eprintid: 18633
rev_number: 16
eprint_status: archive
userid: 2744
dir: disk0/00/01/86/33
datestamp: 2015-04-20 07:40:55
lastmod: 2015-04-22 04:19:34
status_changed: 2015-04-20 07:40:55
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Goeschl, Timo
creators_name: Perino, Grischa
title: The Climate Policy Hold-Up: Green Technologies,Intellectual Property Rights, and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements 
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: International climate policy; diffusion of innovations; intellectual property rights; hold-up problem.
abstract: The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of 'green' technologies. This requires that international environmental agreements (IEAs) and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) interact productively.Using a simple and tractable model, we highlight the strategic reduction in abatement commitments on account of a hold-up effect. In anticipation of rent extraction by the innovator signatories might abate less than non-signatories turning the IEA 'brown'. Self-enforcing IEAs have fewer signatories and diffusion can reduce global abatement under TRIPs. Countries hosting patent holders extract rents from TRIPs, but may be better off without them.
date: 2015-04
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00018633
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0591
ppn_swb: 1656134284
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-186335
language: eng
bibsort: GOESCHLTIMTHECLIMATE201504
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0591
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 25
citation:   Goeschl, Timo ; Perino, Grischa  (2015) The Climate Policy Hold-Up: Green Technologies,Intellectual Property Rights, and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18633/1/goeschl_perino_2015_dp591.pdf