eprintid: 26367
rev_number: 20
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3114
dir: disk0/00/02/63/67
datestamp: 2019-04-25 11:17:57
lastmod: 2019-10-18 10:33:40
status_changed: 2019-04-25 11:17:57
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Schmidt, Robert J.
creators_name: Trautmann, Stefan T.
title: Implementing (un)fair procedures? Favoritism and process fairness when inequality is inevitable
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: equality, procedural justice, discrimination
abstract: We study allocation behavior when outcome inequality is inevitable but a fair process is feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job or award. We show that allocators may be influenced by inappropriate criteria, impeding the implementation of a fair process. We study four interventions to induce process fairness without restricting the allocator’s decisions: Increasing the transparency of the allocation process; providing a private randomization device; allowing the allocator to delegate to a public randomization device; and allowing the allocator to avoid information on inappropriate criteria. All interventions except transparency have positive effects, but differ substantially in their impact.
date: 2019-04
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00026367
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0661
ppn_swb: 1663736855
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-263678
language: eng
bibsort: SCHMIDTROBIMPLEMENTI201904
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0661
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 30
citation:   Schmidt, Robert J. ; Trautmann, Stefan T.  (2019) Implementing (un)fair procedures? Favoritism and process fairness when inequality is inevitable.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/26367/1/Schmidt_Trautmann_2019_dp661.pdf