eprintid: 22588
rev_number: 14
eprint_status: archive
userid: 2744
dir: disk0/00/02/25/88
datestamp: 2017-01-30 13:38:23
lastmod: 2017-01-31 09:47:08
status_changed: 2017-01-30 13:38:23
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Brunner, Christoph
creators_name: Kauffeldt, T. Florian
creators_name: Rau, Hannes
title: Does mutual knowledge of preferences lead to more equilibrium play? Experimental evidence
subjects: 330
divisions: 181000
keywords: Behavioral Game Theory; Epistemic Game Theory; Nash Equilibrium, Games of Incomplete Information
abstract: In many experiments, the Nash equilibrium concept seems not to predict well. One reason may be that players have non-selfish preferences over outcomes. As a consequence, even when they are told what the material payoffs of the game are, mutual knowledge of preferences may not be satisfied. We experimentally examine several 2x2 games and test whether revealing players' preferences leads to more equilibrium play. For that purpose, we elicit subjects' preferences over outcomes before the games are played. It turns out that subjects are significantly more likely to play an equilibrium strategy when other players' preferences are revealed. We discuss a noisy version of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and a model of strategic ambiguity to account for observed subject behavior.
date: 2017-01
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00022588
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0629
ppn_swb: 1655804847
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-225881
language: eng
bibsort: BRUNNERCHRDOESMUTUAL201701
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0629
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 47
citation:   Brunner, Christoph ; Kauffeldt, T. Florian ; Rau, Hannes  (2017) Does mutual knowledge of preferences lead to more equilibrium play? Experimental evidence.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/22588/1/brunner_kauffeldt_rau_2017_dp629.pdf