TY  - GEN
N2  - We investigate the effects of short-term political motivations on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Specifically, we test whether the effect of aid on economic growth is reduced by the share of years a country has served on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the period the aid has been committed, which provides quasi-random variation in aid. Our results show that the relationship of aid with growth is significantly lower when aid has been committed during a country?s tenure on the UNSC. We derive two conclusions from this. First, short-term political favoritism reduces growth. Second, political interest variables are inadequate as instruments for overall aid, raising doubts about a large number of results in the aid effectiveness literature. 
A1  - Dreher, Axel 
A1  - Eichenauer, Vera 
A1  - Gehring, Kai 
Y1  - 2014/10//
TI  - Geopolitics, Aid and Growth
EP  - 47
UR  - https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/17545/
T3  - Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
AV  - public
ID  - heidok17545
CY  - Heidelberg
KW  - aid effectiveness
KW  -  economic growth
KW  -  politics and aid
KW  -  United Nations Security Council membership
KW  -  political instruments 
ER  -