eprintid: 22238
rev_number: 14
eprint_status: archive
userid: 2744
dir: disk0/00/02/22/38
datestamp: 2016-11-24 11:27:56
lastmod: 2016-11-28 08:57:50
status_changed: 2016-11-24 11:27:56
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Curto-Grau, Marta
creators_name: Zudenkova, Galina
title: Party Discipline and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence
subjects: 330
divisions: 181000
keywords: Party discipline; discretionary spending; party line.
abstract: This paper studies the relationship between party discipline and discretionary spending with theory and data. We propose a theoretical model in which a politician faces
a conflict between her constituents' interests and the party line. Party loyalty is electorally costly for the politician and is therefore rewarded by the party leader with greater amounts of discretionary spending allocated to the politician's constituency. The more intense the conflict between the voters' and the party's interests, the more grants the district receives. Using panel data on party discipline in the U.S. House of Representatives
and federal grants to congressional districts between 1984 and 2010, we provide evidence that districts represented by loyal legislators receive greater amounts of discretionary
spending. This effect holds only for legislators in the majority party, who may enjoy a legislative advantage. Districts represented by loyal legislators who face a greater conflict of interest between following the party and serving their constituents (e.g., Republican legislators representing liberal-leaning districts) are rewarded to a larger extent.
date: 2016-11
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00022238
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0624
ppn_swb: 881668451
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-222385
language: eng
bibsort: CURTOGRAUMPARTYDISCI201611
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0624
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 33
citation:   Curto-Grau, Marta ; Zudenkova, Galina  (2016) Party Discipline and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/22238/1/curto-grau_zudenkova_2016_dp624.pdf