TY  - GEN
N2  - Many mechanisms have been designed to solve the free-rider problem in public good environments. The designers of those mechanisms focused on good static equilibrium properties. In this paper, I propose a new mechanism for the provision of public goods that has good dynamic properties instead. The mechanism gives all agents the possibility to condition their contribution on the total level of contribution provided by all agents. Under a reasonable variant of Better Response Dynamics all equilibrium outcomes are Pareto efficient. This makes the mechanism particularly suited for repeated public good environments. In contrast to many previously suggested mechanisms, it does further not require an institution that has the power to enforce participation and/or transfer payments. Neither does it use any knowledge of agents preferences.
UR  - https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18483/
A1  - Reischmann, Andreas
EP  - 30
ID  - heidok18483
KW  - Mechanism Design
KW  -  Public Goods
KW  -  Better Response Dynamics.
TI  - The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for the Provision of Public Goods
Y1  - 2015/03//
T3  - Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
AV  - public
CY  - Heidelberg
ER  -