title: Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining
creator: Miller , Luis 
creator: Vanberg, Christoph
subject: ddc-330
subject: 330 Economics
description: We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different majority requirements on bargaining outcomes in small and large groups. In particular, we use a Baron-Ferejohn protocol and investigate the effects of decision rules on delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach  agreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality of the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and unanimity rule are associated with significantly larger decision making costs in the sense that first round proposals more often fail, leading to more costly delay. The higher rate of failure under unanimity rule and in large groups is a combination of three facts: (1) in these conditions, a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject offers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups.
date: 2014-03
type: Working paper
type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
identifier: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserverhttps://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/16597/1/Miller_Vanberg_2014_dp558.pdf
identifier: DOI:10.11588/heidok.00016597
identifier: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-165973
identifier:   Miller , Luis  ; Vanberg, Christoph  (2014) Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining.  [Working paper]     
relation: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/16597/
rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/help/license_urhg.html
language: eng