TY  - GEN
A1  - Hernandez, Diego
N2  - Discontent with  the  substantial influence  of  major global players in International Financial Institutions (IFIs) has raised a call to restructure these organizations. Greater involvement of borrowing members in  lending decisions  has been  proposed  in order to limit the exposure of development resources to the interests of large donors. No consensus has been reached, however,  if
such eventual reforms  would  create more independent  and efficient  IFIs.  Through its analysis of the allocation patterns of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), this paper  contributes to the debate on whether greater representation of borrowers in the governance of IFIs truly translates into fairer lending practices.  Far from being a fully democratic institution, the IDB is  nevertheless  an 
example of a major IFI not  dominated by non-borrowers, and its organization  and lending behavior may well provide some clues  to  resolve the broader  debate.  Empirical results from examining  IDB loan commitments granted  during  the 1970-2007  period  reveal  that  control  over IDB allocation decisions  by its largest stakeholder, the US,  is limited.  This  atypical  finding  is a result of the  strong influence  of borrowing members in the governance of the Bank. In particular, interest heterogeneity among the US  and large borrowers leads  to  distributional conflicts,  thereby  creating  the opportunity for greater institutional autonomy.  
T3  - Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
UR  - https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/14698/
AV  - public
Y1  - 2013/03/12/
TI  - Does Inclusion Guarantee Institutional Autonomy? The Case of the Inter-American Development Bank
KW  - Inter-American Development Bank
KW  -  United States
KW  -  Governance
KW  -  Aid Allocation.

ID  - heidok14698
ER  -