eprintid: 17688
rev_number: 16
eprint_status: archive
userid: 2744
dir: disk0/00/01/76/88
datestamp: 2014-12-11 08:40:43
lastmod: 2015-04-25 06:11:14
status_changed: 2014-12-11 08:40:43
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Hedlund, Jonas
title: Bayesian signaling
subjects: 330
divisions: 181000
keywords: Bayesian Persuasion, Signaling.
abstract: This paper introduces private sender information into a sender-receiver game of Bayesian persuasion with monotonic sender preferences. I derive properties of increasing differences related to the precision of signals and use these to fully characterize the set of equilibria robust to the intuitive criterion. In particular, all such equilibria are either separating, i.e., the sender's choice of signal reveals his private information to the receiver, or fully disclosing, i.e., the outcome of the sender's chosen signal fully reveals the payoff-relevant state to the receiver. Incentive compatibility requires the high sender type to use sub-optimal signals and therefore generates a cost for the high sender type in comparison to a full information
benchmark in which the receiver knows the sender's type. The receiver prefers the equilibrium outcome over this benchmark for large classes of monotonic sender preferences.
date: 2014-11
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00017688
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0577
ppn_swb: 1654258164
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-176889
language: eng
bibsort: HEDLUNDJONBAYESIANSI201411
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 577
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 31
citation:   Hedlund, Jonas  (2014) Bayesian signaling.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/17688/1/hedlund_2014_dp577.pdf