TY  - GEN
A1  - Eichberger, Jürgen
A1  - Grant, Simon
A1  - Kelsey, David
N2  - We propose a solution concept for a class of extensive form games with ambiguity. Specifically we consider multi-stage games. Players have CEU preferences. The associated ambiguous beliefs are revised by Generalized Bayesian Updating. We assume individuals take account of possible changes in their preferences by using consistent planning. We show that if there is ambiguity in the centipede game it is possible to sustain 'cooperation' for many periods as part of a consistent-planning equilibrium under ambiguity. In a non-cooperative bargaining game we show that ambiguity may be a cause of delay in bargaining.
CY  - Heidelberg
AV  - public
TI  - Ambiguity and the Centipede Game: Strategic Uncertainty in Multi-Stage Games
T3  - Discussion Paper Series
Y1  - 2017/08/15/
EP  - 45
UR  - https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/23389/
ID  - heidok23389
ER  -