eprintid: 18483
rev_number: 15
eprint_status: archive
userid: 2744
dir: disk0/00/01/84/83
datestamp: 2015-03-17 10:17:06
lastmod: 2015-04-22 23:01:24
status_changed: 2015-03-17 10:17:06
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Reischmann, Andreas
title: The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for the Provision of Public Goods
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: Mechanism Design, Public Goods, Better Response Dynamics.
abstract: Many mechanisms have been designed to solve the free-rider problem in public good environments. The designers of those mechanisms focused on good static equilibrium properties. In this paper, I propose a new mechanism for the provision of public goods that has good dynamic properties instead. The mechanism gives all agents the possibility to condition their contribution on the total level of contribution provided by all agents. Under a reasonable variant of Better Response Dynamics all equilibrium outcomes are Pareto efficient. This makes the mechanism particularly suited for repeated public good environments. In contrast to many previously suggested mechanisms, it does further not require an institution that has the power to enforce participation and/or transfer payments. Neither does it use any knowledge of agents preferences.
date: 2015-03
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00018483
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0586
ppn_swb: 1655693727
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-184835
language: eng
bibsort: REISCHMANNTHECONDITI201503
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0586
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 30
citation:   Reischmann, Andreas  (2015) The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for the Provision of Public Goods.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18483/1/Reischmann_2015_dp586.pdf