eprintid: 13440
rev_number: 41
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1
dir: disk0/00/01/34/40
datestamp: 2012-06-21 14:48:08
lastmod: 2016-01-10 07:55:28
status_changed: 2012-08-15 09:06:08
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Duersch, Peter
creators_name: Oechssler, Jörg
creators_name: Schipper, Burkhard C.
title: Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games
ispublished: pub
subjects: 330
divisions: 181000
keywords: Imitate-the-best, learning ,  exact potential games , symmetric games , relative payoffs , zero-sum games
abstract: We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.
abstract_translated_lang: eng
class_scheme: jel
class_labels: D43, C73, C72
date: 2012
date_type: published
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00013440
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0529
ppn_swb: 1651524009
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-134405
language: eng
bibsort: DUERSCHPETONCEBEATEN2012
full_text_status: public
citation:   Duersch, Peter ; Oechssler, Jörg ; Schipper, Burkhard C.  (2012) Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/13440/1/Duersch_Oechssler_Schipper_2012_dp529.pdf