eprintid: 11248
rev_number: 5
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1
dir: disk0/00/01/12/48
datestamp: 2010-11-26 14:00:46
lastmod: 2015-04-25 06:07:39
status_changed: 2012-08-15 08:56:09
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Schnedler, Wendelin
title: Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design
ispublished: pub
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: moral hazard , hidden action , implementation , multi-tasking , identification by organization design
abstract: Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an identifi cation problem. It also describes organizations that can solve this identifi cation problem and provides conditions under which such organisations exist. Applying the  findings to established and new moral hazard models yields insights into optimal organization design, uncovers the reason why certain organization designs, such as advocacy or specialization, overcome restricted implementability, and formalizes a wide-spread type of multi-tasking problem. 
abstract_translated_lang: eng
date: 2010
date_type: published
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00011248
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0505
ppn_swb: 1650472986
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-112481
language: eng
bibsort: SCHNEDLERWHIDDENACTI2010
full_text_status: public
citation:   Schnedler, Wendelin  (2010) Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/11248/1/Schnedler_2010_dp505.pdf