title: From Imitation to Collusion - A Comment
creator: Oechssler, Jörg 
creator: Roomets, Alex
creator: Roth, Stefan 
subject: ddc-330
subject: 330 Economics
description: In oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor yields very competitive outcomes. This theoretical prediction has been confirmed experimentally by a number of studies. A recent paper by Friedman et al. (2015) qualifies those results in an interesting way: while they replicate the very competitive results for the first 25 to 50 periods, they show that when using a much longer time horizon of 1200 periods, results slowly turn to more and more collusive outcomes. We replicate their result for duopolies. However, with 4 firms none of our oligopolies becomes permanently collusive. Instead, the average quantity always stays above the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity. Thus, it seems that “four remain many” even with 1200 periods.
date: 2015-03
type: Working paper
type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
identifier: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserverhttps://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18579/1/Oechssler%20Roomets%20Roth_2015_dp588.pdf
identifier: DOI:10.11588/heidok.00018579
identifier: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-185793
identifier:   Oechssler, Jörg  ; Roomets, Alex ; Roth, Stefan   (2015) From Imitation to Collusion - A Comment.  [Working paper]     
relation: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18579/
rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/help/license_urhg.html
language: eng