%0 Generic
%A Goeschl, Timo
%A Perino, Grischa
%C Heidelberg
%D 2015
%F heidok:18633
%K International climate policy; diffusion of innovations; intellectual property rights; hold-up problem.
%R 10.11588/heidok.00018633
%T The Climate Policy Hold-Up: Green Technologies,Intellectual Property Rights, and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements 
%U https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18633/
%V 0591
%X The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of 'green' technologies. This requires that international environmental agreements (IEAs) and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) interact productively.Using a simple and tractable model, we highlight the strategic reduction in abatement commitments on account of a hold-up effect. In anticipation of rent extraction by the innovator signatories might abate less than non-signatories turning the IEA 'brown'. Self-enforcing IEAs have fewer signatories and diffusion can reduce global abatement under TRIPs. Countries hosting patent holders extract rents from TRIPs, but may be better off without them.