eprintid: 28150
rev_number: 19
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3114
dir: disk0/00/02/81/50
datestamp: 2020-03-30 10:12:52
lastmod: 2020-04-27 12:04:21
status_changed: 2020-03-30 10:12:52
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Miettinen, Topi
creators_name: Vanberg, Christoph
title: Commitment and Conflict in Multilateral Bargaining
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: bargaining, commitment, conflict, delay, environmental agreements, international negotiations, legislative, majority, multilateral, unanimity
abstract: We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the players to attempt commiting to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful,commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which allocates to her a share below a self-imposed threshold. Any such attempted commitment fails and decays with an exogenously given probability. We characterize and compare symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibria under unanimity rule and majority rules. Under unanimity rule, there are potentially many equilibria which can be ordered from the least to most inefficient, according to how how many commitment
attempts must fail in order for an agreement to arise. The most inefficient equilibrium exists independently of the number of players, and the delay in this equilibrium is increasing in the number of players. In addition, more efficient commitment profiles cannot be sustained in
equilibrium if the number of players is sufficiently large. The expected inefficiency due to delay
at the least and at the most efficient equilibrium increases as the number of players increases.
Under any (super)majority rule, however, there is no equilibrium with delay or inefficiency.
The reason is that competition to be included in the winning coalition discourages attempts to commit to an aggressive bargaining position. We also show that inefficiencies related to unanimity decision making may be aggravated by longer lags between consecutive bargaining rounds. The predicted patterns are by and large consistent with observed inefficiencies in many
international arenas including the European Union, WTO, and UNFCCC. The results suggest that the unanimity rule is particularly damaging if the number of legislators is large and the time lags between consecutive sessions are long.
date: 2020-03
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00028150
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0679
ppn_swb: 1696249341
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-281501
language: eng
bibsort: MIETTINENTCOMMITMENT202003
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0679
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 25
citation:   Miettinen, Topi ; Vanberg, Christoph  (2020) Commitment and Conflict in Multilateral Bargaining.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/28150/3/Miettinen_2020_dp679.pdf