TY  - GEN
ID  - heidok28309
KW  - common pool resource
KW  -  collective action
KW  -  social norms
KW  -  lab-in-the-field experiment
AV  - public
CY  - Heidelberg
TI  - The Creation of Social Norms under Weak Institutions
Y1  - 2020/05//
T3  - Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
N2  - Preventing over?shing at Lake Victoria is a typical situation where policies have to rely on norm-based interventions to improve outcomes. Our lab-in-the-?eld experiment studies how information about high or low levels of previous cooperation a?ects the creation of social norms in a three-player prisoner?s dilemma game with/without a feedback mechanism. The provision of social information succeeds in creating norms of cooperation only if a feedback mechanism is available. Without feedback, social information cannot prevent the decline of cooperation rates. Exploring the role of the reference network, we ?nd that the e?ect increases with social proximity among participants.
A1  - Diekert, Florian
A1  - Eymess, Tillmann
A1  - Luomba, Joseph
A1  - Waichman, Israel
EP  - 57
UR  - https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/28309/
ER  -