eprintid: 12512
rev_number: 13
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1
dir: disk0/00/01/25/12
datestamp: 2011-09-22 13:36:35
lastmod: 2016-01-06 22:59:27
status_changed: 2012-08-15 09:01:41
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Oechssler, Jörg
title: Finitely repeated games with social preferences
ispublished: pub
subjects: 330
divisions: 181000
keywords: social preferences , finitely repeated games , inequity aversion , ERC
abstract: A well—known result from the theory of finitely repeated games states that if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which the equilibrium of the stage game is being played in every period. Here I show that this result does in general not hold anymore if players have social preferences of the form frequently assumed in the recent literature, for example in the inequity aversion models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In fact, repeating the unique stage game equilibrium may not be a subgame perfect equilibrium at all. 
abstract_translated_lang: eng
date: 2011
date_type: published
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00012512
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0515
ppn_swb: 165104340X
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-125120
language: eng
bibsort: OECHSSLERJFINITELYRE2011
full_text_status: public
citation:   Oechssler, Jörg  (2011) Finitely repeated games with social preferences.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/12512/1/oechssler_2011_dp515.pdf