eprintid: 30443
rev_number: 16
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3114
dir: disk0/00/03/04/43
datestamp: 2021-09-07 15:24:43
lastmod: 2021-10-05 13:19:54
status_changed: 2021-09-07 15:24:43
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Rimbaud, Claire
creators_name: Soldà, Alice
title: Avoiding the Cost of your Conscience: Belief Dependent Preferences and Information Acquisition
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: Belief-dependent preferences, illusory preferences, information acquisition, self-serving biases, experiment
abstract: Pro-social individuals face a trade-off between their monetary and moral motives. Hence, they may be tempted to exploit the uncertainty in their decision environment in order to reconcile this trade-off. In this paper, we investigate whether individuals with belief-dependent preferences avoid the monetary cost of behaving according to their moral standards by strategically acquiring information about others' expectations. We test the predicitions of an information acquisition model in an online experiment. We use a modified trust-game in which we introduce uncertainty about the second movers' beliefs about first-movers' expectations. Our design enables to (i) identify participants with belief-based preferences and (ii) investigate their information acquisition strategy. Consistent with our predictions of subjective preferences, we find that most individuals classified as belief-dependent strategically select their source of information to avoid the cost of their conscience.
date: 2021-07-14
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00030443
ppn_swb: 1772433594
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-304437
language: eng
bibsort: RIMBAUDCLAAVOIDINGTH20210714
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0705
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 60
citation:   Rimbaud, Claire ; Soldà, Alice  (2021) Avoiding the Cost of your Conscience: Belief Dependent Preferences and Information Acquisition.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/30443/2/Rimbaud_Sold%C3%A0_2021_dp705.pdf