TY  - GEN
ID  - heidok27256
AV  - public
TI  - Legislative bargaining with joint production: 
An experimental study
EP  - 50
T3  - Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Y1  - 2019/10//
KW  - multilateral bargaining
KW  -  claims
KW  -  fairness
KW  -  majority rule
KW  -  experiments
N2  - We conduct 3-person bargaining experiments in which the surplus being divided is produced by completing a prior task. Using a Baron-Ferejohn framework, we investigate
how differences in contributions to production affect bargaining under different decision rules. Under unanimity rule, all proposals and agreements constitute convex combinations of the equal and proportional splits. Contrary to our predictions, this pattern largely persists under majority rule. In sharp contrast to prior experiments in which an exogenous surplus is divided, few subjects attempt to build minimum winning coalitions when the surplus is jointly produced.
UR  - https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/27256/
CY  - Heidelberg
A1  - Merkel, Anna
A1  - Vanberg, Christoph
ER  -