title: Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games
creator: Duersch, Peter
creator: Oechssler, Jörg
creator: Schipper, Burkhard C.
subject: ddc-330
subject: 330 Economics
description: It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies.
date: 2010
type: Working paper
type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
identifier: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserverhttps://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/10545/1/duersch_2010_dp500.pdf
identifier: DOI:10.11588/heidok.00010545
identifier: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-105453
identifier:   Duersch, Peter ; Oechssler, Jörg ; Schipper, Burkhard C.  (2010) Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games.  [Working paper]     
relation: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/10545/
rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/help/license_urhg.html
language: eng