<> "The repository administrator has not yet configured an RDF license."^^ . <> . . "From Imitation to Collusion - A Comment"^^ . "In oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor yields very competitive outcomes. This theoretical prediction has been confirmed experimentally by a number of studies. A recent paper by Friedman et al. (2015) qualifies those results in an interesting way: while they replicate the very competitive results for the first 25 to 50 periods, they show that when using a much longer time horizon of 1200 periods, results slowly turn to more and more collusive outcomes. We replicate their result for duopolies. However, with 4 firms none of our oligopolies becomes permanently collusive. Instead, the average quantity always stays above the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity. Thus, it seems that “four remain many” even with 1200 periods."^^ . "2015-03" . . . "0588" . . . . . . . . . . . "Alex"^^ . "Roomets"^^ . "Alex Roomets"^^ . . "Stefan "^^ . "Roth"^^ . "Stefan Roth"^^ . . "Jörg "^^ . "Oechssler"^^ . "Jörg Oechssler"^^ . . . . . . "From Imitation to Collusion - A Comment (PDF)"^^ . . . "Oechssler Roomets Roth_2015_dp588.pdf"^^ . . . "From Imitation to Collusion - A Comment (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "lightbox.jpg"^^ . . . "From Imitation to Collusion - A Comment (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "preview.jpg"^^ . . . "From Imitation to Collusion - A Comment (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "medium.jpg"^^ . . . "From Imitation to Collusion - A Comment (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "small.jpg"^^ . . . "From Imitation to Collusion - A Comment (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "indexcodes.txt"^^ . . "HTML Summary of #18579 \n\nFrom Imitation to Collusion - A Comment\n\n" . "text/html" . . . "330 Wirtschaft"@de . "330 Economics"@en . .