title: (Un)Trustworthy Pledges and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
creator: Goeschl, Timo
creator: Soldà, Alice
subject: 330
subject: 330 Wirtschaft
description: Pledges feature in international climate cooperation since the 2015 Paris Agreement. We explore how differences in pledgers' trustworthiness affect outcomes in a social dilemma that parallels climate change. In an online experiment, two participants interact with a randomly matched third player in a repeat maintenance game with a pledge stage. Treatments vary whether participants are matched with a player that is more or less trustworthy as revealed by behavior in a promise-keeping game; and whether they observe that trustworthiness. We find that participants knowingly matched with more trustworthy players cooperate more than participants matched with less trustworthy players (knowingly or unknowingly), but also more than participants unknowingly matched with more trustworthy players. In contrast, participants knowingly matched with less trustworthy players do not cooperate less than participants who are unknowingly so. Our findings suggest that the use of pledges, as per the Paris Agreement, can leverage the power of trustworthiness to enhance cooperation.
date: 2023
type: Arbeitspapier
type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
identifier: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserverhttps://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/33250/7/Goeschl_Solda_Untrustworthy_Pledges_2023.pdf
identifier: DOI:10.11588/heidok.00033250
identifier: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-332501
identifier:   Goeschl, Timo ; Soldà, Alice  (2023) (Un)Trustworthy Pledges and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas.  [Arbeitspapier]     
relation: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/33250/
rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/help/license_urhg.html
language: eng