eprintid: 16597
rev_number: 16
eprint_status: archive
userid: 2744
dir: disk0/00/01/65/97
datestamp: 2014-03-21 14:31:01
lastmod: 2015-04-22 11:43:19
status_changed: 2014-03-21 14:31:01
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Miller , Luis 
creators_name: Vanberg, Christoph
title: Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: Majority Rule; Unanimity Rule; Legislative Bargaining
abstract: We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different majority requirements on bargaining outcomes in small and large groups. In particular, we use a Baron-Ferejohn protocol and investigate the effects of decision rules on delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach
agreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality of the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and unanimity rule are associated with significantly larger decision making costs in the sense that first round proposals more often fail, leading to more costly delay. The higher rate of failure under unanimity rule and in large groups is a combination of three facts: (1) in these conditions, a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject offers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups.
date: 2014-03
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00016597
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0558
ppn_swb: 1654467723
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-165973
language: eng
bibsort: MILLERLUISGROUPSIZEA201403
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0558
pages: 36
citation:   Miller , Luis  ; Vanberg, Christoph  (2014) Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/16597/1/Miller_Vanberg_2014_dp558.pdf