TY  - GEN
KW  - Imitate-the-best
KW  -  learning 
KW  -   exact potential games 
KW  -  symmetric games 
KW  -  relative payoffs 
KW  -  zero-sum games
ID  - heidok13440
Y1  - 2012///
TI  - Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games
AV  - public
N2  - We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.
UR  - https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/13440/
A1  - Duersch, Peter
A1  - Oechssler, Jörg
A1  - Schipper, Burkhard C.
ER  -