title: Legislative bargaining with joint production:   An experimental study
creator: Merkel, Anna
creator: Vanberg, Christoph
subject: 330
subject: 330 Economics
description: We conduct 3-person bargaining experiments in which the surplus being divided is produced by completing a prior task. Using a Baron-Ferejohn framework, we investigate  how differences in contributions to production affect bargaining under different decision rules. Under unanimity rule, all proposals and agreements constitute convex combinations of the equal and proportional splits. Contrary to our predictions, this pattern largely persists under majority rule. In sharp contrast to prior experiments in which an exogenous surplus is divided, few subjects attempt to build minimum winning coalitions when the surplus is jointly produced.
date: 2019-10
type: Working paper
type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
identifier: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserverhttps://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/27256/3/Merkel_Vanberg_2019.pdf
identifier: DOI:10.11588/heidok.00027256
identifier: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-272560
identifier:   Merkel, Anna ; Vanberg, Christoph  (2019) Legislative bargaining with joint production: An experimental study.  [Working paper]     
relation: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/27256/
rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/help/license_urhg.html
language: eng