eprintid: 10545
rev_number: 17
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1
dir: disk0/00/01/05/45
datestamp: 2010-03-30 16:09:35
lastmod: 2016-01-10 07:53:59
status_changed: 2012-08-15 08:53:16
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Duersch, Peter
creators_name: Oechssler, Jörg
creators_name: Schipper, Burkhard C.
title: Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games
ispublished: pub
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: Symmetric two-player games , zero-sum games , Rock-Paper-Scissors , single-peakedness , quasiconcavity
abstract: It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies.
abstract_translated_lang: eng
class_scheme: jel
class_labels: C72, C73
date: 2010
date_type: published
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00010545
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0500
ppn_swb: 623037912
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-105453
language: eng
bibsort: DUERSCHPETPURESADDLE2010
full_text_status: public
citation:   Duersch, Peter ; Oechssler, Jörg ; Schipper, Burkhard C.  (2010) Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/10545/1/duersch_2010_dp500.pdf