eprintid: 28309
rev_number: 18
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3114
dir: disk0/00/02/83/09
datestamp: 2020-05-14 14:33:49
lastmod: 2020-05-19 12:31:44
status_changed: 2020-05-14 14:33:49
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Diekert, Florian
creators_name: Eymess, Tillmann
creators_name: Luomba, Joseph
creators_name: Waichman, Israel
title: The Creation of Social Norms under Weak Institutions
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: common pool resource, collective action, social norms, lab-in-the-field experiment
abstract: Preventing overfishing at Lake Victoria is a typical situation where policies have to rely on norm-based interventions to improve outcomes. Our lab-in-the-field experiment studies how information about high or low levels of previous cooperation affects the creation of social norms in a three-player prisoner’s dilemma game with/without a feedback mechanism. The provision of social information succeeds in creating norms of cooperation only if a feedback mechanism is available. Without feedback, social information cannot prevent the decline of cooperation rates. Exploring the role of the reference network, we find that the effect increases with social proximity among participants.
date: 2020-05
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00028309
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0684
ppn_swb: 1698319797
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-283096
language: eng
bibsort: DIEKERTFLOTHECREATIO202005
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0684
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 57
citation:   Diekert, Florian ; Eymess, Tillmann ; Luomba, Joseph ; Waichman, Israel  (2020) The Creation of Social Norms under Weak Institutions.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/28309/7/Diekert_2020_dp684.pdf