%0 Generic
%A Oechssler, Jörg 
%A Roomets, Alex
%A Roth, Stefan 
%C Heidelberg
%D 2015
%F heidok:18579
%K imitation, experiment.
%R 10.11588/heidok.00018579
%T From Imitation to Collusion - A Comment
%U https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18579/
%V 0588
%X In oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor yields very competitive outcomes. This theoretical prediction has been confirmed experimentally by a number of studies. A recent paper by Friedman et al. (2015) qualifies those results in an interesting way: while they replicate the very competitive results for the first 25 to 50 periods, they show that when using a much longer time horizon of 1200 periods, results slowly turn to more and more collusive outcomes. We replicate their result for duopolies. However, with 4 firms none of our oligopolies becomes permanently collusive. Instead, the average quantity always stays above the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity. Thus, it seems that “four remain many” even with 1200 periods.