eprintid: 23389
rev_number: 13
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3114
dir: disk0/00/02/33/89
datestamp: 2017-09-11 09:29:04
lastmod: 2019-02-21 09:56:57
status_changed: 2017-09-11 09:29:04
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Eichberger, Jürgen
creators_name: Grant, Simon
creators_name: Kelsey, David
title: Ambiguity and the Centipede Game: Strategic Uncertainty in Multi-Stage Games
subjects: 330
divisions: 181000
abstract: We propose a solution concept for a class of extensive form games with ambiguity. Specifically we consider multi-stage games. Players have CEU preferences. The associated ambiguous beliefs are revised by Generalized Bayesian Updating. We assume individuals take account of possible changes in their preferences by using consistent planning. We show that if there is ambiguity in the centipede game it is possible to sustain 'cooperation' for many periods as part of a consistent-planning equilibrium under ambiguity. In a non-cooperative bargaining game we show that ambiguity may be a cause of delay in bargaining.
date: 2017-08-15
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00023389
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0638
ppn_swb: 897894774
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-233892
language: eng
bibsort: EICHBERGERAMBIGUITYA20170815
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series
volume: 0638
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 45
citation:   Eichberger, Jürgen ; Grant, Simon ; Kelsey, David  (2017) Ambiguity and the Centipede Game: Strategic Uncertainty in Multi-Stage Games.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/23389/1/dp638.pdf