eprintid: 10544
rev_number: 5
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1
dir: disk0/00/01/05/44
datestamp: 2010-03-30 16:08:45
lastmod: 2015-04-25 06:07:20
status_changed: 2012-08-15 08:53:16
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Duersch, Peter
creators_name: Oechssler, Jörg
creators_name: Schipper, Burkhard C.
title: Unbeatable Imitation
ispublished: pub
subjects: 330
divisions: 181000
keywords: Imitate-the-best , learning , symmetric games , relative payoffs , zero- sum games.
abstract: We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of the rock-scissors-paper variety. Thus, in many interesting examples, like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, rent seeking, public goods games, common pool resource games, minimum effort coordination games, arms race, search, bargaining, etc., imitation cannot be beaten by much even by a very clever opponent.
abstract_translated_lang: eng
class_scheme: jel
class_labels: C72, C73, D43.
date: 2010
date_type: published
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00010544
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0499
ppn_swb: 623037750
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-105444
language: eng
bibsort: DUERSCHPETUNBEATABLE2010
full_text_status: public
citation:   Duersch, Peter ; Oechssler, Jörg ; Schipper, Burkhard C.  (2010) Unbeatable Imitation.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/10544/1/duersch_2010_dp499.pdf