eprintid: 27256
rev_number: 19
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3114
dir: disk0/00/02/72/56
datestamp: 2019-10-11 11:46:36
lastmod: 2019-11-15 11:26:21
status_changed: 2019-10-11 11:46:36
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Merkel, Anna
creators_name: Vanberg, Christoph
title: Legislative bargaining with joint production: 
An experimental study
subjects: 330
divisions: 181000
keywords: multilateral bargaining, claims, fairness, majority rule, experiments
abstract: We conduct 3-person bargaining experiments in which the surplus being divided is produced by completing a prior task. Using a Baron-Ferejohn framework, we investigate
how differences in contributions to production affect bargaining under different decision rules. Under unanimity rule, all proposals and agreements constitute convex combinations of the equal and proportional splits. Contrary to our predictions, this pattern largely persists under majority rule. In sharp contrast to prior experiments in which an exogenous surplus is divided, few subjects attempt to build minimum winning coalitions when the surplus is jointly produced.
date: 2019-10
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00027256
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0670
ppn_swb: 167879581X
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-272560
language: eng
bibsort: MERKELANNALEGISLATIV201910
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0670
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 50
citation:   Merkel, Anna ; Vanberg, Christoph  (2019) Legislative bargaining with joint production: An experimental study.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/27256/3/Merkel_Vanberg_2019.pdf