title: Ambiguity and the Centipede Game: Strategic Uncertainty in Multi-Stage Games
creator: Eichberger, Jürgen
creator: Grant, Simon
creator: Kelsey, David
subject: 330
subject: 330 Economics
description: We propose a solution concept for a class of extensive form games with ambiguity. Specifically we consider multi-stage games. Players have CEU preferences. The associated ambiguous beliefs are revised by Generalized Bayesian Updating. We assume individuals take account of possible changes in their preferences by using consistent planning. We show that if there is ambiguity in the centipede game it is possible to sustain 'cooperation' for many periods as part of a consistent-planning equilibrium under ambiguity. In a non-cooperative bargaining game we show that ambiguity may be a cause of delay in bargaining.
date: 2017-08-15
type: Working paper
type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
identifier: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserverhttps://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/23389/1/dp638.pdf
identifier: DOI:10.11588/heidok.00023389
identifier: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-233892
identifier:   Eichberger, Jürgen ; Grant, Simon ; Kelsey, David  (2017) Ambiguity and the Centipede Game: Strategic Uncertainty in Multi-Stage Games.  [Working paper]     
relation: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/23389/
rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/help/license_urhg.html
language: eng