title: The Creation of Social Norms under Weak Institutions
creator: Diekert, Florian
creator: Eymess, Tillmann
creator: Luomba, Joseph
creator: Waichman, Israel
subject: ddc-330
subject: 330 Economics
description: Preventing overfishing at Lake Victoria is a typical situation where policies have to rely on norm-based interventions to improve outcomes. Our lab-in-the-field experiment studies how information about high or low levels of previous cooperation affects the creation of social norms in a three-player prisoner’s dilemma game with/without a feedback mechanism. The provision of social information succeeds in creating norms of cooperation only if a feedback mechanism is available. Without feedback, social information cannot prevent the decline of cooperation rates. Exploring the role of the reference network, we find that the effect increases with social proximity among participants.
date: 2020-05
type: Working paper
type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
identifier: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserverhttps://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/28309/7/Diekert_2020_dp684.pdf
identifier: DOI:10.11588/heidok.00028309
identifier: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-283096
identifier:   Diekert, Florian ; Eymess, Tillmann ; Luomba, Joseph ; Waichman, Israel  (2020) The Creation of Social Norms under Weak Institutions.  [Working paper]     
relation: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/28309/
rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/help/license_urhg.html
language: eng