TY  - GEN
Y1  - 2015/03//
UR  - https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18579/
A1  - Oechssler, Jörg 
A1  - Roomets, Alex
A1  - Roth, Stefan 
AV  - public
ID  - heidok18579
KW  - imitation
KW  -  experiment.
EP  - 15
CY  - Heidelberg
TI  - From Imitation to Collusion - A Comment
T3  - Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
N2  - In oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor yields very competitive outcomes. This theoretical prediction has been con?rmed experimentally by a number of studies. A recent paper by Friedman et al. (2015) quali?es those results in an interesting way: while they replicate the very competitive results for the ?rst 25 to 50 periods, they show that when using a much longer time horizon of 1200 periods, results slowly turn to more and more collusive outcomes. We replicate their result for duopolies. However, with 4 ?rms none of our oligopolies becomes permanently collusive. Instead, the average quantity always stays above the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity. Thus, it seems that ?four remain many? even with 1200 periods.
ER  -