eprintid: 18747 rev_number: 28 eprint_status: archive userid: 2744 dir: disk0/00/01/87/47 datestamp: 2015-05-15 14:33:54 lastmod: 2016-01-11 14:41:01 status_changed: 2015-05-15 14:33:54 type: workingPaper metadata_visibility: show creators_name: Dominiak, Adam creators_name: Duersch, Peter title: Benevolent and Malevolent Ellsberg Games subjects: 330 divisions: 181000 keywords: Ellsberg task, experiment, zero-sum game, coordination game, ambiguity, uncertainty averse preferences abstract: Traditionally, real experiments testing subjective expected utility theory take for granted that subjects view the Ellsberg task as a one-person decision problem. We challenge this view: Instead of seeing the Ellsberg task as a one-person decision problem, it can be perceived as a two-player game. One player chooses among the bets. The second player determines the distribution of balls in the Ellsberg urn. The Nash equilibrium predictions of this game depend on the payoff of the second player, with the game ranging from a zero-sum one to a coordination game. Meanwhile, the predictions by ambiguity aversion models remain unchanged. Both situations are implemented experimentally and yield different results, in line with the game-theoretic prediction. Additionally, the standard scenario (without explicit mention of how the distribution is determined) leads to results similar to the zero-sum game, suggesting that subjects view the standard Ellsberg experiment as a game against the experimenter. date: 2015-05 id_scheme: DOI id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00018747 schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3 schriftenreihe_order: 0592 ppn_swb: 1656883325 own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-187477 language: eng bibsort: DOMINIAKADBENEVOLENT201505 full_text_status: public series: Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics volume: 0592 place_of_pub: Heidelberg pages: 40 citation: Dominiak, Adam ; Duersch, Peter (2015) Benevolent and Malevolent Ellsberg Games. [Working paper] document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18747/1/dominiak_duersch_2015_dp592.pdf