eprintid: 31339
rev_number: 18
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3114
dir: disk0/00/03/13/39
datestamp: 2022-03-09 13:15:14
lastmod: 2022-04-08 08:57:53
status_changed: 2022-03-09 13:15:14
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: no_search
creators_name: Diederich, Johannes
creators_name: Goeschl, Timo
creators_name: Waichman, Israel
title: Self-Nudging vs. Social Nudging in Social Dilemmas: An Experiment
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: choice architecture, defaults
cterms_swd: nudging
cterms_swd: public goods
cterms_swd: behavioral economics
cterms_swd: experiment
abstract: The exogenous manipulation of choice architectures to achieve social ends ('social nudges') can raise problems of effectiveness and ethicality because it favors group outcomes over individual outcomes. One answer is to give individuals control over their nudge (`self-nudge'), but the trade-offs involved are poorly understood. We examine how subjects self-nudge in a paradigmatic social dilemma setting and whether outcomes differ between the self-nudge and two exogenous nudges in line with perfect free-riding or full cooperation. Subjects recruited from the general population play a ten-round VCM online in fixed groups of four with one daily contribution decision. The nudge takes the shape of a non-participation default contribution, comparing zero, full, and self-determined levels. We find that the average self-nudge is 44% of the endowment and only 7% of subjects choose one of the two exogenous defaults. Yet, there is a hard trade-off between ethicality and effectiveness: Self-nudging groups do not better than groups under the perfect free-riding nudge. The reason is that non-defaulting subjects contribute less. Groups under the full cooperation default exhibit no reactance against the nudge and outperform both alternative choice architectures.
date: 2022-02-21
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0710
ppn_swb: 1796238546
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-313391
language: eng
bibsort: DIEDERICHJSELFNUDGIN20220221
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0710
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 48
citation:   Diederich, Johannes ; Goeschl, Timo ; Waichman, Israel  (2022) Self-Nudging vs. Social Nudging in Social Dilemmas: An Experiment.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/31339/7/Diederich_Goeschl_Waichman_2022_dp710.pdf