title: Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games
creator: Duersch, Peter
creator: Oechssler, Jörg
creator: Schipper, Burkhard C.
subject: 330
subject: 330 Economics
description: We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.
date: 2012
type: Working paper
type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
identifier: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserverhttps://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/13440/1/Duersch_Oechssler_Schipper_2012_dp529.pdf
identifier: DOI:10.11588/heidok.00013440
identifier: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-134405
identifier:   Duersch, Peter ; Oechssler, Jörg ; Schipper, Burkhard C.  (2012) Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games.  [Working paper]     
relation: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/13440/
rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/help/license_urhg.html
language: eng