eprintid: 13124
rev_number: 5
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1
dir: disk0/00/01/31/24
datestamp: 2012-02-17 09:31:16
lastmod: 2015-04-24 12:09:12
status_changed: 2012-08-15 09:04:39
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Driesen, Bram W.
title: The Asymmetric Leximin Solution
ispublished: pub
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: Bargaining , asymmetric bargaining solution , leximin solution
abstract: In this article we define and characterize a class of asymmetric leximin solutions, that contains both the symmetric leximin solution of Imai[5] and the two-person asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution of Dubra [3] as special cases. Solutions in this class combine three attractive features: they are defined on the entire domain of convex n-person bargaining problems, they generally yield Pareto efficient solution outcomes, and asymmetries among bargainers are captured by a single parameter vector. The characterization is based on a strengthening of Dubra’s [3] property Restricted Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (RIIA). RIIA imposes Nash’s IIA (Nash [9]), under the added condition that the contraction of the feasible set preserves the mutual proportions of players’ utopia values. Our axiom, entitled RIIA for Independent Players (RIP), says RIIA holds for a group of players, given that the contraction of the feasible set does not affect players outside that group.
abstract_translated_lang: eng
class_scheme: jel
class_labels: C78
date: 2012
date_type: published
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00013124
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0523
ppn_swb: 1651290385
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-131244
language: eng
bibsort: DRIESENBRATHEASYMMET2012
full_text_status: public
citation:   Driesen, Bram W.  (2012) The Asymmetric Leximin Solution.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/13124/1/Driesen_2012_dp523_neu.pdf