%0 Generic
%A Oechssler, Jörg
%A Roomets, Alex
%C Heidelberg
%D 2023
%F heidok:33829
%K bargaining, ambiguity, experiment
%R 10.11588/heidok.00033829
%T Dissolving an ambiguous partnership
%U https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/33829/
%V 0733
%X Two partners try to dissolve a partnership that owns an asset of ambiguous value, where the value is determined ex post by a draw from an Ellsberg urn. In a within-subject experiment, subjects make decisions in three different bargaining mechanisms: unstructured bargaining, the Texas shoot-out, and a K + 1 auction. We find that the K +1 auction is the most e¢ cient mechanism, which is in line with theory. Free format bargaining yields a surprising number of disagreements, which are not usually observed when the partnership has a certain or risky value.