eprintid: 33829
rev_number: 18
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3114
dir: disk0/00/03/38/29
datestamp: 2023-09-22 14:09:31
lastmod: 2023-09-26 09:01:42
status_changed: 2023-09-22 14:09:31
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Oechssler, Jörg
creators_name: Roomets, Alex
title: Dissolving an ambiguous partnership
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: bargaining, ambiguity, experiment
abstract: Two partners try to dissolve a partnership that owns an asset of ambiguous value, where the value is determined ex post by a draw from an Ellsberg urn. In a within-subject experiment, subjects make decisions in three different bargaining mechanisms: unstructured bargaining, the Texas shoot-out, and a K + 1 auction. We find that the K +1 auction is the most e¢ cient mechanism, which is in line with theory. Free format bargaining yields a surprising number of disagreements, which are not usually observed when the partnership has a certain or risky value.
date: 2023-09
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00033829
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0733
ppn_swb: 1860286747
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-338294
language: eng
bibsort: OECHSSLERJDISSOLVING20230912
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0733
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 34
citation:   Oechssler, Jörg ; Roomets, Alex  (2023) Dissolving an ambiguous partnership.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/33829/7/Oechssler_Roomets_2023_dp733.pdf