eprintid: 25112
rev_number: 17
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3114
dir: disk0/00/02/51/12
datestamp: 2018-07-18 07:36:46
lastmod: 2018-12-05 16:56:56
status_changed: 2018-07-18 07:36:46
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Tremewan, James
creators_name: Vanberg, Christoph
title: Voting rules in multilateral bargaining: using an experiment to relax procedural assumptions
subjects: 330
divisions: 181000
keywords: Bargaining, group choice, voting rules, coalition formation, experimental methodology
abstract: Experiments can be used to relax technical assumptions that are made by necessity in theoretical analysis, and further test the robustness of theoretical predictions. To illustrate this point we conduct a three-person bargaining experiment examining the effect of different decision rules (unanimity and majority rule). Our experiment implements the substantive assumptions of the Baron-Ferejohn model but imposes no structure on the timing of proposals and votes. We compare our results to those obtained from an earlier experiment which implemented the specific procedural assumptions of the model. Our results are in many ways very similar to those from the more structured experiment: we find that most games end with the formation of a minimum winning coalition, and unanimity rule is associated with greater delay. However, the earlier finding of "proposer power" is reversed. While some important patterns are robust to the less stringent implementation of procedural assumptions, our less structured experiment provides new insights into how multilateral bargaining may play out in real world environments with no strict procedural rules on timing of offers and agreements.
date: 2018-07
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00025112
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0651
ppn_swb: 1029278490
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-251129
language: eng
bibsort: TREMEWANJAVOTINGRULE201807
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0651
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 30
citation:   Tremewan, James ; Vanberg, Christoph  (2018) Voting rules in multilateral bargaining: using an experiment to relax procedural assumptions.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/25112/1/Tremewan_Vanberg_2018_dp0651.pdf