title: Finitely repeated games with social preferences
creator: Oechssler, Jörg
subject: 330
subject: 330 Economics
description: A well—known result from the theory of finitely repeated games states that if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which the equilibrium of the stage game is being played in every period. Here I show that this result does in general not hold anymore if players have social preferences of the form frequently assumed in the recent literature, for example in the inequity aversion models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In fact, repeating the unique stage game equilibrium may not be a subgame perfect equilibrium at all. 
date: 2011
type: Working paper
type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
identifier: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserverhttps://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/12512/1/oechssler_2011_dp515.pdf
identifier: DOI:10.11588/heidok.00012512
identifier: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-125120
identifier:   Oechssler, Jörg  (2011) Finitely repeated games with social preferences.  [Working paper]     
relation: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/12512/
rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/help/license_urhg.html
language: eng