eprintid: 33841
rev_number: 12
eprint_status: archive
userid: 3730
dir: disk0/00/03/38/41
datestamp: 2023-09-22 13:39:56
lastmod: 2023-10-02 09:44:26
status_changed: 2023-09-22 13:39:56
type: workingPaper
succeeds: 33733
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Balietti, Anca
creators_name: Budjan, Angelika
creators_name: Eymess, Tillmann
creators_name: Soldà, Alice
title: Strategic Ignorance and Perceived Control
subjects: 330
divisions: 181000
keywords: information avoidance; information recall; perceived control;
motivated cognition; air pollution
cterms_swd: Luftverschmutzung
abstract: Information can trigger unpleasant emotions. As a result, individuals might be tempted to strategically ignore it. We experimentally investigate whether increasing perceived control can mitigate strategic ignorance. Participants from India were presented with a choice to receive information about the health risk associated with air pollution and were later asked to recall it. Perceived control leads to a substantial improvement in information recall. We find that optimists react most to perceived control, both with a reduction in information avoidance and an increase in information recall. This latter result is supported by a US sample. A theoretical framework rationalizes our findings.
date: 2023-09
id_scheme: DOI
id_number: 10.11588/heidok.00033841
schriftenreihe_cluster_id: sr-3
schriftenreihe_order: 0735
ppn_swb: 1860601537
own_urn: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-338419
language: eng
bibsort: BALIETTIANSTRATEGICI20230804
full_text_status: public
series: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
volume: 0735
place_of_pub: Heidelberg
pages: 102
edition: Zweite Auflage
citation:   Balietti, Anca ; Budjan, Angelika ; Eymess, Tillmann ; Soldà, Alice  (2023) Strategic Ignorance and Perceived Control.  [Working paper]     
document_url: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/33841/1/Balietti_et_al._2023_dp735.pdf