eprintid: 18579
rev_number: 17
eprint_status: archive
userid: 2744
dir: disk0/00/01/85/79
datestamp: 2015-04-14 08:11:37
lastmod: 2015-04-22 20:26:19
status_changed: 2015-04-14 08:11:37
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Oechssler, Jörg 
creators_name: Roomets, Alex
creators_name: Roth, Stefan 
title: From Imitation to Collusion - A Comment
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: imitation, experiment.
abstract: In oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor yields very competitive outcomes. This theoretical prediction has been confirmed experimentally by a number of studies. A recent paper by Friedman et al. (2015) qualifies those results in an interesting way: while they replicate the very competitive results for the first 25 to 50 periods, they show that when using a much longer time horizon of 1200 periods, results slowly turn to more and more collusive outcomes. We replicate their result for duopolies. However, with 4 firms none of our oligopolies becomes permanently collusive. Instead, the average quantity always stays above the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity. Thus, it seems that “four remain many” even with 1200 periods.
date: 2015-03
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00018579
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0588
ppn_swb: 1656142260
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-185793
language: eng
bibsort: OECHSSLERJFROMIMITAT201503
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0588
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 15
citation:   Oechssler, Jörg  ; Roomets, Alex ; Roth, Stefan   (2015) From Imitation to Collusion - A Comment.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18579/1/Oechssler%20Roomets%20Roth_2015_dp588.pdf