eprintid: 33832
rev_number: 18
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3114
dir: disk0/00/03/38/32
datestamp: 2023-09-22 14:19:04
lastmod: 2023-10-02 08:22:37
status_changed: 2023-09-22 14:19:04
type: workingPaper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Goeschl, Timo
creators_name: Haberl, Beatrix
creators_name: Soldà, Alice
title: How to Organize Monitoring and Punishment: Experimental Evidence
subjects: ddc-330
divisions: i-181000
keywords: compliance, monitoring, punishment, experiment
abstract: Punishment institutions for curtailing free-riding in social dilemmas rely on information about individuals’ behavior collected through monitoring. We contribute to the experimental study of cooperation-enhancing institutions by examining how cooperation and efficiency in a social dilemma change in response to varying how monitoring and punishment are jointly organized. Specifically, we evaluate - against a no-monitoring baseline - combinations of two imperfect monitoring regimes (cen-tralized vs. decentralized) and three punishment regimes (self- vs. peer- vs. del-egated punishment) in a repeated public goods game. As hypothesized, we find that delegated punishment outperforms other punishment regimes, irrespective of the monitoring regime, both in terms of cooperation and efficiency. Monitoring, both centralized and decentralized, cannot raise cooperation relative to the baseline unless accompanied by a credible punishment. When combined with a punishment institution, both monitoring regime outperforms the baseline.
date: 2023-09
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00033832
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0737
ppn_swb: 1860573819
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-338326
language: eng
bibsort: GOESCHLTIMHOWTOORGAN20230920
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0737
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 73
citation:   Goeschl, Timo ; Haberl, Beatrix ; Soldà, Alice  (2023) How to Organize Monitoring and Punishment: Experimental Evidence.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/33832/7/Goeschl_et_al_2023_dp737.pdf