%0 Generic
%A Duersch, Peter
%A Oechssler, Jörg
%A Schipper, Burkhard C.
%D 2012
%F heidok:13440
%K Imitate-the-best, learning ,  exact potential games , symmetric games , relative payoffs , zero-sum games
%R 10.11588/heidok.00013440
%T Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games
%U https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/13440/
%X We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.