conclude a strictly defensive alliance with the Corcyraeans in 433 in order to avoid violating, or at least appear to be violating, the Thirty Years' Peace. In stark contrast to *συμμαχία*, the word *ἐπιμαχία* is completely absent from epigraphic sources. Even in the literary sources, *ἐπιμαχία* appears very rarely, and Thucydides himself often uses the terms *ξύμμαχος* and *ξύμμαχία* in contexts where we would expect *ἐπίμαχος* and *ἐπιμαχία*, such as at 1.53.4, where he describes the Corcyraeans as Athens' *ξύμμαχοι*.²⁹ Thucydides does, however, use *ἐπιμαχία* and the cognate verb *ἐπιμαχεῖν* at 5.48.2 and 5.27.2 respectively, in both cases describing the initially defensive alliance of 421 between Argos, Elis, and Mantinea that eventually evolved into the Quadruple Alliance.³⁰ An *ἐπιμαχία* obliged one state to assist

²⁶ Bederman 2001, 161; Couvenhes 2016, 14; Lazar 2024, 45.

²⁷ Couvenhes 2016, 17; cf. Baltrusch 1994, 6.

²⁸ On the offensive nature of *συμμαχία*-treaties cf. Hampl 1936, 158; Martin 1940, 126ff.; Ténékidès 1954, 529; Steinbrecher 1985, 55ff; Bederman 2001, 163.

²⁹ Ste. Croix 1972, 328; Adcock and Mosley 1975, 122. Andrewes (*HCT* 4, 23) suggests that defensive alliances had become the norm by the end of the 5th century, rendering the specialized word *ἐπιμαχία* redundant. But he provides no evidence for this claim, and if his argument were correct then we should expect *ἐπιμαχία* to have been used more frequently to describe earlier alliance-treaties, but it is not.

³⁰ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 121-22; cf. Adcock and Mosley 1975, 191. Thucydides is the earliest source in which *ἐπιμαχία* and cognates are found, and it is likely that Thucydides coined the word himself: cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 328; Harris 2021, 60. The word is rare even in 4th century sources, but cf. [Dem.] 12.16; Arist. *Pol.* 1280b 27.

another only if attacked.³¹ In the context of the Corcyra alliance, this meant that Athens, while bound to aid Corcyra if its territory was directly threatened, was not bound to accompany the Corcyraeans on an attack on the territory of Corinth or any other state, which would have been required under a true *συμμαχία*. While this theoretically reduced the risk of a general war between the Delian and Peloponnesian leagues, Thucydides claims (1.44.2 = **D 1.16 LT 1**) that many Athenians had come to believe that such a war was inevitable in any case.³²

Lastly, the concept of *φιλία* in the context of interstate relations is explained by Bolmarcich as ‘a relationship that went beyond mere alliance, perhaps an attempt to establish an affective relationship as well as a formal diplomatic one.’³³ The epigraphic evidence suggests that declarations of *φιλία* were commonly included in treaties made after a period of hostile relations and often accompanied by a formal military alliance. Take for example the Athenian treaty with the Bottiaei at *IG 1³ 76 = D 2.11 ET 1* ll. 24-25: τῶν [πόλεον] τῶ[ν Βοττιαίων τ]ῶν χσυντιθεμένον | τὲν φιλία[ν καὶ τὲν χσυμμαχίαν]. Context is key here: the Bottiaean cities had been in revolt for ten years, and some, such as Spartolus, still remained aloof from Athens. Similarly, the ongoing conflict between Perdiccas II and Arrhabaeus of Lyncestus was resolved by an Athenian-brokered *φιλία/συμμαχία* (*IG 1³ 89 = D 2.10 ET 1* ll. 57-58: ποιέτο δὲ καὶ Ἀρραβ[αῖος πρὸς Περδίκκαν φιλίαν ...] | ποιῆν καὶ Ἀρραβαῖοι φιλ[ίαν καὶ χσυμμαχίαν]).

Ἐκεχειρία

The noun *ἐκεχειρία* is a compound of *ἔχω* and *χείρ*, and so means literally ‘staying of the hand.’³⁴ It is therefore a truce, and this is in fact how P. Karavites translates it, noting its implication of short duration and lack of finality.³⁵ There is good literary support for this: at 5.26.2, Thucydides describes the renewable ten-day treaty contracted between the Athenian and Boeotians after the Peace of Nicias as an *ἐκεχειρίαν δεχήμερον*, though he later refers to it as a *δεχήμεροι σπονδαί* at 6.7.4 and 6.10.3 (and cf. 5.32.5 *δεχημέρους ἐπισπονδάς*); M.F. Arnush emphasizes the fact that there was no apparent distinction between them.³⁶ Perhaps most famously, the Olympic truce which lasted for 60 days is described in numerous sources as an *ἐκεχειρία* (Thuc. 5.49.3; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.2).³⁷ The word therefore seems to be restricted to

³¹ Adcock and Mosley 1975, 191; Bederman 2001, 162.

³² Cf. Giovannini 2007, 33.

³³ Bolmarcich 2010, 121; cf. Adcock and Mosley 1975, 206; Bauslaugh 1991, 56-57; Bederman 2001, 159-60; Couvenhes 2016, 39.

³⁴ Cf. LSJ⁹ s.v.

³⁵ Karavites 1982, 26-29.

³⁶ Arnush 1992, 332-33; cf. Adcock and Mosley 1975, 122; Karavites 1982, 69f.

³⁷ Karavites 1982, 28-29; cf. Karavites 1984, 67; Baltrusch 1994, 147. Thuc. 5.1 also uses *ἐκεχειρία* to refer to the truce in effect during the Pythian games of 422. For *ἐκεχειρία* as applied for the protection of pilgrims see Theotikou 2014.

conflict-interrupting agreements of limited duration, even when they were theoretically renewable in perpetuity. The sole treaty within my database to be described as an *έκεχειρία*, the Truce of Laches, was effective for only one year, and is called an *έκεχειρία* twice at Thuc. 4.118.11 = **D 2.9 LT 1** ποιεῖσθαι τὴν έκεχειρίαν καθ' ἃ ξυγγωροῦσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν καὶ ὠμολόγησαν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ.³⁸

Ὁμολογία

Ὁμολογία, which derives from the verb *ὁμολογέω* ('agree with, grant, concede'³⁹) can mean 'agreement' or 'compact,' but in a wartime context, LSJ's gloss '*terms of peace, truce, or surrender*' is more appropriate.⁴⁰ It appears already in Herodotus, where at 8.52.2 he uses the word to describe a proposal of the Pisistratids in 480 that the Athenians come to terms with Xerxes and the Persian invaders (that proposal, of course, was rejected). Accordingly, E. Baltrusch contends that a *ὁμολογία* is a type of agreement in which the full acceptance of an adversary's demands is agreed to, whereas J. Ma describes it as 'the initial act of surrender by a community to the ruling power.'⁴¹ Within my database, *ὁμολογία* appears exclusively in authorial literary sources in connection with three treaties: the Athenian treaty with Samos (Thuc. 1.117.3 = **D 1.15 LT 1**); the Athenian treaty with Cythera (Thuc. 4.54.2 = **D 2.7 LT 1**); and the Truce of Laches (Diod. 12.72.5 = **D 2.9 LT 2**). Except for the Truce of Laches, these were highly unequal treaties, and Diodorus' testimonium of the Truce, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίουσ σπονδὰς ἐνιαυσίους ἐποιήσαντο κατὰ ταύτας τὰς ὁμολογίας, ὥστ' ἔχειν ἑκατέρουσ ᾧν τότε κύριοι καθειστήκεσαν, incorrectly takes *ὁμολογία* to mean 'clauses of a treaty' (and not, as elsewhere, as a term for the treaty as a whole), for which the more appropriate term, as we have seen, is *συνθήκαι*.

Unclassified treaties

A number of treaties are unclassified: no epigraphic source uses any of the technical terms discussed above to describe the Athenian regulations for Erythrae, Chalcis, Eretria(?), the Colophonians, Mytilene, and Phaselis. What these treaties have in common is that they are regulatory treaties, defining their relationship with the hegemon Athens. While some of them are brief and/or fragmentary, which may explain the absence of technical terminology, the Chalcis inscription is both lengthy and exceptionally well-preserved. Thucydides, though he

³⁸ Cf. Giovannini 2007, 227,

³⁹ Cf. LSJ⁹ s.v. *ὁμολογέω*.

⁴⁰ LSJ⁹ s.v. *ὁμολογία*; cf. Karavites 1982, 29 with n. 17.

⁴¹ Baltrusch 1994, 198; Ma 2009, 127; cf. Karavites 1982, 29.

does specifically mention either Chalcis or Eretria, writes that Athens suppressed the Euboean revolt of 446/45 and imposed ὁμολογία on all the cities except Histiaea, whose inhabitants were expelled (1.114.3 καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ὁμολογία κατεστήσαντο, Ἔστιαϊᾶς δὲ ἐξοικίσαντες αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν ἔσχον).⁴² But such terminology evidently did not carry over into the inscriptions. Some Athenian treaties with other Delian League members do, however, contain technical terminology. The treaty with the Bottiaei is classified as both a συμμαχία (*IG* 1³ 76 = **D 2.11 ET 1** ll. 13-14 [καὶ τὴν χσ[συμμαχία] | ν πιστῶς καὶ [ἀδ]όλο[ς φυλάχσο Βοττι]αίοις) and as a φιλία (l. 25 τὴν φιλία[ν]). Similarly, the treaties with Selymbria (OR 185 = **D 3.14 ET 1** ll. 26-27 τὰς δὲ χσυνθέκ|[ας]) and the Clazomenians at Daphnus (OR 186 = **D 3.10 ET 1** ll. 3-4 [τὰς ξυνθήκα] | ς ἄς ξυνέθεντο οἱ στρατεγοὶ) both refer to συνθήκαι.⁴³ But these are conciliatory treaties made in contexts in which Athenian control was tenuous, and accordingly it was important not to alienate the allies by emphasizing subjection to Athens.⁴⁴

Unfortunately, we cannot say with certainty when the phenomenon of ‘unclassified treaties’ began, but we can hazard an educated guess. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 23.4-25.2 implies that the transition from ἡγεμονία to ἀρχή began early.⁴⁵ Thucydides and others more precisely inform us of the early Athenian campaigns by which Scyros, Naxos, and Thasos were forced to join, or rejoin, the Delian League, though no inscriptions connected with these events survive.⁴⁶ Certainly by the beginning of the period for which epigraphic material becomes available, Athenian-allied treaties clearly show that what P. Low describes as ‘a shift from the language of alliance to the language of empire’ was already more or less complete.⁴⁷ This is reinforced by the fact that some treaties, such as those with Chalcis and the Colophonians, require the erection of stelae at the allies’ expense. According to Low, this constitutes a punitive assertion of Athenian power over its allies, despite the fact that the costs of inscription were probably minimal (approximately 20-30 drachmas).⁴⁸

Conclusion

⁴² *IG* 1³ 41 = *AIUK* 4.2 no. 3 is an Athenian decree about Histiaea probably connected with this episode.

⁴³ Giovannini 2007, 252 strangely classifies the regulations for Chalcis (**D 1.12**) as an ‘alliance offensive illimitée.’ But its purpose is not to establish a military alliance, which was already presupposed by Chalcidian membership in the Delian League, but rather to regulate Chalcis’ internal affairs in order to prevent a revolt from recurring.

⁴⁴ Regarding **D 2.11**, it is apparent from the absence of certain Bottiaean cities from the treaty that the rebellion had not yet been fully resolved.

⁴⁵ Cf. Rhodes 1981, 297-98, suggesting, ‘Probably the source from which *A.P.* is excerpting went into some detail on the change from alliance to empire.’

⁴⁶ For the seizure of Scyros by Cimon, dated ca. 476/75 on the basis of Plut. *Thes.* 36.1 by Reger at *IACP* no. 521, p. 774, see Diod. 11.60.2; *FGrH* Ephorus F 191; Plut. *Cim.* 8.3-7).

⁴⁷ Low 2005, 95; cf. Mattingly 1996, 367.

⁴⁸ Low 2005, 100-01 with n. 36. It is probably not coincidental that the conciliatory Selymbria treaty imposes the cost of inscription on the Athenian generals instead of the Selymbrians (OR 185 = **D 3.14 ET 1** ll. 33-36).

The evolution of Greek treaty terminology in the 5th and early-4th centuries BCE reflects the shifting realities of Greek interstate relations, particularly the rise of Athenian hegemony. While some terms like σπονδαί remained rooted in ancient ritual libations to denote the cessation of hostilities, εἰρήνη evolved from describing a mere state of peace to representing a formal, unlimited peace treaty. The distinction between the offensive συμμαχία and the purely defensive ἐπιμαχία, if Thucydides has accurately conveyed the nature of the debate regarding Corcyra in the Assembly, further highlights a legal precision intended to manage the risks of escalating conflict. However, the emergence of 'unclassified' treaties, where technical terms are conspicuously absent in favor of unilateral regulations, marks a significant departure from standard diplomacy. As the language of alliance gradually gave way to the language of empire, these regulatory instruments became tools for asserting power, often forcing allies to bear the symbolic and financial cost of their own subjection.

Chapter 8

Treaty-making process and duration of treaties

Introduction

While the lexicon of Greek interstate treaties provided the terminological framework for treaty-based relations between states, the transition from negotiation to a binding agreement required a series of rigorous procedural steps designed to ensure permanence and divine sanction. This chapter examines the phases of treaty-making beginning with the selection and roles of the negotiators (πρέσβεις). I also explore the vital distinction between the political approval of treaties and their formal ‘ratification’ through the exchange of solemn oaths. I then investigate possible reasons for the presence or absence of time-limits in treaties before considering treaties containing amendment clauses and/or arbitration clauses. Two addenda examine, respectively, the difference between bilateral and multilateral treaties, and the philologically fraught question of the renewal of the Truce of Laches.

Envoys and embassies

There was no coherent theory of diplomacy in the Classical Greek world, although the lost *Presbeutikos*, a late-4th century treatise on embassies by Demetrius of Phalerum, might have told us much.¹ The so-called Old Oligarch reports delays of up to one year for foreign embassies seeking to address the Boule and Assembly at Athens ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.1-2), though M.F. Arnush thinks this unlikely in the case of embassies presenting testimony that was particularly important to the host city. He cites a passage from the Athenian treaty with Chalcis (OR 131 = **D 1.12 ET 1** ll. 12ff.), in which the Athenians guarantee that any Chalcidian embassy coming from Athens will be heard by the Boule and Assembly within ten days of its arrival.² There was probably less danger of the extreme delays attested by the Old Oligarch when foreign envoys were in Athens on a semi-permanent basis, although it is important to emphasize that permanent embassies, which are taken for granted in the modern world, did not exist in ancient Greece. Eckstein emphasizes the *ad hoc* nature of Greek diplomacy in the Classical era, in which diplomatic exchanges were carried out with the goal of resolving specific issues. This often meant that ‘when situations developed that did require the dispatch of envoys to another state, they came at a point where friction had already mounted to a dangerous level.’³ As D.J. Mosley observes, this was further exacerbated by the fact that envoys were often given vague

¹ Bolmarcich 2012, 78.

² Arnush 1992, 341 n. 29.

³ Eckstein 2017, 495-96; cf. Grant 1965, 262; Aron 1973, 15; Kauppi 1991, 119; Lebow 1991, 144-45.

instructions (or, if we choose a more positive perspective, an ‘open mandate’), and their powers severely curtailed.⁴ We learn from Aeschines that envoys were under no circumstances permitted to commit their home cities to a particular course of action without reference to the political authorities back home (Aeschin. 2.104, 120). The ancient evidence compiled by D.J. Bederman reveals that envoys, under normal circumstances, were competent only to present the position of their home city, to negotiate within a limited scope of options, and to present the results to the political authorities to which they were accountable, nothing more.⁵ The competences of so-called πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες, which I will discuss in greater detail below, were somewhat broader.

The ancient Greek language has at least three separate words for diplomatic functionaries: ἄγγελος, πρέσβευς, and κήρυξ. It is from πρέσβευς that the word for ‘embassy,’ πρεσβεία, is derived.⁶ The chief distinction between κήρυκες and ἄγγελοι on the one hand and πρέσβεις on the other lies in the scope of their functions: while κήρυκες and ἄγγελοι merely conveyed information, πρέσβεις took a more active role, for example by negotiating with the representatives of foreign powers regarding matters such as the contents of interstate treaties.⁷ Κήρυκες seem to have been considered separate from the πρεσβείαι which they at least sometimes accompanied, and the πρεσβείαι were also assisted by attendants (ἀκόλουθοι), who were probably limited to menial tasks (cf. Thuc. 4.118.6 = **D 2.9 LT 1** κήρυκι δὲ καὶ πρεσβείαι καὶ ἀκολουθούς, ὅπόσοις ἂν δοκῆ κτλ.).⁸ The size of embassies – that is, of πρεσβείαι minus their support staff – could vary greatly. The Spartans preferred to employ embassies consisting of three men, possibly connected with the three Spartan tribes (Thuc. 5.42.1; Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.22), while Athenian embassies could consist of two, three, five, or ten men.⁹ Notably, the Peace of Nicias was negotiated by an Athenian ten-man commission (Diod. 12.75.4 = **D 2.13 LT 2**) and, probably, by a parallel Spartan board.¹⁰ When in 403 Thrasybulus defeated the Thirty at Piraeus, the Spartan assembly and ephors despatched a board of 15 men

⁴ Mosley 1973, 25-26.

⁵ Bederman 2001, 102; cf. Mosley 1973, 21-29; Harris 2023, 510 with n. 1; Lazar 2024, 42-43.

⁶ Adcock and Mosley 1975, 122.

⁷ Adcock and Mosley 1975, 152.

⁸ Karavites 1987, 88-89; Bederman 2001, 101.

⁹ Adcock and Mosley 1975, 155 with 273 n. 309. The three Spartan tribes were Hylleis, Pamphyloi, and Dymanes (Tyrtaeus F 19 West; cf. Hdt. 4.148; Plut. *Lyc.* 6).

¹⁰ Thucydides is silent about this board; on the Diodorus passage see Andrewes and Lewis 1957, esp. 177, with Kirchhoff 1895, 63-64. Andrewes and Lewis argue that members of this board constituted 10 of the 17 Athenian oath-takers attested for both the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.19.2 = **D 2.12 LT 1**; 5.24.1 = **D 2.13 LT 1**). Kirchhoff identifies the Spartan oath-takers (*ibid.*) as the two kings, the five ephors, and the parallel Spartan board of ten envoys.

to assist Pausanias, one of the two incumbent kings, to help compose the treaty (**D 4.1**) between the Athenian democrats and oligarchs (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.40-41).¹¹

Greek interstate relations operated under the principle that envoys should be inviolable, but this was not always respected. We learn from Thucydides (2.67) that, in summer 430, the Athenians intercepted and subsequently executed a group of Peloponnesian envoys who were attempting to establish contact with the Persians. In 397 the Spartans captured and similarly put to death a group of Athenian envoys en route to the court of Artaxerxes II (*Hell. Oxy.* 10.1). But Polly Low stresses that such incidents were exceptional, and envoys are depicted elsewhere in Thucydides carrying out their duties in safety (1.73-78; 4.17-20; 6.8, 19).¹² Unsurprisingly, we know more about the πρέσβεις of Athens than of any other city. Πρέσβεις were not selected by lot like most magistrates, but were selected individually based on the proposal of the Boule or Assembly (Dem. 19.121-22). It was a practical necessity that ambassadors have considerable wealth because, although they were provided with a travel allowance, the amount was small.¹³ Πρέσβεις as such appear to have been appointed only for individual missions, but it is important to note that proxeny, which had a diplomatic element, was normally held for life.¹⁴ Like other officials, πρέσβεις were subject to εὔθυναί upon the completion of their assignment and liable to punishment if they were found to have engaged in illegal activity (Aeschin. 3.17).¹⁵ For example, around 400 BCE, a certain Timagoras, who had gone on a mission to the court of Artaxerxes II, was found guilty of corruption and executed upon his return to Athens (Plut. *Pelop.* 30.6; *Artax.* 22.6).

The testimonia for the treaties in my database reveal much about Spartan and Athenian ambassadorial procedures in the 5th and early-4th centuries BCE. When news of the situation at Pylos reached Sparta in 425, the Spartan ‘authorities’ (Thuc. 4.15.1 τὰ τέλη) personally travelled to the Spartan camp before agreeing with the Athenian generals on the spot to send πρέσβεις to Athens in order to negotiate an agreement – ultimately unrealized – that would have allowed them to recover the Spartan troops who were stranded on the beach (4.15.2 σπονδὰς ποιησαμένους τὰ περὶ Πύλον ἀποστεῖλαι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πρέσβεις περὶ ξυμβάσεως).¹⁶ At other times, envoys did not actively participate in the composition of treaties but merely presented the text of a pre-prepared treaty draft to the host city’s political authorities for them to accept

¹¹ Ten men according to [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 38.4. On the ratification of the treaty see Cloché 1915, 294; Loening 1987, 28-30; Joyce 2008, 508; Joyce 2015, 40-41; Joyce 2022, 70.

¹² Low 2017, 111-12; cf. Mosley 1973, 78-79.

¹³ Lazar 2024, 58. The existence of an allowance is implied at Theophr. *Char.* 30.7.

¹⁴ Cf. *OCD*⁴ s.v. ‘proxeny (*proxenos*)’: proxeni could be expected to serve visiting representatives of the city whose προξενία he held (Thuc. 5.45; Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.6; 5.4.22) or act as delegates of their home cities to the city that had awarded him the προξενία (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.4, 6.3.4, 6.4.24).

¹⁵ Mosley 1973, 39-42; Harris 2023, 510 with n. 2.

¹⁶ Cf. Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 543, speculating that the Spartan ‘authorities’ sent to Pylos consisted of the five ephors plus the entire Gerousia including the two kings. This is in my opinion unlikely.

or reject. Lane Fox correctly perceives that the Spartans and their allies Corinth, Sicyon, Megara, and Epidaurus (cf. Thuc. 4.119.2 = **D 2.9 LT 1**) composed the main text of the Truce of Laches alone and subsequently presented it to the Athenian Boule and Assembly.¹⁷ Similarly, in the early winter of 418, the Spartans who were encamped threateningly at Tegea acted through their Argive proxenus Lichas to present the Argives with their written proposal for peace and alliance which, like the Truce of Laches, is recorded *verbatim* by Thucydides (5.77 = **D 3.3 LT 1**; cf. 5.76). But at other times, envoys from opposite sides collaborated actively. The text of the Peace of Nicias was hammered out over the course of several Spartan-Athenian conferences held throughout winter 422/21, as recorded by Thucydides (5.17.2).¹⁸ The events of 420 are similarly illuminative of the role of envoys in diplomacy and treaty-making. Envoys from Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, explicitly referred to as πρέσβεις by Thucydides (5.44.2), travelled to Athens seeking an alliance. At the same time, three Spartans, chosen specifically for their pro-Athenian reputation, arrived at Athens with a proposal to exchange Panactum for Pylos and to defend the recent Spartan-Boeotian alliance (5.44.3).

Typically, when foreign envoys came to Athens, they were received by the Boule or at least by the members of the incumbent prytany, who would decide whether or not to allow the ambassadors to appear before the Assembly.¹⁹ In accordance with Athenian procedure, in 420 the Spartan envoys first presented themselves to the Boule and announced that they had come as πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες with the power to unilaterally settle outstanding disputes (Thuc. 5.45.1). Alcibiades, who wanted to thwart an Athenian *détente* with Sparta and conclude an alliance with Argos instead, intervened in a private capacity and arranged an informal meeting with the Spartan envoys, one of whom, Endius, already enjoyed a bond of ξενία with Alcibiades (8.6.3). Alcibiades tricked them into misrepresenting their negotiating powers when they subsequently appeared before the Assembly, which discredited them and ended any chance of a reconciliation (5.45.2-4).²⁰ Thucydides furnishes further evidence for Spartan treaty-negotiation in the context of the three Peloponnesian-Persian treaties of 412/11. The task of negotiating the first two treaties seems to have been delegated to individual Spartiates, first Chalcideus (Thuc. 8.17.4) and subsequently Therimenes (8.36.2). Kirchhoff attributes the third and final treaty, in contrast, to the efforts of the eleven Spartan counsellors (ξύμβουλοι) led by Astyochus, among whom was Lichas (8.39.2); although Thucydides does not say so explicitly, they were likely involved in negotiating with Tissaphernes and his associate Hiramenes (cf.

¹⁷ Lane Fox 2018, 18, stressing that, despite the absence of the Boule in the Athenian enactment formula (Thuc. 4.118.11 = **D 2.9 LT 1** ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ), the Boule must have formulated the Peloponnesian proposal as a probouleuma which was subsequently voted upon, and accepted, by the Assembly.

¹⁸ Cf. Adcock and Mosley 1975, 51-52.

¹⁹ Adcock and Mosley 1975, 215; Lazar 2024, 62.

²⁰ On this episode and the role of Alcibiades see Lazar 2024, 59.

8.58.1).²¹ Probably the deficiencies of the first two treaties convinced the Spartan authorities that a board of negotiators would achieve better results than the lone individuals behind the earlier agreements, and we may compare this with their (probable) decision to employ a ten-man board to negotiate the Peace of Nicias, which was of course an especially important treaty.

Another common role of ambassadors was to swear the oaths of ratification. This is clear, for example, from the text of the Truce of Laches in which it is stated (Thuc. 4.118.14 = **D 2.9 LT 1**; cf. 4.119.2) that the Peloponnesian ambassadors present in Athens should swear. Aeschines (2.98) suggests that this was standard procedure: once a treaty was ratified by the relevant political bodies in the participating states, the ambassadors of each side travelled to the other side's city to receive the oaths. The Athenian treaty with Chalcis (**D 1.12**), for example, envisions oath-taking ceremonies in both Athens and Chalcis. By contrast, S. Lambert observes that the Athenian treaty with Halieis (**D 2.8**), while providing for an exchange of oaths at Athens, makes no provision for a similar procedure at Halieis.²² Returning to the Truce of Laches, Robin Lane Fox similarly detects only one oath-taking ceremony, again at Athens where the Spartan, Corinthian, Sicyonian, Megaran, and Epidaurian envoys had travelled.²³

Both Sparta, as we have seen, and Athens sometimes made use of a special category of envoys known as πρέσβεις αὐτόκράτορες ('ambassadors plenipotentiary'). Much of our evidence for them comes from Xenophon's narrative of the negotiations which culminated in Athens' surrender in 404 (*Hell.* 2.2.11-22). With Athens facing the prospect of starvation after Aegospotami, regular Athenian πρέσβεις were sent to Agis, encamped at that time just outside Athens, to propose the surrender of Athens on condition that its walls be retained. Their proposal was referred to Sparta and the Athenian envoys travelled to Sellasia on the Laconian border. However, when they were received by the ephors, their proposal was rejected and they were prevented from proceeding to Sparta. The Assembly then chose Theramenes to negotiate directly with Lysander, but Lysander responded that only the ephors had the power to hear him. Theramenes and his fellow πρέσβεις went on to Sellasia, where they declared themselves αὐτοκράτορες with the power to actively negotiate a peace (*Xen. Hell.* 2.2.19 ἐρωτώμενοι δὲ ἐπὶ τίνι λόγῳ ἤκοιεν εἶπον ὅτι αὐτοκράτορες περὶ εἰρήνης). This time the ephors allowed them to address the Spartan assembly, which expressed its readiness to make peace so long as the Athenians dismantled the Long Walls and the walls of the Piraeus, surrendered most of their warships, allowed exiles to return, and accepted an alliance with Sparta. Theramenes returned to Athens, where the proposal was debated in the Assembly and ultimately accepted. As E. Harris observes, whereas the first, rejected πρεσβεία was competent only to present the

²¹ Kirchoff 1895, 139. On the possible location see Erbse 1989, 41f. and Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 927. For Spartan ξύμβουλοι cf. Thuc. 2.85.1; 3.69.1; 5.63.4. For an eleven-man Athenian commission in 411 led by Peisander in 412/11 (not described as ξύμβουλοι) cf. 8.54.2. See also Andrewes' note at *HCT* 5, 85.

²² Lambert 2018a, 11.

²³ Lane Fox 2010, 19.

Athenian position, the πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες were actually empowered to negotiate. However, it is evident from the final debate in the Athenian Assembly that even the αὐτοκράτορες could not unilaterally accept the Spartan proposal, but still required the formal approval of the δῆμος.²⁴

Political approval of treaties: Athens

Having so far considered how treaties were *negotiated* by Athens and Sparta, I will now examine how they were *approved* by the relevant political bodies in both cities. In Classical Athens, the approval of interstate treaties and, indeed, of all legislation lay with the Boule and Assembly, in that order, as illustrated by the standard enactment formula of Athenian decrees, ἔδοχσεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι δέμῳ ('the Boule and the people decided'), a key expression of the legality of the decrees.²⁵ According to the principle of οὐδὲν ἀπροβούλευτον ('nothing without a προβούλευμα'), the Assembly could not debate an item not based on a προβούλευμα ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 45.4), which refers to a proposed piece of legislation (or 'bill,' in modern parliamentary terms) approved by the Boule and placed on the agenda of the Assembly.²⁶ When presented with a προβούλευμα, the Assembly could accept it without alteration, resulting in a 'probouleumatic' decree, or it could amend it either by reworking the existing text (a 'non-probouleumatic' decree), or by supplementing it with a 'rider.' From the mid-4th century onwards, it becomes possible to determine whether an inscribed decree is probouleumatic or non-probouleumatic: the formula ἔδοξεν τῆι βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ indicates that it is probouleumatic, whereas the formula ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ, with no mention of the Boule, points toward non-probouleumatic legislation.²⁷ In the case of probouleumatic decrees, the proposer was, by definition, always an incumbent member of the Boule.²⁸ However, in the 5th and early-4th centuries, this distinction was not strictly observed, so it is usually not possible to determine whether a decree is probouleumatic or non-probouleumatic on the basis of the enactment formula.²⁹ In extenuating circumstances, agreements were sometimes negotiated in the absence of formal political approval. In 424 Nicias and his colleagues on the spot arranged for Cythera's surrender (Thuc. 4.54.2-4 = **D 2.7 LT 1**), but this was followed by a formal Athenian

²⁴ Harris 2023, 521; cf. Heuß 1934, 26; Mosley 1973, 35; Missiou-Ladi 1987, 341; Pownall 1995; Magnetto 2013, 233. The Athenian Boule is not explicitly mentioned in Xenophon's account, but it must have approved putting the Spartans' proposal on the assembly's agenda via a προβούλευμα.

²⁵ Rhodes 1972, 64; Henry 1977, 2.

²⁶ Rhodes 1972, 52; Lambert 2020, 8.

²⁷ Rhodes 1972, 52-81; Lambert 2018b, 227-71; Lambert 2020, 8. Also significant for the 4th century, but not for the 5th, is the formal distinction between ψηφίσματα ('decrees,' including all interstate treaties) and νόμοι ('laws'), which was formalized in 403/02 BCE. See further Hansen 1983a, 183 and generally Hansen 1983b. For the νόμος/ψήφισμα distinction outside Athens see Rhodes and Lewis 1997, 498-99.

²⁸ Lambert 2017, 7; Lambert 2020, 10 n. 52.

²⁹ Rhodes 1972, 64, 66; Lambert 2018b, 257 n. 69; Lambert 2020, 8.

decree to set its level of tribute and forcibly resettle certain Cytherans elsewhere (4.57.4 οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβουλεύσαντο καταθέσθαι ἐς τὰς νήσους κτλ.). The treaties with the Selymbrians and the Clazomenians at Daphnus were likewise negotiated by the Athenian generals on their own authority without reference to the δῆμος. Nevertheless, the treaty with Selymbria was inscribed and placed in a local sanctuary (OR 185 = **D 3.14 ET 1** ll. 26-28), which suggests that both the Athenians and the Selymbrians regarded it as valid. It was only upon Alcibiades' return to Athens in 407 that the Selymbria and Clazomenae treaties were formally approved by the Boule and Assembly and inscribed at Athens.³⁰

Individual proposers in the Assembly were key to the passage of non-probouleumatic decrees. However, before 354/53, they were recorded in inscriptions by their names only; only after this date are names supplemented with patronymic and demotic, making identification easier.³¹ Nonetheless, even in the 5th century proposers can be identified with prominent individuals.³² Both the Halieis treaty (Lambert 2018a = **D 2.8 ET 1** ll. 4-5) and Truce of Laches (Thuc. 4.118.11 = **D 2.9 LT 1**) were proposed by the well-known general Laches, as their prescripts reveal. This raises the question of whether Laches was personally involved in the events leading up to these treaties. Although he is not attested as general after 426/25 and before 418/17, it is still possible that Laches participated in the Halieis campaign of ca. 424/23 in a lesser capacity such as hipparch or taxiarch.³³ I have argued that the Halieis treaty, by further pinching the Spartans within the Peloponnese, hastened the temporary cessation of hostilities in 423 which was also approved on Laches' motion, and Laches reappears as an oath-taker in the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.19.2 = **D 2.12 LT 1**), which he had helped negotiate (5.43.2), and the subsequent alliance (5.24.1 = **D 2.13 LT 1**), further associating him with a pro-peace agenda.³⁴ Similarly Alcibiades, who was instrumental in putting down the revolt of Selymbria through force of arms (Plut. *Alc.* 30.2-5; Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.10; Diod. 13.66.4), proposed the Selymbria treaty upon his return to Athens (**D 3.14 ET 1** = OR 185 l. 31).³⁵

Political approval of treaties: Sparta

³⁰ Cf. Andrewes 1953, 8; Lazar 2024, 32 with n. 12.

³¹ Lambert 2018b, 174. For example, the renewed Athenian alliances with Rhegium and Leontini (**D 1.14**) were proposed by a man named Callias, not further identified, and *LGPN* 2 s.v. Καλλίας identified 262 men named Callias in Attica alone. Lewis 1961, 118 n. 8 suggests that the same Callias proposed *IG* 1³52 = OR 144, the so-called Callias Decrees of ca. 434/33.

³² Lazar 2024, 59 writes, 'The late fourth-century evidence, both epigraphic and oratorical ... provides more explicit testimony for individuals proposing decrees to further their own interests, or those of their friends.'

³³ For Laches' tenures as στρατηγός see Fornara 1971b, 58, 63, with references.

³⁴ Cf. *HCT* 3, 605.

³⁵ This should not obscure the fact, confirmed through the statistical analysis of Athenian decree prescripts by Barbato 2023, that decree proposal in 5th century Athens was diffused remarkably widely among ordinary citizens and was not dominated by a narrow elite.

Spartan deliberation was the result of a complex interaction between the Council of Elders (*Gerousia*), the ephors and the Assembly. The *Gerousia* and the ephors constituted the most important boards of officials in Sparta. They shared the probouleutic power and checked the legality of the enactments of the Spartan Assembly, which ratified the proposals of the γέροντες and the ephors.³⁶

Alberto Esu's summary of Spartan deliberative procedure succinctly reveals how it differed from that in place in Athens. Unlike the Athenian Boule, the *Gerousia* and ephors enjoyed the power of νομοφυλακία (lit. 'protection of the laws'), which allowed them to review and potentially veto legislation that had already been approved by the popular assembly.³⁷ As we have seen, the reception of foreign envoys at Sparta and the decision to allow or deny them access to the Spartan assembly was the prerogative of the ephors, so that in this respect they were analogous to the members of the Athenian Boule.³⁸ The ephors, or the eponymous ephor at any rate, were also involved in the swearing of interstate treaties, as the occurrence of Pleistolas' name in the swearer-lists of both the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.19.2 = **D 2.12 LT 1**) and the alliance (5.24.1 = **D 2.13 LT 1**) reveals. Constitutionally, the kings' power to shape Sparta's foreign policy was limited (cf. Xen. *Lac.* 15.7; Arist. *Pol.* 1285a). However, personal factors such as charisma, wealth, and involvement in military campaigns could lend them considerable informal authority.³⁹ Thucydides (5.16) emphasizes Pleistoanax's role in promoting peace in 421, while Xenophon highlights Pausanias' initiative in bringing about the reconciliation of the Athenian democrats and oligarchs in 403 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.38 = **D 4.1 LT 2**) and, later, Agesilaus' efforts to enforce Theban acceptance of the King's Peace (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.33). As for the Spartan assembly, its role was to ratify the proposals of the probouleutic authorities, namely the γέροντες and the ephors.⁴⁰ Curiously, the enactment formula of the Spartan proposal sent to Argos in 418 mentions the assembly alone (Thuc. 5.77.1 = **D 3.3 LT 1** κατὰδε δοκεῖ τῆ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων), but this may be misleading: Esu is certain that 'some unmentioned

³⁶ Esu 2017, 355. While the two kings were *ex officio* members of the *Gerousia*, their votes counted no more and no less than those of every other member: Hdt. 6.57; Thuc. 1.20.3; Pl. *Leg.* 692a2. See also Nafissi 2007, 331; Schulz 2011, 237; Lupi 2014, 38-41; Schwartzberg 2014, 25-27; Esu 2017, 358. With the kings included, the *Gerousia* consisted of 30 men appointed for life, all of whom except the kings were necessarily over 60 years of age (Aeschin. 1.180; Arist. *Pol.* 1270b39, 1272a36; Plut. *Lyc.* 6, 26.1; *Ages.* 4.2; Paus. 3.5.2).

³⁷ Andrewes 1966, 2; Schulz 2011, 196-201; Esu 2017, 355.

³⁸ Cf. Andrewes 1966, 13.

³⁹ Andrewes 1966, 16-17; Cartledge 2001, 55-67; Nafissi 2007, 332-32; Millender 2009, 31-40; Esu 2017, 357.

⁴⁰ Ste. Croix 1972, 127 with n. 100; Kelly 1981, 55; Esu 2017, 355; cf. Ruzé 1997, 150-56 with Plut. *Lyc.* 6. In a note to the author, Prof. Dr. Trampedach makes the following insightful observation: 'Waren sich die fünf Ephoren und *Gerousia* einig, konnte die spartanische Volksversammlung, zumal angesichts des bizarren Abstimmungsmodus [cf. Thuc. 1.87], nur akklamieren. Einfluß und Entscheidungsgewalt erhielt die spartanische Volksversammlung nur dann, wenn die Elite uneinig war.'

probouleutic body – in all probability the ephors – must have introduced the motion to the Assembly.⁴¹

As is apparent from Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.2.19-20), while the ephors alone decided to allow Theramenes and his fellow πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες to proceed to Sparta, it was in the assembly, attended in this case also by representatives of other Peloponnesian League cities, that the actual negotiations for Athens' surrender took place.⁴² It is therefore surprising that Plutarch refers to the resulting decree as a decree of the ephors (*Lys.* 14.4 = **D 3.16 LT 5** τὸ δ' ἀληθινὸν δόγμα τῶν ἐφόρων) without mentioning the assembly. But the actual text of the decree, which Plutarch immediately proceeds to quote, begins τάδε τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἔγνω, 'the *authorities* of the Lacedaemonians have decided this.' Andrewes finds it difficult to believe that the ephors alone were involved in determining the conditions of Athens' surrender and argues that τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων should be understood to include the assembly as well as the probouleutic bodies.⁴³ This is supported by literary evidence elsewhere: Xenophon indicates that both the ephors and the Spartan assembly were involved in the decision to send ambassadors to Elis in 400 (*Hell.* 3.2.23 ἔδοξε τοῖς ἐφόροις καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ), and he uses the same phrase in describing the Spartan decision to go to war with the Achaeans against the Acarnanians in 389 (4.6.3 ἔδοξε τοῖς τ' ἐφόροις καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι στρατεύεσθαι μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀκαρνανᾶς).⁴⁴

Sparta, as ἡγεμών of the Peloponnesian League, often had to take its allies into consideration when concluding treaties, and the Spartans are seen deliberating with their allies for such purposes during the Peloponnesian War (e.g., *Thuc.* 5.17, 22; *Diod.* 12.75).⁴⁵ Although a League conference is not explicitly attested in 423, the Spartans must have collaborated with the authorities of at least Corinth, Sicyon, Megara, and Epidaurus to compose the terms the Truce of Lichas. The rescripts of the first (*Thuc.* 8.18.1 = **D 3.11 LT 1** ξυμμαχίαν ἐποίησαντο πρὸς βασιλέα καὶ Τισσαφέρνην Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι), second (8.37.1 = **D 3.12 LT 1** ξυθῆκαι Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς βασιλέα Δαρεῖον καὶ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς βασιλέως καὶ Τισσαφέρνην), and third (8.58.1 = **D 3.13 LT 1** ξυθῆκαι ἐγένοντο ἐν Μαιάνδρου πεδίῳ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς Τισσαφέρνην κτλ.) Peloponnesian-Persian

⁴¹ Esu 2017, 367; cf. Colvin 1999, 66. The enactment formula of the treaty proper (*Thuc.* 5.79.1) does not refer to any particular body.

⁴² Cf. Kelly 2019, 285-93. Polyæn. 1.45.5 reports that Lysander was also present and delivered a speech advocating that Athens not be destroyed so as not to benefit the Thebans.

⁴³ *HCT* 4, 135. For the formula Andrewes compares *IDélos* 87 ll. 2-7 *ἡιάλε τὰ τελέε τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐς Δᾶλλον κατὰς συθηκάς*. The inscription is a Spartan decree from Delos which records the island's liberation from Athens in 403.

⁴⁴ Both passages are taken from Xenophon's authorial narrative, but note their resemblance to the formal enactment formula.

⁴⁵ Cf. Mosley 1971, 321.

treaties of 412/11 suggest the involvement of not only of Sparta but of its allies as well.⁴⁶ A conference certainly took place in Corinth on the eve of the Peloponnesian campaign in Ionia (Thuc. 8.8.2 ξυνελθόντες ἐς Κόρινθον οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐβουλεύοντο), which was a necessity because the allies possessed far more warships than Sparta itself (cf. 8.3.2).⁴⁷

Amendment clauses

Just because a treaty was ratified did not always mean that it was unmodifiable. As Adcock and Mosley write, ‘If treaties did become obsolete, or if certain terms were rendered inappropriate by the passage of events, it was an accepted idea that the treaties need not be terminated but could be subject to amendment.’⁴⁸ Four treaties within my database – the Peace of Nicias, the Spartan-Athenian alliance, the Quadruple Alliance, and the Boeotian-Athenian alliance of 395 (see **Appendix 2**) – contain an amendment clause. These allowed for elements of the treaties to be changed at a later time as long as all parties consented. Notably, they are all found in long-term treaties: the Peace of Nicias and the subsequent alliance were concluded for 50 years, the Quadruple Alliance for 100, and the Athenian-Boeotian alliance was expressly unlimited. Long-term treaties were especially vulnerable to changing circumstances and an amendment clause allowed for a degree of adaptability that would not have been otherwise available. Turning to the contents of the amendment clauses themselves, specific verbs such as μεταθεῖναι (‘change’), προσθεῖναι (‘add’), and ἀφελεῖν (‘subtract’) are common. The amendment clause of the Peace of Nicias is the least radical of the four: as Gomme writes, Athens and Sparta could only ‘change the wording if it is found that something has not been mentioned that should have been’ (this is the meaning of Thuc. 5.18.11 = **D 2.12 LT 1** εἰ δέ τι ἀμνημονοῦσιν), but not to add or subtract clauses at their pleasure.⁴⁹ Thus, if the complaint of Sparta’s allies at 5.29.2 (ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖς Ἀττικαῖς ἐγγράπτο εὐορκον εἶναι **προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν** ὅτι ἂν ἀμφοῖν τοῖν πολέοις δοκῆ) is, as Gomme and Hornblower both believe, a reference to the Peace of Nicias and not the subsequent alliance, then they have misrepresented what the Peace demonstrably says.⁵⁰ On the other hand, if in fact their complaint refers to the alliance, in which the formula

⁴⁶ Lévy 1983b, 226 with n. 43 maintains, however, that they remained bilateral treaties, with the Spartans and their allies constituting a single bloc. He points to Thuc. 8.18.2 ἀμφοτέρους and 8.37.3 ἀμφοτέρους.

⁴⁷ Lewis 1977, 89 n. 34 identifies this explicitly as a Peloponnesian League conference. Note again the attendance of Thebans, Corinthians, and ‘many other Greeks’ (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19 Κορίνθιοι καὶ Θηβαῖοι ... πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων) at the meeting of the Spartan assembly at which Theramenes spoke in 404.

⁴⁸ Adcock and Mosley 1975, 225.

⁴⁹ *HCT* 3, 677-78. Gomme adds, ‘It seems clear that this clause was repeated in each copy of the treaty, *ipsissimis verbis*, and not *mutatis mutandis*; for it was a grievance of the allies that Athens and Sparta had assumed this privilege.’

⁵⁰ *HCT* 3, 694-95; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 67. On account of the phraseology used by the allies at Thuc. 5.29.2, I believe that their reference is to the alliance, not the Peace of Nicias, although the fact that they refer to σπονδαί rather than ξυμμαχία complicates matters.

προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν actually appears, they nevertheless had no right to object, strictly speaking, since the alliance was bilateral and did not involve them.

Arbitration clauses

In the 5th century, the arbitration of *private* disputes was already an established procedure in the Greek world. In Classical Athens, two individuals in dispute could choose to submit to binding arbitration in order to reach a solution.⁵¹ *Interstate* arbitration was rather less developed before Hellenistic times. L. Piccirilli's compendium of known Classical arbitrations (which includes many examples better characterized as mediation than arbitration) counts only seven cases from the 6th century, 23 from the 5th, and 28 from the 4th century until 338.⁵² While the resulting corpus is not negligible, it pales in comparison with the very large number of arbitrations from the Hellenistic period.⁵³ Fewer still, but no less significant, are the arbitration clauses inserted in interstate treaties. Arbitration clauses are attested for the Thirty Years' Peace (Piccirilli 21 = Thuc. 1.78.4, 85.2, 140.2, 144.2, 145; 7.18.2 = **D 1.11 passim**), the Truce of Laches (Piccirilli 25 = Thuc. 4.118.8, 122.4 = **D 2.9 LT 1**), the Peace of Nicias (Piccirilli 27 = Thuc. 5.18.4 = **D 2.12 LT 1**), and the Peace of Lichas (Piccirilli 31 = Thuc. 5.79.1 = **D 3.4 LT 1**). The mediation of Cimon (therefore not, strictly, an arbitration) was also key to the so-called Truce of Cimon of 451 BCE (Piccirilli 20 = **D 1.7 passim**), and Athens' attempt to impose arbitration in the war of 440 between Delian League members Samos and Miletus (Piccirilli 22) led to the revolt of the former. Moving briefly beyond the geographical scope of this dissertation, there is a mid-5th century inscription from Argos which records a treaty between Argos' Cretan daughter-cities Cnossus and Tylissus, apparently achieved through Argive mediation or arbitration (Piccirilli 18-19). Another inscription, in this case dated ca. 390, attests a border dispute between Miletus and Myus that was settled by the arbitration of a panel of judges from Erythrae, Chios, Clazomenae, Lebedos, and Ephesus (Piccirilli 36).

G. Shoemaker notes that, while arbitration clauses did sometimes specify who was to conduct the arbitration in the event that the clause was activated, this was not common until Hellenistic times, and in the 5th and early-4th centuries the arbitrator was usually selected on an *ad hoc* basis.⁵⁴ The most common reason for going to arbitrations was to settle territorial disputes, but other disagreements, for example of a financial nature, could also be settled in this way.⁵⁵ The dispute over the political status of Potidaea in 432/31 BCE could have led to the activation of the arbitration clause of the Thirty Years' Peace: this option was notably endorsed by the

⁵¹ E. Harris and A. Magnetto, *OCD*⁴ s.v. 'arbitration, Greek,' with references.

⁵² Piccirilli 1973.

⁵³ For Hellenistic interstate arbitration see esp. Ager 1996.

⁵⁴ Shoemaker 2023, 26.

⁵⁵ Low 2007, 105.

Spartan king Archidamus, who argued that it would be unlawful to attack Athens without first submitting to arbitration (Thuc. 1.85.2). But the Spartan assembly was ultimately persuaded by the ephor Sthenelaidas, who rejected arbitration in favour of a military solution (1.86.4). Piccirilli suggests that the ephor's appeal rested on the very real fear that an unfavourable arbitral judgement would have harmed the Spartans' prestige and the fact that neither side was likely to agree on a suitable arbitrator.⁵⁶ But decades later, the Spartans would come to regret their rejection of arbitration, even ascribing their poor showing in the Archidamian War to the gods' displeasure (Thuc. 7.18.2 = **D 1.11 LT 7**). Conversely, it was the Athenians who rejected the Spartans' offer of arbitration, provided for in the Truce of Laches, when Scione defected (Thuc. 4.122.4-5).⁵⁷ As Piccirilli observes, an arbitral decision favouring Scione would have prevented Athens from punishing an ally's defection, leading to serious loss of face and possibly encouraging further defections.⁵⁸

A key reason that arbitration in the Classical Greek world was much more difficult to realize than in modern international law is the fact that no international court existed to which certain types of dispute were automatically referred.⁵⁹ K.A. Raaflaub emphasizes that interstate arbitration was feasible only if both sides were genuinely committed to a nonviolent solution and willing to abide by the arbitrator's decision even if disadvantageous.⁶⁰ As we have seen, if no suitable arbitrator could be found, or if one side could get its way by military means instead, then arbitration clauses, even if written into interstate treaties, were effectively dead on arrival.⁶¹ 'Hard feelings, state interest, or plain stubbornness were all used to justify states disregarding arbitration,' writes Shoemaker. 'There was, simply put, no feeling of international obligation on the part of the Ancient Greeks to engage in arbitration when their interests or pride might be impinged.'⁶² The examples discussed above reinforce his observations.

Duration of treaties

The stipulated duration of Greek interstate treaties varied enormously. On one extreme are the ten-day truces made between Athens and Boeotia in 421 and regularly renewed (Thuc. 5.26.2; 32.6-7), and on the other are treaties without any time limit at all.⁶³ Perpetual alliance treaties existed already in the Archaic period, as seen in the treaty between Sybaris and the Serdaioi

⁵⁶ Piccirilli 1973, 107; cf. Shoemaker 2023, 30.

⁵⁷ See Thuc. 4.122.3 for background: the Athenians claimed that Scione revolted two days after the Truce of Laches was ratified, but Brasidas insisted that the revolt occurred before news of the Truce reached him.

⁵⁸ Piccirilli 1973, 122-23. For the subsequent Athenian decree to execute the men of Scione see Thuc. 4.122.6.

⁵⁹ Bolmarcich 2007a, 27; Rhodes 2008, 11; Eckstein 2017, 495.

⁶⁰ Raaflaub 2016, 124.

⁶¹ Martin 1940, 573; Low 2007, 106.

⁶² Shoemaker 2023, 32.

⁶³ Cf. Arnush 1992, 335-36.

(ML 10 = *SdA*² no. 120). Karavites suggests that unlimited alliance treaties ‘sprang from the nature of personal relations that characterized the aristocratic world where personal and family friendships were contracted forever.’⁶⁴ Probably the treaty between Tegea and Sparta (*SdA*² no. 112 with Plut. *Mor.* 292b; cf. Hdt. 9.26.2), which D. Yates dates to ca. 560 and identifies as the first in a series of bilateral treaties involving Sparta which ultimately gave rise to the Peloponnesian League, was similarly made ‘forever,’ although this is not explicitly attested.⁶⁵ In contrast to alliance treaties, there is nothing to suggest that peace treaties or were temporally unlimited even in early times. When, during the Persian Wars, the Argives sought to stave off a confrontation with Sparta over Cynuria, they proposed not a perpetual peace agreement but a treaty for only 30 years, which was rejected by the Spartans in any case and would not be realized until ca. 451 (Hdt. 7.148.4-149.2; cf. **D 1.8**).⁶⁶ No Greek peace treaty was temporally unlimited until the King’s Peace (**D 4.8**), and even then, perpetuity is implied merely by the absence of a stated time limit rather than by any positive expression thereof.⁶⁷ In alliance treaties, perpetuity can be expressed by formulae such as ἀείδιον, εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, and εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον.⁶⁸

Our admittedly scant evidence suggests that the maximum time limit for peace treaties before 421 was 30 years (e.g., **D 1.8**, **D 1.11**). The Peace of Nicias’ time limit of 50 years, an extension of 20 years over the previous maximum, is notable: E. Baltrusch even argues that the Peace of Nicias was treated in practice as if it were an unlimited treaty (‘Da ist zunächst die *Dauer* von 50 Jahren, die zwar der Form nach eine Begrenzung, in der Praxis aber die Ewigkeit ausdrücken sollte’).⁶⁹ But I am not fully convinced of this: Argos was evidently eager to resume hostilities with Sparta upon the expiration of their 30-year treaty with Sparta (Thuc. 5.14.4 = **D 1.8 LT 1**), so the Argives evidently did not consider *that* treaty to be ‘virtually’ unlimited. In the case of the Peace of Nicias, Athens and especially Sparta were nearing exhaustion in 421, or at least the possibility was becoming more and more likely, and neither side could foresee how much time they would need to fully recover: with a 50-year treaty they were both playing it safe. The lack of expressly perpetual peace treaties was not a consequence of the lack of developed interstate institutions; rather, as Baltrusch astutely notes, the Greeks of the Classical period were capable only of understanding *positive* relations such as φιλία and συμμαχία as potentially perpetual.⁷⁰ Peace treaties were fundamentally *negative*, i.e., they interrupted a pre-existing state of war but did not in themselves establish a new type of relationship between the contracting states. Whether the expiration of a time-limited peace treaty without renewal

⁶⁴ Karavites 1982, 91. Although he does not say as much, I suspect that Karavites wrote this with Homer in mind.

⁶⁵ Yates 2005, 65. *Contra* Cawkwell 1993, 369, who dates it to ca. 490-460, accepted by Braun 1994, 42-45.

⁶⁶ Cf. Alonso 2007, 220.

⁶⁷ Cf. Ryder 1965, 2, 5.

⁶⁸ Cf. Fisch 1979, 344.

⁶⁹ Baltrusch 1994, 124.

⁷⁰ Baltrusch 1994, 192. *Contra* Keil 1916, 7f.

automatically led to the resumption of hostilities is uncertain: it is Baltrusch's opinion that it did, but V. Alonso disputes this.⁷¹ Probably the pre-existing state of war formally resumed but this did not automatically result in military action. Only two time-limited Classical-era treaties of which I am aware – the thirty-year truce between Argos and Sparta (**D 1.8**) and the treaty of 418 between Sparta and Mantinea (**D 3.6**) – successfully held for their entire intended duration.⁷²

As noted, alliance treaties were often expressly perpetual, such as the establishment of the Delian League (as symbolized by the dropping of iron weights into the sea), Athens' alliances with Leontini (**D 1.14 ET 2** = OR 149B ll. 22-23) and, in the early-4th century, with Boeotia (**D 4.3 ET 1** = RO 6 ll. 2-3) were concluded 'for all time.' But alliance treaties could also be time-limited, and there are three such treaties in my database: **D 2.13** and **D 3.7** (50 years) and **D 3.2** (100 years). Venturing briefly beyond the treaties included in my database, a combined peace treaty and alliance for 100 years was made between the Acarnanians, Amphilocheians, and Ambraciots in 426/25 (Thuc. 3.114.3 καὶ ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο ἑκατὸν ἔτη Ἀκαρνανῆες καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι πρὸς Ἀμπρακιώτας ἐπὶ τοῖσδε); and a 50-year alliance of 392 between Amyntas III of Macedon and the Chalcidians (Tod 111 = *SdA*² 231). It is noteworthy that no time limit is stated in any of Athens' treaties with its fellow Delian League. This is not difficult to explain: clearly they were intended to be perpetual, but this did not have to be spelled out explicitly because the Delian League itself was conceived as a perpetual alliance.

Treaties, of course, could be – and very frequently were – terminated well before reaching their natural expiry. 'Even written and sworn treaties on formal public display we might want to think of merely as gestures in a certain direction – even if well-intentioned, subject to change if the circumstances were pressing enough,' writes Eckstein, and few events exemplify this more starkly than Alcibiades' notorious re-inscription of the Λακωνικὴ στήλη in 419 BCE.⁷³ At the dawn of the 4th century, Agesilaus continued to abide by an agreement with Tissaphernes despite the latter having broken it (Xen. *Ages.* 1.10-12), but Polly Low sees this as the exception that proves the rule: Xenophon's account 'implies that such behaviour was both praiseworthy and unusual.'⁷⁴ It is in fact surprising that a treaty as troubled as the Peace of Nicias, which was formally renounced by the Spartans in winter 414/13 BCE (Thuc. 7.18), did not completely fall apart even earlier. The metaphorical 'tearing up' of the Peace was occasioned by an Athenian

⁷¹ Baltrusch 1994, 92ff., 123-24, 187, 192; Alonso 2007, 223 n. 37.

⁷² Cf. generally Adcock and Mosley 1975, 222: 'The arrangement of contracts in perpetuity seems to have had little marked effect on their practical duration. Members revolted from their perpetual alliance with Athens in the fourth century [i.e., the Second Athenian Confederacy] just as they had done in the fifth, and other alliances displayed the same degree of instability. Political subversion or a change in regime in one of the contracting states was a major factor in the breach or abrogation of treaties.'

⁷³ Eckstein 2017, 494.

⁷⁴ Low 2007, 127 n. 164. Note pseudo-Demosthenes' implication ([Dem.] 17.12) that treaties lost their validity once violated.

raid on the coast of Laconia in 414 (6.105), but this was hardly the first incident since 421 that could have produced such a reaction. Militarily, the raids were not even very significant, certainly less so than the Mantinea campaign of 418. As P.J. Rhodes observes:

In the years that followed [the Peace of Nicias] various things went wrong, and yet it suited both sides to pretend that the peace treaty and the alliance were still in force: clauses about the return of captured territory were not acted on; Sparta broke its alliance with Athens by making a separate alliance with Boeotia; when Sparta tried to salvage its alliance with Athens, the Athenian Alcibiades saw to it that the attempt failed, and Athens in turn broke the alliance by making a separate alliance with Argos and other states; but still the alliance between Sparta and Athens was not renounced by either side. Campaigning followed in the Peloponnese, which could have led to a direct clash between Athenian and Spartan forces on a number of occasions, and actually did so in the battle of Mantinea, in 418.⁷⁵

The true reason that Sparta decided to formally resume hostilities only in 414/13 is that Athens was severely weakened from the Sicilian expedition, while the Spartans were now determined to invade Attica and establish a fort at Decelea but required a suitable pretext to do so (cf. Thuc. 7.18.3-19.2), and to satisfy themselves that they were no longer bound by the Peace of Nicias.⁷⁶ This kind of opportunism echoes the Spartans' reasons for repudiating the Thirty Years' Peace in 431: according to Thucydides (1.88), they were not so much persuaded by their allies' accusations of Athenian violations of the Peace as by their fear of the growing power of Athens (ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν ξυμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις ὅσον φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον δυνηθῶσιν).⁷⁷ Or as Rhodes more bluntly puts it: '[T]o some extent a treaty meant what its participants wanted it to mean; it was broken if they chose to think so and it was not broken if they chose to think not.'⁷⁸ Thus, the formal renunciation of treaties and the renewal of conflict were often the result of deliberate political choices and not purely a consequence of military actions, and highlight the importance ascribed by the Greek states to maintaining the appearance of legality.⁷⁹

Conclusion

Negotiation was a crucial part of the treaty-making process, and the institution of πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες was created to overcome some of the limitations of traditional πρέσβεις, though with mixed results. The cooperation of the probouleutic authorities was crucial to the success

⁷⁵ Rhodes 2008, 9-10.

⁷⁶ Cf. *HCT* 4, 377-78.

⁷⁷ Cf. Eckstein 2017, 506.

⁷⁸ Rhodes 2008, 11; cf. Alonso 2007, 219.

⁷⁹ Stadter 1984, 368-69; Alonso 2007, 216; Rhodes 2008, 8-9, 12.

of proposed treaties in both Athens and Sparta, but they played a greater role relative to the popular assembly at Sparta. Amendment and arbitration clauses, where they appear, were intended to improve a treaty's chances of long-term success, but were hampered by their impracticality and considerations of prestige. Time-limits were the norm for σπονδαί-agreements, but alliance-treaties were sometimes explicitly perpetual.

Addendum 1: bilateral and multilateral treaties

Greek diplomatic practice allowed for both bilateral treaties, which consisted of only two partners, and multilateral treaties, which allowed for the participation of multiple states. While Baltrusch contends that bilaterality was a fundamental element of all σπονδαί-agreements, the ancient literary evidence demonstrates that this was not always the case.⁸⁰ In the Truce of Laches, representatives from Sparta, Corinth, Sicyon, Megara, Epidaurus, and Athens each swear separately (**D 2.9 LT 1** = Thuc. 4.119.2). In the text of the Peace of Nicias as recorded by Thucydides, while the historian records only the names of the oath-takers from Sparta and Athens proper (**D 2.12 LT 1** = Thuc. 5.19.2), the treaty's heading makes clear that Sparta's allies did in fact swear on their own behalf, city by city (5.18.1 σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι κατὰ τάδε, καὶ ὤμοσαν **κατὰ πόλεις**), though not Athens' allies.⁸¹ And later in the treaty, we learn that the Athenian swearers are to swear to Sparta and each of Sparta's allies *in turn* (5.18.9 ὄρκους δὲ ποιήσασθαι Ἀθηναίους πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κατὰ πόλεις). Although we do not have the text of the treaty itself, it is probable that the Thirty Years' Peace which, Thucydides notes, was concluded by the Athenians with the Spartans *and their allies* (**D 1.11 LT 1** = Thuc. 1.115.1 σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τριακοντούτεις), followed the same procedure.

Alliance treaties, much like peace agreements, could be either bilateral or multilateral. The alliance which followed the Peace of Nicias highlights the contrast between bi- and- multilateral treaties: unlike the Peace of Nicias, its heading mentions the Spartans and the Athenians (restored) alone (**D 2.13 LT 1** = Thuc. 5.23.1 κατὰ τάδε ξύμμαχοι ἔσονται Λακεδαιμόνιοι <καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι> πεντήκοντα ἔτη), without reference to their allies, nor are the allies mentioned in the following clauses. Conversely, the Quadruple Alliance (**D 3.2**) is undoubtedly a multilateral treaty, despite the appearance of ἐκάτεροι ('each of two') in both versions (**LT 1** = Thuc. 5.47.1; **ET 1** = OR 165 l. 3). Argos, Mantinea, and Elis do not act as a single unit opposite Athens: they swear independently of one another and erect separate treaty stelae, except for the stele at Olympia which is a joint project (Thuc. 5.47.11 καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι στήλην χαλκῆν

⁸⁰ Baltrusch 1994, 186; cf. 161, 167.

⁸¹ Cf. *HCT* 3, 667: 'Note that, as usual, Athens speaks for all her allies, who appear to have had no voice in the negotiations. ... Sparta, on the other hand, only speaks first among her allies.'

κοινή Ὀλυμπίους τοῖς νυνί). The Delian League is an ambiguous case, especially as we do not have any epigraphic evidence for its foundation in 478/77 BCE (**D 1.1**). Scheibelreiter presents three possibilities: 1) that the League comprised a network of bilateral treaties of each League member with every other League member individually; 2) that Athens had bilateral treaties with each of its allies individually, but without the allies being similarly connected to one another; 3) that Athens had a single bilateral treaty with ‘the allies’ as a single unit.⁸² As Scheibelreiter notes, the anti-Persian ‘Hellenic League’ of 481, from which the Delian League ultimately emerged, as well as the Peloponnesian League itself, comprised a series of bilateral alliances between the ἡγεμών Sparta and its allies individually, although this does not necessarily mean that this was the model was followed by Athens in 478/77.⁸³ Nor does the act of dropping iron μύδροι into the sea, attested both by [Aristotle] (**LT 2 = Ath. Pol.** 23.5) and Plutarch (**LT 4 = Arist.** 25), decisively prove either bi- or- multilaterality.⁸⁴ It is true that a number of later Athenian decrees, such as the Measures Decree (*IG* 1³ 1453 = OR 155), the Cleonymus Decree (*IG* 1³ 68 = OR 152), and the Thudippus Decrees (*IG* 1³ 71 = OR 153), were applied to all Delian League members collectively, but these were unilaterally-imposed decrees rather than proper interstate treaties sworn by representatives of two or more states. Epigraphically-preserved Athenian *treaties* with League members from ca. 450 BCE onwards (**D 1.6, D 1.12, D 1.13, D 1.15, D 2.1, D 2.5, D 3.9, D 3.10, D 3.14**), on the other hand, were all bilateral, redefining an individual ally’s relationship with Athens. This alone strongly implies that their initial entry into the Delian League was made on a bilateral basis.

While multilateral treaties imposed the *same terms* on multiple parties simultaneously, a state on other occasions might conclude two very similar treaties with two or more partners at or near the same time, but under such circumstances the treaties remained *bilateral*. For example, the Athenian alliances with Rhegium and Leontini (**D 1.14**), while containing similar terms and probably both dating to the same year – their later reaffirmation certainly belongs to the same date – remained legally separate treaties. Likewise, the alliances with Boeotia (**D 4.3**) and the Locrians (**D 4.4**) both belong to the early phase of the Corinthian War, but as they were inscribed on separate stelae, by two distinct cutters, and possibly at different times, it is immediately obvious that they constitute two separate bilateral treaties. Still, the Corinthian War spurred on a very notable experiment in multilateralism, the Alliance of Corinth directed against Sparta (**D 4.5**). S. Accame and J.B. Salmon have argued that the Alliance, with its common seat or συνέδριον at Corinth, presupposes a network of bilateral alliance treaties among its members.⁸⁵ If true, this bears a striking resemblance to the Delian League which,

⁸² Scheibelreiter 2013, 257.

⁸³ Scheibelreiter 2013, 259; on the structure of the Hellenic League see 31-40.

⁸⁴ Cf. Scheibelreiter 2013, 258.

⁸⁵ Accame 1951, 55; Salmon 1984, 349; cf. Wüst 1954, 153.

though consisting of bilateral alliances between Athens and each of its allies in turn, initially had a common seat at Delos where its members met periodically (**D 1.1 LT 1** = Thuc. 1.96.2).

The King's Peace and the subsequent κοινή εἰρήνη treaties of the 4th century are often mentioned in discussions of laterality.⁸⁶ Polly Low, for example, has written: 'The Common Peaces of the fourth century, for example, are essentially multilateral agreements, and – in their imposition of certain obligations on those who take part in them – result in the creation of a type of multilateral interstate structure.'⁸⁷ The King's Peace was, at least theoretically, radically multilateral in that its terms, specifically the autonomy clause, could be applied to all Greek πόλεις (with a few exceptions): Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον ... τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31 = **D 4.8 LT 1**). A more limited expression of the same principle could be seen already in 418 BCE in the proposed Spartan peace treaty with Argos: τὰς δὲ πόλιας τὰς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμους ἤμεν πάσας κατὰ πάτρια (Thuc. 5.77.5 = **D 3.3 LT 1**), soon codified in the Peace of Lichas (Thuc. 5.79.1 = **D 3.4 LT 1**). While treaties sworn by more than two states was not a novel element of Greek interstate relations in 387/86 BCE, what was unprecedented about the King's Peace was the fact that it could be enforced even on states that had not sworn to it. The fate of Mantinea illustrates this well: because of its 30-year truce with Sparta concluded in 418/17 (**D 3.6**), Mantinea had not participated in the Corinthian War and, consequently, was almost certainly not a 'signatory' to the King's Peace.⁸⁸ But in 385 Sparta besieged Mantinea and forced it into a dioecism (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.5ff.; *FGrH* 70 Ephorus F 79; Diod. 15.12.1-2; Paus. 8.8.9). Although no source states explicitly that the Spartans justified their actions by reference to the autonomy clause of the King's Peace, it is highly probable that they did so, especially considering that they had recently appealed to it, backed with the threat of armed force, to ensure the dissolution of the Boeotian confederacy (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.32-33).⁸⁹ The applicability of the King's Peace to *all* Greek states (or more precisely, to whomever Persia and especially Sparta *wanted* it to be applied to) is not an element that was foreshadowed in earlier attested treaties. Far from being an organic development, I argue that it was artificially inserted at Sparta's insistence during the negotiations conducted by Antalcidas to furnish a pretext for future intervention where the Spartans saw fit.

⁸⁶ See P. Low, *OCD*⁴ s.v. 'Common Peace' with bibliography.

⁸⁷ Low 2007, 66.

⁸⁸ Even states which were active in the early stages of the Corinthian War, such as Phocis and Locris, may have dropped out of the conflict after 394 (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.21ff.) and probably did not swear to the King's Peace: see Badian 1991, 39 with n. 29; Jehne 1994, 26 n. 91.

⁸⁹ Funke 2004 suggests that Sparta's real motive for the dioecism of Mantinea was that it felt threatened by an epigraphically-attested synoecism treaty between Mantinea and Helisson (*SEG* 37.340; the treaty is not precisely datable but probably belongs to the early-4th century).

Addendum 2: renewal of the Truce of Laches

While there is no clause within the text of the Truce of Laches itself which establishes a mechanism for the treaty's renewal, Thuc. 5.1 (authorial narrative, beginning of summer 422) writes: τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους αἱ μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων. Hammond, on the basis of an emendation by Canfora, translates this, 'In the following summer the year's truce was extended until the Pythian games.'

If the Truce was not renewed, it will have expired on 14 Elaphebolion/12 Gerastius (= March/April) 422, precisely one year after its ratification. The Pythian games were held in approximately August (a literal trans. of the manuscripts would read, nonsensically, 'the year's truce came to an end until the Pythian games': Rhodes *ad loc.*). Rhodes suggests on the basis of Thuc. 5.1 that the Truce was extended for roughly five months, with the Athenian Assembly agreeing to this extension.⁹⁰ But it makes little sense to suppose that the Assembly extended a one-year truce by only five months and not a full year, and a better solution is to suppose that the Truce had indeed expired, but was informally extended out of respect for the *Pythian* truce, which Thucydides at 5.1 classifies as an ἐκεχειρία.

⁹⁰ Rhodes, *Peloponnesian War* notes, 563.

Chapter 9

Publication and archiving of treaties

The inscribing of interstate treaties on non-perishable materials such as stone and bronze appears to have begun in the 6th century BCE. The earliest surviving examples include an agreement between the Greek city of Sybaris in Italy and an obscure people called the Serdaioi (ML 10 = *IvO* 9, ca. 550-525 BCE), and an alliance (συνμαχία) between the Eleans and Heraeans (ML 17 = *IvO* 10, ca. 500 BCE), both of which have been found in Olympia.¹ While the validity of interstate agreements rested on the exchange of oral oaths rather than the written word, the decision to inscribe these treaties and to produce archival copies on perishable materials such as papyrus was itself politically meaningful. This chapter examines the vastly different epigraphic cultures of Athens and Sparta, which is notable for the sheer volume of material produced by Athens compared to the relative scarcity of documents from Sparta. By analyzing findspots, publication formulae, and the evolution of state archives like the Athenian Metroon, we can understand how the inscription, display, and archiving of treaties could project power, legitimize foreign policy, and provide a permanent, if occasionally physically altered, record of their diplomatic history

Inscribed Athenian treaties: locations and motivations

The fact that a particular treaty was inscribed and its original display location can be determined in three ways. The first and most obvious is the evidence of modern findspots, which both proves that a treaty was inscribed and is strongly suggestive of its original location even in the absence of a surviving publication formula. Secondly, a considerable number of treaties contain publication formulae, specifying the location(s) in which they were to be displayed (see **Appendix 4**). The publication formulae can also reveal the existence of additional copies which do not physically survive, usually those located outside of Athens: publication formulae confirm that copies of **D 1.6** (acropolis of Erythrae), **D 1.2** (temple of Olympian Zeus, Chalcis), **D 2.1** (Colophon), **D 2.8** (temple of Apollo, Halieis), **D 2.11** (sanctuaries of the Bottiaean cities), **D 3.2** (temple of Apollo, Argos; temple of Zeus, Mantinea; sanctuary of Olympia), and **D 3.14** (Selymbria) were inscribed and erected in locations other than at Athens, though only the Athenian copies survive. Additionally, two treaties whose text is known only from Thucydides (**D 2.12** + **D 2.13**) also contain publication clauses revealing that multiple copies were inscribed. Another important literary source is Pausanias, who as late as the 2nd century CE could still see

¹ For the dates see Lazar 2024, 44-45. As Lazar notes, ML 10 must predate 510 because Sybaris was destroyed in that year (Diod. 12.9.5-6; Hdt. 6.21; Strab. 6.1.13).

inscribed copies the Thirty Years' Peace at Olympia (5.32.4 = **D 1.11 LT 9**) and Quadruple Alliance (5.12.8 = **D 3.2 LT 2**) at Olympia, although he does not follow the Thucydidean practice of copying their contents.²

The Athenians in the 5th and early-4th centuries almost invariably set up their inscriptions on the Acropolis. This is concordant with the well-documented trend of the Greek states, especially during the Classical period, to display public inscriptions including interstate treaties in religious sanctuaries.³ P. Liddel has compiled a database of 1679 Athenian decrees dating from the 5th century BCE until the 3rd century CE, of which 553 contain publication formulae.⁴ For the period 469-395/94 BCE there are 82 state decrees with preserved publication formulae, of which 89% record the Acropolis as the display site. For the period 394/93-378/77, the proportion is even higher at 96.6%, although this is based on a smaller sample of 29 inscriptions. The accords with the Athenian treaties in my database, whose findspots and/or publication formulae reveal were overwhelmingly intended for publication on the Acropolis. The publication of state decrees in the Agora did not become even somewhat common until 351/51-322/21, accounting for 8.3% of publication formulae in this period based on 84 inscriptions. Not until 229-86 BCE did the Agora finally overtake the Acropolis as the most frequently-attested location in publication formulae (54.9% in the Agora vs. 28.2% on the Acropolis with the remainder displayed elsewhere, based on 142 inscriptions).⁵ Liddel attributes the growing prominence of the Agora to the introduction of new types of honorary decrees in the 4th century, such as those dedicated to *πρυτάνεις* and *βουλευταί* (which began to be published consistently on an annual basis only after the exile of Demetrius of Phalerum in 307), as well as to the inevitable overcrowding of the Acropolis.⁶ But within the period 478/77-387/86 BCE, and with particular intensity after ca. 450, the Acropolis remained very much the focal point of Athenian epigraphic culture.⁷ The Athenians will have found this quite reasonable: the Acropolis was not only a highly conspicuous religious sanctuary, but the heart of the Athenian πόλις.⁸ In such places, a stele, in the words of E. Culasso Gastaldi, 'is able to enjoy the undisputed sanctity of an area subject to divine laws in such a manner that the text as a sacred object may be protected and no one may be permitted to contravene it.'⁹ Although the Acropolis, unlike the Agora, was not a

² For Thucydides' use of inscriptions, see Meyer 1955, 12; Canfora 1990, 205; Sickinger 1999, 253 n. 74; Smarczyk 2006, 502 n. 19; Lane Fox 2010, 12; Allgaier 2022, 135-43.

³ Lalonde 1971, 52-67; Detienne 1988, 42; Hölkeskamp 1992, 100; Thomas 1996, 28-29; Moroo 2016; Mack 2018, 378.

⁴ Liddel 2003, 79. Liddel's database consists of all types of state decrees (e.g., treaties, proxeny decrees, honorary decrees, etc.) but only includes epigraphic material; treaties known only from literary sources are not included.

⁵ Liddel 2003, 85 Table 1.

⁶ Liddel 2003, 81, 84.

⁷ For the emergence of a serious Athenian 'epigraphic habit' around this time, and the possible reasons behind it, see Trampedach 2022.

⁸ Cf. Liddel 2003, 80; Lambert 2020, 14.

⁹ Culasso Gastaldi 2014b, 8-9.

place that could normally be visited on a daily basis, it was accessible both to Athenians and foreigners when participating in religious processions, as tribute-bearers (cf. *IG* 1³ 71 l. 57), or when offering dedications. On such occasions, visitors could hardly fail to notice the Acropolis' considerable and constantly growing collection of inscribed stelae.¹⁰ Liddel argues that the sheer conspicuousness of the Acropolis endowed a certain religious aura to the inscriptions that were erected there, far removed from the hustle and bustle of the lower city.¹¹ In this vein, D.T. Steiner suggests that the display of inscriptions within sacred precincts, such as the Acropolis, sanctified them as 'sacred property' whose physical destruction amounted to temple robbery or sacrilege (ἱεροσυλία).¹² This may explain why in 419 Alcibiades, although he had already persuaded the Athenians to conclude the Quadruple Alliance – which amounted to a *de facto* but not *de jure* renunciation of the Peace of Nicias and the Spartan-Athenian alliance – did not have the 'Laconian stele' destroyed or even removed from public display, but instead added an inscribed postscript that the Spartans had not kept their oaths (Thuc. 5.56.3 τῆ μὲν Λακωνικῆ στήλῃ ὑπέγραψαν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνέμειναν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς ὄρκοις).¹³

As I noted at the beginning of this section, numerous Athenian treaties were displayed not only in Athens but in one or more additional locations. For the 5th century, Leah Lazar identifies about 40 decrees regarding specific Athenian allies and five decrees concerning the whole ἀρχή for which two or more inscribed copies are known to have existed.¹⁴ To take an (admittedly extreme) example, copies of the Athenian coins, weights, and measures decree of ca. 425-15 were to be set up in the agora of every city in the ἀρχή (*IG* 1³ 1453 = OR 155 l. 8), and fragments have in fact been found scattered throughout the Aegean.¹⁵ As Lazar explains, '[T]he Athenians chose to inscribe decrees concerning external relations more than others; this was the subject matter most prevalent in fifth-century Athenian public epigraphic culture, in part due to the Athenians' use of monumental epigraphy as an expression of imperial power.'¹⁶ In other words, the Athenian decision to impose visual reminders of their hegemony inside the territory of their

¹⁰ Hurwit 1999, 48-57; Liddel 2003, 80-81; Faraguna 2017, 30; Lambert 2018b, 27-29.

¹¹ Liddel 2003, 81.

¹² Steiner 1994, 66.

¹³ It is unclear whether this was the stele containing the Peace of Nicias or that containing the alliance. Kirchhoff 1895, 65, followed by Culasso Gastaldi 2014b, 9-10 (without explanation) think that it was the Peace, but both treaties were accompanied by oaths, and Athens' *de facto* renunciation of its new relationship with Sparta implies rejection of both the Peace (Athens and Sparta would come to blows at Mantinea in 418) and the alliance, so in my opinion it is equally possible to have been either treaty. A comic reference to the incident appears at *Ar. Lys.* 513-14. Cf. also Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 148: Alcibiades' action 'did not quite amount to an annulment of the treaty' (though Hornblower does not specify which treaty he is referring to, and Bolmarcich 2007b, 481 emphasizes that Thucydides' ambiguity makes certainty impossible). See also Smarczyk 2006, 506; Allgaier 2022, 141.

¹⁴ Lazar 2024, 32 with n. 14.

¹⁵ Findspots include Smyrna, Olbia, Syme, Cos, Siphnos (mod. Kastros), Aphytis, and Hamaxitos (mod. Gülpınar). See further comm. OR 155, pp. 328, 332-37.

¹⁶ Lazar 2024, 32; cf. Liddel 2010.

subject allies was an exercise in ‘soft power projection,’ a theory developed by the International Relations scholar Joseph Nye.¹⁷ Nye writes that ‘the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others); its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad); and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).’¹⁸ I argue that 5th-century Athens’ tendency towards ‘epigraphic imperialism’ was undertaken in pursuit of the third objective specifically: to legitimize and bestow moral authority on Athenian policy towards an ally or group of allies.

Erasure, destruction, and re-inscription of inscribed treaties

Although (and this needs to be emphasized) it was the exchange of oaths and not the act of inscription that endowed interstate treaties with validity, S. Lambert observes that treaty stelae were sometimes deliberately dismantled or destroyed to symbolize their rescindment. In 340, for example, after breaking with Philip II, the Athenians voted to destroy the epigraphic record of the so-called Peace of Philocrates (*FGrH* 328 Philochorus F 55).¹⁹ At Athens, epigraphic iconoclasm spiked during periods of oligarchy such as the regime of the Thirty and, lying beyond the chronological scope of the present study, under Antipater in the late-4th century BCE.²⁰ We know of the Thirty’s iconoclasm because fresh copies of destroyed inscriptions made after the restoration of the democracy sometimes refer to it explicitly (*IG* 2² 6 = OR 177B ll. 11-14; *IG* 1³ 229 ll. 1-4; *IG* 2² 52 ll. 3-5). Other reinscribed decrees (*IG* 1³ 127 = OR 191 ll. 5-40; *IG* 2² 8 = OR 157) do not mention the Thirty explicitly, but their involvement is suspected by scholars.²¹ When Iulis on Keos revolted against Athens in 363/62, in the context of the Second Athenian Confederacy, its inhabitants destroyed the stelae containing a pre-existing treaty with Athens. After Athens put down the rebellion, a new agreement was made (*IG* 2² 111 = RO 39) which both describes the Iulians’ destruction of the original treaty (ll. 31-33) and orders its re-inscription (ll. 17-23).²² E. Culasso Gastaldi makes the following astute observation:

It follows straightforwardly that acts of destruction and of erasure, and likewise their counterpart act of restoration, possess a strong political will whose intention is either to obliterate through demolition, or to restore through the decision to renew an *anagraphe*, not

¹⁷ Esp. Nye 2019.

¹⁸ Nye 2019, 8.

¹⁹ Lambert 2018b, 59-60; cf. Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 159.

²⁰ On the possible motives of the Thirty see Whitehead 1977, 5 n. 6; Krentz 1982, 66-67; Culasso Gastaldi 2014a, 3-4; 2014b, 2.

²¹ E.g., *IG* 1³ 127 = OR 191, originally enacted in 405/04 and which grants Athenian citizenship *en masse* to the Samians. It was written on the same stele as *IG* 2² 1 = RO 2, a decree of 403/02, i.e., after the restoration of the democracy at Athens. It would be unsurprising if the Thirty destroyed the original stele, since the Samians had been rewarded for their resistance to Sparta. See further Krentz 1982, 66-67; comm. OR 191, p. 553.

²² Cf. Cargill 1981, 61, 138-40; Dreher 1995, 120-24; Culasso Gastaldi 2014a, 9.

the physical object, but rather the decree and the very institution which was the guarantor of the epigraphic writing.²³

Although it was both intended in theory and possible in practice that time-limited treaties remain in force until their natural expiry (e.g., **D 1.8** and **D 3.6**), it was more common, in the period with which the present study is concerned, for such treaties to be prematurely broken, either through the forcible intervention of a third party, or by the renunciation of the treaty by one or more of the contracting states. Sometimes, the ratification of a new treaty automatically voided a previous treaty if their terms were mutually contradictory. Upon Athens' surrender to Sparta in 404, the Delian League was at least *de facto* disestablished – this despite the intended perpetuity of the League as symbolized by the casting of iron weights into the sea returned to the surface ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 23.5 = **D 1.1 LT 2**; Plut. *Arist.* 25 = **LT 4**). Similarly, the King's Peace dissolved the Boeotian confederacy, which logically rendered the Boeotian-Athenian alliance of 395 null and void, even though it was made 'for all time' (RO 6 = **D 4.3 ET 1 ll. 2-3**).²⁴

Lambert observes that even when stelae were intentionally destroyed, the archival copies – on which see *The Athenian 'state archive' and interstate treaties*, below – must have survived to be used as the basis for the new inscriptions.²⁵ Other, more peaceful methods of physically altering inscriptions also existed. The surviving marble stelae of the Rhegium and Leontini alliances show clear physical evidence of partial erasure affecting the original prescripts and the cutting of new prescripts within the erasures, while the remaining part of the stones, which contain the treaties proper, were left unaltered.²⁶ Although these alliances were always intended to be perpetual, the revision of the prescripts reflected the alliances' reaffirmation and emphasized Athens' enduring commitment to its allies.²⁷ A similar phenomenon is evident at *IG* 1³ 101 = OR 187, which consists of two Athenian honorary decrees for Neapolis in Thrace, the first from 410/09 and the second from 407/06. Neapolis was a colony of Thasos, which defected to the Spartans in 411 (*Hell. Oxy.* 10.4-5 Chambers; cf. Thuc. 8.64.2-5; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.32), but the Neapolitans did not follow suit and continued to support Athens, contributing to the recapture of Thasos by Thrasybulus in 407 (ll. 49-51; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.9; Diod. 13.72.1). At ll. 58-59, which belong to the second decree, the secretary of the Boule agrees to correct the

²³ Culasso Gastaldi 2014a, 3.

²⁴ Hansen in *IACP* p. 432 writes simply, 'The [Boeotian] federation was dissolved in 386 in consequence of the King's Peace,' citing Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.33, where the Thebans agree to leave the Boeotian cities autonomous at Agesilaus' insistence (παρήσαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι λέγοντες ὅτι ἀφιᾶσι τὰς πόλεις αὐτονόμους). Cf. Adcock and Mosley 1975, 226. Similarly, Philip II's imposition of the League of Corinth on the Greeks following the battle of Chaeronea formally dissolved whatever remained by that time of the Second Athenian Confederacy (Paus. 1.25.3).

²⁵ Lambert 2018b, 48-49 n. 6.

²⁶ Cf. Culasso Gastaldi 2014a, 3 n. 8.

²⁷ [ἐς ἀ]ῖδιον is partially preserved at OR 149A l. 12 (Rhegium) and, given the stoichedon 33 layout of ll. 9 onwards, is secure. I am less certain about [ἀ]ῖδιο|[ι at OR 149B ll. 22-23 (Leontini), but find it nevertheless probable considering the *stoichedon* 17 layout of ll. 16 onwards and by comparison with the language of the Rhegium treaty.

first decree to remove the emphasis on Neapolis' Thasian origins, and ll. 7-8, part of the earlier decree, show evidence of erasure and recutting in a different hand, demonstrating that this was indeed carried out.²⁸

Other forms of stele-modification could be more hostile in nature while still falling short of outright physical destruction, such as Alcibiades' postscript to the 'Laconian stele' discussed earlier in this chapter. While this was undoubtedly a provocation, there is no indication that the Spartans ascribed any legal force to such tampering.²⁹ The outright destruction of treaty-stelae was very much the exception and not the rule in the Classical Greek world. Pausanias could still see copies of the Thirty Years' Peace and the Quadruple Alliance at Olympia in the 2nd century CE (Paus. 5.12.8, 23.3), although they had both long since fallen into abeyance.³⁰ And the fact that most Athenian treaty-stelae have been recovered on or near the Acropolis, where they were originally displayed, and often considerably intact is hardly suggestive of widespread, systematic stele-destruction. Finally, some inscribed treaties included clauses explicitly prohibiting their physical destruction, such as the Archaic treaty between Elis and the Ewaoioi (*IvO* 9 = *SdA*² 110). According to Plutarch (*Per.* 30.1), the Megarian Decree, while not strictly an interstate treaty, was protected by an Athenian law under which the πινάκιον on which it was written could not be removed from public view.³¹

The Athenian 'state archive' and interstate treaties

For most of the 5th century, there is no unambiguous evidence for an official state archive in Athens in which public documents, including interstate treaties, could be stored. This changed only with the establishment of the Metroon, the exact date of which is uncertain but which probably occurred in the last decade of the 5th century, possibly connected with the revisions of the Athenian law code that took place in two phases between 410 and 400/399 and interrupted by the oligarchic interlude of 404-03 (cf. *IG* 1³ 104 = OR 183A; *IG* 1³ 105 = OR 183B).³² Certainly by the mid-4th century, archival copies of all Athenian laws (νόμοι) and decrees (ψηφίσματα), written on papyrus, were automatically deposited in the Metroon, including documents relevant to interstate relations such as peace treaties and alliance agreements (cf. Diog. Laert. 2.40; Dem. 25.99; Harp. m33; Lycurg. *Leoc.* 66; Ath. *Deip.* 5.53; *Suda* s.v. Μητραγύρτης), which in the 4th century were classified as ψηφίσματα under the post-Euclidian ψήφισμα/νόμος

²⁸ Bertrand 2001, 17-19; Culasso Gastaldi 2014a, 15-16; comm. OR 187.

²⁹ Holladay 1977, 56 n. 16; *HCT* 4, 78; Bolmarcich 2007b, 482; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 264.

³⁰ Cf. Bolmarcich 2007b, 477-78.

³¹ Cf. Steiner 1994, 71; Bolmarcich 2007b, 479-80, 485-86.

³² For the date of the Metroon's establishment see Kahrstedt 1938; Thomas 1989, 38-45, 68-83; Sickinger 1999, 105-06 with 231 n. 61; Valavanis 2002, 221-24; Coqueugniot 2013, 11-21; Lambert 2018b, 48-49 n. 6; Boffo and Faraguna 2021, 207 with n. 60; cf. comm. OR 183, especially p. 508.

distinction (cf. Andoc. 1.89; Dem. 24.42).³³ But archival storage of state documents such as treaties almost certainly did occur earlier: J.P. Sickinger stresses that the nine-book collection of Athenian decrees compiled by the Hellenistic scholar Craterus, including treaties that certainly predate the establishment of the Metroon (Plut. *Cim.* 13.6; Harp. n21, o13; *Suda* s.v. Νύμφαιον), would scarcely have been possible had no system for preserving and archiving official texts existed in the 5th century.³⁴

There is in fact evidence to suggest that, in the 5th century, the ‘old’ Bouleuterion in the Agora, which later became the site of the Metroon, was used for archival storage purposes.³⁵ In *De Reditu*, a speech of Andocides dated ca. 410-405, Andocides refers to an Athenian decree proposed by a certain Menippus which gave Andocides immunity from prosecution in connection with the religious scandals of 415, but which was subsequently revoked. Andocides now seeks to rectify the situation, and the key passage (Andoc. 2.23) reads:

τὸ ψήφισμα ὃ Μενίππου εἰπόντος ἐψηφίσασθε, εἶναι μοι ἄδειαν, πάλιν ἀπόδοτε. ἀναγνώσεται δὲ ὑμῖν αὐτό· ἔτι γὰρ καὶ νῦν ἐγγέγραπται ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ.

You decreed on the motion of Menippus that I should be granted immunity; restore me my rights under that decree. The herald shall read it to you, as it is lying even now among the records in the Bouleuterion.

(trans. K.J. Maidment, adapted)

Sickinger explains that the verb ἐγγράφειν is rare when used in connection with publicly-displayed inscribed documents but well-attested when used of handwritten texts kept by Athenian public officials (cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 42.1, 49.2). This indicates that Andocides is not referring to an inscribed decree on stone, but to an archival document that, Sickinger suggests, was probably composed for reference by the secretary of the Boule (γραμματεὺς).³⁶ As a result of the oligarchic coup of 411 and the subsequent restoration of the radical democracy, Menippus’ decree was no longer legally valid, yet a copy still evidently existed in the Bouleuterion.³⁷ There also survive a number of inscribed 5th century proxeny decrees which refer to the existence of secondary copies in the Bouleuterion, implying its function as a state archive.³⁸ These are *IG* 1³ 56 (ca. 440-25), *IG* 1³ 155 (ca. 435-25), and *IG* 1³ 165 (before 420), with the relevant clauses found at ll. 4-8, 4-9, and 6-11, respectively.³⁹ In each case, it is

³³ Sickinger 1999, 119; Lambert 2018b, 48. On the 4th century ψήφισμα/νόμος distinction (not present before 403/02) see Hansen 1978; Hansen 1983b.

³⁴ Sickinger 1999, 92.

³⁵ Thomas 1989, 73-78; Sickinger 1999, 105; Boffo and Faraguna 2021, 207. *Contra* Kahrstedt 1938, 31.

³⁶ Sickinger 1999, 82; cf. Canevaro and Harris 2012, 103; Boffo and Faraguna 2021, 218 n. 102.

³⁷ Sickinger 1999, 77; cf. Boffo and Faraguna 2021, 218.

³⁸ Thompson 1937, 215-17; Shear 1995, 185-86; Pritchett 1996, 26-27.

³⁹ Dates: Sickinger 1999, 222 n. 97.

decreed that the archival copy is to be inscribed on a σανίς or wooden tablet.⁴⁰ Similarly, *IG* 1³ 78a, a decree dating to the 420s regarding the first-fruits of Eleusis, contains (ll. 26-30) instructions for a tablet (πινάκιον) to be deposited in the Bouleuterion. The so-called Cleonymus Decree of 426/25 (*IG* 1³ 68), which deals with Delian League tribute, also appears to provide for a copy in the Bouleuterion (ll. 54-57), as does *IG* 1³ 71 at ll. 23-25, although in this case the Bouleuterion copy is to be inscribed on stone (l. 24 ἐν δυοῖν στ]έλα[ι]ν λιθίναιν).⁴¹

Sickinger posits that the secretary of the Boule wrote down προβουλεύματα on papyrus or wooden tablets and brought them to meetings of the Assembly. If a decree was passed by the Assembly and it was decided to inscribe it, a further wooden or papyrus copy would be created for use by the stonemason.⁴² Probably, 5th century γραμματεῖς were also responsible for maintaining the written records in the Bouleuterion; certainly by the later-4th century, they were maintaining the state documents (δημόσια γράμματα) in the Metroon ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 54.3; cf. Dem. 18.142).⁴³ R. Thomas suggests that other Athenian officials retained documents relevant to their own work, albeit not in a systematic or centralized way that amounted to a 'state archive.'⁴⁴ This is supported by [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 53.1, where we learn that the ἀναγραφεῖς tasked with republishing Draco's homicide law in 409/08 were instructed to obtain a copy of the law from the Archon Basileus, whose responsibilities included the supervision of homicide cases. If, as Sickinger proposes, copies of all προβουλεύματα dating back to the formation of the Cleisthenic Boule in 508/07 were deposited in the Bouleuterion (which, after all, was the Boule's meeting-house), the documentary collection there will have been very large indeed.⁴⁵

There is evidence that the archival copies of Athenian interstate treaties differed from their inscribed counterparts. It is important to note, first of all, that not all treaties were necessarily inscribed, and the decision to inscribe, or not to inscribe, was made by the Assembly on a case-by-case basis.⁴⁶ It was not essential to a decree's validity that it be inscribed, as ratification was achieved not by the act of inscription, but by the exchange of oaths.⁴⁷ Archival copies of interstate treaties seem to have contained more complete information than their inscribed

⁴⁰ *IG* 1³ 56 l.6 [ἐν σαν]ίδ[ι]; *IG* 1³ 155 l. 8 ἐς σανίδα; *IG* 1³ 165 l. 8 ἐ[ν σανιδί]οι. Note, however, that the word βουλευτήριον is largely or entirely restored in each case.

⁴¹ Cf. Thomas 1989, 75; Sickinger 1999, 81. Further examples are presented by Faraguna 2017, 30; Boffo and Faraguna 2021, 219-21.

⁴² Sickinger 1994, 294-95.

⁴³ Cf. Giovannini 2007, 236 with n. 22.

⁴⁴ Thomas 1989, 74.

⁴⁵ Sickinger 1999, 84; cf. Thomas 1989, 75.

⁴⁶ Adcock and Mosley 1975, 222; Woodhead 1981, 37; Walbank 1988, 57 n. 4; Thomas 1989, 76; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 158. *Contra* Osborne 2012, esp. 44, 47-48.

⁴⁷ Giovannini 2007, 237, 259.

counterparts.⁴⁸ The Athenian resolution to accept the Truce of Laches, beginning at Thuc. 4.118.11 = **D 2.9 LT 1**, includes a standard prescript recording the tribe currently in prytany followed by the names of the γραμματεὺς, the ἐπιστάτης, and the decree's proposer Laches. But then, unusually, the text records the date of enactment (14 Elaphebolion, equated with the Spartan 12 Gerastius at 4.119.1), which also occurs in the Peace of Nicias as reproduced by Thucydides (5.19.1 = **D 2.12 LT 1**).⁴⁹ This is most unusual, since the enactment date did not begin to be included in inscribed Athenian decree prescripts until the 4th century.⁵⁰ Sickinger assesses the phenomenon as follows:

The references to precise dates do show that the secretaries who recorded decrees sometimes included the days on which decrees were enacted when fixing those dates was important. They may have simply omitted such details from the texts delivered to masons for inscribing. Prescripts of inscribed decrees, therefore, need not preserve completely all the elements recorded by Boule secretaries, and any assessments of the organization of the Boule's archives cannot rely on features of prescripts alone.⁵¹

For the Truce of Laches, Peace of Nicias, and the Spartan-Athenian alliance of 421 (**D 2.13**), Thucydides also furnishes complete lists of the oath-takers. While lists of oath-takers do appear occasionally in epigraphically-preserved treaties, such as in the Athenian alliance with Perdiccas II (**D 2.12 ET 1**; but the recorded oath-takers come exclusively from the Macedonian side), this is very much an exception.⁵² Furthermore, the Truce of Laches lacks a publication clause, suggesting that it was never inscribed at all.⁵³

Sparta: a documentary backwater?

In sharp contrast to Athens, the number of attested state documents from Sparta, especially from the Classical period, is very low indeed. In fact, only three Classical Spartan inscriptions are still extant today, or which only one, the treaty with the Erxadieis (**D 5.1**), constitutes an interstate treaty; the other two are lists of allied contributions to the Spartan war fund during the Peloponnesian War (*IG* 5.1.1 and 5.1.219).⁵⁴ Another inscription, *IG* 5.1 1564 of ca. 400 BCE,

⁴⁸ Wilhelm 1909, 249-50, 271-80; Klaffenbach 1960, 26; Henry 1977, 104-05; Sickinger 1999, 89; Davies 2003, 328.

⁴⁹ Cf. Lane Fox 2010, 18.

⁵⁰ Boffo and Faraguna 2021, 218.

⁵¹ Sickinger 1999, 89.

⁵² Cf. Giovannini 2007, 238-39.

⁵³ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 359, suggests – albeit with reservations – that the Truce of Laches was possibly inscribed and displayed on the Acropolis, but the absence of a publication clause and the brief intended duration of the treaty make this unlikely (cf. Kirchhoff 1895, 21-27). For theories about how Thucydides may have obtained a copy of the Truce of Laches see Kirchhoff 1895, 22; *HCT* 3, 606; Canfora 1999, 152-55; Lane Fox 2010, 19-21; Faraguna 2017, 42-43; Boffo and Faraguna 2021, 234.

⁵⁴ Boring 1979, 34; Loomis 1992; Cartledge 2001, 52f.; Millender 2001, 139.

is of Spartan origin but was found on and relates to Delos, and it is unclear whether another copy ever existed in Sparta.⁵⁵ Other types of documents, such as athletic victor-lists (*JG* 5.1 213), were kept in the temple of Athena Chalkioikos.⁵⁶

The literary evidence indicates that Spartan epigraphic culture was somewhat more robust than the paltry physical remains alone suggest. The publication formulae of the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.18.10 = **D 2.12 LT 1**) and the Spartan-Athenian alliance (Thuc. 5.23.5 = **D 2.13 LT 1**) required copies of both treaties to be set up in the sanctuary of Amyclae, a short distance south of Sparta proper. Pausanias reports having seen a stele containing the names of the Spartans who died at Thermopylae as well as an inscribed monument at the site of the tomb of the Spartan regent Pausanias (Paus. 3.14.1; cf. Hdt. 7.224; Thuc. 1.134.4). Plutarch, whose immediate source is a lost work of Aristotle, quotes from a treaty of ca. 550 BCE between Sparta and Tegea (*Mor.* 277c, 292b). Bolmarcich notes that for the treaty to have survived even into Aristotle's time is impressive, as it was of purely historical interest by that point: 'Sparta was no longer lord of the Peloponnese and Messenia was her own mistress, thus invalidating one of the terms of the treaty, namely that the Tegeans should expel the Messenians from their land.'⁵⁷ Thucydides himself quotes verbatim at least one document composed exclusively by Spartans, namely the proposal of peace and alliance offered to Argos in 418 (5.77 = **D 3.3 LT 1**). Fascinatingly, Thucydides retains the original Laconian-Doric dialect of both this document and the formal bilateral Spartan-Argive treaty that followed it (5.79 = **D 3.4 LT 1**).⁵⁸ But the proposal, by its very nature, was almost certainly never inscribed, and it is by no means clear that the Peace of Lichas itself was committed to stone – note that no publication clause appears in Thucydides' transcription. If his source was not epigraphic, Thucydides still could have obtained the documents from a putative Spartan archive, from an Argive source (Kirchhoff), from the Spartan proxenus Lichas (Lane Fox), or even from Alcibiades, who was in Argos on other business at the time (cf. Thuc. 5.76.3).⁵⁹ Thucydides also provides apparently verbatim transcriptions of the three Peloponnesian-Persian treaties of 412/11, but again, none of the treaties contains a publication formula, and it is principally for this reason that I am skeptical of E. Lévy's suggestions that the third treaty was inscribed and erected in Sparta.⁶⁰ Because the prescripts of the first and second treaties are less developed than that of the third,

⁵⁵ Boring 1979, 34.

⁵⁶ Boring 1979, 32; Jeffery 1990, 197, 201; Millender 2001, 129-30 with n. 36.

⁵⁷ Bolmarcich 2007b, 478.

⁵⁸ For the dialect see Kirchhoff 1895, 105-14; Colvin 1999, 61-67; Lane Fox 2010, 14 n. 21.

⁵⁹ Kirchhoff 1895, 127; Lane Fox 2010, 14. Lichas has already appeared in Thucydides' narrative, first (5.22.2) unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate a renewal of the Argive thirty years' peace (apparently connected to his role as the Argive proxenus), and then (5.50.4; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21) at Olympia in 420, where he was flogged for entering his chariot in the games despite the ban on Spartan participation. He was prominent in the negotiations with Argos in 418 (Thuc. 5.76.3) and likely had access to state documents connected with his task. For Alcibiades as an informant of Thucydides see generally Nývlt 2014b.

⁶⁰ Lévy 1983b, 222.

Cawkwell contends that only the third one was ratified, while the first two were nothing more than drafts.⁶¹ However, I am not convinced of this: the prescript of the Spartan Treaty with the Erxadieis, for example, is minimalistic (**D 5.1 ET 1** = OR 128 ll. 1-2 [συνθῆκ]αι Αἰτολοῖς. κ[αττάδε | ?φιλία]ν καὶ ἠιράναν), but we know from the fact that it was inscribed and erected, probably on the Spartan Acropolis, that it must have been ratified. Lane Fox argues that Lichas was Thucydides' source for these treaties as well: although he was involved in negotiating the third treaty only (Thuc. 8.39.1), his opposition (8.43.3, 52) to the terms of the first two implies that he was familiar with their contents, possibly after having acquired written copies.⁶² On the other hand, some scholars have proposed that Thucydides' most plausible source is Alcibiades: Kirchhoff, who was the first to advance this theory, stressed that the treaties, at least as Thucydides preserves them, are written in Alcibiades' native Attic, and that Alcibiades is known to have collaborated closely with Chalcideus, the nominal negotiator of the first treaty (Thuc. 8.17).⁶³ But those who doubt Alcibiades' involvement with Thucydides point out that the Persians might have employed Greek-speaking secretaries writing in Ionic, which Thucydides could have 'translated' into Attic more easily than the Laconian of **D 3.3** and **D 3.4**.⁶⁴ Lane Fox observes that, unlike the Peace of Lichas, the Peloponnesian-Persian treaties involved only one Doric party, reducing the impetus to write them in a Doric dialect.⁶⁵

While there is no direct evidence for a Spartan archive until the time of Trajan (*IG* 5.1 20; cf. 5.1 18, 19), some have argued on the basis of the literary evidence that some kind of archive did exist in the Classical period.⁶⁶ Plutarch (*Lyc.* 6; cf. *Mor.* 1116f.) provides a direct quotation from the 'Great Rhetra,' the Spartan constitution reputedly established by Lycurgus in the Archaic period.⁶⁷ Millender argues that Plutarch's immediate source was a lost treatise on the Spartan constitution by Aristotle, but of course, Aristotle himself is separated from Lycurgus by several centuries, and the very fact of the Rhetra's transmission 'clearly demonstrates that the Rhetra was a written document that had been preserved over a long period and was available for

⁶¹ Cawkwell 2005, 149. Lane Fox 2010, 15 suggests that the first two treaties actually were presented to the Spartan assembly for ratification but were rejected by it.

⁶² Lane Fox 2010, 15-16; cf. Pouilloux and Salviat 1983, 403.

⁶³ Kirchhoff 1895, 143-47; cf. Brunt 1952, 74ff.; Lateiner 1976, 275; Canfora 1999, 152-55.

⁶⁴ Lewis 1977, 95 n. 57; *HCT* 5, 144-45.

⁶⁵ Lane Fox 2010, 17.

⁶⁶ Boring 1979, 19-36. *Contra* Thomas 1992, 94, 131, 136, 144; cf. Millender 2001, 127 with n. 23 on *IG* 5.1 20: 'This inscription, part of a complicated enactment regulating the Leonidea, specifies that lists of the winners' names are to be placed in a building called the *grammatophylakion*. This building may have been the source of Plutarch's information on Sparta in his reference to his own research among such Spartan records (ἀναγραφαί) at *Ages.* 19.10. Its collection of documents may also correspond to the παλαιοτάται ἀναγραφαί containing the Rhetra mentioned by Plutarch (*Mor.* 1116f) and the public records, which Tacitus suggests went back at least to the last quarter of the fourth century (*Ann.* 4.43).'

⁶⁷ The precise date of the Rhetra is uncertain, but a range of ca. 675-650 BCE has been suggested: see Forrest 1963, 157-79; Cartledge 1980, 99-106; Van Wees 1999, 26-27 n. 1, 35-36 n. 70.

consultation at least by the early fourth century, if not earlier.⁶⁸ We are again dependent on Plutarch for another tantalizing piece of circumstantial evidence: citing Ephorus as his source, the biographer recounts that Agesilaus went to Lysander's house shortly after the latter's death in 395 to retrieve a copy of an unspecified interstate treaty (*Lys.* 30.3; *Mor.* 229f).⁶⁹ In the *Agésilauos* (19.10), Plutarch writes: ἡμεῖς δὲ εὐρομεν ἐν ταῖς Λακωνικαῖς ἀναγραφαῖς ὀνομαζομένην γυναικᾶ μὲν Ἀγησιλάου Κλεόραν, θυγατέρας δὲ Εὐπωλίαν καὶ Πρόαυαν. While admittedly Λακωνικαῖς ἀναγραφαῖς may refer to the Trajanic-era archive attested in *IG* 5.1 20, this passage nevertheless raises questions about how such information was transmitted over the preceding centuries. T.A. Boring's theory that 'for at least some purposes, the houses of kings and generals served as the city archives through the early fourth century and probably longer' deserves serious consideration.⁷⁰ One wonders whether Thucydides also consulted the Spartan archives, in whatever form they existed. This is perhaps unlikely: Thucydides himself bemoaned the secrecy of the Spartan state (5.68.2 τὸ μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων πλῆθος διὰ τῆς πολιτείας τὸ κρυπτὸν ἠγνοεῖτο), which prevented him from acquiring accurate information on the size of the Spartan army at the battle of Mantinea in 418. But while Thucydides may not have gained direct access to the Spartan 'archives,' there is good reason to believe that he was at least able to obtain copies of Spartan diplomatic texts from informants whose political roles gave them access to these documents.⁷¹

Boring concludes that the Spartans may have only inscribed documents that were considered especially important, or which they were obligated to inscribe under the terms of a publication clause (as in the Peace of Nicias).⁷² Other factors may lay behind the scarcity of surviving epigraphic remains at Sparta. Millender notes that Sparta in more recent times was the site of a lime-burning quarry, and bronze, which is liable to be melted down, was a popular epigraphic medium in the Peloponnese. And the Spartan agora, where at least some inscriptions could have been deposited, has never been precisely located and therefore remains unexcavated.⁷³ [Dr. Trampedach informs me that the Spartan agora is thought to lie below a modern football pitch, whose proprietors have forbidden excavations from being carried out there. But he is of the opinion that the Spartans are unlikely in any case to have displayed inscriptions in the agora in large numbers during the Archaic and Classical periods].

⁶⁸ Millender 2001, 128-29.

⁶⁹ Cf. Boring 1979, 35: 'Significantly, Agesilaus did not consult a copy of the treaty inscribed on stone; doubtless there was none, perhaps because such a monument was not required by the terms of the agreement.'

⁷⁰ Boring 1979, 32; cf. Shipley 1997, 244,

⁷¹ Cf. Lane Fox 2010, 25.

⁷² Boring 1979, 33.

⁷³ Millender 2001, 139, 141 with n. 93.

Conclusion

The epigraphic habits of Athens and Sparta reveal a fundamental tension between the permanence of stone and the volatility of Greek geopolitics. For Athens, the Acropolis served as a focal point of epigraphic display, emphasizing the (at least notional) sacrosanctity of the inscribed treaties. Even when stelae were dismantled during periods of political upheaval or replaced to reflect new diplomatic realities, archival copies kept in the Bouleuterion or Metroon often ensured the continuity of the written record. Conversely, while Sparta appears to be a ‘documentary backwater’ due to its low volume of surviving inscriptions, literary evidence suggests a more robust culture of record-keeping than the archaeological record alone implies, though still falling far short of the volume of production seen at Athens. Ultimately, while oaths and oaths alone made a treaty valid, the written record made it a lasting monument of state policy.

Addendum: was the treaty between the Athenian democrats and oligarchs inscribed?

The most important testimonium for **D 4.1** is undoubtedly [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 39 = **LT 3**. C.J. Joyce believes that the text of *Ath. Pol.* is based on the author’s autopsy of an Athenian inscription made upon the treaty’s ratification on 12 Boedromion, 403.⁷⁴ However, it is unclear whether there actually was an inscription (none of the testimonia explicitly attest one) and, if there was, to what extent the account in *Ath. Pol.* replicates it. The Aristotelean account does not record the formula of the oaths of reconciliation, which we know only from Andoc. 1.90 = **LT 1** καὶ οὐ μνησικακήσω τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδενὶ πλὴν τῶν τριάκοντα <καὶ τῶν δέκα>* καὶ τῶν ἔνδεκα κτλ. Instead, [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 39.6 μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα μνησικακεῖν ἐξεῖναι πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς τριάκοντα καὶ τοὺς δέκα καὶ τοὺς ἔνδεκα καὶ τοὺς τοῦ Πειραιέως ἄρξαντας κτλ. appears to be merely a paraphrase of this. While J.L. Shear is right to suggest that an archival copy of the treaty was probably available for consultation by the author of the *Ath. Pol.*, written only a few decades after the fact, it does not necessarily follow that it was inscribed (though this of course remains a possibility), nor that the author copied it verbatim.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Joyce 2022, 72; cf. Shear 2011, 209; Scheibelreiter 2013, 101. For the date see my main entry on the treaty.

⁷⁵ Shear 2011, 197. For the date of *Ath. Pol.*’s composition see Keaney 1970.

Chapter 10

Religious and ritual aspects of treaties

Introduction

The use of oaths and sacrificial rituals in treaties is not unique to Greece but is attested in civilizations as diverse as Rome, ancient China, and the Hittite Empire.¹ In Greece, oaths were the essential means by which treaties were ratified, transforming a simple agreement into a binding covenant through prescribed religious formulae. This chapter explores the religious and ritualistic framework of Greek diplomacy, examining how the invocation of the θεοὶ ὄρκιοι (gods of oaths) at least notionally enforced fidelity to treaties through the threat of divine punishment. By analyzing the evolution of attested treaty-oaths and related ratification-rituals in the 5th and early-4th centuries BCE, we can better understand how religion both enforced obligations between states and could be used as a pious tool of domination.

Significance and contents of treaty-oaths

Polly Low emphasizes that, when it came to concluding treaties, oaths were by no means optional, but constituted ‘the sign that the treaty has been accepted by both sides – it is, in other words, the closest equivalent to the ratification of modern treaties.’² D.J. Bederman adds, perhaps even more explicitly, ‘Ancient treaties were, as a matter of definition, an exchange of oaths. A mere promise made without the appropriate religious formula was not held to be binding on the parties.’³ Only the exchange of oaths and the accompanying religious rituals could render a treaty valid, and consequently the Greeks did this with great reverence towards the gods.⁴ Indeed, Thucydides recounts how, upon the Theban attempt to seize Plataea in the first summer of the Peloponnesian War, the Plataeans claimed that their truce with the Thebans was void because no oath had been sworn (2.5.6 καὶ ἐπομόσαι οὐ φασιν).⁵

The exchange of oaths between private individuals is attested from very early in Greek history, notably in Homer, for which L. Lazar sees parallels among various cultures of the ancient Near

¹ Bederman 2001, 71-73 (Rome); Beal 2007, 86 (Hittites); Yates 2007 (China); Hunt 2010, 230.

² Low 2007, 119.

³ Bederman 2001, 61; cf. Mosley 1961, 59; Wheeler 1984, 253. For oaths as the ancient Greek equivalent of signatures in modern treaties cf. Heuß 1934, 16-20, 29-31; Mosley 1961, 59f.; Chaniotis 1996, 66f.; Scharff 2016, 111 n. 245.

⁴ Balcer 1978, 81; Low 2007, 119; MacDowell 2009, 321; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 147.

⁵ Cf. Lonis 1980, 268.

East.⁶ In the Greek world, the use of oaths by whole communities seems to have begun in the Archaic period. Herodotus reports (1.69-70) a treaty between Sparta and Croesus of Lydia (thereby placing it in the mid-6th century) that was ratified by an oath; chronologically this is our earliest example, although Herodotus does not record the oath's contents.⁷ Given the fact that Croesus was non-Greek, some scholars have speculated that the Greek practice of ratifying treaties by oath originated in the Near East.⁸ Others, such as J.A.O. Larsen, suggest instead that they developed from the ἐκεχειρία or sacred truces associated with the panhellenic festivals.⁹ R. Janko stresses that treaty-oaths invoke 'powers greater than oneself to uphold the truth of a declaration, by putting a curse upon oneself if it is false.'¹⁰ By swearing and receiving oaths, one called upon the gods as both witnesses and enforcers who saw to it that violators were punished. This was no mere religious fiction but was sincerely believed at least some of the time. For example, Thucydides tells us that the Spartans came to regret their decision not to submit to arbitration with Athens as the Thirty Years' Peace demanded, and believed that their reversals in the Archidamian War were a just consequence of their impiety (Thuc. 7.18.2 = **D 1.11 LT 7**; cf. 1.78.4 = **LT 5**); and the Greek belief that treaty-breaking is subject to divine punishment is even more apparent in Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.4.11; 5.4.1, 17; 6.4.3).¹¹ It was perhaps to remind oath-takers regularly of their pledges before the gods, lest they incur divine wrath, that certain treaties were to be renewed at regular intervals.¹²

Treaty-oaths in the Classical Greek world followed prescribed formulae which the treaty's swearers were obligated to follow. Fortunately for us, the oath-formulae are often recorded in the text of the treaties themselves (see **Appendix 5**). Although the wording of the oath-formulae is never exactly identical in any two treaties, there are a number of recurrent features. In treaties between equal partners, the oaths of both sides were oftentimes virtually if not completely identical.¹³ On the other hand, unequal treaties, particularly between Athens and its subject allies, tended to impose a significantly more burdensome oath on the latter. This is clearly visible in the Athenian treaty with Chalcis, where both the Athenian (OR 131 = **D 1.12 ET 1 ll. 3-14**) and Chalcidian oaths (ll. 21-32) are preserved. The Chalcidians swore not to defect again (οὐκ ἀπο[σ]τέ[σομαι ἀπὸ τοῦ [δ]έμο τοῦ Ἀθηναίων) and to pay tribute to Athens (καὶ τὸν

⁶ Lazar 2024, 45.

⁷ Cf. Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 148, 150; Lazar 2024, 45.

⁸ Bederman 2001, 61-62; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 150.

⁹ Larsen 1944, 147.

¹⁰ Janko 1992, 194; cf. Rhodes 2008, 11.

¹¹ Hunt 2012, 140; cf. Lonis 1980, 267.

¹² Cf. Steiner 1994, 67.

¹³ Adcock and Mosley 1975, 217.

φόρον ὑποτελῶ Ἀθηναίοισιν, ἢ ἂν πείθο Ἀθηναίος). Obviously, the oath of the Athenians does not contain this kind of language.¹⁴

The Chalcidian oath οὐκ ἀπο[σ]τέ[σ]ομαι ἀπὸ τοῦ [δ]έμοιο τοῦ Ἀθηναίου is an example of an anti-revolt clause, which is a common feature of Athenian treaties with its allies. As A.J. Bayliss argues, anti-revolt clauses were designed to ensure the loyalty of Athenian subjects in a proactive manner. Even in treaties where the Athenians are known to have made certain concessions to their allies, such concessions were always dependent on the latter's continued loyalty.¹⁵ Anti-revolt clauses, introduced by the expression οὐκ ἀποστήσομαι ('I will not revolt'), are securely attested not only in the treaty with Chalcis, but also in the Athenian treaties with Erythrae (OR 121 = **D 1.6 ET 1** l. 23), Eretria(?) (*IG* 1³ 39 = **D 1.13 ET 1** l. 7), and the Colophonians (*IG* 1³ 37 = **D 2.1 ET 1** l. 46). No anti-revolt clause appears in the Halieis treaty (**D 2.8**), but Halieis was not a preexisting Delian League member that had revolted, but a previously independent city under temporary Athenian military occupation. The absence of an anti-revolt clause in the Bottiaei treaty (**D 2.11**) is more difficult to explain, as the Bottiaean cities *were* defecting League members. Perhaps the Athenians were sensitive not to alienate them so soon after winning them back.¹⁶

The anti-revolt clause sworn by the Chalcidians is especially strong. Not only did the Chalcidians renounce defecting on their own initiative (ll. 21-22 οὐκ ἀπο[σ]τέ[σ]ομαι ἀπὸ τοῦ [δ]έμοιο τοῦ Ἀθηναίου), they also swore not to follow others in revolt (l. 24 οὐδὲ τῷ ἀφισταμένοι πείσομαι), and indeed promised to denounce would-be defectors (ll. 24-25 καὶ ἐὰν ἀφιστεῖ τις κατεροῦ Ἀθηναίοισι).¹⁷ In contrast to the Erythraeans of the 450s, the Chalcidians of the 440s swore to the Athenians alone, with no mention of the allies: Meiggs and Lewis suggest that this was to reinforce their explicit reduction to subject (ὑπήκοος) status.¹⁸ By the time of the Archidamian War, the Athenians were evidently prepared to go further still: the treaty with the Colophonians required the people of Colophon to swear to 'love' the Athenian people and not to overthrow the democratic regime there (ll. 48-49 καὶ φιλέσο τὸν δέμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ οὐκ αὐτομόλῃσο καὶ δεμοκρατίαν οὐ καταλύσο). 'The Athenians were clearly attempting to

¹⁴ Cf. Meyer 2013, 471-72 with n. 88. As noted by Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 234-36 and Scharff 2016, 111, the Athenians did not even permit allied participation in treaties like the Truce of Laches, the Peace of Nicias, and the Quadruple Alliance. This changed by the time of the Second Athenian Confederacy, when the Athenians allowed their allies to swear individually to the κοινή εἰρήνη treaty of 371; it was ironically now the *Spartans* who arrogated to themselves the right to swear on behalf of their allies (*Xen. Hell.* 6.3.19).

¹⁵ Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 209.

¹⁶ That treaty does, however, explicitly prohibit the Bottiaei from assisting Athens' enemies (*IG* 1³ 76 = **D 2.11 ET 1** ll. 19-20 καὶ οὐκ ὀφείλοσιν τὸς ἐχθροὺς τὸς Ἀθηναίων οὔτε χρέμασιν ἡπλῶς οὔτε δυνάμει οὐδεμίαι).

¹⁷ Cf. Balcer 1978, 48; Scharff 2016, 109.

¹⁸ Comm. ML 52, p. 141.

use oaths to ensure their allies toed the line,’ writes Bayliss, while according to K. Raaflaub, oaths of this nature represented ‘an unmistakable indication of their [sc. the allies’] servitude.’¹⁹

Closely related to anti-revolt clauses were what E.L. Wheeler calls ‘anti-deceit clauses.’²⁰

However, I prefer the label ‘anti-deceit language,’ as they are typically embedded within the oath-formulae and do not constitute separate clauses of their own. Wheeler contends that their purpose was to preclude ‘sophistic’ interpretations of treaties, which he defines as ‘an overly literal interpretation of the wording of the oath or agreement, or playing on some ambiguity of meaning to produce an interpretation contrary to that intended and obvious.’²¹

For example, in 428 the Plataeans were coaxed into voluntary surrender with the promise that nobody would be punished *παρὰ δίκην* (‘contrary to justice’). But at the subsequent trial, the Spartans qualified *δίκη* as service to Sparta, and the Plataeans were consequently executed without exception (Thuc. 3.52-2-53.2, 68.1).²² In 421, the Corinthians justified their refusal to accept the Peace of Nicias, despite ostensibly being bound by the majority decision of the Peloponnesian League, by claiming that even a majority vote could be rejected ‘if the gods or heroes stand in the way’ (Thuc. 5.30.1 *εἰρημένον κύριον εἶναι ὅτι ἂν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ξυμμάχων ψηφίσηται, ἢν μή τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ*).²³ In fact, anti-deceit language is found in interstate treaties as early as the late-6th century BCE, as seen in the inscribed treaty between Sybaris and the Serdaioi (ML 10 = SdA² 120 ll. 1-5 *ἀρμόχθεν οἱ Συμβαρῖται κ’ οἱ σύνμαχοι κ’ οἱ | Σερδαῖοι ἐπὶ φιλότατ | ι πιστᾶι κ’ ἀδόλοι ἀε | ίδιον*). P. Scheibelreiter inserts an anti-deceit clause (*σύμμαχος ἔσομαι πίστος καὶ ἄδολος Ἀθηναίος*) into his speculative reconstruction of the oath sworn upon the establishment of the Delian League in 478/77, and the earlier Sybaris-Serdaioi treaty shows that this is not impossible.²⁴

The words and expressions *ἀδόλως*, *ἀβλαβέως*, *οὐδὲ τέχνη οὐδὲ μηχανῆ, οὐδ’ ἔπει οὐδὲ ἔργω*, and variants thereof, are common indicators of anti-deceit language.²⁵ Like anti-revolt clauses, anti-deceit language is especially common in unequal treaties.²⁶ The Chalcidians, for example, swore to the Athenians that they would act *οὔτε τέ[χ]ν | νει οὔτε μηχανῆι οὐδεμιᾷ οὐδ’ ἔπει οὐδὲ | ἔργοι* (OR 131 = **D 1.12 ET 1** ll. 22-24), and this exact formula was followed by the Eretrians(?) (*IG 1³ 39 = D 1.13 ET 1* ll. 8-9). The Samian oath has been restored to read [*καὶ οὐ | κ ἀποστέσομαι ἀπὸ τῶ δέμο τῶ Ἀθηναίων οὔτε λ[ό]γοι οὔτ’ ἔργοι ?οὐδενί*] (OR 139*cda = D 1.15 ET 1* ll. 1-2), and that of the Colophonians *οὐκ ἀποστ[έ]σομαι τῶ δέμο τῶ Ἀθηναίων οὔτε | λ]όγοι*

¹⁹ Raaflaub 2007, 111; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 209.

²⁰ Wheeler 1984.

²¹ Wheeler 1984, 254; cf. Gazzano 2005, 14.

²² Cf. Wheeler 1984, 272.

²³ For this so-called ‘escape clause,’ not otherwise attested, see Bolmarcich 2007a, 30.

²⁴ Scheibelreiter 2013, 251.

²⁵ Cf. Wheeler 1984, 254.

²⁶ Gazzano 2005, 30-31; Bolmarcich 2007a, 31-32; Scharff 2016, 109-10; Lazar 2024, 47.

οὐτ' ἔργ[οι] (*IG* 1³ 37 = **D 2.1 ET 1** ll. 46-47). For the most part, the Athenians did not themselves adopt the anti-deceit language imposed on their wayward allies, but the Bottiaei treaty is a notable exception: the Athenians promised to 'preserve the alliance with the Bottiaei faithfully and without deceit' (*IG* 1³ 76 = **D 2.11 ET 1** ll. 13-14 [καὶ τὴν χσ[υμμαχία]|ν πιστῶς καὶ [ἀδ]όλο[ς φυλάχσο Βοττι]αίοις), which echoes the pledge of the Bottiaei to 'be friends and allies of the Athenians faithfully and without deceit' (ll. 17-18 φίλοι ἐσόμε[θα Ἀθηναίοις καὶ χσύμ]μαχοι πιστῶ[ς] κα[ὶ] | ἀδόλος). There exist, however, notable examples of anti-deceit language within between equal partners. An addendum to the mutual defence clause of the Spartan-Athenian alliance of 421 contains the phrase ταῦτα δ' εἶναι δικαίως καὶ προθύμως καὶ ἀδόλως (*Thuc.* 5.23.1 = **D 2.13 LT 1**), and the access-to-Delphi clause of the Truce of Laches insists that persons wishing to go to Delphi should be able to do so ἀδόλως καὶ ἀδεῶς, 'without fraud or fear' (*Thuc.* 4.118.1 = **D 2.9 ET 1**).

The phrase μὴ μνησικακεῖν (μιμνήσκω + κακόν) can be found in the oaths of some treaties. The gloss of the verb μνησικακέω which appears in *A Greek-English Lexicon* reads 'remember past injuries, bear malice'; with μηδὲν or μὴ, it can mean 'pass an act of amnesty.'²⁷ M. Moggi advances the interesting theory that the Peloponnesian War led to an increase both in the frequency and ferocity of episodes of στάσις (that on Corcyra being only the most famous example), and it is perhaps not coincidental that the expression μὴ μνησικακήσειν, within the context of an oath, is first attested during that conflict: Thucydides discusses an incident of στάσις that occurred in Megara in 424 between democrats against oligarchs as the Athenians were trying unsuccessfully to capture the city (for the whole event see *Thuc.* 4.66-74).²⁸ Once the conflict was resolved, oaths of amnesty were imposed: ὀρκώσαντες πίστεσι μεγάλας μηδὲν μνησικακήσειν, βουλεύσειν δὲ τῇ πόλει τὰ ἄριστα (4.74.2).²⁹

Μὴ μνησικακεῖν occurs in the oaths of both sides in the Athenian treaty with the Bottiaei (**D 2.11 ET 1**). This suggests that certain 'past events' had left a bad taste in both sides' mouths that made it prudent to swear off the pursuit of grievances, and indeed the revolt of the Bottiaean cities against Athens had been of long standing, beginning already in 432 (*Thuc.* 1.57.5-58.1).³⁰ In their attempt to crush the rebellion, the Athenians in 429 had destroyed the corn supply of Spartolus, a Bottiaean city, while the Odrysian king Sitalces, allied with Athens, pillaged Bottiaean territory (*Thuc.* 2.79, 100-01). There was thus ample opportunity for bad blood to boil

²⁷ LSJ⁹ s.v. μνησικακέω; cf. Gernet 1917, 233-35; Loening 1987, 21; Loraux 1997, 150-51; Milani 1997, 7-8; Moggi 2009, 167.

²⁸ Moggi 2009, 179.

²⁹ See further Gehrke 1985, 106-10; Moggi 2009, 169. Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 244 notes that such language occurs on only one other occasion in Thucydides, namely at 8.73.6 (as οὐ μνησικακοῦντες) in the context of στάσις on Samos in 411 (on which cf. Moggi 2009, 172). For examples in other authors see Loening 1987, 21 n. 6.

³⁰ Cf. Meritt 1925, 30: 'The Bottiaeans had been hostile to the Athenians ever since the revolt of 432, and this treaty must be considered as the first made after the conclusion of hostilities.'

between Athenians and Bottiaei by the late-420s, and correspondingly ample motive for the Athenians to demand a decisive end to the feud. Uniquely, here μή μνησικακεῖν is not a tool to resolve or prevent purely internal στάσις, but a means of ensuring tranquility on an interstate level.

Two sources report the μή μνησικακεῖν formula in connection with the treaty of 403 between the Athenian democrats and oligarchs. Andocides quotes, apparently verbatim, the oath of the agreement (Andoc. 1.90 = **D 4.1 LT 1** καὶ οὐ μνησικακήσω τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδενὶ πλὴν τῶν τριάκοντα <καὶ τῶν δέκα> καὶ τῶν ἑνδεκα· οὐδὲ τούτων ὅς ἂν ἐθέλη εὐθύνας διδόναι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἧς ἤρξεν), and implies in his authorial voice that it was sworn by the entire citizen body of Athens (ὁ μὲν κοινὸς τῆ πόλει ἀπάση). [Aristotle], though he does not directly record the oath like Andocides, ascribes the following clause to the treaty at *Ath. Pol.* 39.6 = **LT 3**: τῶν δὲ παρεληλυθότων **μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα μνησικακεῖν** ἐξεῖναι κτλ. Again, the insertion of an ‘amnesty clause’ into the treaty must have had as its motive the avoidance of στάσις: while Thrasylbulus and his democrats were victorious in 403, the oligarchic faction was not completely extirpated and it was prudent to ensure the speediest possible restoration of civic concord (ὁμόνοια) while discouraging the return of the most high-profile former oligarchs, who were excluded from the amnesty.³¹

Invocation of gods

As I have already noted, the Greeks viewed the gods as the direct enforcers of treaties. More precisely, as P. Hunt observes, it was believed that the gods punished ὕβρις (‘insolence’), both at the individual and the state level, and the violation of a treaty could constitute an act of ὕβρις.³² The gods, therefore, were ever-present in Greek oaths, including treaty-oaths. In their capacity as oath-enforcers, the gods were called the θεοὶ ὄρκιοι, the ‘gods of oaths.’³³ One can even speak of a god of oaths, namely Zeus under the epithet of Horkios (Ζεὺς Ὀρκίος), whom R.C. Jebb characterizes as ‘the *supreme* guardian of good-faith’ and S.G. Cole as ‘the tacit partner to every agreement’ (cf. *Soph. Phil.* 1324 Ζῆνα δ’ ὄρκιον καλῶ; *Eur. Hipp.* 1025 ὄρκιόν σοι Ζῆνα).³⁴ According to one interpretation, the invocation of the gods in oaths was intended to awaken the religious sensibilities of the oath-takers, reminding them of the consequences should they violate them.³⁵ But while it is clear that the gods were central to oaths, surprisingly few treaties explicitly invoke specific deities. There are three certain examples among the

³¹ Cf. Moggi 2009, 172.

³² Hunt 2010, 230; cf. Wheeler 1984, 253.

³³ Plescia 1970, 5-8; Bolmarcich 2007a, 28.

³⁴ Jebb 1907, 270; Cole 2004, 71; cf. Lonis 1980, 272; Burkert 1985, 251; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 160; Scharff 2016, 46 with n. 2.

³⁵ Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 160, 167.

treaties in my database: the Athenian treaty concerning the Delphic Amphictyony invokes Apollo, Leto (restored), and Artemis (OR 116 = **D 1.5 ET 1** ll. 10-11)³⁶; the Athenian treaty with Erythrae requires the Boule of Erythrae to swear by Zeus, Apollo, and Demeter (OR 121 = **D 1.16 ET 1** l. 16); and the same gods are invoked (Demeter restored) by the Colophonians in their treaty with Athens (*IG* 1³ 37 = **D 2.1 ET 1** ll. 52-53).

While exceptional, these cases are nevertheless significant. The goddess Demeter was particularly relevant to Athens as the deity most closely associated with Eleusis, and she is frequently invoked in oaths attested in comedy.³⁷ As for Apollo, he was the patron god of Delos, seat of the treasury of the Delian League until 454/53 (Thuc. 1.96).³⁸ S. Scharff adds that Delian Apollo was also deeply significant for the Greeks of the Aegean (including the Erythraeans and Colophonians), that many Delian League members were based in the Aegean, and that the triad Zeus-Apollo-Demeter corresponds to and evokes the triad Zeus-Ge-Helios, which appears in oaths from the Homeric epics.³⁹ But perhaps the most surprising fact is the absence of Athena, which has attracted scholarly attention. Scharff argues that Athena was intentionally excluded to allow the Athenians to cloak their domination of the Delian League under a more panhellenic veil.⁴⁰ Conversely, J. Plescia argues that, by forcing the allies to swear by a fixed triad, the Athenians attempted 'to enforce religious allegiance, and thereby give religious sanction to her hegemony.'⁴¹ Plescia's thesis is strengthened by the fact that Athenian treaties with states outside the Delian League tend to offer greater flexibility: in the Peace of Nicias, the Athenians and Spartans were permitted to swear 'the local oath [that is] the greatest' (Thuc. 5.18.9 = **D 2.12 LT 1** ὀμνύντων δὲ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὄρκον ἑκάτεροι τὸν μέγιστον); and an identical formula appears in the text of the Quadruple Alliance (Thuc. 5.47.8 = **D 3.2 LT 1** ὀμνύντων δὲ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὄρκον ἑκάστοι τὸν μέγιστον). Bayliss understands the expression τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὄρκον ἑκάτεροι τὸν μέγιστον to mean that the oath-takers were free 'to swear their most trustworthy oaths invoking what were to them the most terrifying deities.'⁴²

Rituals accompanying treaty oaths

³⁶ By the later fourth century, Apollo had been supplanted by Poseidon, and Athena was occasionally added: Mikalson 1991, 84.

³⁷ Burkert 1985, 251; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 164 with n. 49. See esp. Ar. *Equ.* 941, evoking Zeus, Apollo, and Demeter just like the treaties under consideration. Among fourth-century treaties, the Zeus-Apollo-Demeter triad appears at *IG* 2² 97 = *SdA* 2² 263 ll. 24, 35-36, an alliance of 375/74 between Athens and Corcyra.

³⁸ Smarczyk 2007, 209.

³⁹ Scharff 2016, 105.

⁴⁰ Scharff 2016, 117.

⁴¹ Plescia 1970, 6; cf. Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 166.

⁴² Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 164-65; cf. Adcock and Mosley 1975, 219; Bederman 2001, 175.

The exchange of oaths formed only one part – albeit a crucial and indispensable part – of the ratification procedure for interstate treaties. The oaths were accompanied by the performance of ritual acts, although explicit evidence is hard to come by: as A.J. Bayliss laments, ‘It is unfortunate that we are very limited in the way of primary evidence for the procedures involved in formalizing peaces apart from the eponymous libations,’ i.e., σπονδαί.⁴³ The usual poetic words for pouring a liquid are the verb λείβω and noun λοιβή. In prose, however, χέω/χοή and σπένδειν/σπονδή are more common. Specifically, σπονδαί typically consisted of wine, although honey, oil, and water could also be used, and were poured from a handheld jug or bowl in a targeted flow.⁴⁴ The mythological origins of this practice are recorded by Diodorus (3.71.5-6), who recalls how the god Dionysus freed a number of captives ‘under libations’ (ὑπόσπονδοι) following a confrontation of the Olympian gods and the Titans. The libations in question were of wine, appropriately enough given the role of Dionysus in the story.⁴⁵ It is likely that red wine, specifically, was used for libations in the context of σπονδαί-agreements, since their purpose was to suspend hostilities that cause bloodshed.⁴⁶ However, other types of ritual, such as animal sacrifice, sometimes occurred within the context of interstate relations.⁴⁷ Already in Homer (Il. 3.269-301), the Greeks and Trojans undertake an elaborate sacrificial ritual to accompany the oaths that confirm the truce that allows Menelaus and Paris to duel one-on-one. While not part of an interstate treaty, the oaths of office of the Athenian archons and of litigants in court cases were sworn at the λίθος at the foot of the Stoa Basileios in the Agora, followed by the sacrifice of an animal that was then cut into pieces ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 55.5). While animal sacrifice was usually followed by the consumption of the animal, animals which were sacrificed during oath rituals were instead discarded because, according to I.C. Torrance, this symbolically ‘represented the oath-curse of death or extinction of the family line for the would-be perjurer.’⁴⁸

There is another type of ritual that is worth briefly discussing. Upon the formation of the Delian League under the aegis of Aristides, the oaths of the Athenians and their new allies were accompanied by the dropping of iron weights (μύδροι) into the sea ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 23.5; Plut. *Arist.* 25.1 = **D 1.1 LT 2, 4**). The weights, of course, were expected to remain forever at the bottom of the sea, thus symbolizing the permanence of the covenant (cf. Hdt. 1.165 for a

⁴³ Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 243. But see Bayliss’ assessment of Aeschin. 2.85 at p. 242: ‘The link between peace treaties and libations is perhaps nowhere clearer than in Aeschines’ characterization of Demosthenes’ reaction to an attempt by the representative of the Thracian king Cersobleptes to join in the Peace of Philocrates of 346/5 BC. ... Clearly for Demosthenes, “pouring the libations” and joining the peace treaty are one and the same.’

⁴⁴ Burkert 1977, 121-22 with n. 35.

⁴⁵ Connor 1988, 15; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 241.

⁴⁶ Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 242.

⁴⁷ Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 151; cf. Plescia 1970, 9-10. On animal sacrifice see generally Burkert 1977, 101-05.

⁴⁸ Sommerstein and Torrance 2014, 138-39; cf. Cole 1996, 243 n. 16.

similar action performed by the Phocaeans).⁴⁹ Bayliss recognizes this clearly in his study of oaths connected to alliances:

[T]he oath was vital. First, defecting allies were violating an alliance that would have been permanent once the iron lumps that accompanied their oaths had been dropped into the sea. When Naxos, Thasos, and later Mytilene rebelled because they wanted to leave the alliance, they were technically in violation of these permanent oaths. The harsh punishment meted out by the Athenians can thus be seen as another case of human beings doing the gods' dirty work in policing oaths.⁵⁰

The Greeks, of course, did not make treaties exclusively with other Greeks; even in the Classical period, they could and did conclude treaties with non-Greek peoples, above all the Persians. In such cases, the ancient literary and epigraphic evidence shows that the Greeks continued to practice religiously-based oaths and rituals despite the great differences between Hellenic polytheism and Persian Zoroastrianism.⁵¹ In the *Anabasis* (2.2.9), Xenophon describes an alliance between the Greek mercenaries and Ariaeus, a Persian, which was ratified with the sacrifice of a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a ram over a shield, followed by the Greeks dipping a sword and the Persians a spear in the blood.⁵² An epigraphically-preserved fourth-century treaty between the satrap Mausolus and the Greek city of Phaselis in Lycia (*SdA* 2² 260) invokes the names of Zeus, Helios, and Ge (l. 2). At the same time, the left-hand side of l. 3, which is not preserved, is restored by Wilhelm to read θεοὶ βασιλεῖοι, 'the royal gods,' which Scharff identifies as the Persian gods Ahura Mazda and possibly also Anahita and Mithra.⁵³ A literary parallel occurs in Herodotus (5.106), during an episode of the early-5th century Ionian revolt in which Histiaeus, Greek tyrant of Miletus, swears 'by the royal gods' (θεοὺς ἐπόμνυμι τοὺς βασιληίους) to cooperate with the Persian king Darius. However, alternatives to Wilhelm's restoration have been suggested: Bengtson replaces θεοὶ βασιλεῖοι with βασιλέως τύχαν (although this formula is not securely attested anywhere).⁵⁴

Of the three Peloponnesian-Persian treaties of 412/11, only the second is described as a σπονδαί-agreement within the treaty text itself (Thuc. 8.37.1 = **D 3.12 LT 1**), but while the word

⁴⁹ Jacobson 1975, 256-57; Chambers 1990, 252; Scheibelreiter 2013, 253; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 155; Rhodes 2017, 260; cf. Hdt. 1.165.3; Diod. 9.10.3; Hor. *Ep.* 16.25.

⁵⁰ Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 207-08; cf. Meiggs 1972, 46.

⁵¹ Burkert 1992, 68; Gruen 2011, 9-21, 54; Scharff 2016, 281. Cf. especially I.C.Torrance in Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 312: 'Common ancestry between Greeks and Persians is underlined by Aeschylus and by Herodotus. Xerxes is descended "from the race begotten of gold" (i.e. from Zeus and Danaë, *Pers.* 80), the Greek hero Perseus is the founding father of the Persians (Hdt. 7.61, 150), and Greece and Persia are sisters in Atossa's dream (*Pers.* 185-6).'

⁵² Xenophon's paraphrase of the oath, ἀλλήλους σύμμαχοί τε ἔσεσθαι, indicates that the agreement in question is a συμμαχία. It would be helpful to know which rituals accompanied at least the third Peloponnesian-Persian treaty, but Thucydides does not tell us: cf. Lévy 1983b, 225.

⁵³ Wilhelm 1898, 162; Scharff 2016, 269. For Mithra as a deity invoked in Persian oaths cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.53, *Oec.* 4.24.2f.

⁵⁴ Cf. Hornblower 1982, 153 n. 127.

does not appear in the text of the third treaty, it is described as a σπονδαί-agreement in Thucydides' authorial narrative (8.57.2 καὶ σπονδὰς τρίτας τάσδε σπένδεται, implying that the two earlier treaties were also considered σπονδαί-agreements). E. Lévy surmises on this basis that libations were poured, and if this was in fact the case then it would demonstrate Persian adaptability to Greek ritual.⁵⁵ While it is highly unlikely that the Great King personally participated in any of the three agreements, later evidence – specifically, an Athenian alliance of 384/83 with Chios – indicates that he did personally swear to treaties when required to do so: *IG* 2² 34 = RO 20 II. 6-7 [τὰς οὔσας συνθῆκας] | [ἄ]ς ὤμοσεν βασιλ[εύς] and II. 10-12 τὸς ὄρκ[ο]ς καὶ τὰς οὔσας συνθῆκας, | ἄ]ς ὤμοσεν βασιλ[εύς] καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ | Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνας].⁵⁶ While E. Badian rejects the suggestion that Artaxerxes personally swore to the King's Peace, the possibility cannot and should not be discounted.⁵⁷

Conclusion

The religious components of Greek treaties functioned as a sophisticated mechanism for maintaining some semblance of order in the international arena. Whether through the anti-revolt and anti-deceit language imposed by Athens to secure its hegemony or the inclusion of amnesty clauses designed to quell internal *stasis*, the oath could be a versatile tool of political stabilization or, more often, of political control. Even when engaging with non-Greek powers like the Persian Empire, the Greeks maintained these ritualistic traditions, demonstrating a remarkable ability to integrate foreign gods into their diplomatic formulae to ensure the validity of their agreements. The persistent belief that treaty-breaking invited divine wrath – a sentiment echoed by Thucydides and Xenophon alike – ensured that religion continued to form the bedrock of international relations. Though the specific deities invoked might change and the rituals might vary from animal sacrifice to the pouring of wine, the underlying principle remained constant: a treaty was only as strong as the sacred oath that bound its swearers to the gods.

⁵⁵ Lévy 1983b, 228-29.

⁵⁶ Ryder 1965, 36 with n. 2; Seager 1994a, 117.

⁵⁷ Badian 1991, 37, 47 n. 44. Contrast the Athenian treaty with Perdiccas II, in which Perdiccas himself appears as the first Macedonian oath-taker (*IG* 1³ 89 I. 60). But the Macedonians, unlike the Persians, could not be described as 'non-Greek' without qualification. See further Badian 1991, 38 with n. 28; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 178.

Chapter 11

Treaties and autonomy

Introduction

The principle that ‘all cities and islands,’ or as we might say all peoples or nations, are entitled to autonomy is a fine principle, but how great a degree of freedom is meant by ‘autonomy,’ and how are we to decide what are the entities entitled to it? What territory belongs to an entity by right? Think of what used to be Yugoslavia; think of what used to be the Soviet Union. Think of the European Union, and its constituent states, and the component parts of those states which are federally organised (e.g. Germany and its Länder). Think of what is still, to some extent, the United Kingdom.¹

The above quotation by P.J. Rhodes illustrates just how fluid and inchoate the concept of autonomy can be in our own modern world. In this we are not so far removed from the Greeks, to whom we owe the very word ‘autonomy,’ and for whom *αὐτονομία*, as they called it, was an important albeit often imprecise notion in the realm of interstate relations. In the present chapter I attempt to define *αὐτονομία*, insofar as our sources allow, before exploring the origins of the word. I then individually examine the interstate treaties in which the concept of *αὐτονομία* is prominent and propose solutions as to how it was understood by the contracting parties in each case.

Definition of αὐτονομία

To begin to understand the Greek word *αὐτονομία*, we must break it down into its constituent elements, *αὐτός* and *νόμος*, ‘self’ and ‘law,’ therefore literally ‘self-legislating.’ Accordingly, Liddel and Scott gloss it as ‘freedom to use its own laws, independence.’² But we must be weary of oversimplification: the word’s fluidity, imprecision, and ambiguity has been pointed out on numerous occasions, as will become apparent throughout this chapter.³ In Athenian-authored treaties, the word *αὐτονομία* on its own, when it appears, reveals little.⁴ But insofar as it is possible to summarize the concept in one sentence, M.H. Hansen does so admirably: it is ‘[The right] to give oneself one’s own laws including the right to decide about taxes, to control one’s own territory, to have the sole jurisdiction within the territory, to admit or expel whom you

¹ Rhodes 2008, 27.

² LSJ⁹ s.v. *αὐτονομία*.

³ Ste. Croix 1972, 36-44; Schuller 1974, 111; Sealey 1976, 397; Ostwald 1982, 42; Bosworth 1992, 123; Giovannini 2007, 203; Low 2007, 191.

⁴ Raaflaub 1985, 206.

want, and freedom of action in foreign affairs.⁵ He elaborates that an autonomous (αὐτόνομος) state must have its own constitution (πολιτεία) free from interference by an external power as well as the right to make its own laws (νόμοι) and an independent taxation policy. Defined negatively, αὐτονομία entails the absence of a τύραννος; of control by Persia; of payment of φόρος under compulsion. An autonomous state cannot be a perioecic community or a cleruchy; and it cannot be under the supervision of a Spartan harmost and garrison. If any of the above conditions are present, Hansen argues, a state is no longer αὐτόνομος, but ὑπήκοος ('subject').⁶

Martin Ostwald prefers a more positive framing of αὐτονομία. He argues that it requires, at the very least, that a state 'can make its own decisions, free from violent interference by a stronger state, about what is and what is not in the interest of its survival, and that it can dispose of the military means necessary to implement measures necessary to ensure its survival.'⁷ Polly Low also diverges from Hansen's expansive conception of αὐτονομία: far from being negated by any kind of subjection to a superior power, it is by definition limited, 'not something which can be asserted as an absolute but is always, and necessarily, a relative condition asserted by a weaker power in the face of a stronger (or conceded by that stronger power to weaker states).'⁸ As we shall see, the evidence of the treaties accords more with Low's conception of autonomy than either Hansen's or Ostwald's. Low's observation is also bolstered by the fact that there is a separate Greek word for 'freedom' in an unrestricted or absolute sense, ἐλευθερία. Whereas the antonym of αὐτόνομος, as we have seen, is ὑπήκοος, that of ἐλευθερία is the correspondingly stronger δουλεία, 'enslavement.' And unlike αὐτονομία its cognates, ἐλευθερία and its cognates do not appear in official diplomatic texts of the 5th century BCE.⁹

According to Elias Bickerman, on whom Low's definition is largely based, αὐτονομία must be consciously created by an official act of a superordinate or hegemonic power and bestowed on a state or states that are subordinate in some way.¹⁰ This is most clearly evident in 5th century Athens' relations with the members of the Delian League. With increasing frequency towards the end of the century, Athens showed a willingness to formally grant αὐτονομία to League members that were formerly subject (ὑπήκοοι). Mytilene and Selymbria, for example, were declared αὐτόνομοι through treaties with the ἡγεμών, Athens (**D 3.9 + D 3.14**). In addition,

⁵ Hansen 1995, 26-27; cf. Amit 1973, 39.

⁶ Hansen 2015, 870-71, with references; cf. Hansen 1995, 28, 34-35; Ma 2009, 128.

⁷ Ostwald 1982, 29.

⁸ Low 2007, 189-90; cf. Bickerman 1958, 336-37; Whitehead 1993, 321.

⁹ Cataldi 1983, 323.

¹⁰ Bickerman 1958, 336-37; cf. Ostwald 1982, 1.

Samos was given its autonomy in 412 (Thuc. 8.21; cf. *IG* 1³ 127 = OR 191 l. 16) and an obscure group called the Eteokarpathians, curiously, at a much earlier date (*IG* 1³ 1454 = OR 136 l. 12).¹¹

Thucydides, in a speech attributed to Cleon in the Mytilenean debate (3.39.2), implies that the loss of ships and defensive fortifications are tantamount to the loss of autonomy precisely because the means of self-defence are no longer present.¹² It is true that this was not an absolute: Chios, for example, was still officially αὐτόνομος as late as 412 (3.10.5; 6.85.2; 7.57.4), when it revolted (8.17.1, 38.3-4), even though the Chians had already torn down their walls in 425 (4.51). But this was a voluntary act, a show of loyalty to the Athenians, and Chios retained its fleet in any case (4.13.2; 5.84.1; 6.43.7; 7.20.2).¹³ It is revealing that, when the Athenian oligarchs in 411 mulled a settlement with the Spartans to end the war, under no circumstances were they prepared to surrender the fleet or demolish the walls of Athens, because only by retaining them would they remain autonomous (8.91.3: τὰς τε ναῦς καὶ τὰ τεῖχη ἔχοντες αὐτονομεῖσθαι).

Origins of αὐτονομία

Unsurprisingly, given his intense focus both on interstate relations and internal political debates, the vast majority of attestations of αὐτονομία and cognates in 5th century literary texts occur in Thucydides – 48 out of a total of 58, according to the calculation of J. Roy.¹⁴ Its earliest appearance, in this case as the adjective αὐτόνομος, is at l. 821 of Sophocles' *Antigone*, first performed in or around 443¹⁵, but here the word is used in a personal, metaphorical, non-political sense.¹⁶ In the Hippocratic treatise *De Aera, Aquis, Locis*, the Greek people as a whole are depicted as being αὐτόνομοι, which distinguishes them non-Greeks supposedly accustomed to despotic rule (Hippoc. *Aer.* 16.65, 23.86).¹⁷ Αὐτονομία in a more clearly political sense occurs in Herodotus (8.140α.2) when Xerxes, acting through Mardonius, offers peace to the Athenians after the battle of Salamis, promising them autonomous status (ἔόντες αὐτόνομοι) if they agree. But although Herodotus frames this passage as a direct quotation of Mardonius, it clearly reflects how αὐτονομία-language was being used at the time of the *Histories'* composition

¹¹ The Eteokarpathians were a community inhabiting Karpathos, an Aegean island southwest of Rhodes. The relevant inscription is an Athenian honorary decree for Karpathos and found on that island, and dated by the editors of *IG* 1³ to ca. 445-30 BCE. See further Ma 2009, 129 and comm. OR 136. For the autonomy provision of *IG* 1³ 127 = OR 191 see Lazar 2024, 33 with n. 20.

¹² Ostwald 1982, 29. For an early fourth-century expression of the same view cf. Andoc. 3.14.

¹³ Cf. Thuc. 6.85.2 (Methymna described as αὐτόνομος because of its fleet) with Ostwald 1982, 27-28.

¹⁴ Roy 2022, 120; cf. Lévy 1983b, 255 with n. 51.

¹⁵ The play is usually, but not certainly, assigned to this date: see *OCD*⁴ s.v. 'autonomy.'

¹⁶ Ostwald 1982, 10-11; Raaflaub 1985, 192.

¹⁷ Low 2007, 191-92. The precise date of the treatise is uncertain, but ca. 430 has been suggested, and if true this would still postdate Sophocles' *Antigone* (for a minority view on *Antigone's* date see Lewis 1988). See further Lévy 1983a, 250 n. 9, with references.

much later in the 5th century and should not be taken as evidence for its currency as early as 480.¹⁸ It is surely not coincidental that the vocabulary of autonomy came into being in the 440s and 430s. K. Raaflaub associates its development with the efforts of Athens' allies in the Delian League to assert a limited independence, especially in internal matters, against Athenian encroachments.¹⁹ Although Athens had shown itself willing to coerce the allies from as early as the 470s, the coming of peace with Persia in ca. 449, followed by Athens' harsh reaction to revolts in Euboea in 446/45 and Samos in 439, vividly demonstrated that Athens was willing to go to great lengths to maintain its grip on the ἀρχή even in the absence of the Persian threat.

It would appear that αὐτονομία was on the political agenda by 431, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, when the Spartan embassy at Athens promised that war could be avoided if the Athenians 'left the Greeks autonomous' (Thuc. 1.139.3 Λακεδαιμόνιοι βούλονται τὴν εἰρήνην εἶναι, εἴη δ' ἂν εἰ τοὺς Ἑλληνας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖτε). For the Spartans, this specifically meant revoking the Megarian Decree, ending the siege of Potidaea, and respecting the αὐτονομία of Aegina (cf. 1.139.1). Pericles, speaking on behalf of the Athenians, replied that they would do so only if the Spartans would leave their own Peloponnesian League allies autonomous (1.144.2 καὶ ὅταν κάκεῖνοι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι μὴ σφίσι [τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις] ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς ἐκάστοις ὡς βούλονται), which was, and was intended to be, a non-starter meant only to highlight Spartan hypocrisy. As Bolmarcich stresses, the Athenian democracy and economy were intimately connected with the ἀρχή and the tribute that accrued from it. As for the Spartans, dissolving the Peloponnesian League or even relinquishing their hegemony over it would have rendered them far more vulnerable to the Argives, potentially with help from Athens, and to a helot rebellion.²⁰

Αὐτονομία in individual treaties

Within my database, eleven treaties contain or have been restored to contain an autonomy clause, or at least have some bearing on the issue, when considering both literary and epigraphic testimonia. The relevant passages are compiled in **Appendix 6: Autonomy clauses**.

D 1.1: Establishment of the Delian League

Pericles' objections to Spartan autonomy-demands in 431, noted above, was an implicit acknowledgement that Athens' Delian League allies were by and large not autonomous in 431.

¹⁸ For the date of publication of Herodotus' *Histories*, see Fornara 1971a, arguing for ca. 414 against the orthodox date of ca. 426.

¹⁹ Raaflaub 1985, 204-05; cf. Seager and Tuplin 1980; Ostwald 1982, 1.

²⁰ Bolmarcich 2012, 83.

The question is whether this state of affairs had existed since the League's formation in 478/77 or developed only gradually.

At 1.97.1 (= **D 1.1 LT 1**), Thucydides writes that the original members of the Delian League were all initially autonomous (ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων), and that decisions regarding League policy were made at allied synods (ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων). Gomme suggests that the synods quickly became little more than a rubber-stamping body dominated by Athens and were abandoned entirely by 454 at the latest, when the League treasury was moved from Delos to Athens.²¹ Conversely, Hornblower suggests that they might have continued to meet until the 430s.²² But as P. Low stresses, the virtual nonexistence of evidence for the activities of League synods indicates that the era of collective decision-making was very brief indeed.²³

What was Athens' role in the early history of the Delian League? While Athens was always its formal ἡγεμών, M. Ostwald contends that its prerogatives were likely initially limited to the assessment of allied contributions (both of φόρος and ships) and the selection of the board of League treasurers (Ἐλληνοταμίαι), who were always Athenians (cf. Thuc. 1.96.2 = **D 1.1 LT 1**; Antiph. 5.69-71).²⁴ Additionally, as numerous scholars have pointed out, until the imposition of tribute was taken up by Athens, this practice was associated in the Greek imagination with Persian domination and was therefore viewed as indicative of the political subjection of those who were forced to pay it.²⁵ Δασμός was the term used for the Persian tribute (the earliest evidence is Hdt. 3.89; cf. Isoc. 10.27), and it has been suggested that Athens consciously referred to their own tribute as φόρος in order to avoid the Persian associations of δασμός.²⁶ On the other hand, several early League members contributed ships rather than tribute and, in the beginning, those that did pay tribute did so not because Athens forced them to, but because they either preferred to do so or did not have fleets of their own ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 23.5 = **D 1.1 LT 2**).²⁷

²¹ *HCT* 1, 280.

²² Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 1, 146.

²³ Low 2017, 100.

²⁴ Ostwald 1982, 30. The point about the Ἐλληνοταμίαι being exclusively Athenians is argued cogently by Woodhead 1959.

²⁵ Murray 1966, 150; Kallet-Marx 1993, 45-47; Whitehead 1998, 178-81. Low 2017, 104 points to the Athenian practice of displaying the allied tribute publicly at the Dionysia after 454/53 (Plut. *Per.* 12; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.3) and its unpopularity among the allies (Isoc. 8.82) and reasonably attributes this to Athens' explicit renunciation of φόρος in the Second Athenian Confederacy (*IG* 2² 43 = RO 22 I. 23).

²⁶ Cf. Murray 1966, 159: 'Just as in the second Athenian League the term σύνταξις was used in order to avoid the connotations of the hated, φόρος, so in the first φόρος itself was intended to differentiate the new contributions from the old tribute to Persia.'

²⁷ Ship-contributing members included Chios (Thuc. 8.24.4), Mytilene (3.2-3), and Samos (1.115).

While autonomy clauses became common in treaties later in the 5th century, it seems unlikely that an explicit guarantee of αὐτονομία was offered already in 478/77. Rather, it is more probable that the allies *assumed* that Athens would not interfere in their internal affairs.²⁸ As Ostwald and Raaflaub emphasize, there is no evidence that Athens harboured imperialist ambitions as early as 478/77.²⁹ These only became apparent with the forcible incorporation of Carystus into the League and the suppression of the revolt of Naxos (**D 1.2 + D 1.3**). When the League was formed, the greatest threat to the independence and security of the Greek communities of Ionia, the Aegean islands, and the Hellespont at this time was not Athens but Persia (cf. Thuc. 1.96.1). Nor was Athens' expectation that the allies contribute to the alliance particularly unreasonable, as naval warfare was a costly endeavour.³⁰

However, by the late-5th century, Athens had deprived most of its allies of their αὐτονομία. This is apparent from a speech, reported by Thucydides (6.85.2), of the Athenian envoy Euphemus in 415/14. Here Euphemus distinguishes between three classes of Athenian allies: first were those – Chios and Methymna are specifically mentioned – that continued to contribute ships rather than cash, and for that reason were classified as αὐτόνομοι; another, much larger group, were compelled to pay φόρος and were therefore, it is implied, ὑπήκοοι;³¹ finally, a third group of allies was entirely ἐλεύθερος because they were not liable to tribute of any kind: Euphemus must have had the Ionian Sea islands Zacynthus and Cephallenia in mind (cf. Thuc. 7.57.7).³² Euphemus' speech implies that the key element of αὐτονομία from Athens is freedom from the payment of φόρος under compulsion, though we shall see that this is not its only element, and in the Peace of Nicias, forced tribute payment in limited cases is indeed ostensibly compatible with αὐτονομία.³³ But Euphemus' implication that φόρος negated αὐτονομία, while largely correct by 415/14, does not correspond to the reality of 478/77.

D 1.9: Peace of Callias

Reliable details about the Peace of Callias are notoriously difficult to come by, and yet another area of obscurity is whether the Peace contained an autonomy clause. Literary sources from the 4th century onward imply an affirmative answer to this question. Isocrates (4.120 = **D 1.9 LT 1**) claims that the Peace territorially restricted the Achaemenid realm (τότε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς φανησόμεθα τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν βασιλέως ὀρίζοντες), and although he does not explicitly use the

²⁸ For discussion of αὐτονομία in the context of the Delian League's early history see *HCT* 1, 292; *ATL* 3, 156-57, 228 with n. 14; Ostwald 1982, 39.

²⁹ Ostwald 1982, 25; Raaflaub 2009, 93.

³⁰ Wallinga 1982; Schmitz 1988, 16-57; Gabrielsen 1994; Morrison et al. 2000; Raaflaub 2009, 94.

³¹ The word ὑπήκοοι is not used in this passage, but cf. Thuc. 7.57.4.

³² Lévy 1983a, 264-65; Figueira 1990, 67-68.

³³ Ostwald 1982, 28; Hansen 1995, 32; Fornara 2010, 133 n. 23.

word αὐτονομία or its cognates here, it is possible to interpret this as implying an autonomy clause. Lycurgus (1.73 = **LT 5**), also active in the 4th century, while incorrectly assigning the date of the Peace to the 460s, announces, ‘They [sc. Athens and Persia] made a treaty ... that the Greeks should be autonomous’ (συνθήκας ἐποιήσαντο ... τοὺς δ’ Ἕλληνας αὐτονόμους εἶναι). Diodorus, surely following the 4th century Ephorus, likewise asserts that the Great King agreed not to sail warships west of the River Halys and that the Greek cities of Asia Minor were to be autonomous (12.4.5 = **LT 8** αὐτονόμους εἶναι τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀπάσας).

While Ostwald is cautious about using the testimony of Lycurgus and Diodorus to reconstruct the language of the original treaty, E. Badian is confident that the Peace of Callias really did contain an autonomy clause, comparing an incident from 395, as reported by Xenophon, in which Artaxerxes promised the Spartan king Agesilaus αὐτονομία for the Greek cities of Asia Minor on condition that they pay the δασμός and that Spartan forces withdraw from Persian territory (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25 τὰς δ’ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις αὐτονόμους οὔσας τὸν ἀρχαῖον δασμὸν αὐτῷ ἀποφέρειν). Badian suggests that a similar offer was extended to, and accepted by, the Athenians and incorporated into the Peace of Callias.³⁴ Conversely, R. Meiggs, while accepting the existence of an autonomy clause in the Peace of Callias, suggests it was intended only to limit the amount of the δασμός that could be imposed on the Greek cities of Asia Minor and to guarantee their independence in internal affairs.³⁵ This is only superficially contradicted by Herodotus (6.42), who reports that, after the suppression of the Ionian Revolt of the 490s, the Lydian satrap Artaphernes carried out tribute assessments on the pacified cities of Ionia which, Herodotus adds, remained fixed at the same rate up to his own day. The Lydian satraps, it appears, maintained their theoretical claim to δασμός from the Ionians at least as late as 413/12 (Thuc. 8.5.5), but for all practical purposes they could not collect it, or could collect only a limited amount, on account of the Athenians.³⁶ We may plausibly attribute this arrangement to the Peace of Callias.

D 1.15: Athenian treaty with Samos

Samos was a member of the Delian League, perhaps from the very beginning, and a contributor of ships (cf. Hdt. 9.106.4). [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.2 describes Samos before its revolt in 441/40 in terms suggestive of αὐτονομία, although he does not actually use this word or its cognates:

³⁴ Ostwald 1982, 25-26; Badian 1993, 51 with 198 n. 64.

³⁵ Meiggs 1972, 148; cf. Cary 1945, 90; cf. Gomme 1944, 333f.; Murray 1966, 155.

³⁶ Lewis 1977, 87; *HCT* 5, 16-17; Debord 1999, 121-23; Rubinstein in *IACP*, p. 1057.

λαβόντες τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῖς συμμάχοις δεσποτικωτέρως ἐχρῶντο, πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων καὶ Σαμίων· τούτους δὲ φύλακας εἶχον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐῶντες τὰς τε πολιτείας παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄρχειν ὧν ἔτυχον ἄρχοντες

[The Athenians], having won the ἀρχή, treated the allies rather despotically, except for Chios, Lesbos, and Samos, which they kept as outposts of the ἀρχή and allowed to have their own governments and rule the subjects that they had at the time.

(trans. H. Rackham, adapted)

Here the emphasis is on the constitutional independence of Samos, Lesbos, and Chios, and it was in fact an Athenian attempt to impose a democratic government (Thuc. 1.115.2-3) that prompted Samos' revolt in the first place. But Thucydides, who reports both the course and the aftermath of the revolt, says only that the Samians agreed to raze their walls, give hostages, surrender their fleet, and pay an indemnity (1.117.3 = **D 1.15 LT 1**); he is silent about constitutional arrangements. The associated inscription, OR 139 = **ET 1**, is so fragmentary that nothing of the sort can be securely extracted from here either. Osborne and Rhodes speculatively restore fr. *b* l. 3 of the inscription [--- Σαμῖος δὲ οἰκῆν [αὐτονόμος], which would, it appears, guarantee the Samians their autonomy, but this is so insecure that they also proffer the alternative restoration [τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν ? ---], thereby removing all reference to αὐτονομία.³⁷

Whether or not a democratic polity was forced on the Samians, the punitive measures described at Thuc. 1.117.3 clearly resulted in their reduction to subject (ὑπήκοος) status: while the Samians, unlike the Byzantines (who revolted at the same time and assisted the Samians: Thuc. 1.115.5), are not described as ὑπήκοοι in this passage, they are later explicitly listed among the allies who are 'subject and liable to tribute' (7.57.4: ὑπηκόων καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῶν), although they do not appear in the surviving tribute lists.³⁸ The later Thucydidean passage suggests that, from the Athenian perspective, autonomy ended as soon as an ally was subjected to tribute under compulsion; constitutional arrangements were of secondary importance.³⁹ As Ostwald writes, 'Before the Peloponnesian War it mattered little to Athens whether an ally was oligarchically or democratically governed as long as that ally remained loyal to the ἡγεμῶν; only when loyalty was doubted was a regime friendly to Athens imposed, usually by force.'⁴⁰ Since we are told by Thucydides that the autonomy of Samos was restored in 412 (8.21 Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσι αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς βεβαίους ἤδη ψηφισαμένων), it stands to reason that the

³⁷ Both restorations are based on the edition of Matthaiou 2014.

³⁸ *IACP* no. 864, p. 1095.

³⁹ But see Ostwald 1982, 29 and Figueira 1990, 68, rightly noting that, for practical purposes, a city wishing to protect its autonomy also required a defensive wall and, in the case of island or coastal cities like Samos, a fleet. It is hardly coincidental that Athens, while stripping Samos of its formal autonomy, simultaneously removed the means by which the Samians would have been able to defend it.

⁴⁰ Ostwald 1993, 63; cf. Will 1969.

Athenians did *not* consider it autonomous prior to that, and we can infer that Samos' period of non-αὐτονομία lasted from 439 to 412.⁴¹

D 2.12: Peace of Nicias

The Peace of Nicias contains not one but two distinct autonomy clauses. The first concerns the αὐτονομία of Delphi (Thuc. 5.18.2 = **D 2.12 LT 1**), while the second clarifies the status of six cities in Chalcidice (5.18.5 = *ibid*). The Delphi clause contains the unusual adjectives αὐτοτελεῖς and αὐτοδίκους. LSJ⁹, citing Thuc. 5.18.2, defines the first as '*taxing oneself, self-taxed*.'⁴² This is accepted by Hornblower, who contrasts it with ὑποτελής and συντελής, which are used of states that are liable to financial obligations as a subject (ὑπήκοος) and as a member of a federal state (e.g., Boeotia), respectively.⁴³ As for αὐτόδικος, Liddel and Scott again provide a useful starting point with their definition, '*with independent jurisdiction, with one's own courts*,' again with reference to 5.18.2.⁴⁴ Hornblower's translation of the overall clause makes good sense of what Thucydides' (= the treaty's) Greek seeks to express: 'The sanctuary and the temple at Delphi, and the Delphian people, shall be autonomous and shall have control of their own revenues and shall have their own courts of justice, both for themselves and for their territory, according to their ancestral customs.'⁴⁵ The clause thus applies to Delphi in two senses: the πόλις of Delphi and the ἱερόν that was physically located within its territory.⁴⁶

Specifically, the αὐτοτέλεια of the Delphians, as Hansen interprets it, exempts them from non-consensual tribute to an external power which, like the φόρος paid under compulsion by most Delian League members by this time, was considered to be a violation of αὐτονομία.⁴⁷

Gomme's argument, which is admittedly somewhat difficult to follow, seems to be that the adjective αὐτόνομος is dependent, in the passage which we are considering, on αὐτοτελής and αὐτόδικος: being αὐτοτελής and αὐτόδικος is what makes the Delphians αὐτόνομοι.⁴⁸ The most concise explanation of this passage is given by M. Ostwald:

Since αὐτοτελεῖς includes the injunction that Delphi must pay tribute to neither a superior power nor to a confederacy but be left to determine the disposal of her finances without

⁴¹ Cf. Shipley 1987, 117; Ostwald 1993, 52; *IG* 1³ 127 = OR 191 ll. 15-16 (405/04) τοῖς δὲ νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς σφετέροις αὐτῶν | αὐτόνομος ὄντας. See also *IG* 1³ 96, an Athenian decree regarding Samos; according to Ostwald 1993, 64 it is connected with the events of Thuc. 8.21, and it is dated by the editors of *IG* 1³ to 412/11.

⁴² LSJ⁹ s.v. αὐτοτελής; cf. Rhodes 1981, 106 on the word as used at [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.5, where its implications are more judicial than financial.

⁴³ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 472; cf. *HCT* 3, 667.

⁴⁴ LSJ⁹ s.v. αὐτόδικος.

⁴⁵ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 472.

⁴⁶ For the πόλις of Delphi cf. Hdt. 8.36.2; Ps.-Skylax 37; *CID* 1 9A ll. 2-3; *IG* 2² 109a l. 27; Oulhen at *IACP*, p. 412.

⁴⁷ Hansen 1995, 32.

⁴⁸ *HCT* 3, 667.

outside interference, and since αὐτοδίκους guarantees freedom from external interference in the administration of justice at Delphi, αὐτόνομους – although it is of course strengthened by the addition of these two adjectives – evidently guarantees the freedom of the people of Delphi to make their political decisions without external interference.⁴⁹

Delphi's privileges, then, consist of 1) freedom from tribute and independent control of financial policy; 2) the independence of the Delphian law-courts; and 3) independence in political decision-making, probably encompassing both domestic and foreign policy. J. Oulhen proposes that the clause under consideration was intended to protect Delphi from the Phocian κοινόν, a federal state.⁵⁰ Unlike the clause relating to Delphi found in the Truce of Laches (Thuc. 4.118.1-2 = **D 2.9 LT 1**), whose goal was merely to protect pilgrims from possible harassment or violence, the present clause seeks to clarify the status of both the πόλις and the ἱερόν of Delphi and to guarantee the αὐτονομία of both entities.⁵¹

The clause recorded at Thuc. 5.18.5 awards an unusual status to the Chalcidian cities of Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. They are to be autonomous, yet still liable to the Athenian φόρος, albeit at a rate consistent with the inaugural assessment made by Aristides in 478/77 (τὰς δὲ πόλεις φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου αὐτόνομους εἶναι). But the text implies that, should they fail to pay this, the Athenians would be justified in compelling them to do so, through force if necessary (ὄπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν Ἀθηναίους μηδὲ τοὺς συμμαχοὺς ἐπὶ κακῶ, ἀποδιδόντων τὸν φόρον). While Hansen argues that tribute could indeed be compatible with autonomy, he stresses that this was true only when it was paid on a voluntary basis.⁵² This is evidently not the case here. To solve the inherent contradiction in this clause, we must consider the historical context of τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 23.5 reports that Aristides was responsible for the first allied tribute assessment upon the foundation of the Delian League in 478/77 which, according to Thucydides (1.96.2, not mentioning Aristides) amounted to a total of 460 talents. However, Lisa Kallet-Marx stresses that we must distinguish between the tribute *assessment* (*ibid.* ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεὶς), which Thucydides quantifies, and what the allies actually paid, which he does not.⁵³ This calls into question whether the 'Aristidean' tribute was really as modest as modern scholars sometimes assume.⁵⁴ In an interesting recent article, Nino Luraghi posits that φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου does not, in fact, denote a specific amount, but was an opportunistic

⁴⁹ Ostwald 1982, 7.

⁵⁰ *IACP* no. 177, p. 413; cf. Gallo 2011. On the history and political organization of Phocis in the Archaic and Classical periods see *IACP*, pp. 399-402.

⁵¹ Parke and Wormell 1956, 196-97; *HCT* 3, 667; Ostwald 1982, 7; Sánchez 2001, 116; *IACP* no. 177, p. 413.

⁵² Hansen 1995, 31-32.

⁵³ Kallet-Marx 1993, 181 n. 76.

⁵⁴ Cf. *HCT* 3, 669: 'Aristeides' assessment of the cities mentioned below may have been exceptionally low'; Hornblower (*Comm. on Thuc.* 2, 477): 'It is usually thought that "Aristidean levels" are supposed to be generous or moderate.' However, Hornblower does acknowledge the doubts of Kallet-Marx 1993, 180-81.

political slogan used in 421 to evoke nostalgia towards the Delian League's early years when Athenian power over the allies was supposedly more moderate and benevolent. As Luraghi emphasizes, there is in fact no evidence apart from the present passage (and then only implicitly) suggesting that any of the six cities concerned were founding members of the Delian League, and Acanthus in particular is actually known to have contributed ships rather than tribute until 451/50 (*IG* 1³ 263.3 l. 34).⁵⁵ This must prompt serious reflection, but I would propose a slight amendment to Luraghi's arguments: even if the six Chalcidian cities were not founding members of the Delian League, there is still in my view the possibility that their assessments were reduced in 421 to an extent that was deemed compatible with 'Aristidean' levels; but we are unable to say for sure.

Whatever the concessions made to the six Chalcidian cities, the clause recorded at Thuc. 5.18.5 still represents a violation of their *αὐτονομία*, whatever the Athenians, with Spartan acquiescence, might say. First of all, we have no evidence that they were consulted either by Athens or Sparta during the extended peace negotiations that took place over winter 422/21. And in other contexts, compulsory financial obligations backed by the threat of force were readily seen as violations of *αὐτονομία*: in summer 421, when the Eleans attacked perioecic Lepreum for failing to pay the one talent owed (annually?) to Olympian Zeus, Spartan arbitrators determined that Elis had violated Lepreum's *αὐτονομία* (Thuc. 5.31.2-4).⁵⁶ It could be argued that Sparta was opportunistically seeking to weaken Elis by detaching it from Lepreum, but Thucydides, speaking through Euphemus, does not hesitate to accept that his native city Athens had deprived its allies of their *αὐτονομία* by subjecting them to a mandatory *φόρος* (7.57.3-4).⁵⁷ I therefore cannot see how the fate of the Chalcidian cities differed meaningfully from that of the Delian League members who were *de jure* *ὑπήκοοι*. While Gomme speculates that they did not have to provide contingents to Athenian military campaigns, I stress that his theory lacks evidence (though it is not impossible).⁵⁸ But even if this could be proven to be the case, it does not negate the threat of Athenian retaliation, should the

⁵⁵ Luraghi 2022, 113-15, noting the strong Persian presence in the northern Aegean in the early-470s (Hdt. 7.105-107; 8.126-129); on Acanthus's contributions see Zahrnt 1971, 42 with *IACP* no. 559, p. 823; for the tribute of Argilus see Meiggs 1972, 159 n. 3; *ATL* 1, 232, reading 1.5 talents.

⁵⁶ Cf. Ostwald 1982, 28. Whether the one-talent contribution was expected on an annual basis is unclear from the ancient sources, but Patay-Horváth 2016, 246 argues that it was, while stressing that this did not constitute a particularly heavy economic burden. On Lepreum's perioecic status see Roy 1997, 283-85 with Hdt. 4.148.4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23, 25; Paus. 3.8.3.

⁵⁷ Pace Hansen 1995, 31-32, who apparently distinguishes between allies who joined the Delian League voluntarily and those who were forced into it. This is in my view a moot point: however voluntary the accession of the League's first members was, they presumably had little idea that they would eventually be *forced* to contribute tribute under the threat of violence and could not secede. By 421, there was no longer any meaningful difference between most founding members (and others who had voluntarily joined at an early date) and those, such as Naxos and Aegina, who were enrolled into the League by force.

⁵⁸ *HCT* 3, 670.

Chalcidian cities cease paying. It is possible that they were allowed to conduct their internal affairs as they wished, under constitutions of their choice (and this may very well have been the case even before 421), but their ability to exercise an independent foreign policy was circumscribed by the prohibition on entering into an alliance with Sparta, whereas the possibility of re-entering into alliance with Athens remained, if the Athenians could ‘persuade’ them to do it (Thuc. 5.18.5 *ξυμμάχους δ’ εἶναι μηδετέρων, μήτε Λακεδαιμονίων μήτε Ἀθηναίων· ἦν δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πείθωσι τὰς πόλεις, βουλομένας ταύτας ἐξέστω ξυμμάχους ποιῆσθαι αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίους*).⁵⁹ And as various scholars have observed, it is psychologically implausible on the face of it that the Athenians would reward the Chalcidian cities, all of which had recently revolted against Athens, with genuine *αὐτονομία* while denying the same to the many League members that had remained loyal throughout the Archidamian War.⁶⁰ The best explanation is that given by Luraghi: the Spartans, who thought that Amphipolis was lost to them under the Peace, were desperate to save face. That the autonomy clause on which they insisted was in reality a paper tiger was of no concern to them, and its implementation was left to the Athenians; the Spartans had effectively washed their hands of the matter.⁶¹

D 3.3: Spartan treaty proposal to Argos

D 3.4: Peace of Lichas

D 3.6: 30-year truce between Sparta and Mantinea

That Sparta could insist on the *αὐτονομία* of the Peloponnesian *πόλεις* in the treaties presently under consideration cannot be understood without reference to its decisive victory at Mantinea in 418. As E. Millender writes, ‘The Spartans’ overwhelming victory put to rest the Argives’ claims to supremacy in the Peloponnesus and quashed the Athenians’ attempts to contest both the Spartans’ hegemony in the region and preeminence on the field.’⁶² In the Spartan treaty proposal submitted to the Argives and quoted by Thucydides at 5.77 (= **D 3.3 LT 1**), the Spartans expressed their desire that *τὰς δὲ πόλεις τὰς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμως εἶμεν πάσας κατὰ πάτρια*. Under Ostwald’s interpretation of this passage, the Spartans were claiming that, in the Peloponnese at least, respect for the *αὐτονομία* of individual *πόλεις* was an ancestral practice that must be adhered to; infringing upon it would constitute a violation of *τὰ πάτρια*. In the context of Thuc. 5.77, *τὰ πάτρια* ‘serves to provide, if not a firm sanction, yet at least a reminder to the states involved that certain traditions, which

⁵⁹ Luraghi 2022, 111 n. 24 pointedly asks, ‘Were the Athenians not opening the way for factions within those *poleis* to request their intervention?’

⁶⁰ West 1925; *ATL* 3, 347-53; Luraghi 2022, 118.

⁶¹ Luraghi 2022, 115 n. 36; cf. Robertson 1980, 87 n. 29.

⁶² Millender 2017, 94.

should not be broken, represented a norm in interstate relations.⁶³ T. Figueira takes a rather dimmer view: τὰ πάτρια, far from ensuring the autonomy of a weaker state against a stronger one, could in fact be cited to justify the ἡγεμονία of the latter over the former if this accorded with longstanding practice, i.e., was κατὰ πάτρια. He notes that Thebes, admittedly outside of the Peloponnese geographically, but still a member of the Peloponnesian League, pointedly appealed to τὰ πάτρια to justify Plataea's forcible inclusion in the Boeotian confederacy during the city's siege in the early years of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.2.4; 3.66.1).⁶⁴

An autonomy clause was also written into the Peace of Lichas proper (Thuc. 5.79.1 = **D 3.4 LT 1**): ταὶ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλεις ταὶ ἐν Πελοποννάσῳ κοινανεόντων τᾶν σπονδᾶν καὶ τᾶς ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλιες, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες κατὰ πάτρια, δίκας διδόντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας. As translated by Hornblower, this passage reads: 'The other cities in the Peloponnese may participate in the peace and the alliance, and shall be autonomous and independent, controlling their own territory as they traditionally have done, submitting to fair and impartial judicial proceedings.'⁶⁵ The adjective αὐτόπολις is a hapax and seems to exert an intensifying force on αὐτόνομοι. The definition found in *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 'free, independent state,' makes good sense of the word's literal meaning, 'city by itself.'⁶⁶ This is largely a repetition of the autonomy demand found in the earlier treaty proposal, now codified and enforceable as part of a formal interstate treaty. While the Peace of Lichas did not directly involve Elis as a contracting party, numerous scholars have postulated that the treaty, and particularly its autonomy clause, was intended to challenge Elean control of Lepreum and other perioecic settlements (cf. Thuc. 5.31.4; 5.34.1).⁶⁷

While there is no explicit reference to αὐτονομία in the surviving testimonia of the Spartan truce with Mantinea (**D 3.6**), Thuc. 5.81.1 = **LT 1** τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφεῖσαν τῶν πόλεων – the subject is the Mantineans – implies an autonomy clause. This was the final nail in the coffin of the Mantinean ἀρχή, which at its greatest extent in the Archidamian War encompassed Parrhasia and parts of Maenalia.⁶⁸ While Parrhasia had already been captured by Sparta in 421 (5.33.1), J. Roy stresses that the present treaty reframes the detachment of Parrhasia from Mantinea five years prior as a free decision of the Parrhasians, which it was not.⁶⁹ It is surely relevant that

⁶³ Ostwald 1982, 4, 6.

⁶⁴ Figueira 1990, 66. It is clear from *Hell. Oxy.* 19.3 that Plataea, before its secession in 431 at the latest (Thuc. 2.2.4; 3.65.2; Buck 1979, 153-54), was a member of the Boeotian federation, as it provided two of the Boeotarchs (cf. Kirsten 1950, 2302-03).

⁶⁵ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 201.

⁶⁶ LSJ⁹ s.v. αὐτόπολις.

⁶⁷ Ostwald 1982, 5 with 53 n. 24; cf. Bickerman 1958, 333-34; Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 201-02. *Contra* Roy 2022, 122 with Ar. Av. 149. Roy 2009, 71-74 suggests a separate, unattested Spartan-Elean treaty following the battle of Mantinea.

⁶⁸ Nielsen 1996, 135 with Thuc. 5.29.1, 33.1, 67.2.

⁶⁹ Roy 2022, 124.

Parrhasia was of great strategic significance for Sparta, and the presence of hostile Mantinean forces there was intolerable.⁷⁰

The reality is that, after their battlefield victory at Mantinea, the Spartans were free to impose their will with minimal restraint, forcing disadvantageous terms on the defeated Argives and, not long after, on the Mantineans. *Αὐτονομία*, supposedly guaranteed on the basis of τὰ πάτρια, was ultimately little more than a mask for Spartan self-interest. One of Sparta's first actions following the Peace of Lichas was to impose oligarchies on Sicyon and Achaëa, while Argos itself briefly succumbed to a Spartan-inspired oligarchic coup (Thuc. 5.81.2-82.2).⁷¹ Cartledge's general assessment of Spartan behaviour is entirely on-point: 'Sparta's conception of her own best interests, or rather the conception entertained by the group that at any time happened to be dominant within the Spartan political hierarchy, always guided her actions rather than any altruistic or even impersonal considerations of justice or morality.'⁷²

D 3.9: Athenian treaty with Mytilene

By the time of the Corinthian War at the latest, Athenian cleruchies were recognized as incompatible with autonomy: in 392, Athens rejected a universal guarantee of *αὐτονομία* proposed by Sparta because this would have spelt the end of their cleruchies on Imbros, Scyros, and Lemnos (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.15); their permission to retain them under the King's Peace was only possible as an explicit *exception* to that treaty's autonomy clause (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31 = **D 4.8 LT 1**).⁷³ The Athenian treaty with Mytilene (**D 3.9**), which I have argued dates to ca. 412, indicates that this view prevailed in late-5th century as well. Before revolting in 428 alongside Antissa, Eresos, and Pyrrha (Thuc. 3.2-18, 25, 27-50; Diod. 12.55), Mytilene was an autonomous Delian League member, contributing ships rather than tribute and participating independently in Delian League campaigns (Thuc. 3.10.5, 11.1, 3, 39.2; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.2). The terms imposed on Mytilene after the suppression of the revolt emphatically put an end to its privileged status: its walls were demolished, its fleet surrendered, its *περαία* ceded to Athens, and its territory on the island of Lesbos proper divided into 3000 κληροί (Thuc. 3.50 = **D 2.3 LT 1**).⁷⁴

The present treaty abolished the cleruchy at any rate (*IG* 1³ 66 = **D 3.9 ET 1 ll.** 8-12). Within this clause, specifically at ll. 11-12, the Mytileneans were declared autonomous: καὶ αὐτο[νό]μος δοκ[εῖ] ἔ~ν|[α]. Thus, an association between the abolition of the cleruchy and the regaining of

⁷⁰ Roy 2022, 109.

⁷¹ Cf. Ostwald 1982, 8.

⁷² Cartledge 2002, 228.

⁷³ Cf. Hansen 1995, 35.

⁷⁴ Mattingly 1996, 136 speculates that the Athenian cleruchs, if they ever even stepped foot on Lesbian soil, were withdrawn from the island in or very shortly after 427, possibly due to the return of the plague. However, the present treaty's probable late date of ca. 412 makes this in my view unlikely.

Mytilenean αὐτονομία is implied, from which we can deduce that subjection to a cleruchy was a mark of ὑπήκοος status and was recognized as such by the Athenians.⁷⁵ This was not the only respect in which the Mytilene's lot was improved: the city had walls again by 406 (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.17), and this must have been permitted by the Athenians, though whether this came about via a lost clause of **ET 1**, or through another, unattested treaty, is unclear.⁷⁶ The very fragmentary and undated *IG 1³ 67*, if it actually has anything to do with Mytilene at all (this is entirely dependent on restorations), *may* hint at the restoration of a Mytilenean military apparatus: ll. 7-11 με̅|η[υποδέχε|σθαι μεδ̅ε̅|αὐ]τὸς λείζε[σθαι μεδ̅' | ἐπιστρατεύεσ]θαι μετ[ἄ τῶν πολ|εμίον ἐπ' Ἀθηναίος] μεδ̅[ἐ στρατι|ἄν ὀφελ̅εν τῶν πολεμίον μεδ̅ε̅ ..].⁷⁷ But this is a very thin thread on which to hang such an argument.

T.J. Quinn proposes further that Mytilene may have been allowed to choose its own constitution: this would be in keeping with the spirit of the inscription, and compare the Selymbria treaty (**D 3.14**), which I discuss below; but there is no definitive support from the epigraphic or literary records.⁷⁸ Likewise, the question of tribute is not addressed in the surviving inscription. However, if it postdates 413, however slightly, the point would have been moot because in that year Athens replaced the φόρος with the εἰκοστή, a five-percent levy on all goods transported by sea (Thuc. 7.28.4), and the φόρος is unlikely to have been reintroduced before 404.⁷⁹

D 3.14: Athenian treaty with Selymbria

The events in Selymbria during the Decelean War have already been discussed in the main entry for the present treaty but are worth briefly repeating: the city joined nearby Perinthus and defected from the Delian League in 410 or earlier, only to be captured by Alcibiades in 408, assisted by the city's pro-Athenian faction, and forced to pay an indemnity and receive an

⁷⁵ Cf. Hansen 1995, 32f.; Fornara 2010, 132-33. *IG 1³ 66 = D 3.9 ET 1* ll. 12-13 [πλ̅εν] | ἔ παραδό]ντας [σφ̅δ̅ν τὰ κα]τ' ἔ[πειρον χορία], if correctly restored, allows Athens to retain the Mytilenean περαία. Scholars differ in interpreting the present treaty: Kallet 2001, 196 sees it as indicative of a shift by Athens towards a purely economic form of imperialism, but this is questioned by Figueira 2005; cf. Low 2017, 106.

⁷⁶ Archaeological evidence: Khatzi 1973, 509-10; Kontes 1978; Koldewey 1990; Williams and Williams 1991, 181; Mason 2001.

⁷⁷ '[The Mytileneans] shall not admit pirates, nor themselves commit piracy, nor shall they campaign with the enemies of the Athenians, nor shall they assist an enemy army, nor ...' (own trans.). The association of *IG 1³ 67* with Mytilene is supported by Meritt 1947; Meritt 1954. The argument for Mytilenean military capabilities is made by Figueira 1991, 170 n. 25, 252.

⁷⁸ Quinn 1971, 409 with n. 26. There is no solid evidence for the subsequent nature of Mytilene's government, but Quinn finds it probable that it became an oligarchy.

⁷⁹ Hornblower, *Comm. on Thuc.* 3, 595-96 (against Meritt 1936, arguing for the reintroduction of φόρος in 410/09, after the battle of Cyzicus); Kallet 2001, 223; Figueira 2005, 84-94; Gallo 2013. An important piece of evidence for the retention of the εἰκοστή is Ar. *Ran.* 363 with its mention of an εἰκοστολόγος (collector of the εἰκοστή) in Aegina in 405.

Athenian garrison (Plut. *Alc.* 30; Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.10; Diod. 13.66.4).⁸⁰ The crucial passage for our purposes occurs at OR 185 = **D 3.14 ET 1** ll. 10-12 [καταστέσασθαι δὲ Σελυμ]βριανὸς τὸν πολὶ|[τείαν αὐτονόμος τρόποι ἡ]ότοι ἂν ἐπίστοντ|[αι]. The key word αὐτονόμος is entirely restored, but I am aware of no alternative proposed restorations.⁸¹ This occurs within a clause guaranteeing the Selymbrians' right to choose their own constitution – enough of πολὶ|[τείαν] survives to be virtually certain on this point – which indicates that the Selymbrians' αὐτονομία was defined principally through their constitutional independence. This is supplemented by further provisions guaranteeing to the Selymbrians the right to elect their own representatives and conduct negotiations with the Athenians (ll. 31-32; cf. 45-47). Although this understanding of αὐτονομία seems to conflict with the aforementioned Euphemus' emphasis on the presence or absence of tribute paid under compulsion (Thuc. 6.85.2), we must remember, firstly, that the present treaty likely dates to a time when φόρος was no longer being collected, and secondly that the present treaty was not, until its approval by the Boule and Assembly after Alcibiades' return to Athens, an officially-recognized transaction of the Athenian state, but rather an improvised agreement made on the spot through the efforts of Alcibiades and other Athenians who happened to be in the area.

B. Smarczyk suggests that the Selymbrians used their new αὐτονομία to adopt or re-adopt an oligarchic constitution.⁸² But there is no evidence for the form of Selymbria's government either before or after the treaty, nor for Perinthus, which would have allowed for helpful comparisons. Probably the garrison was removed, though we cannot be certain: there is certainly early-4th century evidence that *Spartan* garrisons and harmosts, a hallmark of Sparta's post-404 imperialism, were deemed consonant with the loss of αὐτονομία, as Hansen emphasizes.⁸³ Other concessions to the Selymbrians are more clearly attested. The Athenians agreed to release hostages (ll. 8-10) and cancel Athenian and allied claims to lost property with the exception of real property (ll. 18-22) which, as argued by L. Loukopoulou and A. Łaitar, implies land ownership by Athenian and allied citizens in Selymbria.⁸⁴

D 4.2: Spartan treaty with Elis

According to Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.2.23, cf. 3.2.30 = **D 4.2 LT 1**), the Spartan war against Elis began when the Eleans rejected the Spartan request that they grant αὐτονομία to the perioecic cities under their control (δίκαιον δοκοίη εἶναι ἀφιέναι αὐτοὺς τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις αὐτονόμους). This passage implies that being a perioecic community was not compatible with αὐτονομία, at

⁸⁰ Cf. Gehrke 1985, 145-46; *IACP* no. 679, p. 922.

⁸¹ Austin 1938, 51-53; comm. OR 185, p. 518.

⁸² Smarczyk 1986, 7.

⁸³ Hansen 1995, 35, with references.

⁸⁴ *IACP* no. 679, p. 922.

least in the Spartans' view, which was reflected in the subsequent peace treaty as reported by Diodorus (14.34.1 = **LT 1**): Ἡλεῖοι δὲ φοβηθέντες τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὑπεροχὴν ... τὰς περιουκίους πόλεις αὐτονόμους ἀφείναι. The perioeci of Elis were concentrated in Triphylia, a region which was bordered by the river Alpheios to the north and by the river Neda to the south and which was entirely perioecic. There existed other perioecic communities, such as Acrorea, Laison, Letrinoi, Marganeis, and Amphidolia, which were outside Triphylia.⁸⁵ Lepreum, whose dispute with Elis in 421 is recorded by Thucydides (5.31.4, 34.1), was a special case: it was previously independent and had participated as such in the Persian Wars (ML 27 l. 11; Hdt. 9.28.4 records 200 Leprean hoplites at the Battle of Plataea). Although not explicitly mentioned in the testimonia for the present treaty, Lepreum was almost certainly granted αὐτονομία, since the Triphylians – presumably including the Lepreans – are attested fighting alongside Sparta in 394 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16).⁸⁶ C. Ruggeri assumes that Elis itself was reabsorbed into the Peloponnesian League, and the same passage of Xenophon does in fact show that the Eleans were allied with Sparta again by 394.⁸⁷

The treaty's autonomy clause served two main purposes: firstly, it weakened Elis by ending Elean control of perioecic communities; secondly, it left the former Elean perioeci open to Spartan political influence, which enabled the Spartan-Triphylian alliance in place by 394. This was in keeping with Sparta's habit of appealing to αὐτονομία to justify the dismantling of rival power blocs within the Peloponnese (cf. **D 3.3** + **D 3.4** + **D 3.6**, above).⁸⁸ There is something deeply ironic in the fact that Sparta stripped Elis of its perioeci in the name of αὐτονομία, but was at no time prepared to question its own control of perioecic communities in Laconia and Messenia.⁸⁹

D 4.8: King's Peace (Peace of Antalcidas)

⁸⁵ *IACP* p. 489. For the boundaries of Triphylia see Niese 1910, 13; Tuplin 1993, 184; Nielsen 1997, 133-44, expressing uncertainty about its exact borders. On Acrorea and Lasion see Krentz 1995, 175.

⁸⁶ Roy 1997, 291; Capreedy 2007/08, 502. On the united Triphylian state that existed ca. 400-369, and which included Lepreum (as attested by *IG* 5.2 1 l. 20), see Nielsen 1997, 153-54.

⁸⁷ Ruggeri 2009, 51; cf. Siewert 1987/88, 8-10.

⁸⁸ Cf. Figueira 1990, 65.

⁸⁹ For a partial catalogue of Spartan perioecic communities see Ducat 2018, 597. One of the best-known was Cythera which, before it was captured by Nicias in 424, was governed by an annual Spartan official called the κυθηροδίκης and guarded by a Spartan garrison (Thuc. 4.53.2). The precise arrangements for Cythera, whose location was strategically sensitive, were possibly unusual, and it does not appear that comparable officials such as harmosts were regularly assigned to perioecic settlements (Cartledge 1979, 179; MacDowell 1986, 28-30; Ducat 2018, 607). However, Sparta did maintain some kind of military presence in the perioecic communities of Mothone and Thyrea during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.25.2; 4.56.2) and in Aulon, Oios, Leutron, and Asine in the 4th century (Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.8; 6.5.24; 7.1.25; cf. Ducat 2018, 606). The perioeci had no decision-making authority except perhaps on a purely local level: Richer 1998, 324-34; Ducat 2018, 602.

The rescript of the King's Peace, though ostensibly a creation of the royal Achaemenid court, was composed under the influence of the Spartan Antalcidas (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28), and nowhere is this more apparent than in the demand that the Greek cities should be autonomous (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31 = **D 4.8 LT 1** τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι κτλ.), which corresponds closely to the Spartan proposal submitted to the Argives in 418 (Thuc. 5.77.5 = **D 3.3 LT 1** τὰς δὲ πόλιας τὰς ἐν Πελοποννάσῳ, καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμως ἤμεν πάσας κατὰ πάτρια).⁹⁰ Unfortunately, the rescript itself gives us little hint of what αὐτονομία was to mean in practice; its focus was instead on the territorial extent of αὐτονομία, with certain areas – Asia Minor, Clazomenae, Cyprus, and the Athenian cleruchies of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros – specifically excluded.

We get a better idea of the specific consequences of the autonomy clause in Xenophon's subsequent authorial narrative. The Thebans insisted on swearing the oaths of the Peace on behalf of all the Boeotians, but this was rejected by Agesilaus on the basis of the autonomy clause (*Hell.* 5.1.32). When Agesilaus threatened military action against the Thebans (5.1.33), they relented and allowed the Boeotian cities to swear separately, which briefly terminated the experiment in Boeotian federalism, although it would be revived after 378 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.63; 6.1.1; Isoc. 14.9; Diod. 15.28.1; Plut. *Pel.* 13.1; *Ages.* 24.6).⁹¹ But while Agesilaus painted the Boeotian federation as a non-autonomous organization, the status of its non-Theban members was clearly not identical to that of, for example, the ὑπήκοοι of the 5th century Delian League. Thucydides writes (1.113.4) that the Boeotians, previously under Athenian domination, became autonomous in 447 after casting off the Athenian yoke at the battle of Coronea, though Hansen cautions that this does not necessarily mean that they were still autonomous on the eve of the King's Peace.⁹² Both Thucydides (5.38.2) and the Oxyrhynchus Historian (*Hell. Oxy.* 19 Chambers) attest the existence of four federal Boeotian councils, indicating a level of collective decision-making comparable to that of the Peloponnesian League but which was absent from the mature Delian League.⁹³ Also, Boeotarchs were elected from each of the eleven districts of Boeotia, of which Thebes only controlled four (*Hell. Oxy.* 19.3 Chambers). Their responsibilities included overseeing the mobilization of the military contingents that made up the federal Boeotian army and the conduct of operations on a collegial basis (Paus. 9.13.6 indicates that

⁹⁰ Cf. Tuplin 1993, 98 n. 33; Schmidt 1999, 90.

⁹¹ Cf. Hamilton 1991, 118.

⁹² Hansen 1996, 133-34. *Contra* Keen 1996; cf. Buck 1979, 153, who suggests that the Boeotian πόλεις had the freedom to choose their own local governments. In a note to the author, Prof. Dr. Trampedach raises an intriguing possibility: ‚Möglicherweise beherrschten die Thebaner zu diesem Zeitpunkt faktisch mehr als 4 der 11 boiotischen Bezirke. Außerdem dürfte der Versammlungsort auf der thebanischen Kadmeia zu einem thebanischen Übergewicht im Boiotischen Bund beigetragen haben.‘

⁹³ Hansen 1995, 35 n. 57. See more broadly Salmon 1978.

decisions required a majority vote), although the chief command may have been permanently in Theban hands.⁹⁴

Hansen correctly observes that a strict adherence to the autonomy clause of the King's Peace would have required Sparta to release its grip on the perioeci of Laconia and Messenia.⁹⁵ It is thus very suspicious indeed that the Peace had no detectable effect on their status despite the fact that perioecic communities clearly lacked *αὐτονομία* in external affairs. On the other hand, it did not even theoretically endanger Spartan leadership of the Peloponnesian League owing to its relatively decentralized and egalitarian nature compared, for example, to the Delian League.⁹⁶ As Badian observes, Spartan garrisons were never imposed on its allies except in emergencies; there was no levying of a monetary tribute; the allies were usually free to arrange their internal affairs as they pleased (although the Spartans did sometimes impose oligarchies: cf. Thuc. 5.81.2); and offensive campaigns required the consent of a majority of the League's members, with Sparta's vote having a weight equal to that of each of its allies (cf. Thuc. 1.67-87; 5.17.2, 5.30).⁹⁷

Agesilaus also cited the autonomy clause when demanding that the Corinthians dismiss the Argive garrison on the Acrocorinth, likewise threatening war if they did not comply (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.34; cf. 5.1.36 = **D 4.8 LT 2**). Whatever the precise date and nature of the collaboration between Argos and Corinth during the Corinthian War, it is clear, at the very least, that the maintenance of foreign garrisons was deemed incompatible with the autonomy clause.⁹⁸ Finally, so long as Sparta and/or Persia were willing and able to enforce it, the autonomy clause prevented the resurgence of Athenian imperialism as it had existed for much of the 5th century, which was surely one of its primary intentions. Thus, when the Athenians established the Second Athenian Confederacy in 378/77, they were careful to emphasize the *αὐτονομία* of its members in accordance with the requirements of the King's Peace (*IG* 2² 43 = RO 22).

Conclusion

The concept of *αὐτονομία* in the 5th and early-4th centuries BCE remained a fluid and often subjective instrument of Greek interstate relations. While scholars like Hansen and Ostwald have attempted to establish rigid criteria for the term – focusing on the right to internal self-legislation, independent taxation, and freedom from external military interference – the

⁹⁴ This may be implied at Thuc. 4.91, where the Theban Boeotarch Pagondas is described as 'holding supreme command' (ἡγεμονίας οὔσης αὐτοῦ). See, for possible interpretations, *ATL* 3, 560.

⁹⁵ Hansen 1995, 27-28.

⁹⁶ Cf. Larsen 1933; Larsen 1934; Salmon 1984, 364; Jehne 1994, 33-34; Lendon 1994; Cartledge 2002.

⁹⁷ Badian 1991, 44-45; cf. *HCT* 1, 384-85; Bickerman 1958, 327-32, 334-37, 343; Ostwald 1982, 1; Hansen 1995, 35; Cartledge 2002, 224.

⁹⁸ Cf. Griffith 1950; Hamilton 1972; Tuplin 1982; Whitby 1984; Fornis 2006.

evidence from contemporary treaties suggests a more relative and pragmatic application. From the foundation of the Delian League until the time of the King's Peace and beyond, αὐτονομία was often invoked not as an abstract moral principle, but as a strategic tool used by powers like Athens and Sparta to mask their own imperialistic ambitions. Ultimately, the term's very ambiguity allowed it to function as a vital, if imprecise, diplomatic currency in a world where true independence was often secondary to the realities of hegemonic control.

Chapter 12

Conclusion

On 10 March 1996, the mayors of Athens and Sparta signed a symbolic peace treaty to formally end the Peloponnesian War.¹ Although this was a purely symbolic gesture with no legal effect whatsoever, it was a perhaps subconscious acknowledgement by the two mayors that their 5th century ancestors had no instrument by which to legally, definitively, and perpetually terminate the Peloponnesian War. Even the *κοινή εἰρήνη* treaties of the 4th century, while representing a step in this direction, were regularly broken and cannot be compared to the treaties of the modern world which regulate war and peace. Rather, any serious analysis of the interstate treaties of Classical Greece must examine them on their own terms, in their proper context, and with due consideration for the political institutions and diplomatic practice of the time, while at the same time looking for the patterns and commonalities that bind the separate treaties together.

Recapitulation and summary of findings

I began this dissertation seeking to answer one overarching question: to what extent did historical developments in the period under consideration influence the development of Greek interstate treaties? As we have seen, I have tackled this question via a two-pronged approach, first by undertaking a chronologically-organized, case-by-case analysis of individual treaties, taking particular note of their contents (both explicit and implicit) and their historical context, and secondly by examining the treaties thematically.

It can be confidently stated that Greek interstate treaties were both influenced by and influenced historical developments. The establishment of the Delian League (**D 1.1**) was a response to the perceived harms of the Spartan regent Pausanias' military leadership of the 'Hellenic League' formed in 480. In retrospect, the Delian League's creation was an epoch-making event that marked the beginning of the Athenian-Spartan dualism of the 5th century BCE. The Athenian reduction of Carystus, Naxos, and Thasos, followed by the regulatory agreement imposed on Erythrae (**D 1.2-1.4**, **D 1.6**), illustrates that Athens was prepared to coerce both existing and prospective League members early on.² Tensions between Athens and Sparta first boiled over into open conflict in 460 (the so-called First Peloponnesian War), but this was interrupted by the Truce of Cimon (**D 1.7**), which allowed Athens to pivot briefly towards a 'Cimonian' policy of peace with Sparta and hostility towards Persia. But the Peace of

¹ 'Athens, Sparta sign peace pact.' United Press International. 12 March 1996. <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1996/03/12/Athens-Sparta-sign-peace-pact/9963826606800/>.

² For a similar view, see Kallet 2013 and cf. Rhodes 1982, 297-98.

Callias (**D 1.9**), which should be dated to the early-440s rather than the 460s, definitively terminated Athenian-Persian hostilities until the Decelean War, while the war with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League resumed by 447. This culminated in Athens' defeat in Boeotia (cf. **D 1.10**) and the Thirty Years' Peace (**D 1.11**), which though it ended Athenian dominance of Central Greece, allowed Athens to consolidate control of its Aegean-centred ἀρχή, exemplified by the subsequent regulatory agreements with Chalcis and Eretria(?) (**D 1.12-1.13**).³ The ἐπιμαχία with Corcyra (**D 1.16**), and the reaffirmation of the existing alliances with Rhegium and Leontini (**D 1.14**), should be viewed as part of Athens' preparations for the impending Peloponnesian War.⁴

Unsurprisingly, the intense military activity of the Archidamian War was accompanied by correspondingly intense diplomatic activity. The Pylos ceasefire agreement (**D 2.6**) and the Athenian treaties with Hermione (**D 2.4**), Cythera (**D 2.7**), and Halieis (**D 2.8**) were part and parcel of Athens' efforts to force Sparta to the negotiating table and offset Spartan gains in northeastern Greece. The Athenian alliance with Perdiccas II (**D 2.10**) and the treaty with the Bottiaei (**D 2.11**) must be interpreted in light of the stunning success of Brasidas in the Thraceward region. The Truce of Laches (**D 2.9**), followed by the Peace of Nicias (**D 2.12**) and the Spartan-Athenian alliance (**D 2.13**), were the result of both Sparta and Athens' inability to gain a decisive advantage after nearly a decade of fighting and sought, unsuccessfully, to achieve a durable peace. The rapid breakdown of the Peace of Nicias was occasioned, on the Spartan side, by a reluctant alliance with Boeotia (**D 3.1**) and, on the Athenian, by the rather less reluctant Quadruple Alliance with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea (**D 3.2**). The Quadruple Alliance in particular is illustrative of a shift in Athenian strategy, attributed by Thucydides to the influence of Alcibiades, who sought to counter the policy of Nicias and challenge Spartan power directly within the Peloponnese. The treaties that followed the battle of Mantinea, most notably the Peace of Lichas (**D 3.4**; cf. **D 3.3** and **D 3.6**), re-established Spartan mastery of the Peloponnese, which was only partially offset by the new Athenian-Argive alliance concluded in 416 (**D 3.7**). The destruction of the Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily and the subsequent widespread defection of Athens' allies prompted a flurry of diplomatic activity which resulted in formal military and economic cooperation between Persia and the Peloponnesian League (**D 3.11-3.13**).⁵ Athens' efforts to prevent the rapid dissolution of its ἀρχή culminated in a series of unusually lenient agreements with Mytilene (**D 3.9**), Selymbria (**D 3.14**), and the Clazomenians

³ See esp. Kagan 1969, 120-30 and Lewis 1992b.

⁴ Cf. Thuc. 1.36.2, 44.3 with comm. OR 149, p. 287 and Lambert 2020, 53.

⁵ The first allies to revolt after the Sicilian expedition were the Euboeans and Lesbians, followed by Chios and Erythrae (Thuc. 8.5.1-4). As Rhodes 2006, 142-43 writes, 'Athens will now have looked much less able to compel loyalty than in the past.'

at Daphnus (**D 3.10**). But such concessions could not prevent Athens' surrender to Sparta in 404 (**D 3.16**), soon followed by that of Samos (**D 3.17**).

The postwar treaty between the Athenian democrats and the oligarchic Eleusis faction (**D 4.1**) highlights the contested and fragile process of internal political restoration and the existence of powerful anti-democratic currents within Athens itself. The Spartan treaty imposed on Elis following the latter's defeat in ca. 400 (**D 4.2**) brings Sparta's hegemonic ambitions in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War into clear relief. That the Spartans' newfound hegemony was, by 395, ready to be challenged by their enemies found its expression in the Athenian alliances with Boeotia (**D 4.3**), Locris (**D 4.4**), and Eretria (**D 4.6**), and the establishment of an anti-Spartan allied council at Corinth (**D 4.5**). However, the Athenian alliance with Evagoras (**D 4.7**) alienated Persia, hitherto supportive of Athens, and contributed to Artaxerxes II's eventual decision to switch his allegiance to the Spartan side, the result of which was the epoch-making King's Peace/Peace of Antalcidas (**D 4.8**).

Of the themes to which the latter half of the dissertation is devoted (classification, treaty-making process, duration, inscription/archiving, religious/ritual aspects, and *αὐτονομία*), changes can be detected in each of them during the period 478/77-387/86 BCE. First, classification: conflict-resolution treaties, as a rule, are described as *σπονδαί* prior to the King's Peace and as *εἰρήνη* thereafter (though later literary sources are often less precise: see **Appendix 1b**). But *εἰρήνη* only came to replace *σπονδαί* in the sense of 'peace treaty' at the time of the King's Peace. While the word *εἰρήνη* does sometimes appear in 5th century sources, both literary and epigraphic, it almost always refers to a *state* of peace rather than a specific treaty.⁶ Regarding alliances, Thucydides' narrative suggests an emerging terminological distinction between a full offensive/defensive alliance (*συμμαχία*) and an exclusively defensive one (*ἐπιμαχία*) on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, at least among the Athenians; but this distinction has not left traces in the epigraphic record, which continued to use *συμμαχία* as the catch-all term for alliance treaties of any kind.

Turning to the treaty-making process, both Athens and Sparta made use of *πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες* for high-stakes diplomacy during this period. The earliest attested Spartan *αὐτοκράτορες*, and the earliest overall, appear in 420 (Thuc. 5.45), while Athens was employing *αὐτοκράτορες* by 405/04 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.17-19). It therefore appears that the institution was created under the unique geopolitical conditions of the Peloponnesian War.⁷ Other experimental approaches to treaty-negotiation were undertaken around the same time,

⁶ Cf. Keil 1916, 5; Ryder 1965, xv; Giovannini 2007, 226; Couvenhes 2016, 15 n. 10. There are some exceptions, but these occur within authorial comments (e.g., Thuc. 3.54.3 describing the Thirty Years' Peace as *ἡ εἰρήνη*) or in comedy (Aristophanes refers to numerous fictional *εἰρήνη*-treaties in his works: *Acharn.* 1051-67; *Pax* 1079). See further Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 245 n. 7.

⁷ Cf. Mosley 1973, 30-38; Harris 2023, 510-15.

notably the ten-man boards commissioned to negotiate the Peace of Nicias (Diod. 12.75.4 with Andrewes and Lewis 1957). At Athens, proposed treaties required the assent first of the Boule, then of the Assembly. The evidence suggests that treaties were often ‘moved’ in the Assembly by individuals who were personally involved in the events leading to their creation, usually in a military role. At Sparta, probouleutic power was shared between the ephors and Gerousia, who had more control over the treaty-making process than the Athenian Boule.⁸ The use of arbitration clauses, which became relatively frequent in this period, was probably influenced by the growing human and material cost of war in the 5th century BCE, reflecting greater hesitation in undertaking hostilities. But their implementation was impaired, in the case of Athens and Sparta, by the absence of a suitable arbitrator, the risk of losing face from an unfavourable arbitral decision, and by the enduring belief that a state’s objectives could be more easily achieved through conflict than by arbitration. Furthermore, treaties could be terminated by the declaration by one of the parties that a state of φανερός πόλεμος existed (cf. Thuc. 6.105.1-3), although what constituted φανερός πόλεμος was largely open to subjective interpretation, further highlighting the absence of a codified international law in Classical Greece.⁹

With respect to the duration of treaties, an overarching trend is apparent throughout this period: conflict-resolution treaties before the King’s Peace were always time-limited, although their precise duration could vary wildly. There was some tendency towards longer-time limits in the 5th century before the limitation was done away with altogether beginning with the King’s Peace. Treaties explicitly intended as preliminary agreements, such as the Truce of Cimon and the Truce of Laches, logically had shorter time-limits than the ‘definitive’ treaties that followed them, such as the Thirty Years’ Peace and the Peace of Nicias. On the other hand, alliance-treaties could be and often were unlimited even in the 5th century, though time-limited alliances are also well-attested.

When analyzing the inscription, display, and archiving of treaties, we are confronted with very different epigraphic and archival cultures in Athens and Sparta. The beginning of the Athenian ‘epigraphic habit’ on the Acropolis, where interstate treaties among other documents were prominently displayed, has been convincingly associated with the centralization of the ἀρχή in Athenian hands in the late-450s.¹⁰ The use of the Acropolis as the chief repository for inscribed treaties emphasizes the sacrosanct nature of the covenants which the treaty-stelae contained, in contrast to the more easily accessible but essentially secular Agora.¹¹ Both literary and epigraphic evidence strongly suggests that the Old Bouleuterion in the Agora was used as the

⁸ Esu 2017, 355.

⁹ Alonso 2007, 219.

¹⁰ Trampedach 2022.

¹¹ Liddel 2003.

Athenian state archive prior to the establishment of the Metroon.¹² The archival versions of interstate treaties almost certainly contained additional information not found in the inscriptions, where they existed.¹³ The deliberate destruction of inscribed stelae at Athens, which expressed the intention of renouncing both their contents and the regime which created them, was rare and mostly confined to periods of oligarchy.¹⁴ Turning to Sparta, the literary evidence indicates that the Spartans inscribed public documents more frequently than the meagre physical remains suggest, but still on a much smaller scale than at Athens. Furthermore, in contrast to post-Metroon Athens, no centralized Spartan archive existed in the Classical period.¹⁵

We can detect gradual changes in the religious elements of treaties, particularly with respect to oath-formulae. There is a notable increase in the ‘imperialism’ of Athenian-imposed oath-formulae as the 5th century progressed, though a softening of the language used is detectable following the Sicilian expedition. The expression μή μνησικακήσειν was sometimes added to treaty oaths to forestall the risk of στάσις and suggests that the underlying conflicts between the contracting parties had not yet been entirely resolved.¹⁶ In treaties between equal partners, oath-takers had greater flexibility in choosing which gods to swear by, whereas in unequal treaties, the oath-gods were often unilaterally imposed by the dominant partner, although it bears emphasizing that most preserved treaties do not appear to have invoked specific deities. As the name implies, the swearing of σπονδαί-agreements was accompanied by the pouring of libations. Uniquely, the formation of the Delian League required the dropping of iron weights into the sea to symbolize the League’s intended perpetuity.

Although αὐτονομία had no fixed, universally accepted definition, the Athenians qualified it primarily as freedom from the obligation to pay tribute (φόρος) under compulsion (cf. Thuc. 6.85.2). The word is not attested before the 440s which, taken together with the geopolitical context of the early-470s, strongly suggests against the theory that Athens explicitly guaranteed αὐτονομία to its new allies in 478/77.¹⁷ On the other hand, the Peace of Callias very possibly did restrict the ability of the Persian king to collect tribute from the Greek cities of Asia, which later writers interpreted as an autonomy clause.¹⁸ Αὐτονομία appears prominently and explicitly in the Peace of Nicias, but the remaining obligation of the supposedly newly-autonomous Chalcidian cities to pay tribute to Athens suggests that the Chalcidians’ αὐτονομία

¹² Thomas 1989, 73-78; Sickinger 1999, 105; Boffo and Faraguna 2021, 207.

¹³ Sickinger 1999, 89; Lane Fox 2010.

¹⁴ Whitehead 1977, 5 n. 6; Krentz 1982, 66-67; Culasso Gastaldi 2014a, 3-4; 2014b, 2.

¹⁵ Boring 1979; Millender 2001.

¹⁶ Joyce 2022, 183-95.

¹⁷ Ostwald 1982, 25; Raaflaub 2009, 93.

¹⁸ Accepted by Ostwald 1982, 25-26 and Badian 1993, 51.

was more notional than real.¹⁹ For Athens, the question of αὐτονομία was intimately tied with the administration of the ἀρχή, and most Athenian-allied treaties (or treaties with implications for its allies) were concerned, at least in part, with expanding or restricting an ally's αὐτονομία. At the same time, the Spartans were content to adopt a self-serving and contradictory understanding of αὐτονομία, forcing their enemies to relinquish territory (cf. **D 4.2**) while at no point questioning their leadership of the Peloponnesian League. The proclamation that the majority of the Greek πόλεις were to be αὐτόνομοι under the King's Peace was notionally a great leap forward, but its interpretation was riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies.²⁰ For Sparta, αὐτονομία was understood mainly as the absence of perioecic status and other forms of direct political control of one state by another, but there can be little doubt that Sparta's interpretation became increasingly self-serving from the Battle of Mantinea onwards.

Limitations

The geographical and chronological parameters of my dissertation have necessarily imposed certain limitations on the scope of the material considered. Notably, this means that the interstate treaties of the decades following the King's Peace, a period rich in diplomatic developments (particularly the development and refinement of the κοινὴ εἰρήνη system) and geopolitical realignments, have been excluded. The diplomatic culture of the fourth century BCE is not only fascinating but unusually well-documented: Bengtson records a total of 105 treaties for the period between the King's Peace and the inauguration of the Macedonian hegemony with the creation of the League of Corinth in 338/37 BCE (*SdA*² nos. 243-347). This naturally represents an extremely rich mother lode of unmined gold for future analysis.

Another worthwhile avenue of pursuit would be the minority of interstate treaties from my period in which neither Athens nor Sparta participated. One such example is the Argive treaty of ca. 450 BCE regulating relations between its Cretan daughter-cities Cnossus and Tylissus, establishing Argos as the arbitrator of disputes between them (OR 126 = Piccirilli 18-19). Another roughly contemporaneous, inscribed treaty between the minor πόλεις of Oeanthea and Chaleion (Tod 34) is a rare surviving Classical-era example of a *symbola*-agreement, regulating legal relations between individuals of different states and prohibiting the summary seizure of each other's property (σύλη).²¹ Certainly, such treaties are not without interest, since they shed light on regional dynamics and contribute to our understanding of the broader diplomatic landscape of the Greek world. My decision to exclude them is thus a matter

¹⁹ See esp. Luraghi 2022.

²⁰ Hansen 1995, 27-28.

²¹ For *symbola* see generally Cataldi 1983.

of methodological focus rather than of perceived historiographical insignificance, and they deserve dedicated treatment in future research.

Final remarks

The evolution of Greek interstate treaties cannot be understood without reference to the historical developments that underlay them. The emergence of Athenian imperialism in 478/77 BCE can be argued to have inaugurated the ‘classical’ phase of Greek treaty-making, in which interstate treaties played in one way or another into the great-power rivalry between Athens and Sparta. It ended nearly a century later with the King’s Peace which, while significantly guided by Sparta, politically atomized the Greek world through its autonomy clause and – though this could hardly have been Sparta’s intention – enabled a new multipolar order to emerge in which ultimate supremacy over the Greek world was contested between Sparta, Thebes, Athens, and eventually (and most successfully) Macedon.

The period 478/77-387/86 BCE was a period of great experimentation and refinement of interstate treaties. It was during this time that σπονδαί-agreements reached their most mature, developed form before giving way to the κοινή εἰρήνη system. Different time-limits were tested with various degrees of success, while the inscription of treaties – a rarity at the beginning of this period – became commonplace at Athens and was sometimes undertaken even at Sparta. Αὐτονομία, a concept that did not exist as such in the early-5th century, became increasingly broadly applied and finally, with the King’s Peace, was explicitly granted to most Greek πόλεις. These and other developments can only be understood in light of the historical ‘matrix’ in which the treaties were created, and we must see the treaties themselves as products of the great two-sided struggle for power and control, which is one of the great historical narratives of ancient Greece.

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Concordance of Inscriptions

Editions in **bold** are those which I have reproduced in the chronological chapters and in the appendices.

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D 3.14 ET 1	1 ³ 118	185	87	--	162	207	--
D 3.15 ET 1	1 ³ 123	189	92	--	165	208	--
D 4.3 ET 1	2 ² 14	6	--	101	--	223	<i>Agora</i> 16.34
D 4.4. ET 1	2² 15	--	--	102	--	224	--
D 4.6 ET 1	2² 16	--	--	103	--	229	--
D 5.1 ET 1	--	128	67 bis	--	--	--	Pikoulas 2000- 2003

Appendices

Appendix 1a

Classification of treaties: epigraphic testimonia

Treaty	Testimonium	Passage
D 1.5	ET 1 ll. 4-5	χσ[υνθ] έσθαι μέν τέν χ]συμμαχίαν
D 1.14	ET 1 ll. 1-2	πρέσβες έκ Ρεγίο η]οί τέν χσυμμαχίαν [έποέσαντο και τόν ήόρκ]ον·
	ET 2 ll. 1-4	πρέσβες έγ Λεον[τ] ίνον ηοί τέν χσυμμαχί αν έποέσαντο και τόν η όρκον·
	ll. 16-18	τέμ μέν χσυμμαχία ν εΐναι Αθηναίοις και Λεοντίνοις
D 2.8	ET 1 l. 5	χσυνθέκα[ς τε πρός χαλιās και σπονδά]ς έΐναι
	ll. 24-25	[έ]μμενόμεν ταΐς χσ [υνθέκαις χαΐς χσυνεθέμεθα Αθηναί]οις·
	ll. 28-29	έμμε [νέν έν ταΐς χσυνθ[έ]κ[αις ήας χσυνέθεντ]ο πρός χαλιās
	ll. 30-32	[τάς δέ χσυνθέ]κας άναγράφα [ι έστέλε]ι λιθίγε[ι τόν γραμματέα τέ]ς βο[λ]έξ και κατα [θέναι έμ πόλει·]
D 2.10	ET 1 l. 41	[τ]άς δέ χσυνθέκα[ς έμ]πεδόσο πρός Πε[ρδίκκαν]
	l. 51	[... ²² ...]ι χσυμμαχία[ν... ²¹ ...]
	l. 58	ποιέν και Άρραβαίοι φιλ[ίαν και χσυμμαχίαν]
D 2.11	ET 1 ll. 12-14	[άμυνό τοΐς] Βοττι[αίοις τοΐς] χσυντιθεμέ[νοις [τέν χσυμμαχίαν, κ]αι τέν χσ[υμμαχία] ν πιστῶς και [άδ]όλο[ς φυλάχσο]
	ll. 21-23	τάς δέ χσυ νθέκας τά[σδε και] τόν [ήόρκον κατα]θέναι Αθηναίος μέ ν έμ πόλε[ι άναγρά]φσ[αντας έστέλει] λιθίνει
	l. 25	τέν φιλία[ν και τέν χσυμμαχίαν]
D 3.10	ET 1 ll. 3-5	τάς χσυνθήκα] ς άς χσυνέθεντο οί στρατεγοί [τοΐς οίκίσασ] ι Δαφνόντα
D 3.14	ET 1 ll. 26-28	τάς δέ χσυνθέκ [ας άναγράφ]σαντας έ[ς] στέλεν θέναι ές τὸ ηιερό [ν τὸ ... ⁷ ...]ς
D 4.3	ET 1 l. 2	[συμ]μαχία Βοιω[τῶν και Α]θηναί[ων
D 5.1	ET 1 l. 3	συνμαχ[ίαν ?άίδιον]

Appendix 1b

Classification of treaties: literary testimonia

Treaty	Testimonium	Passage
D 1.7	LT 1	σπονδαὶ γίνονται Πελοποννησίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πεντέτεις
	LT 2	ὁ δὲ παραγενόμενος τῇ πόλει τὸν πόλεμον κατέλυσε
	LT 2	Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις πενταετείς ἐγένοντο σπονδαί
	LT 5	εἰρήνην ἐποίησε ταῖς πόλεσιν
D 1.8	LT 1	ξυνέβαινε δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους αὐτοῖς τὰς τριακοντούτεις σπονδὰς ἐπ' ἐξόδῳ εἶναι
D 1.9	LT 4	Καλλίαν τὸν Ἴππονίκου ταύτην τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων θρυλουμένην εἰρήνην πρεσβεύσαντα
	LT 5	συνθήκας ἐποίησαντο, μακρῶ μὲν πλοῖῳ μὴ πλεῖν ἐντὸς Κυανέων καὶ Φασήλιδος, τοὺς δ' Ἕλληνας αὐτονόμους εἶναι, μὴ μόνον τοὺς τὴν Εὐρώπην ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας
	LT 7	ἐγένοντο δὲ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ... καὶ σπονδαὶ οὖν ἐγένοντο τοιαῦται
	LT 8	ἐγένοντο συνθήκαι περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας
	LT 9	οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πέρσαι διττὰς συνθήκας εἶχον πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας
	LT 10	τὴν περιβόητον εἰρήνην ἐκείνην
D 1.10	LT 1	σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι ἐφ' ᾧ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιοῦνται
D 1.11	LT 1	Εὐβοίας οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον σπονδὰς ἐποίησαντο πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τριακοντούτεις
	LT 2	λύσετε δὲ οὐδὲ τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων σπονδὰς δεχόμενοι ἡμᾶς μηδετέρων ὄντας ξυμμάχους
	LT 3	εἰ γὰρ εἴρηται ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς, ἐξεῖναι παρ' ὁποτέρους τις βούλεται τῶν ἀγράφων πόλεων ἐλθεῖν, οὐ τοῖς ἐπὶ βλάβῃ ἐτέρων ἰοῦσιν ἢ ξυνθήκη ἐστίν
	LT 4	μάλιστα δὲ λιμένων τε εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀγορᾶς παρὰ τὰς σπονδὰς

	LT 5	τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκη λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ξυνθήκην
	LT 7	εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνθήκαις ὄπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν
	LT 8	σπονδὰς δ' ἐποίησαν τριακονταετείς, Καλλίου καὶ Χάρητος συνθεμένων καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην βεβαιωσάντων
	LT 9	ἔστι δὲ πρὸ τοῦ Διὸς τούτου στήλη χαλκῆ, Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων συνθήκας ἔχουσα εἰρήνης ἐς τριάκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμόν ... αὐται μὲν λέγουσι τοιαῦτα αἰ συνθήκαι
D 1.15	LT 1	οἱ Σάμιοι, ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀντίσχειν ἐξεπολιορκήθησαν ἐνάτω μηνὶ καὶ προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογία
D 1.16	LT 1	ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέγνωσαν Κερκυραίοις ξυμμαχίαν μὲν μὴ ποιήσασθαι ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν ... ἐπιμαχίαν δ' ἐποίησαντο τῇ ἀλλήλων βοηθεῖν, ἐάν τις ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἢ Ἀθήνας ἢ τοὺς τούτων ξυμμάχους
D 2.2	LT 2	καὶ πυνθανόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐς τὴν Καμάριναν κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Λάχητος γενομένην ξυμμαχίαν πρεσβεύεσθαι ... προσχωρῶσι δ' αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν προτέραν φιλίαν πεισθέντες
D 2.6	LT 1	δεξαμένων δὲ τῶν στρατηγῶν τὸν λόγον ἐγίνοντο σπονδαὶ τοιαίδε
D 2.7	LT 1	καὶ τὸ ἔπειτα τὰ τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐπράχθη αὐτοῖς
D 2.9	LT 1	αἱ δὲ σπονδαὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἔσσονται. ... ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν καθ' ἃ ξυγχωροῦσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν καὶ ὠμολόγησαν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ. ... ἢ μὲν δὴ ἐκεχειρία αὕτη ἐγένετο, καὶ ξυνήσαν ἐν αὐτῇ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων σπονδῶν διὰ παντὸς ἐς λόγους
	LT 2	Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους σπονδὰς ἐνιαυσίους ἐποίησαντο κατὰ ταύτας τὰς ὁμολογίας
D 2.12	LT 1	ἔτη δὲ εἶναι τὰς σπονδὰς πεντήκοντα

	LT 2	ἔδοξαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις συνθέσθαι σπονδὰς πεντηκονταετείς
	LT 3	γενομένων δὲ συνθηκῶν ὅπως τὰ χωρία καὶ τὰς πόλεις, ἃς εἶχον ἀλλήλων, καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἀποδιδῶσι, προτέρων ἀποδιδόντων τῶν κλήρω λαχόντων
D 3.1	LT 1	οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἀποδώσειν, ἢ μὴ σφίσι ξυμμαχίαν ἰδίαν ποιήσονται ὥσπερ Ἀθηναίοις ... ἐποίησαντο τὴν ξυμμαχίαν
	LT 2	ἐπεὶ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς τε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἐποίησαντο συμμαχίαν
D 3.2	LT 1 (= ET 1)	σπονδὰς ἐποίησαντο. ... τὰς δὲ ξυνθήκας τὰς περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν καὶ τῶν ὄρκων καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἀναγράψαι
	LT 3	ἔχουσα ὄρκον παρὰ Ἡλείων ἐς συμμαχίαν ἐτῶν ἑκατόν
D 3.4	LT 1	σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν εἶμεν πεντήκοντα ἔτη
	LT 2	Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι διαπρεσβευσάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰρήνην ἐποίησαντο καὶ συμμαχίαν συνέθεντο
D 3.6	LT 1	ξυνέβησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφεῖσαν τῶν πόλεων
	LT 2	ἐλέγοντο δὲ καὶ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐξεληλυθέναι τοῖς Μαντινεῦσι
D 3.11	LT 1	ξυμμαχίαν ἐποίησαντο πρὸς βασιλέα
D 3.12	LT 1	ξυνθῆκαι Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς βασιλέα Δαρεῖον καὶ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς βασιλέως καὶ Τισσαφέρην, σπονδὰς εἶναι καὶ φιλίαν κατὰ τάδε
D 3.13	LT 1	ξυνθῆκαι ἐγένοντο ἐν Μαιάνδρου πεδίῳ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς Τισσαφέρην καὶ Ἰεραμένη καὶ τοὺς Φαρνάκου παῖδας περὶ τῶν βασιλέως πραγμάτων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων

D 3.16	LT 1	ἐποιοῦντο εἰρήνην ἐφ' ᾗ τὰ τε μακρὰ τεῖχη καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ καθελόντας
	LT 2	τῆς εἰρήνης γενομένης αὐτοῖς ἐφ' ᾗ τε πολιτεύσονται τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν
	LT 3	οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ διαπρεβευσάμενοι πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους συνέθεντο τὴν εἰρήνην
	LT 4	Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν καταπεπονημένοι ἐποιήσαντο συνθήκας πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους
	LT 5	ταῦτά κα δρῶντες τὰν εἰράναν ἔχοιτε
D 4.1	LT 2	οἱ δὲ διήλλαξαν ἐφ' ᾗ τε εἰρήνην μὲν ἔχειν ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλους
	LT 3	ἐγένοντο δ' αἱ διαλύσεις ... κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας τάσδε
D 4.2	LT 1	εἰρήνη τε γίνεται καὶ συμμαχία Ἑλλείων πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους
D 4.3	LT 2	πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ὅτε τὴν συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσασθε πρὸς (τούς) Βοιωτοὺς
D 4.5	LT 1	συμμαχίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐποιήσαντο
D 4.8	LT 1	ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται
	LT 2	αἱ πόλεις ἐμμενεῖν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἣν κατέπεμψε βασιλεὺς ... ἐγένοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης
	LT 4	ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔφησεν ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰρήνην ... τοῖς δὲ ἀπειθοῦσι καὶ μὴ προσδεχομένοις τὰς συνθήκας διὰ τῶν εὐδοκούντων πολεμήσειν

Appendix 2

Amendment clauses

Treaty	Testimonium	Passage
D 2.12	LT 1	εἰ δέ τι ἀμνημονοῦσιν ὀποτεροιοῦν καὶ ὄτου πέρι, λόγοις δικαίοις χρωμένοις εὖορκον εἶναι ἀμφοτέροις ταύτη μεταθεῖναι ὅπη ἂν δοκῇ ἀμφοτέροις, Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις
D 2.13	LT 1	ἦν δέ τι δοκῇ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν περὶ τῆς συμμαχίας, ὅτι ἂν δοκῇ, εὖορκον ἀμφοτέροις εἶναι
D 3.2	LT 1 (= ET 1)	ἐὰν δέ τι δοκῇ ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῖς πόλεσι ταύταις προσθεῖναι πρὸς τοῖς συγκειμένοις, ὅτι ἂν δόξη ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀπάσαις κοινῇ βουλευομέναις, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι
D 4.3	ET 1 ll. 11-14	ἐὰν δέ τ[ι δ]οκῇ ἢ προσθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖν Ἀθην[αίο]ις καὶ Βοιωτοῖς κοινῇ βουλευομένο[ις (?)] - - - - - - -]

Appendix 3

Arbitration clauses

Treaty	Testimonium	Passage
D 1.11	LT 5	λέγομεν ὑμῖν, ἕως ἔτι αὐθαίρετος ἀμφοτέροις ἢ εὐβουλία, σπονδὰς μὴ λύειν μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὄρκους, τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκη λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ξυνηθήκην
	LT 6	εἰρημένον γὰρ δίκας μὲν τῶν διαφορῶν ἀλλήλοις διδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, ἔχειν δὲ ἐκατέρους ἃ ἔχομεν
	LT 7	εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνηθήκαις ὄπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν, ἦν δίκας ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων
D 2.9	LT 1	δίκας τε διδόναι ὑμᾶς τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς ὑμῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, τὰ ἀμφίλογα δίκη διαλύοντας ἄνευ πολέμου
D 2.12	LT 1	ἦν δὲ τι διάφορον ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, δικαίῳ χρήσθων καὶ ὄρκοις, καθ' ὅτι ἂν ξυνηθῶνται
D 3.4	LT 1	τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες, κατὰ πάτρια δίκας διδόντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας

Appendix 4

Publication clauses

Treaty	Testimonium	Passage
D 1.6	ET 2 II. 42-45	[ἀναγράψαι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν ἠόρκον ἐν] λιθίνει στέλει [καὶ τὸν ἠόρκον τὸν τῆς βοῶν ἐμ πόλ]ει, Ἐ[ρυθ]ρᾶ[σ]ι δὲ ἐν τῆι ἀκροπόλει τὸν φρόραρχον ἀναγράψα]ι ταύ[τά. ν]
D 1.12	ET 1 II. 57-63	τὸ δὲ ψέφισμα τότε καὶ τὸν ἠόρκον ἀναγράψαι, Ἀθένεσι μὲν τὸν γραμμ[α]τέα τῆς βοῶν ἐστέλει λιθίνει καὶ καταθέσθαι ἐς πόλιν τέλεσι τοῖς Χαλκιδέ[ο]ν, ἐν δὲ Χαλκίδι ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου ἡ βολεῖ Χαλκιδέων ἀναγράψασθαι καταθέσθαι
D 2.1	ET 1 II. 38-43	[τὸ] δὲ ψέφισμα τότε καὶ τὸν ὄρκον ἀναγραψάτο ὁ γραμμ[α]τεὺς ὁ τῆς βοῶν ἐστέλει λιθίνει ἐμ πόλει τέλεσι τοῖς Κολοφονίο[ν]. Κολοφῶνι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν ὄρκον ἀναγράψαντες ἐστέλει λιθίνει οἱ ἐς Κολοφῶνα οἰκιστὰς καταθέσθαι ἐν τόποις ὅσοι τάττει Κολοφονίον ὁ νόμος.
D 2.8	ET 1 II. 30-34	τάς δὲ χουνθέκας ἀναγράψαι [ἐ]στέλει λιθίνει τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βοῶν καὶ καταθέσθαι ἐμ πόλει. οἱ δὲ κολακρέται δόντων ἀργύριον. ἡλιεῖς δὲ θέντων τὸν στέλεον ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος. πρέσβεις ἡοῖδε ὄμνουσιν τὴν χουμαχίαν.
D 2.11	ET 1 II. 21-30	τάς δὲ χουνθέκας τότε καὶ τὸν ἠόρκον καταθέσθαι Ἀθηναῖος μὲν ἐμ πόλει ἀναγράψαντας ἐστέλει λιθίνει καὶ τὰ ὄμματα τῶν πόλεων τῶν Βοττιαίων τῶν χουντιθεμένων τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὴν χουμαχίαν, καὶ ἐπιγράψαι ἐν τῆι στέλει τὸ ἄρχοντος τὸ ὄνομα ἐφ' ᾧ ἐγένοντο αἱ χουνθίαι. Βοττιαῖοι δ' ἐν στέλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντες καταθέσθαι ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς καταπόλεως, ἐπιγράψαντες ἐν ταῖς στέλαις

		τῶν ἀρχόν]τον τὰ ὄνόμα[τα τῶν Β] οττιαίον ἐφ' [ῶν ἐγένοντο και χσυνθε]κ[α]ι·
D 2.12	LT 1	στήλας δὲ στήσαι Ὀλυμπίασι και Πυθοῖ και Ἴσθμοῖ και Ἀθήνησιν ἐν πόλει και ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἐν Ἀμυκλαίῳ
D 2.13	LT 1	στήλην δὲ ἐκατέρους στήσαι, τὴν μὲν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι παρ' Ἀπόλλωνι ἐν Ἀμυκλαίῳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐν πόλει παρ' Ἀθηνᾶ
D 3.2	LT 1	τάς δὲ ξυνθήκας τὰς περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν και τῶν ὄρκων και τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἀναγράψαι ἐν στήλῃ λιθίνῃ Ἀθηναίους μὲν ἐν πόλει, Ἀργεῖους δὲ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τῷ ἱερῷ, Μαντινέας δὲ ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τῷ ἱερῷ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ· καταθέντων δὲ και Ὀλυμπίασι στήλην χαλκὴν κοινῇ Ὀλυμπίους τοῖς νυνί
D 3.5	ET 1 II. 11-12	[τὸ δὲ φσέ]φισμα τόδε και τὸν [hόρκ]ο[ν] ἀνα[γρ]ά[φ]σα ι ἐστέλει λιθίνει ἐμ πόλει τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βολῆς·
D 3.8	ET 1 II. 25-27	[ταῦτα δὲ τὸν γραμ]ματέα τῆς βολῆς ἀναγ[ρά]φσαι ἐμ πόλει ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ στέλει ἐν ἡεῖ ἀναγ[έ]γραπται και περὶ Ἐ[γεσταίον τὰ ἐφσεφισμένα τοῖ δέμοι]
D 3.9	ET 1 II. 20-22	ἀναγράφ[σαι ταῦτα τὸν γ ρα]μματέα τῆς βολῆς ἐστέλει λιθ[ίν]ει και καταθ[ῆ]ναι ἐμ πόλει τέλεσι τοῖς σ[φ]ετέροις αὐτῶν·
D 3.10	ET 1 II. 6-9	[και ἀνα] γράψαι τὸν γραμμα[τέα] τῆς βολῆς ἐν στήλῃ λιθίνῃ ἐν [πόλει τὰς τε ξυνθήκας και τὸ ψή φισμα τόδε]
D 3.14	ET 1 II. 26-28, 33-36	τάς δὲ χσυνθέκ[]ας ἀναγράφ[σαν]τας ἐ[ς] στέλεν θῆναι ἐς τὸ ἱερὸ [ν τὸ ... ⁷ ...]. ... και καταθῆναι ἐν [πόλ]ει ἀναγράφσαντας τὸστ [ρ]ατε<γ>ὸς [τ]ὰς συνθέ[κ]ας μετὰ τῶ

		γραμματέος τ [ἔς] βολῆς [[..... ¹⁸]] ἐν στέλει λιθί [ν]ει τέλεσι τοῖς αὐτοῦν καὶ τὸ φσέφισμα τόδε
D 3.15	ET 1 II. 6-8	[ἀ]ναγρά[φσαι δὲ Καρχεδονίος εὐ εργέτας Ἀθυνα]ίον τὸν [γραμματέα τῆς βολῆς ἐ μ πόλει ἐστέλ]ει λιθίν[ει]

Appendix 5

Oath-formulae

Treaty	Testimonium	Passage
D 1.5	ET 1 II. 9-13	[έμμενέν τε ό]μόσαντας έν [τέ]ι χσυνμαχίαι νέ τ]όν Άπόλλο [κα]ι τέν Λετό και τέν]Άρτεμιν έ[χσ όλειάν τε και हा]υτοίς έπαρ[ομ ένος έάν παραβαί]νομεν
D 1.6	ET 1 II. 16-17, 21-29	όμνύναι [δέ? Δ]ία κα[ι] Άπόλλο και Δέμε[τρα] έπαρομένο[ς έχσό]λειαν έφ[ιορκόντι τε κ]αι παι[σ]ιν. ... όμν[ύ]να[ι δ]έ [τά]δε [τέν] βολέν· βολεύσο hos άν [δύ]νομαι άριστ[α .].ΔΕΚΑ[.].ΤΑ Ερυθραίον τδι πλέθει και Άθenaίον και τόν [χσυ] νμά[χ]ον· [κ]αι ούκ [άποσ]τέσομαι Άθenaίον τδ π[λ]έθος ούδέ [τόν] χσυνμάχον τόν Άθenaίον ούτ' αύτός έγδ ούτ' άλλοι πε[ί]σομ[αι] άφισ[τα]μένο[ι] ούτ' αύτός έγδ ούτ' άλλον [-]ΕΙ[.... ^c ¹⁰ ούδέ] τόν φ[υγά]δον [κατ]αδέχομαι ούδ[έ] ήνα ΟΥΤΟΠΟΙΚΑΙΝΑ[.5..] ΙΠΕΙΣ[.]Θ[.]Α[.1- ² .τόν ές] Μέδος φευγό[ντο]ν άνευ τέ[ς] βολξ τ[έ]ς Άθε ναίον και τδ δέμο· [ο]ύδέ τόν μενόντον έχσελδ [ά]νευ τξ βολξ τξ Άθenaίον και τ[δ] δέμο
	ET 2 II. 40-42	ούκ άπο[στέ]σομαι Ά[θenaίον τδ πλέθος ούδέ τόν χσυνμάχο] ν τόν Άθεν[αίο]ν ούτ' αύ[τός] έγδ ούτ' άλλοι πείσομαι, τέι δέ γνώ[μ]ει τέ[ι] Άθ[ε]ναίον πείσομαι·
D 1.12	ET 1 II. 3-14, 21-32	κατά τάδε τόν ήόρκον όμόσαι Άθenaίον τ έν βολέν και τός δικαστάς· ούκ έχσελδ Χα λκιδέας έχ Χαλκίδος ούδέ τέν πόλιν ανά στατον ποέσο ούδέ ιδιότεν ούδένα άτιμ όσο ούδέ φυγεί ζεμιόσο ούδέ χσυλλέφσο μαι ούδέ άποκτενδ ούδέ χρέματα άφαιρέ σομαι άκρίτο ούδενός άνευ τδ δέμο τδ Άθ enaίον, ούδ

D 1.15	ET 1 fr. cda II. 0-8	[... ⁸ ... κατά τάδε Σαμίος ὁμόσαι· δράσο καὶ ἐ ρῶ καὶ βουλευέσο ἡ ὅ τι ἂν δύνομαι ἀγαθόν, [καὶ οὐ κ ἀποστέσομαι ἀπὸ τῷ δέμο τῷ Ἀ]θναίον οὔτε λ[ό]γοι οὔτ' ἔργοι ?οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν] χυμμάχον τῶν Ἀ [θναίον, βοεθέσο δὲ καὶ ἀμυνῶ τ]δι δέμοι τῷ Ἀθ [εναίον. τάδ' ὁμόσαι Ἀθναίος· δρ[άσο καὶ ἐρῶ καὶ [βουλευέσο ἀγαθόν τῷ πλέθει τῷ] Σαμίον ἡ ὅ τι ἂν [δύνομαι ἀδόλος ποιόντων τῶν Σα]μίον κατὰ ἡὰ χ [συνέθεντο τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τοῖς] Ἀθναίον
D 2.1	ET 1 II. 43-56	[Κολοφονίος δ' ὁμόσαι· δράσο καὶ ἐ] ρῶ καὶ βουλευέσο [ὅ τι ἂν δύνομαι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν πε] ρὶ τὸν δῆμον τ[ὸν Ἀθναίον καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀποικί α]ν καὶ οὐκ ἀποστ[έσομαι τῷ δέμο τῷ Ἀθναίον οὔτε λ]όγοι οὔτ' ἔργ[οι οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἄλλοι πείσομαι κ]αὶ φιλέσο τῶν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθναίον καὶ οὐκ αὐτομ[ο]λέσο καὶ δεμ[ο]κρατίαν οὐ καταλύσο Κολοφῶνι οὔτ' α] ὑτὸς ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἄ[λλοι πείσομαι οὔτ' ἐς ἄλλεν ἀφιστά] μενος πόλιν ο[ὔτ' αὐτόθι στασιάζον, κατὰ δὲ τὸν ὄρκ]ον ἀλεθῆ [τ]αὔτ[α ἐμπεδόσο ἀδόλος καὶ ἀβλαβῶς νὲ τὸν Δ]ία καὶ τὸν Ἀπό[λλο καὶ τὴν Δέμετρα, καὶ εἰ μὲν ταὔτ[α] παραβ<α>ίνοιμ[ι ἐξόλες εἶεν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ γ]ένος τὸ ἐμὸν [ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, εὐορκῶντι δὲ εἶε] μοι πο[λ]λὰ καὶ [ἀγαθὰ - - -]
D 2.8	ET 1 II. 21-30	[κατὰ τάδε ὅμοσαν ἡλιεῖς· χσύμμαχο]ι ἐσόμεθα Ἀθναί [οις ¹⁸ καὶ παρέ]χσομεν Ἀθναίοι [ς φρορὰν τε καθιστάναι καὶ εὔ ποέσ?]ομεν Ἀθναίος κα [τὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἐμ παντὶ καιρῷ καὶ ἐ]μμενῶμεν ταῖς χσ [υνηθείαις ἡαῖς χσυνεθέμεθα Ἀθναί]οις· ὁμύνοντων δὲ [καὶ] α[ὔ]τῳ[ν πρέσβες ? καὶ

		<p>ἐχσόλειαν ἐπ]αράσθον εἰ μὲ ἐμμ [ἐ]νοιεν [ἐν τοῖς ἠόρκοις ἠὸς ὁμομόκα]σιν ἠαλιῆς· ὄμ[οσ αν δ'] αὐτοῖς Ἀ[θ]εναῖον ἠε βολὲ καὶ ἠοι σ]τρατεγοὶ ἐμμε [νῆν ἐ]ν ταῖς χσυνθ[έ]κ[αις ἠὰς χσυνέθεντ]ο πρὸς ἠαλιῆς [ἠοι ἐπ]ι τὰ χσυγκε[ίμενα]</p>
D 2.11	ET 1 II. 11-21	<p>[ἠο δὲ ἠόρκ] ος ἔστο Ἀθην[αί]οις ἠόδε· ἠμυνῶ τοῖς Βοττι[αί]οις τοῖς χσυντιθεμέ[νοι]ς [τὲν χσυμμαχίαν, κ]αὶ τὲν χσ[υ]μμαχία]ν πιστὸς καὶ [ἠδ]όλος [φ]υλάχσο Βοττι[αί]οις προ[θ]υμόμε ν]ος κατὰ τὰ χ[σ]υ]γκε[ί]μενα· καὶ οὐ μνε]σικακέσο τῶ[ν παρ] οἰχομένον ἔ[νε]κα· [Βοττιαῖοι δὲ ὄμν]υόντων κατὰ [τάδε]· φίλοι ἐσόμε[θα Ἀθ]εναῖοις καὶ χσύμ]μαχοι πιστῶ[ς] κα[ὶ] ἠδὸλος καὶ τ[ὸς αὐ]τῶ[ς] φίλος καὶ ἐχθ]ρὸς νομιῶμε[ν] ἠὸς περ ἠν Ἀθ]ενα[ῖ]οι, καὶ ο[ὐκ ὄ]φελέσο τῶ[ς] ἐχθρὸς τὸς Ἀθ]εν αῖον οὐτε χρέμα]σιν ἠ[απλὸς οὐτε δυ]νάμει οὐδεμιᾶ, ο ὐδὲ μνεσικ[ακέσο] τῶν [παροιχομέν]ον ἔνεκα·</p>
D 2.12	LT 1	<p>ῥοκους δὲ ποιήσασθαι Ἀθ]ηναῖους πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κατὰ πόλεις· ὄμνύντων δὲ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ῥοκον ἑκάτεροι τὸν μέγιστον ἐπτὰ καὶ δέκα ἐκάστης πόλεως· ὁ δ' ῥοκος ἔστω ὄδε· ἐμμενῶ ταῖς ξυνθήκαις καὶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖσδε δικαίως καὶ ἠδὸλως· ἔστω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις κατὰ ταῦτὰ ῥοκος πρὸς Ἀθ]ηναῖους· [10] τὸν δὲ ῥοκον ἠνανεοῦσθαι κατ' ἑνιαυτὸν ἠμφοτέρους</p>
D 3.2	LT 1	<p>ὁ δὲ ῥοκος ἔστω ὄδε· ἐμμενῶ τῇ ξυμμαχία κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα δικαίως καὶ ἠβλαβῶς καὶ ἠδὸλως, καὶ οὐ παραβήσομαι τέχνη οὐδὲ μηχανῆ οὐδεμιᾶ</p>

Appendix 6

Autonomy clauses

Treaty	Testimonium	Passage
D 1.1	LT 1	ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων τοσάδε ἐπῆλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ
D 1.9	LT 5	συνθήκας ἐποιήσαντο, μακρῶ μὲν πλοίῳ μὴ πλεῖν ἐντὸς Κυανέων καὶ Φασήλιδος, τοὺς δ' Ἕλληνας αὐτονόμους εἶναι, μὴ μόνον τοὺς τὴν Εὐρώπην ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας
	LT 8	ἔκρινε συμφέρειν εἰρήνην συνθέσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. ἔγραψε τοίνυν τοῖς περὶ Κύπρον ἡγεμόσι καὶ σατράπαις, ἐφ' οἷς ἂν δύνωνται συλλύσασθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας
	LT 9	οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πέρσαι διττὰς συνθήκας εἶχον πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, τὰς μὲν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμαχοὺς αὐτῶν, ἐν αἷς ἦσαν αἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις αὐτόνομοι
D 1.15	ET 1 fr. b l. 3	--- Σαμῖος δὲ οἰκῆν [αὐτονόμος οἰ τὲν πόλιν τὲν ἑαυτῶν ? ---
D 2.12	LT 1	τὸ δ' ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν νεῶν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Δελφούς αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αὐτοδίκους καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἑαυτῶν κατὰ τὰ πάτρι. ... τὰς δὲ πόλεις φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου αὐτονόμους εἶναι. ὄπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν Ἀθηναίους μηδὲ τοὺς συμμαχοὺς ἐπὶ κακῶ, ἀποδιδόντων τὸν φόρον, ἐπειδὴ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο. εἰσὶ δὲ Ἄργιλος, Στάγιρος, Ἀκανθος, Σκῶλος, Ὀλυνθος, Σπάρτωλος.

		ξυμμάχους δ' εἶναι μηδετέρων, μήτε Λακεδαιμονίων μήτε Ἀθηναίων· ἦν δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πείθωσι τὰς πόλεις, βουλομένας ταύτας ἐξέστω ξυμμάχους ποιεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίους
D 3.3	LT 1	τὰς δὲ πόλιας τὰς ἐν Πελοποννάσῳ, καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτόνομως εἶμεν πάσας κατὰ πάτρια
D 3.4	LT 1	ταὶ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλιες ταὶ ἐν Πελοποννάσῳ κοινανεόντων τᾶν σπονδᾶν καὶ τᾶς ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλιες, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες κατὰ πάτρια, δίκας διδόντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας
D 3.6	LT 1	μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων ἀπόστασιν ἐκ τῆς ξυμμαχίας καὶ οἱ Μαντινῆς, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀντέχοντες, ἔπειτ' οὐ δυνάμενοι ἄνευ τῶν Ἀργείων, ξυνέβησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφεῖσαν τῶν πόλεων
D 3.9	ET 1 II. 8-12	κέρυκα ἀποπέμψαι εὐθύς ἐπειδ]ὰν δόχσ [ει ταῦτα ἡὸς ἀπαγγελε]ῖ τ[οῖς Μυτιλεν]αίοις ἡότ [ι καλὸς διάκειται ἡὸ δ]ῆμος ἡὸ Ἀθηναῖον καὶ ἀπο [δίδοσιν αὐτοῖς τὲν γῆ]ν καὶ αὐτο[νό]μος δοκ[εῖ] ἔ~ν [αι αὐτὸς οἰκῶντας πάντα] τ[ὰ] σφ[έτερα] αὐτῶ[ν]
D 3.14	ET 1 II. 10-12	[καταστέσσασθαι δὲ Σελυμ]βριανὸς τὲμ πολι [τεῖαν αὐτονόμος τρόποι ἡ]ότοι ἂν ἐπίστοντ [αι ¹⁷]
D 4.2	LT 2	Ἦλεῖοι δὲ φοβηθέντες τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὑπεροχὴν, κατέλυσαν τὸν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πόλεμον, ἐφ' ᾧ τὰς τριήρεις δοῦναι Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τὰς περιουκίους πόλεις αὐτόνομους ἀφεῖναι
D 4.8	LT 1	Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομενᾶς καὶ Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ

		ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι πλὴν Λήμνου καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου· ταύτας δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶναι Ἀθηναίων
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