eprintid: 18159
rev_number: 20
eprint_status: archive
userid: 2744
dir: disk0/00/01/81/59
datestamp: 2015-02-10 14:42:07
lastmod: 2016-01-15 10:49:12
status_changed: 2015-02-10 14:42:07
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Tremewan, James
creators_name: Vanberg, Christoph
title: The dynamics of coalition formation - a multilateral bargaining experiment with free timing of moves
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: Bargaining; group choice; experiments; coalition formation
abstract: We experimentally study behavior in a finitely repeated coalition formation game played in real time. Subjects interact in groups of three, bargaining over the distribution of payments which occur at regular time intervals. During a given interval, payments occur if and only if a majority is in agreement about their allocation. Aside from these rules, we purposefully impose little structure on the bargaining process. We investigate the frequency and stability of different types of agreements, as well as transitions between them. The most frequent  agreement is an equal split between two players, leaving the third with nothing. The most stable is the three-way equal split. Transitions between agreements are frequent and generally consistent with myopic payoff maximization. We find evidence that both fairness concerns and risk aversion may explain the prevalence of the three-way equal split, and that loyalty can play a role in cementing coalitions.
date: 2015-02
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00018159
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0582
ppn_swb: 1655725246
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-181595
language: eng
bibsort: TREMEWANJATHEDYNAMIC201502
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0582
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 42
citation:   Tremewan, James ; Vanberg, Christoph  (2015) The dynamics of coalition formation - a multilateral bargaining experiment with free timing of moves.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18159/1/Tremewan_Vanberg_2015_dp582.pdf